

Wolpert

Jinnah of Pakistan

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JINNAH
of
PAKISTAN

Stanley Wolpert

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for
Dorothy
with love

Preface

Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three. Hailed as "Great Leader" (*Quaid-i-Azam*) of Pakistan and its first governor-general, Jinnah virtually conjured that country into statehood by the force of his indomitable will. His place of primacy in Pakistan's history looms like a lofty minaret over the achievements of all his contemporaries in the Muslim League. Yet Jinnah began his political career as a leader of India's National Congress and until after World War I remained India's best "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity." As enigmatic a figure as Mahatma Gandhi, more powerful than Pandit Nehru, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah was one of recent history's most charismatic leaders and least known personalities. For more than a quarter century I have been intrigued by the apparent paradox of Jinnah's strange story, which has to date never been told in all the fascinating complexity of its brilliant light and tragic darkness.

Many people have helped make this book possible. To the late Lord Louis Mountbatten I am indebted for his having so generously given me a morning in the last year of his life to recall personal meetings with and impressions of Jinnah. To Begum Liaquat Ali Khan I am equally indebted for her gracious hospitality and assistance in Karachi. Professor Z. H. Zaidi of London University most warmly encouraged me to write this book more than a decade ago and helped in many ways; he shared his Jinnah letters with me, and his own cogent articles, and introduced me to his old friend and one of Jinnah's closest colleagues, Mr. M. A. H. Jafarali, who was still living in London then. Vice-Chancellor Sir Cyril Henry Philips of London University kindly assisted me during the early stages of my long search for Jinnah.

My dear friend, the late Professor B. N. Pandey of London, helped by inviting me to participate in his "Leadership in South Asia" seminar in 1974. Warmest thanks to my mentor, Professor Holden Furber, for inspiration and generous criticism.

Professor Sharif al Mujahid, the director of the Quaid-i-Azam Academy in Karachi, was most generous in assisting me during my visit to Pakistan in 1980 as a Fellow of the American Institute of Pakistan Studies. I thank him and AIPS Director Professor Hafeez Malik for all of their invaluable help. I gratefully acknowledge the aid provided by the AIPS and its board in awarding me a fellowship to complete my research in Pakistan. My sincere thanks also to Dr. Charles Boewe, Mr. Arshad, Mr. Afaq, and Akbar, of the United States Educational Foundation in Islamabad for their kind hospitality.

Dr. A. Z. Sheikh, the director of the National Archives of Pakistan, and his fine staff were most cooperative in opening the full resources of their archives to me during my visit to Islamabad. I am especially grateful to Mr. S. M. Ikram, the microfilming and photostating officer of the NAP, for expediting the filming of Jinnah papers for me. Vice-President Khalid Shamsul Hasan of the National Bank of Pakistan in Karachi was most helpful in granting me full and immediate access in his office and home to the excellent Shamsul Hasan Collection of primary Jinnah papers. I am deeply grateful to him, and to Dr. M. H. Siddiqi, the director of the University of Karachi's Freedom Movement archives, who introduced me to his very impressive collection.

My continuing gratitude and appreciation to the librarian and staff of the excellent India Office Library in London, with special thanks to Deputy Archivist Martin Moir and to Dr. Richard Bingle, both of whom were singularly helpful in steering me toward new material. For this book I have interviewed a great number of Jinnah's colleagues and contemporaries in Pakistan, India, and Great Britain, as well as in the United States, over the past fifteen years; and although there is not space to mention each by name, I wish to thank them all for helping me to better understand this singularly secretive and complex man.

To the Rt. Hon. S. S. Pirzada, the minister of law of Pakistan and chairman of the Quaid-i-Azam Biography Committee, my sincere thanks for sharing with me his personal memories and writings on the Quaid-i-Azam. To Admiral S. M. Ahsan I am most warmly indebted for historic insights and generous hospitality. My grateful appreciation also to Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Sardar Shaukat Hayat, Justice Javid Iqbal, Brig. N. A. Husain, former Chief Minister of Sind Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, former Karachi Mayor Hashim Raza, and former Ambassador Mohammad Mansoor, for many helpful insights concerning Jinnah's personality.

To Lady Dhanavati Rama Rao, Srimati Pupal Jayakar, and Srimati Sheela Kalia I am deeply indebted for singularly sensitive keys to the character not only of Jinnah, but of his wife and daughter as well. I thank Ved Mehta for sharing with me his father's memory of Jinnah. I am most thankful to Professor Fazlur Rahman for recalling all that he did about Jinnah, and to Professor Khalid Bin Sayeed for his help. Many colleagues and students at the University of California have helped me stay the course in this long march, and I especially thank Professors Damodar Sar Desai, Nikki Keddie, John M. Gulbreath, H. Arthur Steiner, Steven Høy, Peter Loewenberg, and Gmali Poomwala. For the past decade and a half, my seminar students have posed useful questions about Jinnah, each stimulating deeper investigation into his life and motivations; and for this I especially thank Ravi Kalia, Juan Cole, Roger Long, Anand Mavalankar, David Keister, Sasha Jussal, Nasir Khan, Rajan Samant, and Professor Saleem Ahmad.

I spoke many times by phone with Jinnah's only daughter, Mrs. Dina Wadia. In 1980 I was to have interviewed her at her Madison Avenue apartment in Manhattan, but unfortunately, perhaps because of her acute asthma or illness, the meeting was canceled at the last moment. One question she asked in a conversation has often echoed in my memory as illustrative of their relationship, "Why so much interest in my father's life, after all these years?" Mrs. Wadia's only son, Nuail, was unavailable to meet with me in Bombay, both in 1978 and in 1982, but he did write: "My grandfather died when I was four. . . . My memory of him is vague indeed." Nuail's father was equally elusive, writing from Switzerland in 1982 to inform me that "As Mr. Jinnah disapproved of my marriage to his daughter on religious grounds [Wadia was born a Parsi and converted to Christianity], I saw very little of him & therefore regret I cannot help. . . . My daughter was too young to remember him & saw little of him so there would be no use in contacting her." In 1980, Jinnah's last surviving sister was bedridden in Karachi; I was unable to see her, and she died shortly after my visit there.


I thank my editor, Nancy Lane, and my copy editor, Kathy Antrim, for their help in bringing this book to press, and I thank Kate Wittenberg as well. To Fayy Pannan, who typed the manuscript, and to my friend Elaine Simon who so kindly photographed me, heartfelt thanks.

As for my dearest wife, who has nurtured, sustained, and inspired me and my works throughout the past thirty years, I confess that no good thing I have ever done or written would have been possible without her co-authorship.

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WEST PAKISTAN from 1947-71

JINNAH OF PAKISTAN



EAST PAKISTAN from 1947-71

Karachi

Students, barristers, and benchers rushing in and out of Lincoln's Inn now-a-days rarely glance at the oil painting, hung since July 1965, on the stone wall over the entrance to their Great Hall and Library in London. Those who do may wonder why on earth the gaunt, unsmiling face of "M. A. Jinnah, Founder and First Governor-General of Pakistan" should be staring down at them. Tall, thin, monocolled, astrakhan-capped, the portrait's subject was, so the print of lines secured to its frame attests, "born 25 December 1876 and died 31 September 1948." Nothing more is revealed of M. A. Jinnah's history. The anonymous artist captured his upright, unbending spirit, as well as his impeccable taste in clothes, yet Jinnah's face is almost as enigmatic and spare as the shining brass plate beneath. His eyes, opened wide, are piercing; his lips, tightly closed, formidable. One would guess that he was a man of few words, never easily thwarted or defeated. But why is he there—in so honored a place on that hallowed wall of British jurisprudence?

Across the timeworn stains of stone that supported Queen Victoria and Her Majesty's entourage when she came to dedicate that Great Hall and oak-panelled Library in 1845 are two portraits of Englishmen who obviously do belong. Sir William Henry Maule was baron of the Exchequer, a judge of the Common Pleas, and a benchler, one of four officers elected to administer Lincoln's Inn. Lord Arthur Hobhouse was legal member of the Executive Council of India's Viceroy in 1875, the year Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli persuaded Queen Victoria to add "Empress of India" to her regalia. Two marble busts flank M. A. Jinnah's portrait, like berserkers, their unblinking eyes staring ahead. These also seem appropriate to the setting, for one is Lord Macnaghten, who was "Lord of Appeal in Ordinary" and not only a benchler but treasurer, while the other immortalizes Sir Francis Henry

Coldsmi, "First Jewish Barrister," bencher and member of Parliament. Jinnah, however, held no office at Lincoln's Inn, nor was he ever elected to Parliament or appointed to preside over any British court, nor did he even serve on the cabinet of a single British viceroy.

Yet the story of Jinnah's unique achievement was so inextricably the product of his genius as a barrister, perhaps the greatest "native" advocate in British Indian history, that his portrait richly deserves the place of high honor it holds. During the last decade of his life, in fact, Jinnah may have been the shrewdest barrister in the British Empire. He was certainly the most tenacious. He crossed swords with at least as many great British-born as Indian barristers, defeating them all in his single-minded pleas for Pakistan. He burned out his life pressing a single suit, yet by winning his case he changed the map of South Asia and altered the course of world history.

Jinnah (in Arabic, "wing" as of a bird or army) was born a Shi'ite Muslim Khoja (*Khwaja*, "noble"). Disciples of the Isma'ili Aga Khan, thousands of Khojas fled Persian persecution to Western India, among other regions, between the tenth and sixteenth centuries. The exact date of the flight of Jinnah's ancestors is unknown, but as a minority community within Islam, itself a religious minority in India, the Khojas of South Asia remained doubly conscious of their separateness and cultural difference, helping perhaps to account for the "aloofness" so often noted as a characteristic quality of Jinnah and his family. Khojas, like other mercantile communities the world over, however, traveled extensively, were quick to assimilate new ideas, and adjusted with relative ease to strange environments. They developed linguistic skills and sharp intelligence, often acquiring considerable wealth. Mahatma Gandhi's Hindu merchant (*bania*) family, by remarkable coincidence, settled barely thirty miles to the north of Jinnah's grandparents, in the state of Rajkot. Thus the parents of the Fathers of both India and Pakistan shared a single mother tongue, Gujarati, though that never helped their brilliant offspring to communicate.

Jinnah's father Jinnabhai Poonja (born c. 1850), the youngest of three sons, married Mithibai, "a good girl" of his own community,² and soon moved with his bride to Sind's growing port of Karachi to seek his fortune. After completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, Karachi enjoyed its first modern boom as British India's closest port, only 5,918 nautical miles from Southampton, two hundred miles nearer than Bombay. The population was as yet under 50,000, a far cry from the more than 6 million who inhabit that premier city of Pakistan today, but enterprising young people, like Jinnabhai and Mithibai, flocked to its municipality's commercial heart, pulsating along

both banks of the Lyaree River. There Jinnabhai rented the second floor apartment of a three-story house, Wazir Mansion (since rebuilt and made into a national monument and museum), in the bustling cotton mart on Niesenham Road still cluttered with camels and laden with bales of raw cotton.

Here sometime in the 1870's Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the first of seven children born to Mithibai and her husband.³ Certificates of birth and death were not issued by Karachi's municipality prior to 1879, and though Jinnah in later life would claim December 25, 1876, as his true date of birth, the birthday officially celebrated throughout Pakistan, there is reason to doubt its accuracy. Unlike Hindus of comparable wealth and social status, who would have been careful to record the precise date and moment of a child's birth for astrological purposes, Muslims generally did not concern themselves with birthdates and no records were kept prior to their enrollment in a public school. The register preserved at the first such school Jinnah attended, the Sind Madressa-tul-Islam of Karachi, notes October 20, 1875, as the birth date of "Mahomedali Jinnabhai."⁴

At birth, in fact, "Mama" (his pet name at home) was "small and weak," his devoted sister Fatima (July 31, 1893-July 9, 1967) recalled, "His health caused concern as he weighed a few pounds less than normal."⁵ Maman was approximately six when his father hired a private tutor to start his son on alphabets and mathematics, but the boy proved "indifferent" to studies, "positively loathed" arithmetic, and could not wait to go outdoors as soon as his tutor arrived. Those private lessons were one indicator of how Jinnabhai Poonja's business had prospered by the early 1880's. The annual value of Karachi's trade almost doubled since he had arrived scarcely a decade earlier, climbing to above 80 million rupees. Jinnabhai handled all sorts of produce, cotton, wool, hides, oil-seeds, and grain for export, and Manchester manufactured piece-goods, metals, and refined sugar imports into the busy port. Business was so good, in fact, with profits soaring so high, that he became a "banker and money-lender" as well for his customers. Despite Islam's prohibition against lending or borrowing money at interest, bustling was clearly how Jinnabhai made his fortune, and subsequently lost it.

Early in 1887, Jinnabhai's only sister, Manbai, who had married an even more successful Khoja named Peerbhai and lived in metropolitan Bombay, came to visit. Maman loved Auntie's witty, vivacious, cosmopolitan good humor, and she in turn adored her bright, handsome young nephew. "Night after night," Fatima remembered, Manbai told them "wonderful tales of fairies and the flying carpet, of jinn and dragons." She hired Maman back to Bombay with her that year, introducing him to the great city that was to

down Fleet Street past Chancery Lane and the old Temple Bar, into the spacious fields of Lincoln's Inn, then still bare by winter's bite but having the promise of forsythia, lilac and wisteria. Half a century later addressing Karachi's Bar he recalled: "I joined Lincoln's Inn because there on the main entrance, the name of the Prophet was included in the list of the great lawgivers of the world." It was a fascinating trick of memory he played on himself for no such inscription exists over the main, or indeed any other entrance of Lincoln's Inn nor did it then. What Jinnah recalled seeing, however was G. F. Watts's fresco in Lincoln's New Hall called "The Law Givers," depicting the Prophet, with Moses, Jesus and other great spiritual leaders of civilisation. A Lion Inn tour guide or Inn-guard must have pointed out Muhammad's visage with the earshot of young Jinnah, who possibly decided then that this was the Inn he would like most to attend. For orthodox (Sunni) Muslims, of course, any human depiction of the Prophet was an anathema, heinous to iconoclasm. Islam, Jinnah's message to Pakistan's young Sunni characters was national in want to be inspirational yet how could he admit to them that the holy prophet's image had early inspired him? Subconsciously, therefore, he deleted the face from memory "inscribing" Muhammad's "name" over Lincoln's "main entrance" instead.

Young Jinnah was immersed in the glamorous world of politics that he glimpsed as often as possible from the visitors' gallery of Westminster's House of Commons. Lord Cross's India Commemorative Act passed after heated debate in 1892 stimulated the first to address a session of Indian affairs in London since 1888. That act introduced albeit indirectly the elective principle to British India's constitution thus serving as an historic thin edge of the wedge of representative government that was soon to force open officially dominated colonial chambers throughout British India. Jinnah himself soon was elected as one of Bombay's representatives to Calcutta's Central Legislative Council and later served for decades on New Delhi's expanded assembly, where he played an important parliamentary role.

The Liberal tide that brought William Gladstone back to 10 Downing Street for a third time in 1892 also carried Bombay Parsi Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917) into Parliament. Dadabhai, who had started a firm in London and Liverpool in 1855, was elected to the House of Commons from Central Finsbury on a Liberal ticket by slender margin, three votes, that he was commonly called "Mr. Narrow-Majority" by his peers. To friends, or at least to Dadabhai, was the Crime Old Man of national writers, a certain Indian nationalist, Dadabhai, however over his several sessions of the Indian Congress in 1896, it is he that "Nationalist spirit in Legislative Council."

As a member of the Council of the Indian National Congress, Jinnah

there in Parliament to tell at least what the native view is on any Lord Salisbury, the ousted Tory prime minister, characterized Dadabhai as a "black man" during the campaign: a racist slur contributing to Parsi Dadabhai's victory. The volunteer ward of energetic young Indians like Jinnah helped bring the voice of a young Indian nationalist to echo through the mightiest chamber of the Empire.

"If Dadabhai was black, I was darker," Jinnah told his sister. "And if it was the mentality of the British politicians then we would never get a hint from them. From that day I have seen an uncompromising enemy of all forms of colour bar and racial prejudice." Jinnah stood in the Commons gallery to Dadabhai's maiden speech in 1893 and "thundered" as he called it, against Old Man extol the virtues of "free speech." As Jinnah noted, he or was an Indian, who would exercise that right and demand justice for his countrymen. Without freedom of speech Jinnah wisely understood that there would remain "a shadow" or well, "like a rose which is planted where there is neither sunshine nor air." Thanks to Dadabhai's inspiring example, Jinnah entered politics as a Liberal nationalist joining the Commons after he returned to India.

Jinnah embarked upon his study of the law in preparation for a political career. No record survives of the thoughts that passed through his mind in the spring of 1893. We know only that he did decide, to set for his London university examination as a "relatively simple" test for admission to the Law Court he took it without the Latin portion and "passed" on the 15th. Thus he procrastinated he might not have been able to complete his apprenticeship. For next year a number of precedents were cited in the process of professional legal education was substantially prolonged. Jinnah's funds would have run out before he finished his studies.

He received no further support from home since his father's death had left the victims of world market and monetary exchange cycles completely bankrupt. The year 1895 had collapsed.

Even if Jinnah's father Poonji could have afforded the luxury, it is doubtful that he would have contributed another type of his sons' support in London. Jinnah was "furious" when he learned of Jinnah's impulsive decision to abandon his business career. Nor is it very likely that Sir Frederick Sturges, Jinnah's first official mentor, would have offered a further nudge to help this "Socialist spirit migrate." As Jinnah well knew, he was on the verge of a political career. He had no other and no capital to be the only time in life that he would find himself isolated, cut off in so profound a position. Still he never faltered, acting with surgical swiftness to

after his career. If he had any fears or doubts about his future, he left no record of them. On June 25, 1893, he embarked upon his study of the law at Lincoln's Inn.

Lincoln's Inn had a most imposing list of graduates and dropouts, including Thomas More, William Pitt, and half a dozen other British prime ministers from Lord Cairns to Asquith. Two of Britain's greatest prime ministers, Disraeli and Gladstone, went there but neither completed his course of study. In 1893 when Jinnah enrolled, John Morley (1838-1923), who first entered Lincoln's premises thirty-one years earlier, was elected a benchers. Author of *On Compromise*, John Stuart Mill's greatest disciple, Gladstone's Irish Home Rule secretary and Liberal lieutenant "Hoosier John." After Lord Morley, then had his most important had decade as secretary of state for India, 1900-10, still ahead of him. One of Britain's most brilliant Liberals, Morley became one of Jinnah's heroes. The uncompromising idealistic fervor of *On Compromise* went through Jinnah's mind "like a flame," igniting his imagination with arguments such as that which insisted upon putting "truth" first among any choice of "principles." Jinnah quoted Morley to himself in years later in life, and he personally tried to adhere to the Liberal ideals early imbibed from Lincoln's great benchers.

Mr. Jinnah's legal education was with minor exceptions, the medieval guild apprenticeship method inherited with the founding of Lincoln's Inn, which was named for the King's Sergeant of Holborn, Thomas de Lincolne, in the latter half of the fourteenth century. Records of that self-governing society's council meetings and business affairs have been preserved at Lincoln's library in annual "Black Books" since 1422, when the students all still lived within the Inn's somber walls. After the encroached number of students became too great to accommodate inside the hostel tradition was only symbolically retained through the requirement that all students enrolled at a university eat a minimum of three dinners in the Great Hall, or those not enrolled, as in Jinnah's case, eat six. The convivial environment of those dinners, where barristers and benchers sat close enough to students to engage them in conversation, argument or debate, was deemed an important aspect of legal training. For how better could young men sharpen their wits and develop forensic skills, after all, than in debate with their guild elders? The conviviality of table talk was, moreover, a shortcut to friendship or antipathy, and a young apprentice was alert as well as wise, he soon learned what was best said or left unsaid in the company of lawyers.

The Great Hall was used not only for dining, however, since "moots" and "bolls" were also held here, but for debating, law cases and elections in the former, students following suit in the latter. The most important

part in Jinnah's legal education, however, was the two years of "reading" apprenticeship he spent in a barristers' chambers. He would follow his master's professional footsteps outside chambers as well, through all the corridors of Temple Court, up every creaking stair of Holborn's crowded pubs. A highly exaggerated one might say that if in addition to the above, a student had read William Blackstone's *Commentaries* on common law he would have enough information to be heard to pass the final examination for admission to the Bar. Jinnah's class still belonged to that old school of diligent men who were deemed fit for a career in law as long as they were well dressed properly, and ate with the right utensils.

As yet, he was not in chambers or dining in Great Hall, Jinnah passed his time in London strolling or studying in the book-lined Reading Room of the British Museum, a Mecca for scholars the world over. On Saturdays that haven closed, he went at times to Hyde Park corner at the Museum to listen to the open-air oratory of anyone who had a box to be read, or courage to speak his mind on any subject. Irish Home Rule was one of the burning issues of the day, and Irish Parliamentary party leader John P. Webb, whom Jinnah had heard from Westminster's gallery, seemed to preside over the Madras Congress in 1894. "I hate tyranny wherever practised, more especially if practised by my own countrymen," he declared, "for here I am in a measure responsible." Webb said to his audience that Disraeli and the "Irish question" was resolved, and that Webb must J. P. Webb, like the rest of the British Empire, would be paralyzed with the affairs of under five million people. He said, "I will not see the rise and fall on the question of Ireland rather than the perpetration of crimes." It was an important lesson for Jinnah, one he never forgot. He was assuaged during those early lonely years in London, of course, but the constant demands could "paralyze" a huge empire. He did not appreciate all the weaknesses as well as strengths of the British Empire. Whether or not he ever rose the requisite moral height to be a statesman at Hyde Park corner to harangue any London audience, he did learn many useful debating tricks merely by listening there and engaging speakers in argument.

Every weekend was spent in London, however. He went at least once a week to the British Museum, later recalling that his first "friction with the police" occurred during the annual Oxford boat race, when "I was with two friends and we were caught up with a crowd of undergraduates. We found a boat in a side street, so we pushed each other up and down the roadway. We were arrested and taken off to the police station. . . [and] let off with a caution."⁴⁴ It was the closest this remarkably law-abiding Indian

would ever come to being placed behind bars—another polar difference that separated him from Gandhi, Nehru, and most other nationalist leaders who spent years in British prison cells.

Young Jinnah fell in love with theater while living in London. His secret ambition he never confessed was "to play the role of Romeo at the Old Vic."⁵⁵ Exactly when he started to dream of an acting career is unclear, though it was obviously after he had begun to study law. Perhaps law bored him at first, or it may have been watching the performances of barometers, the greatest of whom were often spending thespians, that stimulated his interest in going on stage. At any event, it was no mere whim or passing fancy, but a love affair that lasted till the end of his years. "I recall the days of his most active years," he later wrote in retrospect, "when he returned home tired and late, he would read Shakespeare, his voice resonant. The obnoxious monotone remained his major characteristic, prop later and those who witnessed his dramatic interrogations and in various roles, whether to judge or try, often commented that he was a born actor. Many a political opponent made the mistake of believing, however, that Jinnah was "only acting" when he was most serious.

On June 7, 1895, Jinnah wrote a check for £138.19—covering all fees for admission to the Bar. He had ignored his father's letters ordering him to "come home" to help save the family business and paid the full Bar expenses early to not be harassed after completion of that aim. He was charges on £10 a month for his room and half board at the home of Mrs. Page Drake and would always be very careful with money. The habits of frugality he developed in those early London years never left him. He even managed to save £7.1.0 of the sum his father had in half turned over to him after three years of saving—the heart of what was then surely the most tempting warlike place on earth. Still he dreamed of a life at art, and of returning to London.

"After I was called to the Bar—was taken by some friends to the Manager of a theatrical company who asked me to go up to the stage and read a bit of pieces of Shakespeare," Jinnah reminisced. "I did so. His wife and he were immensely pleased, and immediately offered me a job. I was exultant and I wrote to my parents craving for their blessings. I wrote to them that law was a lingering profession where success was uncertain, a stage career was much better and it gave me a good start and that I would now be independent and not bother them with grants of money at all. My father wrote a long letter to me strongly advising me against it, but there was one sentence in his letter that touched me most and which influenced a change in my decision, 'Do not be a trailer to the family.' I went to my employers and conveyed to them that I no longer looked forward to a stage career

"I was surprised, and they tried to persuade me, but my mind was made up. According to the terms of the contract I had signed with them, I was to have given them three months' notice before quitting. But you know, they were Englishmen, and so they said, 'Well, when you have no interest in the stage, why should we keep you, against your wishes?'"⁵⁶

The signed contract indicates how serious Jinnah's commitment to London law and acting had been. It was obviously his first love at this time. His "long letter" had dissuaded him, forcing him to change his mind on a matter of major importance, but that was the last time he would ever be charged of familial "treason" cut his conscience to the quick, leaving him deeply wounded. Apparently that letter also informed him of his father's death, and possibly of his wife's as well. For in reporting how much he had felt after reading her letter, he wrote to his parents about their messages. What a shock that letter must have been, full of dread news and reprimand. And what a cloud it must have cast over his last days and weeks in London.

On May 1896, Mahomed A. Jinnah, Esquire, a Barrister of the Supreme Court of the Benchery of London, in for "Court House" attesting his admission to the Bar and of his appointment "With that admission we are welcome to join the Bar of all courts in British India. Now he could go home—but not to Karachi. There was nothing left. Karachi was a dead end for me more so before leaving London. I transferred the total balance of his bank account to a new account in his name to be in the National Bank of India Ltd. Bombay. That was done on May 1896. Next day he boarded the gangway of the I & O liner that Karachi would be not a moment that a brief stop or route to the city he chose as his new permanent home. His father had lured him from London to Karachi as a vendor, but nothing short of the partition of India would have been able to have in Karachi—and then, only briefly, to found a new nation, before dying.

2

Bombay (1896-1910)

Jinnah was enrolled as a barrister in Bombay's high court on August 24, 1896, precisely one decade after the Karachi country boy was first driven past that Victorian palace of law. His rich variegated London experiences, tempered by the traumas of his brief return home, had made a man of him. He was bereft of mother and wife, his most powerful ties to Karachi had been cut with surgical finality. M. A. Jinnah, Esq., borne out of the bitter disappointment and pain that shrouded his last few months, was launched into orbit on his own.

For Bombay, as for Jinnah personally, it was a time of tragedy and mourning. Bubonic plague from China reached that busy port in the autumn of 1896. The Black Death that claimed millions of Indian lives in the ensuing decades remained most severe in the crowded, bustling cities of Bombay, Poona, and Ahmedabad, at least until the ingenious Dr. W. M. Haffkine, 1866-1930, developed his vaccine in 1899. Jinnah's preoccupation with cleanliness, scrubbing his hands many times daily at almost obsessive length, seems to date from this pre-Haffkine era, when the only known "antidotes" to the Black Death were soap, water, and whitewash. His lifelong obsession with clear, meticulous dress as well as personal hygiene and privacy soon, rather more sensible than surprising, given the humid heat and health hazards prevalent in Bombay, especially at this time, Jinnah rented a reasonable room in the Apollo Railway Hotel on Charni Road without waiving a stance of the high court, where he spent most of his days attending the advocacy of others and awaiting his first client.

A decade and a half later, at the passing barrister's first three years in Bombay, W. M. Haffkine, Esq., was hailed as the "high priest" of hygiene. "A man of no small talents," W. M. Haffkine, Esq., was introduced to the Bombay

Bar advocate-general, John Molesworth MacPherson. The latter took immediate liking to young Jinnah and invited him to work in his office. It was the first such invitation MacPherson "ever extended to an Indian," Sarojini (1879-1949), one of Jinnah's most devoted friends, recalled.² MacPherson's confidence and support came "as a beacon of hope" at a low point in Jinnah's early struggles to establish himself. Annie Manbai Peerbhoy, her husband and their circle of friends, assisted him socially, of course,³ and later, come through Lincoln's Inn gave him the proper credentials, but it was MacPherson who did for Jinnah's legal career what Croft had done for his life. He opened to him the boundless realm of legal competition—a more useful arena of power and possibility. In MacPherson's chambers Jinnah had information long before it reached the ears of penurious pleaders, and in the high dim corridors of the court. Within a few months of going to work for MacPherson, he learned, for example, that one of Bombay's four principal judgeships was about to fall vacant. His response to a question of this valuable news offers a glimpse of young Jinnah in the morning, leaning through the window and smoking a cigarette: "In the morning, in my office, I once saw a 'Victoria' slowly passing by." He jumped and jumped into it and drove straight to the office of Sir Charles. Sir Charles was then judicial member of the provincial court of Bombay and found MacPherson's handsome, ambitious young assistant so impressive that he invited him to serve as "temporary" third pres-

ident for six months on the municipal bench, hearing every sort of case, from the most charges brought against two Muslim "opium" dealers to the most serious charges under the opium laws, to come to the Great Indian Peninsula Railway brought against riders accused of paying too high fares. Accusations against ordinary Chinese came to go to work on their ships while in port. Jinnah proved himself a capable judge. He found the Bench a much less attractive prospect, and he found the law a far less pugnacious of youth that made the law a more attractive career. Of the lure of more lucrative rewards? "As well as fortune went to great barristers, of course, and Jinnah found that Sir Charles offered him a permanent place on the bench, the law at that time a respectable starting salary of 1,500 rupees per annum. Jinnah declined to reply, 'I will soon be able to earn that much in a single day.'"⁴ As soon he did.

The dawn of the Edwardian era, coinciding with that of the twentieth century, found Jinnah firmly established in his chosen career, earning enough to rent a "new office." He "spared no expense" to furnish that office and attractive chamber, his later recalled, in a manner which "any

lawyer would have been proud to call his own." Jamnabhai Poona when he had declined with his business fortune and so the old man moved with his remaining children to Bombay, renting a small house in the Khoja district of *Khopak*. Jinnaah appears not to have seen much of his father at this time, however, and by 1904 Jinnaah moved off to Bombay's Balaqu coast, where he spent his final years in quiet retirement. The only sibling with whom Jinnaah established a close, continuing relationship was Fatima, who enrolled as a boarding student in Bombay's Bhandra Convent School thanks to her brother's abundant support. Mission schools were still the best primary and secondary sources of education in India at this time, and because of her excellent early education Fatima was able to gain admission to the highly competitive University of Calcutta, where she attended the Dental School. Jinnaah visited his adoring sister on Sundays, taking her carriage rides around Bombay, which she learned to love as much as he. Almost as tall and lean as his father, his appearance was an arresting result of her brother's noble brow as high, the cheek bones as prominent, the luminous eyes as deep and probing, and the hair initially as wavy and raven black, would later become just as coldly white.

Though religion never played an important role in Jinnaah's life, except for its political significance, he left the Aga Khans "Seventeen" minority community at this stage of his maturation, opting instead to join the less ethnically strict and *Isma'ili Ashrafi* sect of "Twelve" Khojas who acknowledged no leader. One of Jinnaah's most admired Bombay friends, Justice Bhanu Tyabji (1844-1906), first Muslim high court judge and the president of the Indian National Congress, was an *Isma'ili Ashrafi*. Tyabji, like Jinnaah, was a secular, liberal, modernist, was argued in his presidential address to the Madras Congress "I for one, am utterly at a loss to understand why Muslims should not work shoulder to shoulder with their fellow countrymen of other races and creeds for the common benefit of all. This is the principle on which we, the Bombay Presidency have always acted." Jinnaah's other closest friends and admired elders in Bombay were the Hindus, and Christians, none of whom took their respective religions as seriously as their faith in British law and Indian nationalism.

Most of the leaders of the one-fourth of British India's population who adhered to Islam, however, were either orthodox *Sunni* or *Shi'ite* Muslims who continued to look to the *Quran* and prophetic practices as their sources of appropriate daily behavior, or modernist disciples of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-98) who advocated a rationalist, scientific rejection of a single united Indian national movement as vigorously as he denied Islamic orthodoxy's infallibility. In 1875, a decade before the Indian National Congress was founded, Sir Sayyid started his potent Muslim

a) College at Aligarh, some sixty miles southeast of Delhi, on the Cambridge residential and tutorial collegiate system, Aligarh drew the wealthy young Muslim males of British India. Western philosophy, and the dual virtue of loyalty to the British raj as Islam. Aligarh's cricket fields and common rooms served as breeding ground for the Muslim League. Sir Sayyid himself, knighted in 1870, devoted his life to service in the British Empire. Appointed by the Imperial Legislative Council, Sir Sayyid argued from that forum in 1881 against "the introduction of the principle of electing members into the body politic of a country like India, where still flourish, where there is no fusion of the various races, and where the different communities are still so distinct." A decade later he denounced the Congress as "based upon ignorance of history and of the facts of the country, where there is no fusion of the various races, and where the different communities are still so distinct." That was the earliest modern articulation of a nation theory which was to become the ideological basis

of Bombay remained as remote from such feelings, as much as he had been in London in 1883, when he spoke of Hindus and Muslims as "different nationalities." At this time was the law, though his singular success as an orator related to his native talent. "He was what God made him," said of Bombay's high court put it, "a great pleader. He could see around corners. That is where his talents were." But he drove his points home—slow delivery, word by word. "Announced. When he stood up in Court, slowly looking to the judge, his mind in his eye—with the sense of timing from an actor, he became omnipotent. Yes, that is the point. Alva said he 'cast a spell on the court-room' on called in the worst circumstances. He has been our most famous legal apprentice, M. C. Chagla, who appointed chief justice of Bombay's high court, referred to a 'parliament of a case' was nothing less than 'a

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minorities in India's nation-building process. To my mind, a Parsi is a better and a truer Parsi, as a Mahomedan or a Hindu is a better and truer Mahomedan or Hindu, the more he is attached to the land which gave him birth. Sir Pherozeshah insisted "Is it possible to imagine that Dadabhai Naoroji, for instance, true Parsi that he is, is anything but an Indian? . . . Can any one doubt if I may be allowed to take another illustration, that Sir Sved Ahmed Khan was greater and nobler when he was devoting the great energies and talents with which he is endowed . . . for the benefit of all Indians in general than when, as of late he was preaching a gospel of selfishness and isolation?"¹⁵ Mehta was India's first Parsi barrister, called to the Bar from Lincoln's Inn in 1868, and served as a member of Bombay's Municipal Corporation for forty-six years, four times in its chair. Elegant in person, a fierce advocate, hailed as "The crowned King of Bombay," Sir Pherozeshah was more the Bombay model for Jinnah's early career than Dadabhai. In 1891 he helped to bridge the gulf between Hindus and Muslims, something that had in consequence drawn too much attention and to defer the day of reform.¹⁶ Young Jinnah felt much the same way.

The first annual session of Congress after led by Jinnah was its twentieth, held under canvas on Bombay's Oval in December 1901. Sir Pherozeshah opened the session, his welcoming "remarks" taking longer than Sir Union Curzon's entire speech that addressed indicative of their true relations with the Congress as well as the rhetorical styles. Responding to Viceroy Lord Curzon's patronizing advice "I do not think that the satisfaction of India can be sought in the field of politics. Mehta asked "How can these aspirations and desires be even gradually achieved, unless we are allowed to play at all times a most active and temperate part in the field of politics?" Sure, not through the "obvious abuse of British India's 'secret' and irresponsible bureaucracy," agreed Mehta, agreeing with Walter Bagehot that all bureaucracy tended to "under-government in point of quality" and "over-government in point of quantity." Mehta proposed that two of his trusted disciples from Bombay be sent as Congress deputies to London the following year to lobby what he and other well-informed observers of Britain's political climate correctly anticipated would be the new Liberal government in Westminster and Whitehall. His choices for so important a task were Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1868-1915) and V. A. Jinnah (Maha Mahatma "Great-Souled") Gokhale, who was to preside over the next session of Congress, seemed an obvious choice to everyone, but Jinnah was still unknown to most Congress delegates, and enough questions were raised to hold up release of any funds for his passage.¹⁷ He did, however, sail to England with Curzon eight years later, when both were appointed to the same royal mission. The 1904 Congress was Jinnah's first meeting with Gokhale, whose

calmness and moderation he came to admire, so that he soon stated "Curzon's mission" to politics was to become the Muslim Gokhale."¹⁸ Jinnah's involvement in Congress politics was as integral a by-product of his political career and social life in Bombay as his earlier commitment to Dadabhai had been in London. Lord Curzon's paternalistic vice-regal style stimulated growing political impatience among India's educated pool of educated young men, fired with the fiery loving hatred of a people while faced with the depressing realities of Indian political dependence and abysmal poverty. Internationally, a year of revolutionary surprises, Japan's electrifying victory over Russia, the Russian Revolution, and the Chinese boycott of British goods in many parts of the world, sent shock waves of excitement throughout the continent. Internally, the most dramatic and far-reaching act of Curzon's half decade of viceregal rule was the partition of Bengal. British India's premier province,

partitioned over 80,000 square miles, was certainly "unwieldy to administer," but the administrative burden through the Bengal-speaking population was growing, dividing its predominantly Hindu population into the West from the mostly poorer Muslim Bengal. Curzon's Viceroyalty was marked by a number of events. Bengal was divided into two parts, Eastern Bengal and Assam, and the new province of West Bengal administered by a British official. A Hindu majority but discontented, secretly hating the British, but no longer had the right to speak in the assembly. Calcutta's Bengali Hindu elite, who had been Curzon's critics since 1900, viewed this partition of their "motherland" as a "blow of impetuosity with a vengeance. The half decade of violent anti-British sentiment had crowded bazaars and narrow streets with processions and boycotts against British goods across the province. Muslims and Indians, Muslims of Indians, who had been united in their hatred of the British, were polarized by the passionate Bengali extremists who left the British with a new anthem "Bande Matarani" ("Had To Thee, Mother")

by the British (the Hindu) and the British of Bengal's first partition. The political impact of its explosive aftermath was to change his life and he altered the map of India. As a Congress moderate, friend, and he must have agreed, however, with President Gokhale's characterization of partition as "a cruel wrong," a complete illustration of the

coming all the political machinery of the Western world amongst the hereditary instincts and traditions of Eastern races."

Finally, Minto announced that "any electoral representation in India would be based on miscellaneous factors which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the needs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this continent. The Mahomedan community may rest assured that their political rights and interests as a community will be safe guarded by an administrative re-organization with which I am concerned."

The Governor's remarks were greeted with "murmurs of satisfaction" and cries of "hear hear" from the delighted delegation. At a garden tea party that afternoon, Legation assured Jinnah that now we see the victory of our friend, Minto and Lord Curzon. Jinnah countered it as a last report of days work and it was only the other day that Lord Curzon had been saying that he viewed this as a bad sign, the putting back of sixty-two millions of people from getting the rights of the white is opposition. Calcutta's leading nationalist newspaper, *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, reported the depiction and recognition as a got-up affair. Fully covered by interested officials to white-washed the grounds. The authorities wanted a few more men to be put in to give them a certificate of good conduct. They knew the Hindus were not so happy to have an operation among the old class. Minto was not. Both assessments were exaggerated, though the depiction did not give the promise of separate electorates for Muslims a major setback. It was the road to Pakistan. From the time that the Muslim League, however, the Muslim League would be born before the year's end, Jinnah, who had so recently said that the Akhbar's Ismaili had no right to be a Muslim, was now the Muslim League's first and last. Aftermath.

In November, Baluchistan Khan, the leading landowner of Dacca, whose vast holdings were in the "Nawab" and the Aligarhi Mohammedan Educational Conference in Dacca for the first time, suggesting at the same time that a "Muslim All-India Confederacy" be convened in his city. The Nawab of Dacca had been "in" during the Simon meeting but chair of the reception committee for the founding meeting of the Muslim League in Dacca was Shah Baga. Boylston in December 1906. Sleep Dacca's backwater thus suddenly emerged as the center of South Asian Muslim politics, hosting fifty-eight Muslim delegates from every corner of the subcontinent.

The Muslim League was founded in Dacca on December 30, 1906. The first meeting was held at the residence of the Nawab of Dacca, Mirza Asaf-ud-Daula. The first meeting was held at the residence of the Nawab of Dacca, Mirza Asaf-ud-Daula. The first meeting was held at the residence of the Nawab of Dacca, Mirza Asaf-ud-Daula.

It is manifest that if at any remote period the British Government ceases to exist in India, then the rule of India would pass into the hands of that community which is nearly four times as large as ours. Now gentlemen let each of you consider what will be your condition if such a situation is created in India. Then, our life, our property, our honour and our faith will all be in great danger. When we see that a powerful British administration is putting its subjects, the Muslims, to face most serious difficulties as a safe-guard against the grasping hands of our neighbours. And to prevent the realization of such aspirations on the part of our neighbours, the Muslims cannot find better and more effective means than to congregate under the banner of Great Britain, and to devote their lives and property in its protection.²³

It is manifest by conservative loyalties. Muslims in nobility, frank in their loyalty to British protection was manifestable to them. The Muslim League emerged with a clear mission. It is through regard for our own lives and our own honour and religion, that we are impelled to be faithful to our own principles. Our own principles are bound up with and depends on the British rule in India. President Hussain frankly admitted. He was, after all, reared in the autocratic service of the nizams of Hyderabad who permitted no political agitation, tolerated no dissent.

He did not hesitate in declaring that unless the leaders of the Congress make every effort as speedily as possible to quell the hostility against them by British rule, the necessary consequences would be rampant and the Muslims of India would be in a perilous position. In the necessity of containing this rebellious side by side with the British Government, more effectively on the mere use of words.²⁴

At the same time, Jinnah moved four resolutions in Dacca, and carried unanimously creating the "Muslim League." Destined to remain Muslim League, a major political organization, emerging in less than four decades as the primary force for Pakistan, the League was created to "protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Muslims of India, and to ally represent their needs and aspirations to the Government."²⁵ The meeting in Dacca called it "a turning of a corner of the course" and two days later by Mir Sayyid Ahmad Khan when he founded the Muhammadan Educational Conference.

At the same time, Jinnah was elected first honorary president of the Muslim

League, though he did not attend the Dacca Mangrove session, and later wrote it was "treachishly ironic that our dearest opponent in 1906" was Jinnah, who "came out in bitter hostility towards all that I and my friends had done and were trying to do. He was the only well-known Muslim to take this attitude." He said that one principle of separate electorates was dividing the nation against itself.²⁶

Jinnah had joined forty-four other like-minded Muslims in neighboring Calcutta, meeting together with some 500 Hindus, Parsis and Christians at the 1906 annual session of Congress. Dadabhai Nauroji presided with Jinnah serving as his secretary. Old Dadabhai was too weak to read the addresses himself, but Jinnah had helped write so Gokhale read it for him, beginning with several quotations. One from Liberal Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman called for self-government. "Good government could never be a substitute for government by the people themselves." And a practical aimed steps toward attainment of this goal. The Dadabhai Gokhale Jinnah address earned a letter for employment of more Indians in every branch of the services to be implemented. "The hindu wrong reflected on India by retaining so many British officers

depriving us of wealth, work and wisdom, of everything, in short, worth living for. . . . Alteration of the services from European to Indian is the keynote of the whole. . . . Co-ordinately . . . education is the most vigorous disseminator among the people—free and compulsory primary education and free higher education of every kind. . . . Education on the one hand, and actual training in administration on the other hand, will bring the accomplishment of self-government far more speedily than many imagine."²⁷

Dadabhai's speech replete with quotes from Morley, included one equating "the sacred word 'freedom' with 'the noblest aspirations that can animate the breast of man.' Such were the feelings and aspirations animating Jinnah as he celebrated his thirtieth birthday from the platform of India's National Congress. The speech called the Bengal partition "a bad blunder for England," but one Dadabhai hoped "may yet be rectified through agitation." And addressing himself to the growing distance between Hindus and Muslims in the aftermath of partition, Dadabhai called for

a thorough political union among the Indian people of all creeds and classes. . . . I appeal to the Indian people for this because it is in their own hands. . . . They have in them the capacity, energy and intellect to look after their own and to get their due share in all walks of life—of which the State Services are but a small part. State services are not everything. . . . Once self-government is attained, then will

be no prosperity enough for a life, but not till then. The thoroughness of the reform of all the people for their emancipation is an absolute necessity. . . . They must sink or swim together. Without this mutual efforts will be vain."²⁸

Theme of national unity was to be echoed by Jinnah at every political gathering attended during the ensuing decade in which he emerged as the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.²⁹ At the first all-India protest Sarojini Naidu at that Calcutta Congress, Jinnah already represented a rising lawyer and a coming politician, and as she recalled, by a "rule patriot." She was instantly captivated by his "striking appearance and 'far-seeing complex temperament' and has left a most insightful portrait of young Jinnah.

He had stately but then as the point of observation, laconic and dignified. . . . Mohammed Ali Jinnah's a far later day form is a delicate, a cool, spry, of exceptional ability and endurance. Some-thing of a faustidious, and a little aloof and imperious of manner, the calm hauteur of his accustomed reserve but masks, for those who have known him, and seen him in his own rich and varied life, a warm, a humourous, a winning as a child's—pre-eminently rational and practical, discreet and dispassionate in his estimate of the value of life for the obvious sake of self-interest. . . . He has the effect of disguising a shy and splendid idealism which is of the very essence of the man.³⁰

At Calcutta Jinnah, with his mission of advancing the cause of the Indian people, perfecting as few of his contemporaries and how independent of the new goal of "self-government" that had adopted. He was politician enough to realize, of course, that only hope of succeeding his liberal mentors and friends Dadabhai Nauroji and Khwaja Salimullah at Congress was by virtue of his secular appeal, not through his double minority status. He spoke, I recall, and presented, a shakespearean in modern garb, with the noblest imprecations of Burke, Mill, and Jinnah. . . . Jinnah's Congress national political new dramatic stage, grander and more exciting. . . . In one short decade after returning from London he emerged as heir-apparent to the Bombay triumvirate which Congress's slow-moving, political bullock-cart toward the promised land

the militant, revolutionary faction within Congress, led by Mahatma Mohandas ("Friend of the People") Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1858-

1920 and Bengal's fiery Bipin Chandra Pal (1858-1932) competed, however, by then with the moderate "old guard" for control of India's premier nationalist organization. Though Tilak and Gokhale both started as Poona colleagues in public education and national service, they differed fundamentally in many ways, especially with respect to political tactics and philosophy. The Lokamanya and his "new party" had no faith in Morley's proposed reforms, rejecting reliance on "pleas or petitions" to British officials in favour of a *satyagraha*. *Bhagat* was their battle cry: first of British machine-made cloth and other manufactured imports, later of all British institutions including schools, courts and council chambers. The other side of their economic plank or *boycott* was *swadeshi* ("of our own country") stimuli among indigenous Indian industry, especially cotton cloth woven and spun both by hand and machine. They made *swadeshi* their goal but the "extremists" they denigrated were not that of British citizens but of fully independent Indians. They were best popularized by Tilak in raising the mass following he won among middle-class professionals and urban workers were drawn from their ignorance of Hinduism and regional lore and usually served to alienate Muslim and other minorities as it won Hindu adherents. British officials in the spot vainly tried harsher techniques of repression to smother this mounting opposition. "Fairs of the Earthquake" Morley called that method of dealing with nationalism. The most popular leaders were arrested and deported including a new "martyr" from the Punjab, Lala Lajpat Rai (1865-1928) who became a hero as soon as he was arrested in the spring of 1907 and shipped off to Mandalay prison. The new party immediately proposed Lalpur Rai as their candidate for next president of Congress. Pherozeshah and Gokhale had their own candidate, however, the mild-mannered moderate Calcutta educator Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh.

The factional split that left Congress torn apart for almost a decade exploded at the session in Surat in 1907. Next to Bombay which had so recently hosted the Congress, Surat was the strongest bastion of moderate leadership power. Gujarat's center of mercantile wealth, Sir Pherozeshah was confident that he could keep the peace and control of his organization. The port of Surat, he had, however underestimated the passion and stubbornness of Tilak and his followers. As Rash Behari Ghosh moved toward the rostrum inside the Congress pandit to read his presidential address, Tilak rose to shout "Tune of order!" He had indeed earlier his intention of introducing Lalpur Rai's candidature from the Congress floor. "None on the platform recognized" him, however, yet that did not stop the Lokamanya. He moved the platform himself and headed for the rostrum. Several tough young "guards" moved to intercept Tilak, but Gokhale warned them off, joining in his old colleague's defense and protectively extending his own

around Tilak's body. Most of the delegates were on their feet shouting "order!" A stiff Maharashtra shipper was then tossed vigorously onto the floor, both Pherozeshah and Bengal's venerable Surendranath Banerjee in 1926. Panic and confusion ensued. The tent had to be pulled down and hired guards. For the next nine years Congress resorted to angry confining moderate and revoltuary parties, each claiming to be sole rightful heir to India's national movement.

In the end of the Surat split, revolutionary violence and official repression triumphed. Tilak was arrested in the summer of 1908, charged with "sedition" for a radical address published in his popular *Pravara*. A son, Triak represented himself before the high court in Mumbai, but after his arrest when he was held without bail, the services of Jinnah to plead for his release pending trial. Jinnah's efforts and trial were avail for British justice had imposed on him. He had been his trial began. And although Jinnah's argument was that he was innocent of the charge, he was arrested and the British national independence protested. A person was in a great deal of trouble, but he was not only stood up by Tilak as an independent leader, but a large of support in 1910 and won, thus the gratitude as well as affectionate admiration of Hindu India's conservative leader.

The reforms proposed by Morley and Minto initial in 1909, but the elected Muslim members on the expanded committee were few. By this time the Indian council's bill was 1909, however, no fewer than six such seats were reserved on a committee of more than half of the remainder. But it was not a "conservative" point at least two additional members as nominees of his own but if they were not elected by committees such as landlords or municipalities, raising Muslim representation to a point at least two additional members, more than the actual ratio of India's Muslim minority to the rest of the subcontinent. By 1909 even Minto complained of the "separate electorate" formula, which Jinnah initially rejected on the national principle, in fact, to raise his personal consciousness of Muslim identity. Jinnah was one of the first half dozen Muslim mem-

was specially elected, in his case from Bombay to sit on the viceroy's Central Legislative Council in 1910, three years before he actually joined the Muslim League. At thirty-five, he was one of the youngest members elected to that high council and would have stood no chance but for the fact that two much older knighted Muslim candidates, equally matched and antipathetical, ousted one another in preliminary skirmishes to choose the "Muslim candidate." Jinnah's secretary recalled that "Discussions went on for hours and in the end both of them decided that none of them should seek election but should send a third candidate and after careful scrutiny, the choice fell on the young lawyer."²² That singular honor catapulted Jinnah to the side of Gokhale, whose "general Bombay seat had been held before him by Sir Ferozeshah. The legislative center of India's government, first in Calcutta and Simla, later in Delhi, soon became one of Jinnah's most important and powerful stages.

Morley's reforms also introduced Indian participation in British India's powerful executive councils, both at Whitehall and in Calcutta-Simla. Two Indian members were appointed to the secretary of state's Whitehall Council of India in 1907 and the first Indian to hold the post of law member of the government of India, Sarvendrap Singh, 1864-1925, took his seat in 1909. A Hindu Brahmin by birth, Singh was like Jinnah, a barrister and moderate Congress leader. His legal practice in 1908 was so lucrative that according to government records he had a cut in his annual income of £40,000. Singh's first indication therefore was to turn down the viceroy's invitation. But Jinnah and Gokhale convinced him to accept the job. His reluctance was neither further attested to Jinnah's strong personal commitment to the principle of finding the candidate best qualified for any job regardless of race, religion, caste, or creed. Muslim League leaders had lobbied for a Muslim jurist to fill the powerful position in India's central government. The League's president at its 1908 Amritsar session, Syed Anwar Imam (1869-1933) was himself a barrister of London's Middle Temple and would succeed Singh as law member after the former resigned in November 1910, establishing the precedent of alternating Hindu-Muslim appointees and subsequent contractual parity in a Executive opportunity. Born as the League was out of the separatist elections, its "affirmation action" demand that organization remained most firmly committed to its founding principle: proposing names of Muslim candidates for every important official vacancy. Congress in the other hand always viewed as a representative multi-national and undemocratic, even as English liberals like John Morley did. Any "religious register," after all, whether Muslim, Catholic, or Calvinist, was dangerously subversive to the utilitarian foundations of a modern secular nation. Barrister Jinnah believed that as much as his great lawyer mentor

himself was to rise in the Allahabad Congress of 1910 to second a resolution that "strongly deprecates the expansion or application of the principle of separate Communal Electorates to Municipalities, District Boards, or other Local Bodies."²³

Individually, Jinnah spoke at the end of his first year as the Calcutta Council's Muslim member from Bombay

Dacca read in Britain's reversal of partition, the government of India's capitulation to Congress agitators, and a simple new message to all Indians: "No bombs, no boons!" Together with his announced announcement of partition, King George VI proclaimed his government's decision to shift the capital of British India from Calcutta to Delhi, his historic plan, where a new imperial city was to be built. Delhi had been the capital of Muslim sultans and Mughal emperors who reigned over most of the subcontinent since the early thirteenth century. Delhi remained at the hub of North India's Muslim population, educational centers and historic monuments with an easy reach of Lahore, Agra, Deoband, Aligarh and Lucknow. On December 23, 1947, however, when Lord Hardinge passed through Delhi's Chandni Chowk Silver Market, atop the elephant riding, a viceregal procession to the new capital, Delhi, a most became a viceroys graveyard. A bomb hurled into the parade's howdah killed one of his guards and wounded the Viceroy's back, exposing, he said, the "the worst he-assassin of one of India's most popular viceroys was never apprehended."

Jinnah attended the annual meeting of Congress as well as the council meeting of the Muslim League, both held in Bikaner in December of 1947. He was not a member of the League but was permitted to speak to its council at Bikaner supporting a resolution that expanded the League's goals to include "the attainment of a system of self government suitable to India" to be brought about through constitutional means, a steady reform of the existing system of administration, a promoting national unity and fostering a close spirit among the people of India and by co-operating with other communities for the said purposes.¹⁰ A few months later he went to Lucknow joining Mrs. Gandhi on the platform as an honored guest at the larger League meeting where a new more liberal constitution was adopted. President Shafi Muhammad, the new constitution noted that "I am in entire accord with my friend, the Honorable Mr. Jinnah in thinking that the adoption of any course other than the one proposed by the Council would be absolutely unwarranted." The League's first resolution congratulated the Hon. Mr. M. A. Jinnah for his skilful promotion of the Waki Vetoing Act through the Imperial Legislative Council. Facet with such acclaim, Jinnah could hardly resist renewed appeals to join the Muslim League pressed upon him that year by its new permanent secretary, Syed Waheed Haqqi (1874-1947) and Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1875-1933), reversed Lord Hardinge and editor of *Comrade*, both of whom were deputed to London to lobby there for Muslim deputations to the new British Parliament. He said he would not work in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated.¹¹

In April 1913 Jinnah and Gokhale sailed together from Bombay for London to meet with Lord Islington, Under Secretary of State for India and Chairman of their Royal Public Services Commission on which Ramsay MacDonald (1866-1937) also served. That leisurely trip was their longest abroad but no record is preserved by either of the subjects they discussed though the commission agenda, general council reforms, and among Hindu-Muslim unity and ultimately of achieving Indian civil service were surely among them. Gokhale later told Sarojini who was close to him at his Servants of India Society in Poona before he died, "Jinnah has true stuff in him, and that freedom from all sectarian prejudice which will make him the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity."¹² In the end, the product of his sounds, set in his late thirties is Jinnah seems to have been that tragically elusive spirit of communal unity. Jinnah arrived in London in September 1913 and attended the Karachi Council of the League celebrating his thirty-seventh birthday. He had not completed thirty or over seventeen years, and in now warmly expected to find a number of personal friends with whom to discuss the League's future and convey a resolution on reconstruction of the League but that he came first of all for changing the salary of the Council and his departure to the English Home rather than to the League's working class Indian taxpayers the burden of the League's administrative staff. The new council, Jinnah argued, should not be more than nine members, at least one-third of whom should be non-Muslim Indians chosen by a vote among members of the Council of the League and a third of the League's Council should be public men of the League's Council. Jinnah dealt with the other half of the League's Council, the League's Council, in an experience no more than a day. Jinnah was not purely advisory rather than administrative and tenure on it would be limited to five years. Thanks to his work in the League, Jinnah was chosen to chair a Congress deputation to London in 1914 to lobby members of Parliament and Whitehall on Lord Curzon's Communal Bill. Jinnah also seconded a resolution, congratulating the League for adopting "the principle of the League, the League's Council, and expressing complete accord with the belief that the League has so emphatically stated at its last session that the political future of the country depends on the League's Council."¹³

From Karachi, Jinnah entertained the Agra, where the Muslim League met

"Great Leader." A number of bearded Pathans in the audience rushed the dais, shouting angrily in Pashtu. Hasrat Moham called for the only "proper language" in which to hold Muslim League proceedings. Every one in the crowd of several thousands was standing, many shouting at once while wildly waving their arms. Jinnah helped escort the ladies in attendance out of and around Bombay's commissioner of police. Mr. Edwardes nonchalantly standing near the tent keeping his men alert. Jinnah told Edwardes that the crowd inside had become so disorderly the meeting could not proceed and that those causing the disturbance were public violators who had been admitted out of courtesy and by mistake. He asked the commissioner's help to clear the tent of our members offering "to refund the money instead of an one who had paid for a ticket. Edwardes refused to be of such sensuous service. However insisting I would use his force only to clear the tent entirely if I saw that the situation inside was out of control." Jinnah preferred to urge President Haque to adjourn the meeting and he met with the League's leaders later that day in the president's house to plan for the next day's session.

The Muslim League was reconvened on New Year's Day, 1916 in Bombay's Regent Hotel. Attendance was strictly limited to regular members and the press. President Haque opened the meeting at 10:00 AM. Jinnah was elected to be its various disorders the real reason for Mr. Jinnah, who was received with much cheer. "As president of the Bombay Muslim League," Jinnah was the "doer of the youth" and "unwearied king of Bombay." He was known with a monomachia almost as full as Kitchener's and known as a raper in quarters like Roma's Calcutta, dressed like Anthony Eden, and was adored by most women at first sight and admired or envied by most men. He reported Commissioner Edwardes's pig headed behavior to a group of "his name" to his audience. He moved the unanimously carried resolution to appoint a special committee to formulate and frame a scheme of reforms in consultation with other "political" organizations the two purposes of Congress which would allow them to demand a single platform of reforms in the name of United India. That resolution was greeted with loud applause. A committee of seventy-one leaders of the Muslim League was appointed representing every province of British India and chaired by Jinnah's close friend and client Raja Sir Mohamad Ali Mirza Muhammad Khan Bahadur the Raja of Muzaffargarh. Its members from Bombay were Jinnah, Aga Khan (1877-1965) and Jinnah's friends from the Punjab were Mirza Asaf Ali Khan (1877-1965) and Mirza Asaf Khan (1877-1965) while the Bengal contingent was A. K. Fazlul Haq (1893-1962) in its ranks. Before that meeting in the Raj

ended, President Haque remarked upon "the great work done for the Muslim League" by his friend Mr. Jinnah." added.

The entire Mohammedan community of India owed him a deep debt for without his exertions they could not have met in Bombay," to which he added the president then turned to Jinnah saying "Mr. Jinnah,

the Muslims of India thank you." It was the first such tribute Jinnah received from the Muslim League, but would not be his last.

Lucknow to Bombay (1916-18)

For Jinnah, 1916 was a year of nature's fume and good fortune. After helping to save the Muslim League from dissolution in Bombay he was elected to enter it to see the bright hope in Lucknow, capital of the once mighty Moghul empires of India. While Europe tore itself apart all along the just gasp-fled western front, India advanced, under Jinnah's inspiring leadership, toward a political horizon that seemed ablaze with the golden crown of imminent freedom.

Jinnah was re-elected for a second term to Bombay's Muslim seat on the Central Legislative Council and used that forum to good advantage in presenting the Congress League program, once drafted to London Congress and upon which its own committee headed by Motilal Nehru (1871-1931) who invited it to members to his ancestral Aala road house in April to discuss the proposed reforms with League leaders. Part of the fortune he had earned as a lawyer was lavished on hospitality and support for Congress and for Mrs. Besant's Home Rule League, which Motilal funded most generously. The elder Nehru admired Jinnah, introducing him to friends at this time as "unlike most Muslims . . . as keen a nationalist as any of us. He is showing us a new way to Hindu-Muslim unity." For a while they supported one another in the Central Legislative Council but by the late 90's Motilal and Jinnah became bitter rivals. Motilal, a fierce advocate and tenacious wrestler, wanted personally to lead India's nationalist movement to independence, or hoped at least to bequeath such power to his son, Jinnah, the Lincoln's Inn barrister, would never rest content simply to assist a provincial pleader no matter how great his fortune happened to be.

That April, as Congress and the League labored in Allahabad to draft

the "Freedom Pact" that was to be sealed at Lucknow, Duhrai lay shattered, ruins under martial law. The Easter Rising of 1916 was as brutal as crushed by Kitchener's army in Ireland as was General John Nixon's Indian army by disease, incompetence, and Turkish troops in Mesopotamia that month. Contrary to all rational expectation, shattering every civilized notion and dream, the war produced intense fighting rather than shoring in its aftermath with the incredible death toll of its rage, mounting every moment human demands for direct representation with the self-governing dominions at the Imperial Conference. Interimperial Crowe left the India Office replaced by Austen Chamberlain in 1863-1931. In May Hardinge found it impossible to ignore Indian demands for a greater role in deliberations, agreeing that the claim to a representative voice at all imperial conferences was just. Yet Curzon and Kitchener still dominating the War Cabinet, however change was ignored. By mid-1916 the British Empire was popularized as a by an uninspired and uninspiring war-time captain Lord Curzonford (1805-1833).

During his meeting in Allahabad Jinnah went north to Darjeeling to join the next two months of distress. Bombay had been a center of the anti-imperialist of its clients and friend Sir Dunsin Mackenzie Pette (1873-1931). The Pettes were one of Bombay's wealthiest Parsi families, textile capitalists whose vast fortune was being in Sir Dunsin's emigration, a great effort that who came to Bombay from Surat in 1850 or worked as a clerk, clerk and *dubhashi* (a language interpreter for the British East India Company). French merchants who dealt with this bright very small Parsi clerk lured away *La petite Parsi*. The merchant became her dead wife's surname. His son Manockjee Pette for whom Bombay's first successful cotton mill, which grew into the sprawling *La mackenzie* Mills complex in India. The first secretary Sir Dunsin's started Bombay's powerful M.L.A. Association in 1875 when he chaired from 1894-95. He also served as a trustee of the Bombay Parsi community and acted as a mediator in succession laws and proper disposition of the dead upon the death of a Parsi. The clerk Sir Dunsin had been instrumental in securing the recognition of the public promulgation of the Parsi's recession in 1875, and was a very much helped administrator. The Pette family was thus not only among the richest, but also one of the most devout, a Hindu Parsi was a Parsi. But it was the end of the nineteenth century. With the death of the first Sir Dunsin in 1901, his entire name, fortune, and religious duties and responsibilities passed on to his son, whose first title was *the first Sir Dunsin*. The son's intervention was not only a great help to the Parsi community but also to the British Empire.

way. As she matured, all of her talents, gifts, and beauty were magnified in so delightful and unaffected a manner that she seemed a "fairy princess," almost too lovely to be real. And her mind was so alert her intellect so keenly and profoundly that she took as much interest in politics as she did in romantic poetry and insisted on attending every public meeting held in Bombay during 1919, always sitting of course in "the first row," chaperoned by her "multum in unum philanthropic" maiden aunt, Miss Mumtaz Petit.¹

That summer when Rittie was sixteen and Jinnah at least forty, they shared the Petit chateau with a view of Mount Everest, perched 7,000 feet high in the idyllic "Town of the Thunderbolt"—Darjeeling—where only the choicest tea plants and the steepest snow-clad mountain peaks and isolated trails witnessed the passionate gambles of longing and love that passed between these two.

That October 29, 1916, Jinnah presided over the Bombay Provincial Conference in Ahmedabad, the textile capital of Gujarat, wealth and power. Jinnah proposed transferring provincial governments, such as that of Bombay, into directly elected bodies, administration responsible to elected representatives of the people. Muslims and Hindus, wherever they are in a minority, having proper adequate and effective representation. As to all direct and principal government functions Jinnah reiterated the arguments of Jinnah's Lipou and Morley, insisting they "should be wholly elected; that the present official control exercised by the Collectors and Commissioners should be removed; that the chairman should be elected by the Boards and the *ex officio* President should be lone away with that a portion of the revenue should be set aside for the revenue of the revenue should be made over to these Bodies so that they may have adequate resources at their disposal for the due performance of their duties." It would have meant no less than transforming the all powerful Indian Civil Service into trustees of responsibility. Indian vision Jinnah's radical proposals for change did not however stop there. He also demanded an end to "the unjust application of the Arms Act to the people of India from which the Europeans are exempted" called for the repeal of the Press Act, less resort to the "partial law" Defence of India Act specifically denouncing its recent application in banning Mrs. Besant from Bombay; and immediate enactment of a free and compulsory measure of elementary education. He also said that India should have long since been admitted to equal commissions in the army and navy, asking, "If Indians are good enough to fight as soldiers and sailors, why are they not good enough to be commissioned officers?" Jinnah concluded his Bombay Conference address with the "all absorbing question" of Hindu-Muslim unity.

I believe a fifth plank men are thoroughly convinced that the secret of our real progress lies in the goodwill, concord, harmony and co-operation between the two great sister communities. The true locus of progress is centered in their union. But the solution is not difficult.

Jinnah was speaking as an advocate for the Muslim community as a whole. He was not expressing his own political ideology or reflecting his personal prejudice. The burden of sacrifice he argued fell upon the majority community, yet their reward would be commensurate.

I would, therefore, appeal to my Hindu friends to be generous and understanding and encourage the transfer of power to Muslims even if it involves some sacrifice in the matter of separate electorates.

It is a question . . . of transfer of the power from the bureaucracy to democracy. Let us concentrate all our attention and energy to this point. Let us accept the transfer of power to Muslims and let them at once reconstitute the constitution and give them the means to effect that transfer as soon as possible. . . . We are on a straight road, the promised land is within sight. "Forward" is the motto and the clear course for young India.

Jinnah more precisely. The future for India seemed as bright, as clear and as good as ever seen yet Rittie and he were to different communities, yet love scaled every height, reduced to life all barriers. So at least it must have seemed to him then, at the peak his creative political powers, on the road to his triumph at Lucknow.

That he went to Calcutta, where the Imperial Legislative Council met for its winter session, the New Delhi of Lutyens and Baker rising so high on the spacious plain south of the old city's massive wall and gates. It would not be ready for council use till the late 1920's. Before October 1917 Jinnah was able to convince eighteen other elected members of the Council to sign his "Memorandum of the Nineteen," which was presented to the viceroy and sent on to Whitehall. The memorandum²

was a bold and direct demand for a new constitution. It should have a substantial majority of elected members and the franchise should be "broadened" with "Muslims, wherever they are in a minority, being given proper and adequate representation." It also demanded that the Council should be a body of 100 members, of whom 75 should be elected and 25 should be nominated by the Crown.

Ministerial councils of from 60 to 100 men were recommended to enjoy greater responsibilities and parliamentary freedom, the position of the secretary of state should be abolished, reduced

as a friend to Jinnah after that hour of such a bitter and rude awakening to what everyone in Bombay already knew. Nor would he sanction the marriage under any circumstances. First he forbade Ruthe ever to see Jinnah again—at least while she remained married under the paternal roof of his marble. Then he sought legal remedies, filing an application to prevent their marriage once she came of age, based on the Parsi Marriage Act, but he was pitted against a barrister who rarely lost an case and could gladly have died before surrendering in this matter. Predictably perhaps Ruthe's passionate devotion to her self-chosen husband to be only intensified, thanks to her father's adamant insistence that she never see him again. Just like she would not be deterred by prejudice or the interference of her parents, Sir Dinshaw met his own match in stubborn resistance twice over in the long suffering concentrated on the couple's defiantly passionate ties. Ruthe waited for Jinnah would attain her majority at night and eloped married just a few months after that as known as the most inviolable article could be shaken aside by Jinnah's invincible courtroom sword.

The Congress Committee of 1917 proved as frustratingly difficult and far more arduous than Ruthe's father. The Mesopotamian Disaster or Hasty War as the streets of Iraq Desert tragically to British become crime was to be valued not to miss a grey pastures in Baghdad and long inquiries that revealed water accumulation at the shipment of British medical supplies and their vital demand from Indian ports to the Persian Gulf. Secretary of State Chamberlain accepted the excuse "I am" through hardly deserved, as his own resignation to command of the India Office in mid 1917. Thanks to that sacrifice, however, General Kitchener Montagu, 1879-1917, was placed in charge of it and raised the House of Commons on August 20, 1917, to announce that the new inspiring policy of His Majesty's Government by which the Government of India are in complete accord. It is that of the decreasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-government institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. Here at last appeared to be the promise of "dominion status" that political leaders throughout India had awaited since the war began. Nationalist elites glossed over the "practical development" and "progressive realisation" read gleefully the self-governing institutions and "responsible government" maintain a Montagu formula Imperialist Curzon rather than the Montagu statement. Here government all power transferred. What that meant was that the British Government would no longer be able to say no to any demand for a new law to give the Montagu tenure at Whitehall. In the winter of 1917, however, Edw.

Montagu became the first secretary of state for India actually to visit the Continent while holding that high office.

The ancient complexity of India, its pluralism and paradox affected him deeply as it did most visitors from afar though he had toured the country once before in 1913, and, as a Jew, considered himself "an Oriental." He could never see so many people, so much poverty and so ostentatious of wealth and luxury. India fascinated and terrified him so that by the end of his journey he was thoroughly exhausted, frustrated and depressed. The notorious Montagu was traumatized by India. Flattered by the civility of her welcome, shocked at the magnitude of her problems, pleased and disoriented by the official treatment he received.

For the political readers Montagu talked with a Hindu Jinnah and a Muslim. "Young, perfectly mannered, impressive looking, armed with his dialectics and western upon the whole of his scheme."

J. Chelmsford tried to argue with him, and was tied up into knots. He was a very good man, and it is of course an outrage that such a man has no chance of running the affairs of his own country." "Montagu

"My visit to India means that we are going to do something, and something is going to go home and produce a whole lot of nothing, it must be epoch-making, or it is a failure; it must be the keystone of the new era." "Nothing is waiting in comfort. I am the stuff to carry this sort of thing off. For the first time in my life I wish I looked like Curzon. . . . I wish Lloyd George were here; I wish I could be a member of the British Cabinet had I only wish I was were were. . . . One of India's misfortunes that I am alone, alone, alone the person that has got to carry this thing through."¹⁰

Curzon's first official personal thanks to Jinnah's personal appeal to the minister on her behalf, invited Montagu to attend the Calcutta session which she was to preside that December. "Oh, if only Lloyd George were here," Montagu boasted to his diary. "He would dash down to the Congress and make them a great oration. . . . It might save the whole situation. But the Congress have carefully arranged our plans so that we shall be able to do it. . . . The Congress, the real Indian political movement, is in a very good way of becoming the only Englishwoman, to be president of the Congress, her reward for the suffering she experienced in the last few years. . . . I wish I could be a member of the Bombay branch of her House of Commons immediately after

bitterness in them which cannot be eradicated and for my part I am not going to attempt the task."²⁰

Governor Willingdon convened his own provincial war conference in Bombay's town hall on June 10, 1918. Jinnah was there and must have felt the blood rush to his face as Willingdon remarked: "There are a certain number of gentlemen, some of whom have considerable influence with the public many of them members of the political organisation called the Home Rule League whose activities have been such of late years that I cannot honestly be sure of the sincerity of their support."²¹ Jinnah tried to amend Willingdon's proposed resolution insisting there could be no Home Defence without Home Rule, but he was ordered to leave the conference. Jinnah then rose to speak and said he was

pained very much, pained that His Excellency should have thought fit to cast doubts on the sincerity of the majority of the Home Rule Party. It was very sorry that with the utmost respect he must enter his emphatic protest against it. They were sincere as any one else to keep the defence of the motherland and the Empire. The if freedom was not secured, the conditions for Government's methods the Home Rule Party did not want. He was making suggestions for the improvement of the scheme. The Government had their own scheme, namely for the next treaty of secrets, but that was not enough to save them from the German menace. They wanted a national army or in other words a citizen army and not a purely mercenary army. I say that if you wish to enable us to help you to face that and stimulate the next stage you must make the citizens people free that they are the citizens of the Empire and the King's equal subjects. But the Government do not desire to say that we shall be trusted and made real partners in the Empire. When? We don't want to wait. We don't want the consideration of the matter in definitely put off. We want action and immediate deeds.²²

Jinnah's public conflict with Willingdon was reflected in their acerbic sound relationship. The Jinnahs had been invited to dinner at Bombay's Government House soon after returning from their honeymoon. Bitter was one of her lowest and Paris evening gowns and Lady Willingdon was quick to order her servant to bring a "wrap to cover up Mrs. Jinnah." In case she feared cold, Jinnah did not wait for the servant's return, jumping up from table to inform his hostess: "When Mrs. Jinnah feels cold, send a servant and ask for a wrap, will you?" He conversed with her while Mrs. Jinnah did not get foot inside the Government House again till the Willingdons had moved out.

Less than a week after the provincial war conference broke up, Jinnah's

league celebrated Home Rule Day, on June 18, 1918, with a mass rally in Bombay, at which Jinnah said

Lord Willingdon has said that the support of the Home Rule Party is half-hearted. My answer is this: Your methods and policy are all wrong. I cannot believe that even a bureaucrat is so blind as not to see it . . . they do not trust us and, therefore, are not prepared to allow us to take up arms for the defence of our own motherland and of the Empire. They want us to continue an organisation which they call an army which is ~~no~~ an army and nothing else and they then turn round and tell us that we are not helping them. I say what Mr. Montagu in his speech at the Mesopotamia Report has said: "that the Government of India is 'too wooden, too iron, too antediluvian to be of any use for the modern purpose we have in view.'"²³

Less than a month later, Gandhi wrote to urge Jinnah to "take an emphatic ~~statement~~ regarding recruitment," arguing

Can you not see that if every Home Rule League became a potent recruiting agency, what at the same time fighting for constitutional rights we should ensure the passing of the Congress League scheme? "Seek we first the recruiting office and everything will be added unto you."²⁴

A copy of Gandhi's strange letter appears to have left Jinnah too flustered to respond. Gandhi ~~can~~ appreciate the wisdom of Jinnah's position on recruiting as soon as he started going from village to village in order to the seat of a sedition bar drum.

As soon as I set about my task, my eyes were opened. My optimism found a rude shock. We had meetings wherever we went. People would hardly one or two would offer their services as recruits. You are a votary of Ahimsa, how can you ask us to take up arms? What could a Government do for India to deserve our co-operation? These and similar questions used to be put to us.²⁵

At Lucknow, Gandhi wrote Mafat, quoting even tougher common peasant questions, such as, "How can we who can hardly bear the sight of blood and bloodshed take up arms suddenly without the courage to join the army?" Before September was over, Gandhi's health broke down, perhaps because of his new difficult meetings. I wrote

I very nearly ruined my constitution during the recruiting campaign. I had to lie in bed for some time. I could not get up.

While I was thus toiling on the bed of pain . . . Vallabhbhai [Patel] brought the news that Germany had been completely de-

feated and that the Commissioner had sent word that recruiting was no longer necessary. The news that I had no longer to worry myself about recruiting came as a very great relief. I all but broke down up with Dr. Kanungo, who felt my pulse and said, "Your pulse is quite good. I see absolutely no danger. There is a very slight breakdown due to extreme weakness." I passed the night without sleep. The morning broke without death coming. But I could not get rid of the feeling that the end was near.⁵⁸

Montagu's report on Indian constitutional reforms was published in July 1918, recommending partial control of the executive in the provinces by the legislature and the increasing influence of the legislature upon the executive in the Government of India. As far as possible complete popular control in local bodies.⁵⁹ Jinnah studied this initial report and issued his reactions to the press on July 23, 1918, noting that

The proposals are not like the laws of the Persians and the Medes, but they may be made the subject of further discussion. Great effort has been made to face the problem. I know that great difficulties were put in the way of Mr. Montagu in India and he was called upon to deal with one of the most intricate and complicated problems that any country had ever to face. But I think he has been unduly influenced by the almost sinister and exaggerated suggestions that are being put on the concession that have been made to the people. . . . The advancement would be worthless unless in major provinces like Bombay as the departments except the Police and Justice are transferred. I am willing to accept this only as a transitional stage with a view to show that for the present the maintenance of law and order may be reserved to the Government since the argument has been advanced that after a few years we are going through an experimental stage.⁶⁰

Again Jinnah proved himself an eminently moderate and flexible brilliant constitutional lawyer and negotiator. Had his efforts to deal directly with Montagu not been sabotaged by the government of India and its "Black Rowlatt acts" the course of tragedy that were to ensue in the wake of the war need not have derided the process of responsible transfer of power set so patiently in motion by Britain's two greatest Liberal secretaries of state John Morley and Edwin Montagu.

Jinnah served on the joint Congress-League committee to coordinate both responses to Montagu's proposals which emerged as a balanced acceptance of the report combined with reaffirmation of the Lucknow Declaration and urged rapid strides toward attainment of full responsible government. Congress leaders differed widely in their assessments of the report. Some

Nath Banerjee was willing to support it. C. R. Das, anticipating "the failure of Democracy," wanted "real Responsible Government in 5 years," while Motilal Nehru was ready to wait another two decades.⁶¹ The regular annual sessions of Congress and the Muslim League were scheduled to be held in Delhi in December.

As World War I spluttered to its end that November, so did Willingdon's rule over Bombay. The Jinnahs could hardly wait for that governor to leave and when they learned of plans by some of Willingdon's close friends of a public function at Town Hall honoring him on the eve of his departure they launched a mass opposition movement to that function. It was Jinnah's first and most vigorous public demonstration against a British man. The Willingdon Memorial Committee and their meeting to start on December 11. Some 300 Jinnahs' youthful followers started picketing out near the steps of Bombay's town hall a night before. Police officers surrounded the picketers, but they held their ground. At 10:00 a.m. when the crowd started before which Jinnah himself arrived to take a place at the head of the queue. He faced up the steps as fast as he could carry him and secured the very first rows with his flame-colored robes. About noon, Rattie arrived with a ribbon basket filled with flowers for the band and did not leave those choice seats. Knowing that his supporters would start to show up not too early at noon, the crowd was still in fact some before the robed sheriff of Bombay arrived. In order for Justice Jeejeebhoy, one of Bombay's leading whose family fortune was made in the opium trade, "presided" over the meeting, but from the moment he rose to address the audience, Jinnah and his league were on their feet, shouting "No, no!" Raucous protesters and about twenty police officers and though no one could hear him, the committee supposedly moved the "resolution of appreciation" for Willingdon. The constabulary of police then ordered the crowd to be dispersed, and Jinnah as well as Rattie and their friends were hustled out of the Town Hall and only then Jinnah would be recognized up to the Town Hall. He emerged from the town hall, however, a popular Bombay hero.

"Gentlemen, you are the citizens of Bombay," Jinnah told his adoring crowd that stretched across Apollo Street that evening, "Your triumph made it clear that even the combined forces of bureaucracy and authority could not overawe you. December the 11th is a Red-Letter Day in the history of Bombay. Gentlemen, go and rejoice over the day that has witnessed the triumph of democracy."⁶² That night a huge demonstration was held in Shantaram's Chawl and soon no fewer than 65,000 rupees were contributed to the cause, to build "People's Jinnah

Memorial Hall" which still stands in the compound of Bombay's Indian National Congress Building, commemorating the "historic triumph" of the citizens of Bombay "under the brave and brilliant leadership of Mohamunad Ali Jinnah."⁴² After Jinnah left Congress, and especially after the birth of Pakistan, that hall appeared strangely anachronistic and is now anonymously referred to only by its initials as P. J. Hall. Few Indians remember that People's Jinnah Hall was erected to honor the fearless leadership of Bombay's most inspiring ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.

5

Amritsar to Nagpur (1919-21)

Amritsar brought not peace, but the sword of harsh repression and bitter rule in India. Martial-law "Defence of India Acts" passed in 1915 had suspended civil liberties and all legal due process throughout the war, leaving the government of India to arrest, detain, strip or expel any citizen without trial, warrant or stated cause. The Allied victory was, naturally, supposed to restore all such rights and legal safeguards. Such was not the case. Instead, for an ominous report written by the government's such-and-such a committee chaired by Kings Bench Justice Sir Sidney Rowlatt had been published recommending immediate extension of the Criminal Emergency Powers Act for at least six months. Such was the very thing that led to the postwar Congress League's active Council, at once organized and debated throughout India as the "Black" or Rowlatt Act. It was a weapon feared for the disclosure of revolutionary crimes," and it was Mr. Jinnah, as Rowlatt's Bill was tabled on February 6,

"to substitute the Executive for the Judicial will lead to the abuse of those vast powers. . . . There was no precedent or parallel in the legal history of any civilized country to the enactment of such laws.

This was the most inopportune moment for this legislation as high hopes about momentous reforms had been raised. . . . If these measures were passed they will create unprecedented discontent, agitation and will have the most disastrous effect upon the relations between the Government and the people."

His warnings fell on deaf ears. Chelmsford, Rowlatt, and the others were not to stream full ahead despite the unanimous opposition of all

twenty-two Indian members on the council. There were thirty-four official members willing to rubber stamp the Black Act that was passed into law on March 1919.

"By passing this Bill," Jinnah wrote Chelmsford a few days later from his Maabar Hall house to which he had returned as soon as the vote was announced,

Your Excellency's Government have actively negated every argument they advanced a year ago when they appealed to India for help at the War Conference and have ruthlessly trampled upon the principles for which Great Britain avowedly fought the war. The fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the State, no anarchy, no incompetent bureaucracy which is neither responsive to the people nor in touch with real public opinion. I therefore, as a protest against the passing of the Bill and the manner in which it was passed tender my resignation for I feel that under the prevailing conditions it can be of no use to any people and I feel for myself with my self-respect as a member of a Parliament with a Government that knows such utter disregard for the opinion of the representatives of the people in the Council Chamber and for the feelings and sentiments of the people outside. In my opinion a Government that passes or sanctions such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim to remain a sovereign Government and I hope that the Secretary of State for India Mr. Montagu will advise His Majesty to signify his disallowance to this Black Act.²

The resignation further attesting to Jinnah's courageous national feeling at this time, made no impact on Chelmsford while Montagu's own influence in London continued to deteriorate. Jinnah had no way of knowing how impotent a secretary of state he placed his hopes for India's future and he decided to say for London to seek to persuade his fathering friend to override the government of India. But he was pregnant and though their love would never be as strong again and the aftermath of the war proved so politically frustrating, the future never seemed as promising to both of them as it did that winter at the start of 1919.

The Muslim League had appointed Jinnah to lead a delegation to Prime Minister Lloyd George that year to plead for at least one Muslim delegate to the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference. Most Indian Muslims followed League president A. K. Fazlul Haque in not attending the conference on the basis of the League's opposition to the partition of India. A split in the Muslim League had also occurred during the World War years

being fought for the protection of the rights of the small and defenceless minorities.³ Sir Sateyendra P. Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner, 1880-1943 had been appointed to represent India at the Imperial War Conference in 1917 but since neither was Muslim the League feared that Islamic interests were being shortchanged or ignored. With the Anjuman and other popular Khilafat leaders, including Delhi's scholarly devout Maulana Muhammad Azad, 1887-1958 still under detention without specified charges, Muslims felt more intensely than ever a sense of communal alarm and second-class subjecthood under British rule. Khilafatists feared that Britain was the pledges and promises to protect Islam's holy places would be broken now that Turkey was a defeated enemy, now at the mercy of Christian victor states, determined to crush it for all time.

The Jinnahs reached London in March and rented a flat near Regent's Park. Jinnah visited them there including Bombay's answer Chaudhury Lala Lajpat Rai. Jinnah's unabashed laughter when telling a funny story circulated in the category of a possible "One evening in mid-August, Jinnah and his wife went to the theatre but they were obliged to leave their box as the lady could find no drug for a cold Du was born in London. Jinnah died on August 14-15, 1919 and enough precisely twenty-five days and hours before the birth of another offspring. Jinnah's mission to the League proved so successful, however that he later stated the Muslim case vigorously to Lord Curzon, the Secretary of State for India, and to Montagu and Bickener a year later. Jinnah and Montagu, who British and French officials assumed to be close friends, quarrelled over Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and the partition of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) and must have been reluctant to attend the peace conference in itself especially since he had come so far and was the "delegate" of the Muslim community. Jinnah's hatred and suspicion of him so recently expressed in Amritsar was a different thing experts on India sufficed to Jinnah's view of him to his overtone. More doors remained closed to him in London than in Bombay's new governor George Lloyd. Jinnah praised Montagu's aims against Jinnah, writing of him that "there is 'fair of speech and black of heart,' a 'real irreconcilable,' and 'of gentle straight away and done the other.'"⁴ There were fewer smiles on those whom Jinnah faces he met, as Whitehall, closed ranks behind Simla, Delhi, He had after all, resigned his "honorable" position. Best not encourage that sort.

In April, moreover, non-cooperation and violence had spread across the British Empire in the wake of anti-Bowling Act mass protests and the

British massacre at Jallianwala Bagh. Gandhi chose April 6, 1919, as the first "sacred" day of a nationwide business strike (hartal) to protest the Black Acts, which he urged his *Satyagraha* followers to "refuse civilly to obey." It was a totally nonviolent day, but a week later on April 13, 1919, Amritsar, "Nectar of Immortality," a city sacred to the Sikhs of the Punjab, was transformed shortly before sundown into India's first national urban slaughter. Two of Gandhi's lieutenants had been arrested a few days earlier and dispersed, thus starting up a protest march toward the British commissioner's bungalow in the cantonment. Several soldiers panicked and opened fire, killing a few marchers and turning the peaceful crowd into a raging mob bent on retaliation. They burned British banks and attacked a few Englishwomen as well as Englishmen in Amritsar's city. A British brigadier and his force were called in to restore order. The general banned all public meetings. On April 13, when he learned of a meeting of thousands taking place inside Jallianwala Bagh, "Garden," he drove to that almost fort-like enclosed site with some of his troops, ordering them to open fire without further word of warning to the peacefully assembled crowd inside. It was a Sunday, a Hindu festival holiday. The crowd, mostly villagers, had come to the city to celebrate. The soldiers fired 1,650 rounds of live ammunition in a point blank range for ten minutes at the terror-stricken human targets who found no exit from that nightmare in the garden, leaving some 400 persons dead and over 1,200 wounded. The general and his troops beat a hasty retreat as the scene set on that darkest massacre in British Indian history which Chamberlain later termed an "error of judgment."

Jinnah was not to keep her head cool in this most critical moment. Jinnah advised his readers in an interview, the *Bombay Chronicle* published on his return home in mid-November 1919, "Unless at the next session of the Congress in December a thoughtful programme is laid down by our leaders and accepted by the people, a considerable amount of harm would be done to our cause." Jinnah still felt confident that Mr. Montagu will not fail us, but termed Chamberlain's administration "a failure" and argued that "the sooner he is recalled the better for all concerned." As to the prime minister's "promises" in behalf of "poor Turkey," he called these "a scrap of paper" and did not believe the Allies stood ready to concede "self-determination and independence to Arab states. He was, however, more optimistic about India, envisioning a true "renaissance" through education, commercial industrialization, and economic progress and growth, and a rationalized financial policy. Asked for his final message to the people, as the Amritsar Congress was approaching, Jinnah replied, "The objective of the Congress will have to remain unchanged. It will be to work for the well-being of the whole of India, and to secure for the people of India a free and independent state."

Long what he thought of Montagu's bill then in Parliament, and Gandhi opened

cannot say anything about the Reforms Bill. I have hardly studied it. My preoccupation is Rowlett legislation. Our Reforms will be practically worthless, if we cannot repeal Rowlett legislation. And as I can imagine no form of resistance to the Government than civil disobedience, I propose, God willing, to resume it next week. I have taken all precautions that are humanly possible to take, against a resurgence of violence."

He analyzed their different approaches to political process, Jinnah still favoring the moderate legislative change. Gandhi preferred direct civil disobedience. The vectors of their widely divergent paths led them ever further apart.

Jinnah was to send her real representatives, say half a dozen, who would do propaganda work there in her honor, backed up by substantial financial and political resources. Jinnah's suggestion for his *Bombay Chronicle* was that a great deal can be done. But it must be a controlled and organized effort, established institution carried out by men, not only who go to the front but who are permanently settled. "We are hoping for a such a result," he said. He was now a father, after all, and had to plan for his future, as well as his young wife's India was less secure than before. He had a land to raise a family in than it had been since the terrible massacre. He had a pragmatic sense of the danger more than six months later and with the front crumbling, the British had led and the rest of the land poised on the verge of Satyagraha, prospects of a new India were dim. Jinnah's heart recoiled, refusing to refuse to acknowledge them socially despite the birth of his son. So the turn of London remained, growing more romantic in its permanent realization became less plausible. Jinnah's Bombay was consumed to prosper, demanding and receiving more and more of time and attention, evenings as well as days and often seven days a week. Jinnah was to be in London as little as he could. What little was left to him, politics consumed. "Mercurial, dashing, impulsive, and with a great deal of energy," he said, "he was a man who could possibly devise ways to spend

the long awaited Montagu reforms were passed into law as the Government of India Act on December 23, 1919, the day of King-Emperor's royal proclamation granting amnesty to all political prisoners. His Majesty's "earnest desire at this time that so far as possible any differences between my people and those who are responsible for my

Government should be obliterated," but the new act fell far short of that mark. Had it come a year earlier, perhaps it would have sufficed to satisfy expectations roused by the war. Though it did provide some measure of provincial responsibility to elected representatives of India by "transferring" certain departments and their revenues to popular control, while "reserving" other more important matters to official hands. This newly devised technique of half and half rule, called diarchy, was Britain's formula for devolving political power "by successive stages" to India. The Central Legislative Council was greatly enlarged into a bicameral parliament with an executive majority lower house to be called the Legislative Assembly. The expense of the secretary of state for India's salary and those of his assistants was taken off India's budget and transferred to Parliament as Congress and the League demanded. A public service commission was to be established in India, thanks to which simultaneous recruitment to the coveted civil services would begin in New Delhi as well as in London by 1923. Finally, the act provided for further statutory improvement into the working of the system of government, the growth of education and the development of representative institutions, in British India. As to whether and to what extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible government" after ten years. If these come before the Bill at Act and Amhar such constitutional amendments would surely have been generous and have been more warmly welcomed throughout India.

Both Congress and the Muslim League held annual meetings in Amritsar in 1919. If the Muslim League was secretly the League to be the secret of success, but just of the new proposed reform, but of all work done by Indians at home and abroad and thanks to the "Congress League Committee of 1916" the major political obstacle to such aim had been resolved. The A.I. brothers appeared before the Amritsar League to stand in opposition and "reverberating chorus of ex-Mohammad Ali assured his personal, representative audience that "there was no Government but the Government of God. Jinnah was elected to preside over the League for the following year.

Jinnah called a special meeting of the Muslim League that September in Calcutta, where Congress met as well in emergency session to consider radical change of political posture caused not only by announced All-India peace terms but also by harsh, callous British reactions to the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre and published reports of its atrocious aftermath throughout the Punjab.

We have met here principally to consider the situation that has arisen owing to the studied and persistent policy of the Government since the signing of the Amritsar. First came the Bowlett Bill, accompanied by the Punjab atrocities—and then came the spoliation of the

Ottoman Empire and the Khilafat. The one attacks our liberty, the other our faith. Now every country has two principal and vital functions to perform—one to assert its voice in international policy, and the other to maintain internal order. The largest test is of justice and humanity. But one must have one's own administration in one's own hands to carry it out to one's own satisfaction. As we stand in maladministration notwithstanding the assurances of our Muslim leaders, and in breach of the Prime Minister's solemn pledges, numerous and outrageous terms have been imposed upon Turkey and the Ottoman Empire has served for a ruler and broker up by the Allies under the guise of Mandates. This, thank God, has at last convinced us, one and all, that we can no longer abide our trust either in the Government of India or in the Government of His Majesty the King of England to represent India in matters international.

And now let us turn to the Punjab. That Sir Charles Legation named after the notorious Chairman of the Rowlett Committee was a traitor to the Government of Lord Curzon and a traitor to those "celebrated crimes" which neither the words of men nor the words of women can wash away. An error of judgment that cost the life of the last and the last with them—an error of judgment that cost the lives of many—has paid for it if you could see them tomorrow. One has to say that it is incalculable and that is that this Government will go and give place to a completely responsible Government. The Congress and the Muslim League will not forget this. We are going to think out some course more effective than the present one. His proposal to be forwarded to the Secretary of State. The League shall now find a way, even as I have and study it. And the new born Egypt has. We are not going to rest content until we have attained the fullest political freedom in our own country. Mr. Jinnah has said by programme of non-cooperation supported by the authority of the Khilafat Conference, before the country. It is now for you to consider whether or not you approve of its principle and approving of its principle whether or not you approve of its details. The operations of this scheme will strike at the individual in each of you, and therefore it rests with you alone to measure your strength and to weigh the pros and the cons of the questions before you arrive at a decision. But once you have decided to march, let there be no retreat under any circumstances.¹⁰

Butler sat behind him on the platform, a vivid reminder of all that he personally risked from so revolutionary a step. He would, of course, be expected to give up his lucrative legal practice as long as Satyagraha continued, if he endorsed it, which he never did. He must have sensed, now, as that the unique role of rising political power he had enjoyed at Luck-

he could accept. Gandhi remarked that anyone was "free" to "resign" from the Sabha who could not accept the majority's decision. Only sixty-one members attended that meeting, which had been called at short notice but of those less than one-third, eighty agreed with Jinnah, including his loyal Bombay Parsi lieutenants, the brothers Jinnabhai and Kama Dwarikadas. The defeated minority left the meeting and before month's end, Jinnah wrote "with great sorrow" to resign from the League he had joined. Gandhi then wrote to seek to win Jinnah back, asking him to take his share in the new life that has opened up before the country, and benefit the country by your experience and guidance. Jinnah's reply to that letter indicates how passionately apprehensive he felt on the eve of the Nagpur Congress about the course Gandhi charted for India.

If by "new life" you mean your methods and your programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them, for a new life is not a new life but a new life to disaster. But the actual new life that has opened up before the country is that we are faced with a Government that pays no heed to the grievances, feelings and sentiments of the people, that our own countrymen are divided, the Moderate Party is still going wrong, that our methods have already caused split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the country not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Muslims and Muslims and Muslims and even between Hindus and Muslims generally are desperate over the results and our extreme programme has forthwith struck the magnanimous spirit of the experienced statesman, he is ignorant and illiterate & this means anarchy, disorganisation and chaos. What the consequence of this may be I should not contemplate but I am convinced that the present policy of the Government is the primary cause of it all and unless that cause is removed, the effects must continue. I have no voice or power to remove the cause but at the same time I do not wish my countrymen to be dragged to the brink of a precipice in order to be shattered.¹⁸

Was that "shudder" of apprehension in 1920 Jinnah's first rude awakening to the death knell of his dream of national leadership and unity? Clearly he had no faith in Gandhi or his judgment to save India from being "shattered." Was this possibly his first premonition of partition? The only way for the Nationalists, Jinnah warned, his revealing letter to the moderate wing of the programme was to accept a universal franchise for the election of a completely responsible government. Such a programme cannot be achieved by any single individual but only by the approval and support of the prominent Nationalist leaders in the country and to achieve this end I am

sure my colleagues and myself shall continue to work." While conceding his own weakness, on the one hand Jinnah thus reaffirmed his commitment to the same goal, the same struggle for responsible government through Hindu-Muslim unity to which he had devoted himself since long before Lucknow. His wounded pride was palpable, perhaps more in those conciliatory remarks even than in his pained confession, "I have no voice or power."

Central India's Nagpur hosted both regular sessions of the Muslim League and Congress after Christmas in 1920. That ancient sacred stronghold of Hindu religious ceremonies, ruled by Nawabdarulha regional ruler, gave birth to a new Congress under Gandhi's revolutionary leadership. Jinnah first moved his credo resolution at a meeting of the subjects committee on December 38, proposing "the attainment of swaraj by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means." Jinnah immediately stated that it was impractical and dangerous to dissolve "the British dominion" without greater preparation for independence and Gandhi argued:

I do not for one moment suggest that we wait to end the British connection at all costs unconditionally. If the British connection is for the advancement of India we do not want to destroy it. . . . I know, before we are done with this great battle on which we have embarked . . . we have to go probably, possibly, through a sea of blood, but let it not be said of us or any of us that we are guilty of shedding blood, but let it be said by generations yet to be born that we suffered that we shed not somebody's blood but our own; and so I have no hesitation in saying that I do not want to show much sympathy for those who had their heads broken or who were said to be even in danger of losing their lives. What does it matter?¹⁹

Jinnah argued as best he could against the resolution in committee, but he lost the vote because of a war of courage and was soundly as well as down in the day. As a matter of fact, he rushed to its end, he new it was passed by Gandhi before the more than 14,500 delegates who met in Nagpur approved the Congress text more than two to one. The next day, the Mahatma's resolution was greeted with a spontaneous outburst of applause. Jinnah, but he seconded the motion amid further raucous acclamation. Jinnah alone rose and demanded to be heard in opposition, struggling to the dais. "Mr. Jinnah with the usual look on his face mounted the platform with an ease suggestive of self-confidence and the conviction of the man, and opposed in an argumentative, bold and clear style the change of creed," reported the *Times of India*.

He was "howled down with cries of shame, shame and political im-

He referred to "Mr. Gandhi a few at any," but the true a chance

yelled "No. Mahatma Gandhi."⁴⁹ He repeated "Mister" then finally abandoned any pretence, seeking a way to inject some air of logical reasoning into an atmosphere charged with passionate emotion. "At the moment the destinies of the country are in the hands of two men," Jinnah argued, "and one of them is Gandhi. Therefore standing on this platform knowing as I do that he commands the majority in this assembly, I appeal to him to pause, to cry halt before it is too late." Jinnah's appeal went unanswered by Gandhi, however, as he thus, losses and appeals of the audience finally drove the author of the Lucknow Pact and ex-president of the Home Rule League and the Bombay Conference from the Nagpur platform. As the Central Provinces Commissioner Frank Sly later accurately reported of the Nagpur Congress to Chelmsford two days later, Jinnah carried no influence.⁵⁰ It was the most bitterly humiliating experience of his public life. He left Central India with Rattie by the next train, the searing memory of his defeat at Nagpur permanently etched on his brain. Whatever hopes he had had of National Congress participation faded that day. Jinnah had scaled the heights of political greatness. Jinnah plummeted over the precipice to a new low, reviled by fellow Muslim khilafat leaders even more than by the Mahatma's devotedest Indian disciples. Shariat Ali hated him and made no secret of his sentiments whenever he went.

Though he had presided over the Muslim League only three months earlier, Jinnah did not even bother to attend its Nagpur session, rightly gauging his failure at his opposition to the Congress khilafat express. He had no more heart for national confrontations that bitter December: no stomach left for the games he had been forced to play, warning them only of the futility of their battle participation. In the havoc he correctly anticipated would be wreaked by and against the suddenly politicized masses of every-where Khilafat Conference, Swaraj Sabha, Congress and Muslim League had re-created its arguments as outmoded, cowardly and invalid. There was no court of appeals left for the moment, so Jinnah went silently some—his "career in politics a shambles, though hardly at an end

6

Retreat to Bombay (1921-24)

Jinnah's withdrawal from the political stage in 1921 left him totally preoccupied with his law. He poured all his energy and talent into his work then, for the last bit of his fifth decade devoted himself day and night to an demanding mistress. His political ambitions and the Burgher's protective work from the house immediately field of public life. Safely removed from the fray, he watched as violence and strife darkened up dark clouds of the rage and official repression. The death of his son, a career politician, coincided with changes in his relationship to Rattie. Their lives were becoming less exciting. Jinnah was no longer the rising political star. Formerly were the days of his leading a charge against a town hall for addressing mass meetings on streets named for Congress. After that he aged much faster. The rakish, lean of forty-two was transformed into a portly, bearded one an older statesman, a careful strategist of the few who had precious little time for the whims or fancies of a young wife and infant daughter.

Rattie tried in many ways to recapture his interest and attention, using the old tricks and charms he possessed. But she belonged to his Lucknow days, those days of heady promise and infinite possibility. That image was behind him, almost as remote and strangely romantic a dream as his childhood, when he and his mother were "two souls apart." Jinnah's legal career had reached its peak. Jinnah used to pore over his briefs every day. I remember her walking into Jinnah's chambers while we were in the midst of a conference, dressed in a manner which would be called fast even by modern standards, perch herself upon Jinnah's table, dangling her feet and waiting for Jinnah to finish the conference so that they could leave together. It was a sight to be seen and heard.

New Delhi (1924-28)

British India's newly elected National Assembly met for the first time in New Delhi on January 21, 1924. Jinnah wasted no time, within twenty-three "independents" to confer with him immediately after the viceroy's opening address. Jinnah's negotiator, practical politician that he was, he managed to define a program of basic reforms that he convinced in his prominent embassies, Jawahar and C. R. Das, offering to merge his powerful swing between independent votes with their plurality of forty-two Swadeshi members who could not let the phantom of thirty-six official appointees whenever they wished. A new Nationalist party was thus born within the assembly's overcast, much to Roundings amazement and dismay. This powerful Indian bloc of elected representatives committed to achieving dominion status and full responsible provincial government at the earliest possible date had been compared into existence miraculously it seemed from the disparate droves of individuals who posed no threat, no political challenge to officialdom, nor troubled by the swirling fire of Jinnah's brilliant alienism. No he repeated in New Delhi, much the same feat of political education he had achieved at Lucknow. Only the vague formula did not extend as far this time, nor last quite as long.

Jinnah's assembly strategy bore fruit in February 1924 when a resolution on constitutional reforms recommended the early surrender of a Round Table Conference with due regard to the preservation of the rights and interests of representative minorities. Jinnah's strategy had been to establish a full responsible Government in India. That resolution carried by a vote of 78 to 48, and as a result, Lord Irwin appointed a Reforms Inquiry Committee, chaired by Home member Sir

Alexander Muddanun. Jinnah served on that committee with four other Indians. Madras Sir P. S. Sivaswami Aiyer 1864-1946, president of the National Liberal Federation. Poona educator Dr. R. P. Paranjpye 1877-1969. Allahabad's barrister Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru 1875-1949, and the Punjab's Sir Muhammad Shafi, law member of the government of India. The committee soon came to be referred to among the elected members within the assembly as "the Jinnah Committee". Jinnah drafted a national demand and minority report by the year's end, out of fifteen years of the growing effectiveness and escalating demands of the Indian National Congress were a then so strong that the viceroy vetoed several attempts to debate the Reforms Inquiry Committee reports, thus squelching Jinnah's recommendations.

The Pakistan movement and its singular impact on recent Indian history have tended to obscure Jinnah's positive contributions to the evolution of a parliamentary government in India. Much of his time and talent however were absorbed in debating legislation, arguing for or against bills, convening, and trying to keep offends as well as national colleagues interested. Jinnah's first as a Member of the Central Legislative Council of Calcutta, Jinnah emerged with a reputation as the "debater" of the assembly speaking to most resolutions, preserving every document and report with the precision of a lawyer and expressing himself with the force of a great orator. Speaking, for example, to a resolution designed to empower the assembly to enter government contracts, strongly opposed a ridiculous Jinnah remark: "What is the difficulty? It is only an excuse, it is the same old story, the executive does not wish to, and the secretary of this House is not into engagements of a serious character. I say, there is absolutely no objection. And to be proposed to require passports for entry into the country," Jinnah remarked, "Sir, I think that all regulations which impede the free movement of the people are the biggest nuisance and the sooner they are done away with the better."¹⁴

In 1924 he introduced an important resolution that went to the heart of India's struggle for economic independence, insisting that the government of India be allowed to purchase its vast and valuable "stores" of raw materials, minerals, and land a rather than only through the market in London. Although this Resolution of mine may not later attract every Member of the House, it being a very dry subject," Jinnah began wisely. "I have no doubt that when Honourable Members understand this question, they will realise that it affects India most vitally." He then reviewed the history of some seventy-five years of imperial purchases that inhibited Indian economic development, concluding "it gives a tremendous advantage to the British manufacturers who are on the spot, who get the information first, and invariably it is really for all practical purposes con-

Each flurry led to more retaliatory raids, provoking further blooded riots, leaving countless dead, wounded, and embittered.

Motilal Nehru, as head of the Swarajist faction within Congress (Das felt mortally wounded in 1924) was Gandhiji's only competitor for leadership of that organization. In August 1924, in a "Very Confidential" letter, the Mahatma wrote Motilal to inform him that he was "prepared to facilitate your securing the Congress machinery, actually assisting you to do so," and would "in no case be party to vetoing, claiming no interest in anything but promoting a peaceful atmosphere" and adding: "If you are not prepared to take over the whole of the Congress machinery I am quite prepared to facilitate you taking over those portions where you think you have no difficulty in running it." Almost as an afterthought, however, in the very same letter Gandhiji named those who, have been, insist that he [Gandhiji] should become president himself, concluding: "The only condition that we make in reconsidering my position would be your desire that I should accept. Will you please consult Messrs. Das, Kelkar and others and let me know what you would advise?"¹²

The Mahatma's continued boycott of all councils undermined Motilal's position within the Legislative Assembly and Congress; Gandhiji had published a statement of "total moral difference" with the Swarajists that Motilal felt that Congress entry is inconsistent with Non-cooperation as he conceived it.¹³

Motilal was thus faced with the need to choose, by mid-1924, between continuing his party's assembly alliance with Jinnah and risking the loss of Gandhiji's confidence and erosion of his Congress position, or moving the other way. It was not an easy decision. The elder Nehru wrestled with it all summer, inviting Gandhiji to stay as his guest at the family beach house in Bombay during August, trying to convince the Mahatma of the "nation-building utility" of Swarajist work within the assembly. Motilal's son, Jawaharlal, who was Congress secretary that year, joined them during those vacation months but recalled that he and his father "did not succeed in winning Gandhiji, or even in influencing him to any extent." The Mahatma's only match for stubbornness in recent Indian history was Jinnah: "Behind all the friendly talks and the courteous gestures, the fact remained that there was no compromise," wrote the younger Nehru. "I also retreated from Jinnah... disappointed, for Gandhiji did not resolve a single one of my doubts. As is usual with him he refused to look into the future, or lay down any long-distance program."¹⁴ Jawaharlal rightly called it a tug-of-war between his father and Gandhi.

Capitulating to Gandhiji's position, Motilal got his assembly Swarajists to agree after mid-year to "throw out all proposals for legislative council work

in which the bureaucracy proposes to consolidate its power." While admitting that it is conceivable that some good may incidentally result from a few of these measures, Motilal insisted, "we are clear" of opinion, but in the larger interest of the country, it is better to temporarily sacrifice such other benefits than add an iota to the powers of the bureaucracy.¹⁵ That "Swarajist" move presaged the death of the Nationalist party for Jinnah and his supporters refused to engage in "obstructionist tactics" that the assembly was unwilling to consider each motion on its merits voting for or against a measure only because they believed it might advance or retard the economic or constitutional development of India.

At the time, Jinnah left to Bombay, that summer, and spoke to the "First Congress" in London to raise money for Mahatma's home in Poona. Jinnah attended the meeting and asked a Jinnah's Nagpur footsteps address to Gandhiji as "Master" and noting that a great deal of "busy work" had been done under the banner of "Mahatma" Jinnah was for a week and a half in London. But Gandhiji rose on this occasion to his critic's defense, stating:

"The word 'Mahatma' strikes in my nostrils and in addition to that somebody exists and ever our ears call me 'Mahatma' I get nervous, I do not wish to live. Had I not known that the more I insist on the word 'Mahatma' not being used, the more does it come into vogue, I would most certainly have insisted. In the Ashram where I live, I told Brother and Sister has orders not to use the word 'Mahatma'.¹⁶

When Jinnah came to a public apology to Jinnah for what had happened in 1924, Jinnah said: "You must have known that Kanji had reported what he said to Mr. and Mrs. J."

Ruttie was almost as much of Kanji by now as she did of her busy husband. She had recently a divorce from him. She turned to mysticism for solace, and Kanji was her guide in the realm of spiritualizing and thought transference. Wrote Kanji: "Ruttie was interested in contacting the non-physical world and she made difficult dangerous experiments to verify her beliefs and convictions. She needed first hand knowledge."¹⁷ Just how difficult or "dangerous" her "experiments" were is unclear, but she seems to have been taking drugs for some time, initially to help her cope with insomnia and depression perhaps on morphine, hashish, and cocaine were, of course, readily available in part of Bombay. Sir wrote Kanji to November 1924:

I have a matter about which I am most anxious to speak with you, as I think you can help me. Lately I have been very much drawn to

wards the subject of Spirit Communication and I am most anxious to know more and to get at the Truth. It is such an elusive Subject and the more I hear of it the more puzzled do I become, though still more passionately interested. I have some sort of an idea that you must be cognisant of spiritual circles in our City, whose Seneca one may join. I don't profess any creed nor do I subscribe to a belief, but . . . I am too deeply immersed in the matter now to give it up without some personal satisfaction for I cannot content myself with other peoples' experiences . . . I would prefer my identity, however, to remain unknown while you make enquiries. And I sincerely hope that you will be able to assist me.¹⁸

A month later Rutte wrote again to remind him that "What I am after is a Seneca or troubled by some experienced medium" as I am most anxious to get a personal experience of this matter which I so passionately believe in.¹⁹ Her loneliness her desperation for someone to talk with and discuss questions that interested her so passionately was palpable. "Do come and see me soon so that we may revive our last conversation."

"My dear Karji," she wrote the following April, "Yes, I know of the career tracks of which you speak but I am too busy during my waking hours. There is nothing I would welcome with greater eagerness than a experience of the sort which you describe in a letter but in my busy day like sleep there is no evening feature—five or at most six hours rest . . . a restless mind, and a correspondingly restless physical state. I don't dream excepting very rarely." She was now twenty-five years old. "My soul is so clogged and though I aspire and crave God knows how earnestly my researches remain unproductive. I have a feeling peculiarly restless and wish one with psychic powers could come to my assistance."²⁰

She tied her best to a case her associate's interest in such things. Writing to report to Kanji, she even thought she had succeeded.

I am slowly but surely drawing his interest into the matter and by alternate bullying and coaxing I got him to read that book "The Spirit of Irene." . . . I had to admit that it was remarkable and unrefutable. . . . The incident deals with the tracing of a murder—it revolves round a poor girl—a cook—who was deceived from London to Boscomb and then done to death, the details of the crime are horrible, it having been a crime of lust. The police being baffled by the cunning of the man, were at their wits end, or you may be sure they would not have consented to hold Seneca. Anyway they got the needed clue and the evidence was of such a nature that the unfortunate man was hanged. . . . I was not at all events able to find any new in the crime.²¹

One can hardly imagine Jinna devoting much time or attention to "Irene." His legal practice alone remained so demanding that Rutte added in his letter of April 12, 1925, "It doesn't look as if we were going to Kashmir after all, as I am engaged in the Bawa case." Kanji kept her well supplied with books at a kind of his own literary reviews, and plays—she especially enjoyed Noel Coward. Throughout 1925 he saw her regularly three or four times a week. Dina was now six, and Kanji tried to convince Rutte to send her to school in Madras, at the headquarters of Mrs. Besant's Theosophical Society. Jinna resisted that move, sensing no doubt that it would further alienate his daughter from her own community. He may have feared he would soon "lose" his daughter as Sir Dinshaw had lost his in June 1925. Rutte was ill again and wrote dear Kanji "as it was nearing 2 A.M. I am frightfully tired and sleepy but the thought of you having come to me tonight had to crawl out of bed to write to you—to ease my conscience if nothing else. Will you excuse me and let me get back now?" She told him in July that she would go with Kanji to the Theosophical Society's Ladies' Convention in Madras that December. The Madras League which met in Aligarh. She was to have been introduced as a representative by Mrs. Desai at the pulpit but then Rutte's suit for divorce and her departure overtook her. She did, however, meet Anand Besant at Ayrer before she and the older woman arrived at a perceived how "happy" she was, "meeting Kanji's movement at that verdict with—Don't you see, my happiness in her eyes? Look at her."²²

Despite his rise as a matter of interest, Gandhi himself did preside over the Congress in 1925 but as he insisted "only" as a businesslike presence at business meetings. The 1921 census figures revealed such rapid growth among Muslims in both wings of the north that they were now a majority in the Provinces—54.5 percent and in Bengal—52.1 percent. This development stimulated demands for reorganizing the Government with a view to giving large-scale leaders from both Muslim-majority provinces no longer without representation within the framework of a non-provincial council status. The Congress Committee's opposition was thus driven upon a vigorously advocating the Muslim League from Congress, even as Muslim disillusion with Gandhian methods of non-cooperation grew.

It was Bhandari's final year in India. The viceroy valued Jinna's assembly work and high regard for him. His name and December 1925 in the invited list he was recommending for knighthood, if only Jinna would agree to accept that honor. "I prefer to be plain Mr. Jinna," he replied, "I have loved as plain Mr. Jinna and I hope to die as plain Mr. Jinna."²³ Rutte reportedly responded to a query of how she would like being addressed "Lady Jinna," by snapping—"If my husband accepts knighthood I

will take a separation from him." The latter course may have been an option she contemplated by now. It was one she would at an early date exercise a few years later even though Jinnah was never knighted. His increased conservatism and growing Islamic consciousness contributed to the ideological gulf that divided them. There were more personal gulfs as well. He was practically fifty, she was half that age and they were attuned to different harmonies. Not that he ever stopped loving her, he hoped in fact that they might recapture the magic of their early years in the spring and summer of 1926 when he took her abroad with him on a tour that included London, Paris, Canada, and the United States.

Jinnah had been appointed to the Assembly's Sandhurst Committee in 1925 chaired by John Army, chief of staff Lieutenant General Sir Andrew Skene, to study the feasibility of establishing military college like Sandhurst in India. He was one of three Indian subcommittee members invited to undertake the grand tour in inspection of military colleges and institutions. As he was leaving Rangoon early in April and returning home in August Ruttie was nervous about the trip and wrote her friends shortly before leaving. "Keep I am going away to Europe and U.S.A. for a few months. You will not be able to protect me and help me. Do please therefore suggest something for me to keep in touch with you." She gave him a beautiful bangle from the store and he inaugurated it with thoughts of love and protection. Jinnah ever believed in such things and sed to laugh at her for putting faith in omens. Ruttie reported to Kaur after her return home. But instead of being a second honeymoon, it was their final trip together.

Ruttie's health deteriorated rapidly after their trip abroad. "I suppose we will have our moments of melancholy and morose when everything seems to be impending and yet nothing happens a sort of waiting mood and one at wars and wars and grows distrustful of life," she wrote her best friend early in 1927. "I am always glad when you come. So don't push away most of my not being strong enough and well enough. Keep it away . . . P.S. I am quite alright again and were it not that my feet are ugly and swollen. I should be getting about as usual. As it is I go walking with my friends and to-night I am going to cinema-in bedroom slippers as no shoes are large enough to accommodate my elegant ankles." Her X-rays taken and find that the broken needle is still there. so am trying to make up my mind to undergo another operation.²⁴ She lavished most of her time and emotional energy now on her numerous pets, cats and dogs, each of which she pampered, nursed, and treated as a child. For unlike Dina, who was out all day at school or preoccupied with friends, the pets were hers alone to fondle, spoon, and project all of her feelings and fears upon.

The Muslim League's devoted secretary, Syed Shamsu, Hasan, wrote that "after the slitting of the League Office to Delhi in February 1927" he acted as a sort of chamberlain to the Quaid-i-Azam, whenever he visited Delhi. His relations with his wife, Mariam (Ruttie's Muslim name), were estranged during this period and he resided alone sometimes at the Cecil Hotel or Old Delhi's best hotels—Mir Maiden's—and sometimes at the Western Courts—the accommodation provided by the Government for the members of the Legislative Assembly. He was not so careful about his health as in other matters. The Delhi winters did not suit him, and he often suffered from severe attacks of cold and influenza. In spite of his poor health he attended the Assembly and devoted most of his time and energy to political activities.²⁵ This may have made the beginning of the complex and compounded lung disease that would take him in twenty-one years later. Was it coincident that Jinnah's powerful constitution should have suddenly started to deteriorate then? His separation from Ruttie was surely a severe blow. Her lungs and body were more affected than his and too frail to survive another two years. And the combination of the distressing winters, knowing and just that one loved his life and the hope of his faith in the *hona fides* of an imperial system to last, always frustrated, probably wounded him. He would never breathe easily again.

For India as a whole as well as for individual persons,²⁶ 1927 was a year of shattered hopes and dreams. A few weeks had elapsed since Mahatma's campaign had given wings to soaring, unbridled excitement. Yet the country's status of dependence, *Strategic* seemed more remote, ever the concern of State Lord Birkenhead (1872-1931) and his friends, not the concern of the new rulers of Westminster, placed were more than asking them all to be more determined to bend their bound of empire to a racial rule and to a new Lord Raitan. MacDonald's Labour opposition was growing stronger with the execution of rather than wait for the inevitable Labour victory. It would come in 1929, the Tory cabinet decided to jump the gun by appointing its own Royal Statutory Commission in 1927 carrying out the mandate of the Act of 1925, and before the deadline expired to chart the "next" in constitutional advance for India. Birkenhead could now choose the membership of that mighty commission and appointed his barrister friend, Mr. John Simon (1873-1954), and six other Englishmen, all equally uninformed about India. Heading a successor as viceroy, Edward Wood, Lord (later Halifax) (1881-1959), more sympathetic and sensitive to Indian feelings, had urged the appointment of at least two Indian members on this blue-ribbon body, but Birkenhead wanted his "jury," as he thought of them, to do their research in India "without any preconceived prejudice."²⁷

Jinnah had written the viceroy in June explicitly to warn him that "the

personnel of the Commission is far more important than any other factor in this matter.²¹ Had he hoped to be appointed himself? Most probably. He was always generous in helping government with his time and deep understanding of what needed to be done to reform India's constitution, and work was his only solace now. Doubly bitter was the draught of rejection. Jinnah was obliged to swallow then with the rest of India's ignored and wasted leadership, which was so publicly rejected, repudiated that November by Lord Birkenhead's "ly wite"ist. As few to one impassioned voice, India would respond. "Simon, go back" when the commission reached Bombay's port February next, 15 years of projected labor doomed, torpedoed before it ever got underway, by the pig-headedness of a narrow-minded coterie of imperial managers who put their selfish interests above the needs, aspirations, and just demands of most of humankind.

The Muslim League divided over the Simon Commission issue. A small group, most from the Punjab, lined up behind ex-Law Minister Shafi and met in Lahore where they voted to welcome and cooperate with the commission. Most members of the League's central committee, however, joined the "Jinnah Group" in Calcutta, meeting on December 30, 1927, and New Year's Day, 1928. Annie Besant and Sarojini Naidu attended as honored guests and the Ag. Khan was to have presided, but he withdrew at the last moment. Masud, Muhammad Yakub took his place and delivered his presidential address, extemporizing in Urdu. The most important resolution, carried by acclamation, declared "unmistakably" that "the Statutory Commission and the procedure as announced are unacceptable to the people of India. If the Jinnah League [therefore] resolves that the Muslims throughout the country should have nothing to do with the Commission at any stage or in any form."²² Jinnah was re-elected permanent president of the League for another three years and thundered:

A constitutional war has been declared on Great Britain. Negotiations for a settlement are not to come from our side. Let the Government sue for peace. We are demoequid partners. We will resist the new doctrine to the best of our power. Jallianwalla Bagh was a physical butchery; the Simon Commission is a butchery of our souls. By appointing an exclusively white Commission, Lord Birkenhead has declared our unfitness for self-government. I welcome Pandit Motilal [a leading Congress Hindu in attendance], and I welcome the hand of fellowship extended to us by Hindu leaders from the platform of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. For, to me, this offer is more valuable than any concession which the British Government can make. Let us then grasp the hand of fellowship. This is indeed a

bright day, and for achieving this unity, thanks are due to Lord Birkenhead.²³

The outgoing Tory secretary of state thus achieved in a single act more than Gandhi and Jinnah alone could accomplish at the peak of their popularity and power, momentarily at least, turning a country still bleeding from communal wounds, breathing fresh life into the all but abandoned hopes of boycott and non-cooperation, and bringing Gandhi, Jinnah, the Nehrus, and even old Annie Besant back to harness at the head of a single mass national movement resolved to reject Birkenhead, Simon, and the morally bankrupt company they represented.

Calcutta (1928)

The euphoria Janab felt at the start of 1928 was to dissipate long before the year ended. His joy was a brief respite. By years end the castle of Hindu-Muslim unity built on shifting sands of communal mistrust, suspicion and doubt would be washed away by tides of frustration and disunion. There was no true turning back — restoration of that bountiful climate before Nagpur. It was a momentary respite Janab experienced, savoured as the enormity of Birkenhead's conspiracy for all Indian politicians. How this particular, such English arrogance sadly made his conflicts with Congress colleagues seem

In November after Calcutta, Janab returned to Bombay to organize the boycott of Simon and his commission's imminent entry there. Janab claimed the non-boycott committee and his assistant Chagla was his secretary. "I must say," Chagla recalled, "Janab was as firm as a rock as far as the question of the boycott of the Commission was concerned. Proposals were made that the boycott should be only political and not social. Janab would not agree and did not give an inch. He said a boycott was a boycott and it must be total and complete. We held many meetings in connection with boycott campaign. We had a mass meeting at the Chowpatty sands."

Simon arrived on February 3, 1928, and Janab's boycott proved to be effective. A call went out "tender my congratulations to the organizer for the very great success in achieving it. It did not seem good to see the crisis, a desperate and Congressmen came together at the same point form." Birkenhead had briefed Simon on the eve of his departure from Calcutta. He was told that the boycott was the worst failure. We have been relied on the non-boycotting Moslems, on the depressed community, on the

cott. You and Simon must be the judges whether or not it is expedient in these directions to try to make a breach in the wall of antagonism. Officialdom cracked down with a vengeance as the nationwide boycott proved more effective than Birkenhead dreamed it would be.

The primacy of Janab's role in this boycott was underscored by Birkenhead's singling him out as the leader to be undermined. "I should advise Simon to see at Calcutta Moslem people who are not boycotting the Commission," Birkenhead urged Irvine, particularly Moslems and the depressed classes. I should widely advertise all his interviews with representative Moslems." He then announced, as laudably as it had ever been put into writing by a British official, the whole policy of *divide et impera*, advising that Simon's "obvious" goal was "to terrify the Moslem Hindu population by the apprehension that the Commission is being got hold of by the Moslems and may present a report altogether destructive of the Hindu position, thereby securing a solid Moslem support and raising Janab high and dry."

On February 12 Janab attended the All-Parties Conference chaired by Congress president at Asarami in Delhi. Motilal and Jawaharlal were there as were Lajpat Rai, Mahadevi Varma and most of the other leaders of national India. Gandhi did not attend, as he remained at his Sabarmati ashram, planning as he did to file the last of his constitutional petitions. The conference, however, was convened only just that seeking to resolve a single Indian dilemma to what yet united Simon and the others might fashion. "The first question discussed by the Conference was the objective to be aimed at in the constitution. It was proposed that the objective should aim at establishing what is called a dominion form of government in India. Objection was taken by some members to this or the ground that the Congress had levied in favour of independence its sole goal and no lesser goal should be envisaged." Jawaharlal Nehru was Congress president in 1924-1931 and the latter group, differing sharply from Motilal as well as Gandhi on this point. The two gradually agreed upon was to frame a constitution "for the establishment of full responsible government." The problem of Moslem rights and representation was less easily resolved. Wrangling and bickering continued for over a week till "the strain was too great for national life to stand, a near insurrection." Jawaharlal repeated to Gandhi:

"I have tried to bring the All-Parties Conference to a close, but it has started before the All-Parties Conference was over, and he convinced a number of the representatives present to give a compromise by 'appeal' be drafted. Ten fruitless days after the conference had begun, however, it ended without agreement on any Muslim question. Jaykar, Mahadevi and Lajpat Rai wanted to eliminate separate electorates entirely, yet they were unwilling to concede any of the compensating constitutional

Jinnah refused Motilal's invitation. The Muslim League had not as yet had a chance to meet to consider the Nehru proposals, he argued, and "As the President of the League it would not do for me to anticipate their decisions."²² It was one of his most effective negotiating techniques: part of the secret of his singular power for he always magnified himself by the force of his entire party whenever he felt unhappy about the terms of an offer. He was just then emerging for Sind to take charge of the defense of a wealthy and powerful Muslim piri of its northernmost district.

Pir Fagaro had been jailed at Sukkur for "theft and wrongful confinement of some one and for keeping a large number of arms and ammuni- tion in his possession."²³ His trial was held in a special magistrate's court in the Sukkur district. There Jinnah stayed in the government guest house. Sukkur's only decent accommodation for a Lalpur overlooking the Indus and the massive dam that spanned it. He commanded 500 rupees a day, a very high fee for the time. Although the magistrate convicted Fagaro, Jinnah appealed two years later, and had his client's sentence reduced.

Two significant things occurred while Jinnah was in Sind. He met young Mohammed Khokha, who later worked for Pir Fagaro and was destined to become independent Pakistan's first minister of Trade. And Miran Sir Hay Haroon, a princely ruler of neighbouring Khairpur State and one of Jinnah's independent party assembly colleagues, held a fête in his honor at the ornate Khairpur House, which Jinnah attended in a most fashionable modern Sindhi costume: black shawl, floral dhoti, and pink shoes. Jinnah took this occasion to speak to the Muslim League and several of whom would become his strongest backers and hesitants during the two remaining decades of his life.

Before leaving Sind in November 10, Jinnah had openly discussed his grave concerns and pessimism about Motilal's committee and its report with fellow Muslims. He would be going to Calcutta in December but anticipated quite accurately as a future critic that the conclusions there might prove "the putting of the wares." Had he decided in fact, prior to December in Calcutta that it was time to abandon the ingenious all parties search for a constitutional solution acceptable to every shade, caste and religious community of India's pluralistic spectrum? Had he concluded that it might be more profitable and less hazardous for the Muslim League to go it alone in negotiating with the British? For what had he time spent on all parties' agonizing accomplishments after a year when he and the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha lay closer to consensus than they had been five years ago? With increasingly fragile health he must have felt more keenly the

some of whom could barely speak the English language, most of whom had never drafted a legal document. Nor was he simply being middle-aged and irritable, though he would soon be at least fifty-one.

At Lucknow, the meeting of Jinnah's League council did not go as he hoped it would, and to his personal disappointment he found many good Muslim colleagues so unimpressed by the Nehru report that he dared not call for a vote on it nearly a month later. Even the maharaja of Mahmudabad, who was elected that year's president of the Muslim League, liked the report and was ready to accept it. Chagla was overjoyed to find so many allies and hoped Jinnah would see the wisdom of his earlier actions, but Jinnah remained set against the Nehru "constitution," viewing it only as a "Hind" document.

Motilal, Dr. Ansari, and Maulana Azad met with him in Lucknow, urging him to attend a special meeting of the Nehru committee before the League or Congress met in December, and before the All Parties Convention would be convened in Calcutta to try to fashion a common set of principles on communal issues. Jinnah turned them down, insisting that first his League had to meet and officially take its stand. He asked Motilal to postpone the convention till early next year after his annual sessions of League and Congress. Then he returned to Bombay and prepared for a provincial League meeting which was held on November 23, holding at least a very a majority in his home town. But Chagla stood up and argued so effectively for the Nehru report that Jinnah adjourned the meeting without putting the question to a vote. Had he sensed once again that on this issue he sided with a minority of his own party? Jinnah was growing, so effectively, more isolated and dispirited.

In an earlier "confidential" letter to his own committee, Motilal had requested, after meeting with Jinnah in Lucknow, that Jinnah object to the Convention being held before the meeting of the Muslim League on the ground that the authority to represent the League at the Convention could only be derived from the League. . . . I may mention that had the Report of the Committee and the Lucknow decisions been taken into consideration they would have been approved by a greater majority [of the Muslim League Council] than at which he elected the Maharaja of Mahmudabad as President of the League. It is expected that the result will be the same at the open session of the League.²⁴ Motilal was obviously kept well informed of Jinnah's feelings and his attitude towards the League's demands that he might otherwise have done. He misjudged Jinnah's resistance, however, by underestimating his powers. It was a fatal error, not only for his report, but for his hopes of retaining India as a united entity. The All India

National Convention started as scheduled in Calcutta on December 22 but no officially appointed representatives of the Muslim League arrived to attend its crowded sessions till December 28.

Following recitations from the *Quran*, Abul Karim, the chairman of the League's reception committee, welcomed its delegates on December 28 at the opening of Jinnah's address at the meeting in Calcutta "on the eve of momentous changes in the Constitution and administration in India." Karim reported that "some forces were at work to divide the political strength of the Muslims of India at a time when vital interests both of the community and the country required that there should be solid unity." On December 27, the League voted to appoint with three delegates to represent them and take part in the deliberations of the Convention called by the Indian National Congress. This delegation led by Mahomed Ali Jinnah, included thirty-two-year-old Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan (1898-1951) who was to become Pakistan's first prime minister, and Chagla who was to be India's minister of external affairs, 1966-67. Chagla recalled that "Jinnah was in favour of outright rejection of the Nehru report. After a long and protracted debate, we ultimately decided three important principles: (a) that the separate electorate system should remain, second that there should be reservation of one-third of the seats in the Central Legislature and the remainderary powers should be vested in the Provinces."

Jinnah presented the Muslim case before the national convention on December 28. He stressed it was absolutely essential to our progress that a Hindu-Muslim settlement should be reached and that all communities should live in a friendly and harmonious spirit in this vast country of ours.

Aliumad's Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a law member of the viceroy's council, rose to respond to Jinnah's plea.

If you examine the figures, you will find that including nominated members Muslim representation in the Central Legislature is 37 per cent and Mr. Jinnah wants 33. . . . Speaking for myself, I would like you to picture Mr. Jinnah, whom I have known intimately for fifteen years. If he is a spoilt child, a naughty child, I am prepared to say, give him what he wants and be finished with it.¹⁰

However, Prerna's M. R. Jayakar, then deputy leader of the Nationalist party in the assembly, spoke out for her friend Mahomed Ali. The convention was less willing to "pamper" Jinnah than Sapru had been.

I have also known Mr. Jinnah for the last sixteen years in close association as a colleague in nationalist life and I can assure you that he comes before us today neither as a naughty boy nor as a spoilt

child. . . . One important fact to remember . . . is that well-known Muslims like the esteemed patriots Mir Jinnah, Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Ansari, Sir Ali Imam, Raja Salub of Mahmudabad and Dr. Kitchew have given their full assent to the compromise embodied in the Nehru Committee Report. It is further to be borne in mind that even in the Muslim League a large odd of members have given their assent to the Nehru Committee Report. Mr. Jinnah, therefore, represents, if I may say so without offence, a small minority of Muslims.¹¹

He knew, of course, just how offensive a slap that was to Jinnah's ego and sensitivity and there was applause and many a thump of approval as Jayakar sat down.

Jinnah responded softly yet spoke with an intensity of conviction he had not publicly displayed since Nagpur.

We are engaged to-day in a very serious and solemn transaction. We are here, as I understand, for the purpose of entering into a solemn contract and all parties who enter into it will have to work for it and fight for it together. What we want is that Hindus and Muslims should work together and our object is attained. Therefore it is essential that you must get together. The Muslim League is the Muslims of India and hence we are not speaking as a Muslim but as an Indian. . . . Would you be content with a few? Would you be content if I were to say, I am with you? Do you want or do you not want the Muslim India to go along with you? . . . Minorities cannot give anything to the majority. It is, therefore, no use asking me not to touch the small points. I am not asking for these modifications to arise as a "naughty child." If they are small points, you must concede. It is up to the majority, on whom alone we can give. I am asking you for this adjustment because I think it is the best and fair to the Muslims. . . . We are all sons of this land. We have to live together. We have to work together and whatever our differences may be, let us at any rate not create more bad blood. If we cannot agree, let us at any rate agree to differ, but let us part as friends. Believe me there is no progress of India until the Muslims and Hindus are united, and let no logic, philosophy or squabble stand in the way of coming to a compromise and nothing will make me more happy than to see a Hindu-Muslim union.¹²

He must have sensed that the restless jury he addressed had made up their minds against him long before he reached the end of his argument, surely by the time he said "let us part as friends." For that marked a major

of Congress and all it represented than Nagpur had been eight years earlier. It had delivered his swan song to Indian nationalism. The Dream stirred by Laddiphal's ringing voice in Westminster's Commons, nurtured by Marley and Therozesh, enriched by Goshale and Montagu, all those long lost dreamers, all those dead. Born thespian that he was, Jinnah spoke his lines as if he were in a packed, if not always friendly, house before each curtain fell on a major act of his outcast life. Nagpur had ended Act One. Calcutta finished Act Two. This time there would be a longer intermission.

9

Simla (1929-30)

Jinnah adjourned his faction of the Muslim League after a stormy session that followed the Calcutta conference debate. He left Mahomed Ali Jinnah and the two Jinnahs and Bengali and Urdu-speaking for Delhi before the year's end. On New Year's Day, 1929, he entered the All-India Muslim Conference presided over by Aga Khan in the ancient capital of Feroz Afghani's Dargah. Mirza Asaf-ud-Din was there with his Pur. Jinnah walked to the silver sandal patch on the parade ground of the Red Fort that Shah Jahan had built. Bearded mullahs and nighted bejewelled princes of Delhi sat side by side. Jinnah entered alone and sat alone. He was as yet undecided how long he would remain in the land of his fold, who must have seemed a mass of foreign and emigrants, as much as the other emigrants from India who had fled the Mughals. All brothers were there, together with nawabs and rajahs from many a Muslim state. Was this really his home? Were these truly his people?

"It was a vast gathering representative of all shades of Muslim opinion," wrote the Aga Khan, recalling the conference. "I came to be the parent of a movement and a new era of Muslim life. After long and frank discussions we were able to adopt a unanimous series of principles which we set out in a manifesto." The first of these was that "the only form of government suitable to Indian conditions is a federal system with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent states." The next reaffirmed separate Muslim electorates and others asserted further Muslim "weightage" demands in provincial and central governments, as well as for the civil services. It was not yet Pakistan, but almost its early embryo, with a weak federal womb. The League's weighty royal letter, driven from the bridge of his commonwealth a decade and a half earlier, was at the helm.

all of them might survive the coming flood. Asaf Ali and Dr. Saifuddin Kitchi dreamed, believing it to be the best solution under the circumstances. But there was no enthusiasm for his makeshift craft. Little chances that those "opportunists" would survive the first rough squalls of any storm-ravaged sea. Nor could his "coalition" hold together—even for one day.

Next morning, the League was to have met at the Rowsan Theatre near Amir Gate in Old Delhi. Jinnah was to have opened the meeting at 10.30 as he arrived late, doubtless exhausted after his long night of huckstering. Dr. Amari's supporters were in the front rows, and "Dr. Alam forcibly occupied the presidential chair. He presented a resolution approving the National Congress and called upon Tassaddiq Ahmad Khan Sherwani to second it. The gathering, however, did not allow Dr. Alam to conduct the proceedings. Muhammad Ali demanded that he should vacate the chair. As Dr. Alam refused, the audience rushed towards the platform and a general melee followed. Just then, Jinnah arrived and his appearance seemed to have a calming effect, but gaining the fulcrum of the enterprise, he had embarked on a premature journey, abandoned the vessel on without coming to save his beleaguered forces. Had the audience waiting him been his friends, he had little need to retrace his many pointed platform. In announcing them that if the wish of Muslim India was to be "registered, then it can only be accomplished by a united decision."¹²

No more was to come of it. The former League had, in fact, ceased to exist. At few meetings did more leather for lack of a common cause become so obvious. The rest of "Muslim India" was either within Congress or the Mahanaba. Karam Azad remained, or impotent, divided into two camps: the "pure" none of which attracted more than provincial support. Shafi's league attracted force in the Punjab. Dr. Amari conceived Asaf Ali and Choudhry Khazimzai to hold a start a new Nationalist Muslim party that was influential in the United Provinces. The Aga Khan launched a new All-India Muslim Conference, a continuing seminar of conservatives such as Sir Fazl-i-Husain, Sir Shafat Ahmad Khan, and the mufti of Chhatari. It was less than three months since the All Parties Muslim Conference, and they were all running again, in different directions. How realistic were the leaders' prospects of pulling them back together? Except for a few personal friends such as Malik Barkat Ali, Abdul Matin Choudhry and Sir Mohamud Yakub, his loyal helper in running the League, Syed Shamsul Hasan, rightly noted that "others were reluctant to work with the Quaid. His strict attachment to principles and independent approach to problems were the main reasons which kept the others away from him."¹³

Jinnah had no place left to turn but to his British friends. The political

climate in London was rapidly liberalizing, and his old Islington Communist colleague, Ramsay MacDonald, was about to become Westminster's new polestar. That May the Tory government fell, and Prime Minister MacDonald appointed his Labour colleague, William Wedgwood Benn, 1877-1961, after Viscount Stanmore, secretary of state for India, and wasted no time traveling to India as soon as he learned of the Labour victory for a long personal talk with Lord Irwin. "The scene would be returning to London in a few weeks to meet with his new chiefs at Whitehall and 10 Downing Street. Jinnah urged him to press for a strong declaration by the Home government that dominion status was the goal of British policy for India, suggesting a Round Table conference in London to draft such a constitution."

But the "present system" was again coming under heavy siege. Gandhi had returned to Congress's center stage during its final hours in Calcutta to prepare to mount a new national *Satyagraha* campaign. "At present failed to implement the Nehru report within the calendar year 1929."

The Mahatma moved the Congress resolution accepting the report for one year only and thereby averted a fight between the forces of Mahatma and Jinnah on the Congress floor, over whether the national goal should be dominion status or complete independence. "The Congress had adopted the Nehru Report, constitution in its entirety (11th and 12th) and the British Parliament on or before December 31st, 1929," that resolution stated, "but the event of its non-acceptance by the Government or its earlier rejection Congress will organize a non-violent non-cooperation by advising the country to abstain from and resist all Government activities." Section II, spirit of that resolution's mover, Subhas Bose proposed an amendment calling for "complete independence" without further delay. "What is the fundamental cause of our political degradation?" cried Bose, the future Indian National Congress's first minister, and later twice Congress president. "It is the slave mentality. If you want to overcome this slave mentality, you will do so only by giving our country men with a desire for complete independence."¹⁴ He was cheered wildly. Young India was ready to shed its blood for freedom. The darkest days of 1929 were by now forgotten.

On June 10, 1929, Jinnah wrote to Ramsay MacDonald, his old friend and the new prime minister. "The present situation is a very serious deadlock and if allowed to continue it will, in my judgment, prove disastrous both to the interests of India and Great Britain."¹⁵ He then briefly outlined political events of the preceding few years, especially since the appointment of the Simon Commission and the futility of awaiting its report, since "So far as India is concerned, we have done with it." Noting that "India has not her faith in the word of Great Britain," Jinnah advised "The first and foremost

thing that I would ask you to consider is how best to restore that faith and revive the confidence of India in the "bona fides of Great Britain."¹⁸ He warned that "there is a section in India that has already reacted in favour of complete independence, and I may tell you, without exaggeration that the movement for independence is gaining ground as it is supported by the Indian National Congress. To diminish the momentum of such a movement which I think considered no less dangerous a threat to India's security than the necessity has suggested as step one a declaration "without delay" by His Majesty's Government that "Great Britain is unequivocally pledged to the policy of granting a full and responsible Government with Dominion status. The effect of such a declaration will be very far-reaching and go a great way to create a different atmosphere in the country." As to practical measures to implement this, Jinnah declared, "I have urged his friend to 'invite representatives of all communities to a position to deliver the goods' because completely 'mainstream' or 'Inda' is not possible at present." To London to meet with British officials till they could reach a constitutional "agreement which might carry over the areas of the viceroy, the winning assent of the Indian States. His proposals thus formulated could then be placed before Parliament."

Lord Irwin reached London at the same time as Jinnah's letter and went directly to the Foreign Office to meet with Woodrow Wilson, suggesting "the two ideas of Round Table Conference and formal declaration of Dominion status as the goal of British policy for India."¹⁹ The new secretary of state was anxious to convert his wish to be satisfied that we were not going behind the backs of Simon and his Commission, who were then preparing their report. Accordingly, this secret both suggestions with Simon and was much interested in his reaction to them," Irwin recalled.

Somewhat to my surprise, he at first saw no objection at all to the declaration about Dominion Status, but felt difficulty about the Round Table Conference, principally on the ground that it would be likely to affect adversely the status of the Commission's report, when it appeared, by making this only one among other papers that the Conference would presumably have before it. . . . A little later, again to my surprise, his position changed on both points, and I have always surmised that he was much influenced by Reading. Anyhow, whatever the cause, he finally expressed himself satisfied with the Round Table Conference, and fed in with the plan of an exchange of letters with the Prime Minister by which the Conference would appear as an adjunct by the Commission to the Government and readily accepted by them, on the very proper ground of the need to take account of the Indian States as well as of British India."

So much for historic duplicity seeking to salvage Simon's face. Actual credit for both ideas belongs not to Irwin but to his new, unacknowledged adviser Jinnah.

Soothing Simon's ruffled feathers took time. It was not until August 14 that Ramsay MacDonald could reply in a "private letter"

Dear Mr Jinnah,

I am very sorry, but owing to a mistake [*sic*] your letter of the 19th of June was not put immediately before me. Let me say at once how much I appreciate the spirit in which it was written and how glad I would be to meet it in any way possible. The report of the Simon Commission you need have no hesitation in assuming was never intended to be anything more than advice given for the guidance of the Government and that the intention of the Government is, as soon as that report is made, to consider it in the light of all the facts. The suggestions which you make in your letter will be pondered over with a desire to use them in every way that circumstances will allow. But one thing I can say here—because I have said it before repeatedly and still remains the intent of the Government—that we want India to enjoy Dominion status.

There will probably be announcements made very soon regarding future proceedings.²¹

Jinnah was very pleased and optimistically replied on September 7 "If you carry out my suggestion with which I am glad to find that you are in accord, I will then upstage the report for India and the name of Great Britain will live down in history as one nation that was true to its decorations."²²

Lord Irwin wrote Jinnah from his "Viceroy's camp" the following month promising that

"His Majesty's Government are greatly concerned to find means by which the broad question of British Indian constitutional advance may be approached in co-operation with all who can speak authoritatively for British Indian opinion . . . and I am authorized to say that in the judgment of His Majesty's Government it is implicit in the Declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress as then contemplated is the attainment of Dominion Status. In the full tribulation of this policy the States must ultimately have their place . . . and His Majesty's Government accordingly propose to invite representatives of different interests in British India and of the Indian States to meet them, separately or together as circumstances may demand, in regard both to British India and all India."

problems. They hope thus to be able to submit eventually to Parliament proposals commanding a wide measure of general assent.²²

The first steps that would lead to three major Round Table conferences in London were thus taken, and Jinnah was not only the prime minister's personal friend and adviser in that important complex process but had now become the viceroy's key emissary as well.

Irwin's historic statement appeared on the front page of every major Indian newspaper on November 1, 1929. Jinnah was in Bombay that day and met with eighteen others in Sir Chhambhai Setalvad's chambers to issue a joint public statement in response to Irwin's announcement, welcomed as a

fundamental change of procedure whereby the representatives of India will be free to meet His Majesty's Government in conference for the purpose of arriving at the greatest possible measure of agreement regarding the proposals to be submitted to Parliament for the attainment of Dominion Status by India, thereby reaching a solution which might carry the willing assent of political India.²³

Sir B. N. Dutta, Bhulabhai Desai, Sir H. J. P. Mack, Chagla Khami Dwar Khami and his friends were among those who signed this statement. In New Delhi, the meeting, chaired by Motilal Nehru, including thirty leaders of various parties other than Congress, a political general consultation was called together with the great of general assembly for political prisoners, and the permanent representatives of the Indian National Congress at the forthcoming Round Table conference. This famous Manifesto, as it soon came to be called, further insisted that "the [Round Table] Conference is to meet not to discuss when Dominion Status is to be established but to frame a scheme of Dominion Constitution for India."

Whether in Jawaharlal Nehru's eye that Manifesto than he regretted or no, he was indeed ahead of walking at with Subhas Bose and his comrades. Feeling himself "an interloper," Jawaharlal now wanted to "resign" from the presidency of Congress, which he had just accepted. Gandhi responded to Jawaharlal's distress and his leave was granted. You must not resign, it will affect the national cause. There is no hurry and no principle at stake. About the crown, no one else can wear it. It never was to be a crown of roses. Let it be all thorns now,"²⁴ Nehru did not, in fact, resign, but his emotional threat of resignation stiffened both Gandhi and Motilal in their resolve to stand by the leaders' manifesto as the most they would be willing to do by way of "accommodating" the viceroy and His Majesty's government. Irwin, however, had secured as much promise of change as himself. MacDonald was prepared to offer Jinnah, therefore, found himself in the

unenviable, yet not unfamiliar position, of having to try to bridge the gap remaining between both sides.

Jinnah, Gandhi, Motilal, Nehru, Sapru, and Pate, met with Irwin at the viceroy's house in New Delhi at 4.30 p.m. on December 23, 1929. Irwin had just returned from his viceregal tour that morning, and as his train approached Delhi station a bomb exploded under one of its carriages. Fortunately, neither the viceroy nor his escort was injured. Gandhi was first to speak that afternoon, expressing "the horror he and those who accompanied him felt at the attempt on His Excellency's train" offering "congratulations on Their Excellencies' escape."²⁵ He then asked Lord Irwin whether the interpretation of his announcement published in the Congress leaders' manifesto "The [Round Table] Conference is to meet not to discuss when Dominion Status is to be established but to frame a scheme of Dominion Constitution for India" was accurate. Gandhi explained that "unless agreement was reached on this point he felt it fruitless to proceed to any other questions." Irwin insisted "he thought that the wording of his announcement made the position plain." The object of the conference "was to thresh out the problems which arose out of His Majesty's Government's definite declaration of policy. He then quickly added that here at last was a chance "of doing something big and the danger of losing a great opportunity." It "was impossible to lay it down that the Conference was to draft any particular Constitution." Irwin argued, but "it would have the fullest opportunity to discuss any proposals put before it. He emphasized that the Conference would be absolutely free. There would be no closure to the freest discussion, the Conference would not, he took it, proceed to definite voting, but would rather follow the lines of the Imperial Conference, a record being kept of the general sense of the members."

Mr. Gandhi felt that the Imperial Conference was on a different footing. There all the parties to the discussions were more or less of one mind. At the Indian Conference this would not be so. However much they argued they could not reach a policy which would be acceptable to all.²⁶

It was a remarkably prophetic conclusion, coming as it did almost eight years prior to partition and anticipating hundreds of thousands of man-hours wasted on conferences and in cabinets, and millions of futile words, when the first element of power of power Gandhi advocated, there could be no actual voting at the conference; but he argued that unless the establishment of dominion status could be "presumed as an immediate result of the Conference," he could not take part in it. He demanded "complete freedom at

once" and said India was capable of "solving her own problem of defence." Motilal agreed, adding that "British people exaggerated the difficulties in the way of Dominion Status for India. There was no difficulty about having full Dominion Status at once, though he did not mean that the Indian form of it would necessarily be exactly the same as any particular form of Dominion Status already in existence."²¹

Lord Irwin thought this "unreasonable" and looked to Jinnah and Sapru at a moment for more effective support. Both reasoned at some length with Ambedkar and Purna Motilal Nehru. They argued that those who went to the Conference would have liberty to propose Dominion Status. Supposing that the opposite side somebody pointed out the difficulties, that would at least narrow the issues, and the true function of the Conference would be to discuss the difficulties in the way of a more complete achievement of full Dominion Status and to argue about safeguards.²² But Gandhi and Motilal remained true to their promise to Jawaharlal and others who had signed the Declaration, refusing to attend another conference to "argue" about Dominion Status. Thus, the parties with their divergent perspectives.

Prime Minister Nehru gave it as his opinion that no Indian would be satisfied with less than Dominion Status. He saw no difficulties in the way of it. But if there were any, they could be solved after the conference point was admitted India could solve them for herself. The whole crux was the transference of power from Great Britain to India.²³

The bitterness and cold inflexibility later noted by those who were to be disappointed emerged in the wake of this aborted conference more than a month later. Raza's death. Once again he had permitted his hopes to be dashed by what he had "arranged," after all, was no negotiable affair. He was estranged from Ramsay MacDonald and Lord Irwin no ordinary men. What chance did he have if a coalition could have taken their place behind Canada and Australia as an independent dominion helping "the progress of India as a large as a step up to the same master whom he had also admired "a great success." In response to his announcement And he had actually brought them all into the same room, though that alone had taken almost two months of "negotiating." Then to watch everything disintegrate before the stone wall, erected by Gandhi and Motilal as spokesmen for Jawaharlal and his friends—how else could it leave Jinnah but bitter? Tired, frustrated, furious. Alone and on his own. He understood precisely what Motilal meant when he said that he saw no difficulties in the way of winning dominion status. He said he had been more than right. What else there was in fact, "the lack of unity" and that did present a problem. Motilal, however, was

not even prepared to concede that a "Muslim problem" existed, even as his son would it. He refused to admit it eight years later. Jinnah knew how much this grieved him. His mere presence in so select a group, though he had been the most instrumental in bringing it together, must have been singularly offensive to Motilal for Jinnah was the living reminder to him of why the "constitution" he had labored so hard to win last year was about to pass into the trash bin of history. Nor could Jinnah have helped feeling as the sun set upon that long and weary afternoon that he was, at heart, closer to Lord Irwin than to Motilal or the Mahatma seated beside him. He had no Muslim League left to meet with this year. Nor would the ocean now dividing him from Congress ever be bridged again.

Congress met that week in Lahore for "complete independence" ("purna swaraj") resolution passed at this Congress marked a radical departure for the Indian nationalist movement now in its forty-fourth year. This would be the last annual session of Congress held during the Christmas holiday. President Jawaharlal Nehru announced, "Inasmuch as the Congress is intended to be representative of the poor masses and peasants as the holding of the Congress at the end of December involves very considerable expenses to the poor people in providing or extra clothing for themselves and is otherwise inconvenient to them." The resolution was adopted by Congress a decade earlier had carried to the point where Congress and its younger generation of leadership wanted no longer to be tied in any way to the British Empire its habits, traditions, traditions, at the end of the day, January 26, 1930 was proclaimed Purna Swaraj Day by the Working Committee of Congress, and a resolution stating that "We believe that India must sever the British connection and attain Purna Swaraj, or Complete Independence."²⁴ was passed and read out in all languages as a subject of debate.

From his lofty lonely Mahatma Hill Jinnah watched the rising of this new revolutionary tide lash against official indifference and repression, raised like mighty breakwaters against every gateway to India. The irresistible force of those waves would be shattering themselves against these immovable obstacles, but he felt he turned back again. Imperceptibly the rocks would erode, the soft stones would settle and others sink. With the next high tide, more of the sea would break through, and still more with the tide after Jinnah was wearied, bored by the fatality of it all. Was it perhaps time for him to abandon India altogether or what really kept him there? He could practice law just as he had in London, confining himself to appear before the Privy Council, if he liked. There were enough such briefs in his reach, and they would prove just as rewarding—and far less exhausting.

Jinnah blamed Gandhi "for this sudden outbreak of political hysteria," as he publicly characterized the new Congress program.²⁵ Sapru agreed, writ-

last year to let me see the list of the invitees before you finally decide upon the terms so that I may be in a position to make such suggestions as it may seem to me. Of course it will be for you ultimately to decide who should be invited. This can be done while I am at Simla.³⁷ The viceroy had insisted on having his assembly meet in Simla that July despite Jinnah's advice to the contrary. Jinnah's relationship with Irwin thus became increasingly strained. He did not always mix smoothly. Both gaunt, elegant, and punctilious, these two men were so alike they must have found one another at once at once and exasperating.

Sapru and Jinnah came to the Yeravda prison to meet with Gandhi on 11-2-30. In the meantime wrote a note for hand delivery by the vice-regal emissaries to Motilal and Jawaharlal in Nanai prison stating that his

personal opinion is that if the Round Table Conference is restricted to those who can self-govern that it may be necessary in connection with this Government to deal with the question of transition. I should have no objection being understood that the question of independence should not be ruled out if anybody raises it. I should be satisfied before I endorse the idea of the Congress attending the Conference about its whole composition.³⁸

Gandhi sent a covering letter to Motilal on the same day adding, "My position is somewhat awkward. . . . But after all Jawaharlal must be the final voice of the Congress. . . . Then Sapru and Jayakar must go to both Narayan Nanai on July 27-28. Motilal's health had deteriorated. His incarceration in jail had run a high fever during the long months and the two main masterminds. The elder Nehru did not live another year.

On July 18 Irwin wrote Jinnah to inform him of the Labour government's invitation to the members of London Liberal and Conservative opposition parties to the Round Table. Jinnah wrote him in reply, stressing, "May I urge you to not to forget the suggestion I made in the course of our conversation at Simla that Your Excellency should do your utmost to arrange and be present in London at the time of the Conference? I am more than ever convinced that your presence is absolutely essential to the success of the Conference." Jinnah also pressed this offer for the release of the prisoners, giving Khair Abdul Gaffar, Chaffar Khan one of his two recommended delegates to the conference from the North-West Frontier Province, though as Jinnah noted, he has no or very little knowledge of the Urdu language. That "Lion of the Frontier" was, however, the most popular leader of the Pathans and would become a staunch Congress ally known to be hailed as the "Frontier Gandhi."

Sapru returned to Naini prison on August 8 to inform the Nehrus that Lord Irwin had "no objection" to sending them to Poona to meet with Gandhi in Yeravda. Two days later a special train rushed them to Maharashtra, and from August 13-15 Congress three leaders met with Sapru and Jayakar inside the Mahatmas' "prison camp" cell. Several other members of the Congress party's working committee including Vallabhbhai Patel and Sarojini Naidu joined them. On August 15 the Congress prisoners wrote to Sapru and Jayakar concluding that "the time is not yet ripe for securing a settlement honourable for our country."³⁹

Jinnah's anxiety over the fate of his conference mounted as he followed news reports of the Yeravda prison "all parties" conference from which he and the Muslim League by his own choice were excluded. He wrote again to Irwin on August 19 what was a most remarkable letter not only for the impatience and irascibility bordering on petulance it revealed but because it reflected what was actually a reversal of roles with Jinnah urging the viceroy to be more "firm and definite" in his dealings with Indian nationalists.⁴⁰

Jinnah had taken upon himself as it were the burdens of viceroy and secretary of state, internalizing those roles in what he truly believed to be the best interests not only of the Muslim minority, but of the entire population of India. Great Britain and indeed the world had sided with Gandhi quite emphatically and he knew by now believed Jawaharlal Nehru a dangerous young radical whose judgment could not be trusted and knew that Motilal's fever was higher still at Yeravda than at home. He sensed that the older Nehrus would have taken a strategic view of the situation, rose to the challenge toward complete independence but cut off from the Congress talks' entreaties. Jinnah saw no ray of hope left in India only in the distant glow of London's Round Table conference the thoughts of which sustained him.

Lord Irwin wrote to Sapru and Jayakar from his viceregal lodge at Simla on August 28:

I fear as you will no doubt recognize that the task you had voluntarily undertaken has not been assisted by the letter you have received from the Congress leaders. In view both of the general tone by which that letter is inspired and of its contents, as also of its blank refusal to recognize the grave injury to which the country has been subjected by the Congress policy not the least in the economic field, I do not think any useful purpose would be served by my attempting to deal in detail with the suggestions there made and I must frankly say I regard discussion on the basis of the proposals contained in the letter as impossible. I hope if you desire to see the Congress leaders again you will make this plain.⁴¹

He ended Round One of the peace talks. Irwin wrote to notify Jinnah of his firm response on September 1. Jinnah's reply a week later continued to make like a communication from a higher official to his subordinate. "I am in receipt of yours of the 1st September, 1930 and I thank you very much for it. It is just to inform you that I am going to Sind on a professional engagement tonight and shall return to Bombay on the 18th or 19th. I have now booked my passage for the 4th October in view of the fact that the Conference does not meet till the middle of November. More when I return."⁴⁴

He had much to arrange in what was to be his last full month in India in sixteen years. Almost thirty-five years had gone by since his return from London to make Bombay his home. The would-be thespian had reached Bombay as a 21-year-old successful barrister, a viceroi's alter ego, and the prime minister's friend. It was time to go back then to London—not to retire but to settle in and to enjoy an atmosphere less frenzied, less perilous. The Indians had become ever guarded and secretive about his private life. He had made no pronouncement of future plans on the eve of his departure. Those who knew him assumed, of course, that he was merely packing up for a tour of the Round Table conference. But he was planning his next step. He intended to transfer his practice entirely to appeals and to become a law lord—the highest court in the empire. In mid-October he invited Dr. M. A. Jinnah, born 1877, 1938, to preside over the Muslim League's annual session, which he would not himself attend. He had placed great faith in his Muslim League colleagues as the Hindus' Muslim ally. In return for nothing Jinnah was faced with petty considerations of jobs and engagements. The Round Table would serve as the curtain for his final act on British India's political stage. And should the curtain there descend on a flop, at least that would leave him in London.

10

London (1930-33)

Jinnah had sailed aboard the P&O *Viceroy of India*, leaving Bombay on October 4, 1930. As the first stroke of noon reverberated from Big Ben on November 12, 1930, King Emperor George V, standing before his throne in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords inaugurated his first Round Table conference on India, with his message being broadcast throughout the world by wireless. Rays of morning sun filtered through the high stained glass windows of that cathedral-like hall filled with the fifty-eight addressed delegates from British India, among whom stood for a while the Aga Khan, Sahib Javakar, and sixteen representatives of the Indian states, including Patiala and Baroda, Bhopal and Alwar. He was a green turban, plus a phylax of officiated by Prime Minister MacDonald, Mr. Bann, and Lord Sankley, the chancellor of the lords. Ex viceroi's Hardinge and Reading were there, as were the prime ministers of most dominions of the British Commonwealth. All of whom remained standing during His Majesty's brief address. King George departed as soon as he concluded his speech. The maharaja of Patiala, the chancellor of the Chamber of Princes then proposed that Prime Minister MacDonald take the chair of the conference, and the Aga Khan seconded the motion, which was carried by acclamation. Liberal V. S. Srinivasulu Sahib spoke first for the British Indian delegation. Then Jinnah, as spokesman for the sixteen Muslim delegates, introduced what the Times reported as "the first suggestion of controversy." "I am glad, Mr. President [MacDonald], that you referred to the fact that the declarations made by British sovereigns and statesmen from time to time that Great Britain's work in India was to prepare her for self-government have been plain. . . . But I must emphasize that India now expects translation and fulfilment of these declarations into action."⁴⁵

Jinnah then stated "the cardinal principle" which he hoped British members of the conference would keep uppermost in mind, that "India wants a stress in her own house" and "I cannot conceive of any constitution which may frame which will not transfer responsibility to the Central Government to a Cabinet responsible to the Legislature". It was, he argued, the least that would now suffice to satisfy political leaders throughout the subcontinent, those who came to London, as well as those who remained in British India crowded prisons etc. He reminded Mac Donald that two years earlier, at a Labour conference, the future prime minister said "I hope that within a period of months, rather than years, there will be a new Dominion added to the Commonwealth of our nations, a Dominion of another race, a Dominion that will find self-respect as an equal with the Commonwealth. I refer to India." Trenchantly he added, "since 1928 two years have passed."

Jinnah was assigned to the editorial structure subcommittee chaired by Sir Sayyid Hakeem ul-Ullah Shafi both "made it clear that no constitutional work unless it embodied provisions which gave a sense of direction to Muslims and other minorities". Hakeem reported to Jinnah after his first visit to London, a letter at resolving the Hindu Muslim conflict on December 10 and 15. The last of these meetings was at the latter's country house, Chiswick, to which Hindus and Muslims and Congress leaders "noted buses," wrote Hakeem on the 15th. "I had a long and pleasant discussion of India at night. So far as one can prophesy, the future of India in the hands of Muslims will give up separate electorates but will continue to demand the Punjab and Bengal and weightage to the other provinces. The Congress present no more pretence. The Muslims acting on their own basis from India now refuse to go back on their assistance in separate electorates and demand not only these but also the terms which have been asked—fourteen points. The Hindus led by Moomey went back on their agreement to concede the fourteen points. There was, therefore, a complete deadlock." Ramsay MacDonald was so depressed by the Chiswick fiasco that he decided to turn to Lord Willingdon (1866-1936), his governor-general in Canada, for help in suggesting a new approach. "India's future term as was expressed in April 1931 and on December 23, 1930, British prime minister wrote to Canada's prime minister, Richard Bennett, asking him to let go of his governor-general, explain, "A solution of this problem is essential to the future government of India, and it must now be sought in India itself. I know no man who can come out of those negotiations better than Willingdon."

Jinnah's bitter note as governor of Bombay during World War I would fit in return to take the helm of India's government at New Delhi from

1931-36. It was not entirely coincidental perhaps that for most of Lord Willingdon's term as governor Jinnah remained out of India, though by then he more closely resembled the formidable martyr in temperament as well as appearance than he did that radical young nationalist leader of the 1918 anti Willingdon protest. Willingdon's feelings toward Jinnah sufficed to keep the latter off the joint committee appointed to fashion final Round Table conference proposals into a new government of India bill for Parliament. Jinnah opted to live in London. However, despite Willingdon's presence in India—a "target" who must have tempted him sorely at times to return to the legislative assembly—as much as because of it Jinnah did not hesitate to return periodically, for visits to Simla, Delhi, and Bombay during his half decade of "permanent" residence in London.

Before Ramsay MacDonald's admission of failure to resolve the communal problem could reach Canada, however, a new proposal of the Muslim position was being articulated at a poorly attended meeting of the Muslim League in Allahabad on December 29, 1930. That meeting was presided over by Dr. Mahomed Jinnah (1877-1938), a veteran Urdu pamphlet philosopher of the Punjab. Though a supporter of Lincoln's law, educated at Heidelberg and Munich University, and a graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge, Ali Muhammad "Islamic Scholar" Iqbal remained deeply engaged throughout his career with the Muslim League's British committee when it was first started in London in 1908, served as secretary of Shafi's League, and was a leading force in the Punjab's legislative council from 1928-30. In Allahabad Iqbal was first to articulate the two nation theory of irreconcilable Hindu Muslim difference. He was not calling for complete national separation as yet but insisted that "The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognizing the fact of communal groups. The Muslim's demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is therefore perfectly justified." He then went further, that any previous suggestion of the League had been gone, spelling out his vision of the future "final destiny of the Muslim community of his own Punjab and its neighboring provinces. "I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Provinces, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India." Iqbal had not said "Pakistan" until the Round Table conference and, in the concluding section of his Allahabad speech, criticized Ramsay MacDonald for refusing "to see that the problem of India is international."

On January 14, 1931, the Aga Khan, Jinnah, and Shafi called on Ramsay MacDonald to warn him that "unless his statement of the Government's

policy is accompanied by an announcement of satisfactory safeguards for the minorities. Most of the Moslem delegates will disavow themselves from the findings of the Conference.¹³ Karim Dadas reported that Ramsay MacDonald tried, by this means, to win greater cooperation from the Muslims during the conference by "casually" remarking to him in "the course of conversation" that

in view of the forthcoming changes in India the British Government would be looking for distinguished Muslims or a prominent as Provincial Governors. The obvious implication of this suggestion was that "Jinnah would have an excellent chance if he proved to be a good boy" Jinnah at once made it clear to Ramsay MacDonald that his services were not available for sale and firmly rejected the offer which he believed was nothing less than "an attempt to bribe him."¹⁴

In the long run, however, it was moreover, at least as important a factor by now as Jinnah's reliability in the long run for the leadership he attained in the Muslim delegation in London, as later over all of Muslim India. At the end of the first Round Table conference,

Muslim delegation was anxious to learn beforehand what safeguards were to be incorporated for the protection of minorities. . . . A letter was received by the Aga Khan and the delegation met immediately in this room. Jinnah was deputed and the letter was discussed and approved of when Mr Jinnah arrived. He went through it and pointed out the flow where some seemed to exist a flow but would have meant the annulment of most of what had been considered. All were amazed. The result Muslims secured for their part in 12 out of the 14 points.¹⁵

Immediately on the eve of the concluding plenary session of the conference, Muslims were therefore united in presenting their last offer to the Round Table Committee. The proposals, Hindu-Sikh and Muslim and Hindu-Muslim parties for Bengal but both reasonably expected to attract a Hindu-Sikh or Bengali Hindu approval. Significantly, in the final Shafi-ur-Raza Aga Khan spoke at the concluding session when most other delegates and even Shafi's lovely daughter Begum Shafi Nawaz left the conference. Jinnah's speech of thanks to the British hosts, opening a national work of the Muslim League, was a landmark. A letter from Jinnah, the hope that had buoyed his spirits on arrival at Westminster two months earlier had dissolved in the acid of fermenting disagreements as to the possibility of ever settling the Hindu-Muslim conflict. He had sent for Fatima and Fatima's daughter Dina to live with him in London and began looking for a

home for the three of them. He was ready to leave the League to Lybali and his Punjab friends. Jinnah's only remaining political ambition was to enter Parliament through which ever party would have him. Perhaps he thought he could still be of service to Muslim India from there or if not—the Privy Council remained, possibly even its Bench, as the crowning achievement of his career. And the news he read and received from India served only to confirm the wisdom of his withdrawal from that scene of chaos compounded.

Jinnah applied to London's Inner Temple to let chambers that had just fallen vacant to him as work. The Temple's treasurer was none other than Sir John Simon, who wrote to assure a mutual barrister friend Bhagwan Dube that his Inn would "be very glad to have so distinguished a man within our own boundaries. . . . He need not trouble about recommendations, as, if I confess, I know of Jinnah and I think I know of him as, according to our ordinary rule, a successful one, and I think he is a very good one." Jinnah secured his chambers in King's Bench Walk before any winter was over. It would take several more months of state building to create the appropriate house. "A three-storied building in the confined style of the 1880's with many rooms and gables and a tall tower which gave a splendid view over the surrounding country" set at the mid of a light house of garden and pasture on Hamstead's West Heath Road. This home was torn down soon after his death, however, and the unobscured view he enjoyed has also long since disappeared.)

Lord Milner was sworn in as viceroy of April 25, 1931. Before leaving London he had had so much to meet with Jinnah at his home in Albany Road on the morning of Saturday, March 21. Though no record of their conversation has as yet come to light, I was not a stranger to the friendship between them. Jinnah, doubtless reiterated the Muslim position, briefing the new viceroy on a lot of the new demands that had been asked since he first drafted his four-point points. Milner's response can well be imagined, for he was always vocal in support of a Muslim League and encouraging to Muslim leaders. He had no time to spare to see how much Jinnah's political point of view had "matured" since their last heated confrontation.

Jinnah hoped initially to enter Parliament as a Labour M.P., desiring "to try the fortune of the ballot box in a party which in the main" agreed with his own "political creed."¹⁶ His uncooperative stance on several key issues at the First Round Table conference had, however, left Ramsay MacDonald less than eager to further this erstwhile friend's political ambitions, and by June the prime minister wanted nothing whatsoever to do with Jinnah, actually refusing to see him by pleading "it is absolutely impossible for me to fit in another engagement."¹⁷ Jinnah had by then gone so far as to

join the Fabian Society,²⁴ yet even that did not make him sufficiently attractive to Labour's leadership as a Commons candidate. To British workingmen Jinnah hardly looked like a trustworthy representative—one York Daily Labourer was reported having said, after listening to Jinnah talk to a party's selection committee, "We don't want a toff like that!" By June, therefore, Jinnah decided to try securing the nod to run for a Tory constituency—he abandoned Labour and turned to the Aga Khan for help. The Conservative party was traditionally opposed to all Indian political aspirations. Jinnah, much like the Aga Khan himself, hoped to appeal to the growing interest in Muslim demands as the only effective internal counterpoise to Congress revolutionaries.

With such high-level help, including the Aga Khan's personal backing, however, Jinnah never managed to find a Tory constituency willing to back his candidature. Had he been elected to Parliament, he might never have returned to India as political stage, except for brief visits, such as the one he undertook in August 1931 when he ventured east to defend a legal challenge in a Tanakpur case before the chief court of Oudh. In Bombay Jinnah spoke at Lorne House University Union one evening in 1931, reporting on the Round Table conference and "his disappointment at the attitude of the Hindu leaders." Karachi's former mayor, Nawab Ismail Khan, recalled how he "ruined his forefinger" reviving a speech Jinnah gave at Westminster in London: "We are still going round in a round in India without reaching the straight path that would lead us to freedom."²⁵

On his return to India Jinnah visited Simla, conferring with old Congress leaders who were here for the fall legislative session. Sind's Agha Hashim Ali Khan had written earlier to report that "There is no cohesion among any kind . . . Needless to say we are all feeling your absence keenly." Sir A. P. Patil, the ruler of Madras's Non-Brahmin Justice party, had written Jinnah in much the same vein: "There is no outstanding question among the Moslems. There are many lieutenants but no general." From this point of view I thought you would have been very helpful to find an unity . . . Inigue and jealousy rampant on all sides. . . We feel your absence very much."²⁶ Jinnah met briefly with Willingdon in Simla.

By the evening of August 27, Gandhi, who had been released from prison by Irwin and made up his mind to go to London for the second Round Table conference, as he reported to Willingdon, not "without fear, trembling and serious musing." Things from the Congress standpoint do not appear to be at all happy but I am relying upon your repeated assurances that you will give personal attention to everything that is brought to your notice."²⁷ Willingdon sent him "blessings and all good wishes," informing

Gandhi, "You can entirely rely upon my assurance to you."²⁸ To Ramsay MacDonald, the viceroy had recently written of Gandhi, "He is a curious little devil—always working for an advantage." In all his actions I see the bias predominating over the samiti.²⁹ Gandhi embarked for London as sole representative of the Congress. Jawaharlal wanted to accompany him, and many "friends" urged Gandhi to take Nehru along but the Mahatma refused to allow any of his colleagues to share his London sojourn.

Jinnah returned home by early September. The new passport he had taken out in 1931 gave England, not India, as his place of residence.³⁰ Fatma was waiting in Hampstead, and Dina was safely enrolled in her private boarding school nearby. Secretary of State Wedgwood Benn invited Jinnah to sit on the Federal Structure Committee at the second Round Table conference that started on September 7, 1931, but his role was much diminished from what it had been the previous year. All eyes were on Gandhi in 1931 for his was the voice of Congress on every committee as well as at the plenary sessions where he spoke. The Federal Structure Committee met from September 7-27 under Lord Sankey's chairmanship. The next day the Minorities Committee was convened by Ramsay MacDonald, with Gandhi joining its ranks at just 11 November 1931, six weeks after which the entire Conference gathered again in St. James's Palace in plenary session.

The second Round Table conference achieved no greater progress than the first had done for all its strenuous, wordy labor and well-meaning leaders: Sankey, Sirpi, Gandhi, Ambedkar, the leader of the Untouchables, and Jayakar. The ranks of the Muslim delegation remained firm behind the line of their as yet unmet demands of the previous year. Though Lord Sankey reported that his committee had concluded its lengthy deliberations with the hope that an all-India federation was possible, Jinnah spoke for the entire Muslim deputation when he resisted. "I am still of the opinion that the achievement and completion of the scheme of all India Federation must wait, be it so long, till we could take many years. No outstanding vital precedent of the scheme has yet been agreed upon."³¹ Sir Shah, Nawaz Bhatto, one of Sind's wealthiest landowners and the father of Pakistan's first prime minister, felt much the same feeling, noting before Ramsay MacDonald's concluding statement, "The Conference has come to an end without achieving any tangible result."³²

Mr. C. D. Birla, one of India's wealthiest millowners and Congress supporters, represented the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry at this second conference and "frankly" stated, "we are not at all satisfied with what has taken place."³³ Birla's critique of the Indian budget and financial situation was as brilliantly scathing as any made to the face of a British cabinet minister. Birla suggested a number of ways in which to

British officials before Parliament's Joint Committee on proposed Constitutional Reforms echoed that as yet obscure demand. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, 1864-1940, who ruled the Punjab during the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre and its martial law aftermath, testified before that committee in 1929, opposing an all-India federation since "if the Federal Government with Hindu majority endeavours to force its will on provinces with Muslim majority, what is to prevent a breakaway of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the N.W.F.s already, or shadowed and their possibly forming a Muslim Federation of their own" [Haines added "Sir Michael O'Dwyer was aware that 'Muslim Federation' was foreshadowed but he appears to have received one of Rahmat Ali's pamphlets. Or could he perhaps have helped inspire it?"]

Sir George Coadlock, 1868-1937, former Home member of the government and a conservative member of Parliament from 1931, appeared at the House of Commons Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, discussing the Pakistan demand in August 1, 1933, when he asked Abdul Aziz Ali, M.L.A. for the North-West Frontier Province, "whether there is a definite indication of Provincial desire in the name of Pakistan?" Yusuf Ali answered, "As far as I know it is only a student's scheme in response to a paper sent out by Mr. [sic] Sir Reginald was more sanguine about its prospects, however, stating 'They have not so far, but . . . you advance the idea, and it may be, when those students grow up it will be a reality and a serious matter for the hands of the people anyhow.'" Mr. Aziz Ali, 1885-1982, the previous year's president of the League, stated that in the past year the government had never heard of the word or movement. Mr. Isaac Foot, a Liberal member of Parliament, who, unlike the Tories, had a prior India experience, asked "What is Pakistan?" To which Ali was served as a spokesman for the joint five member Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference to the Parliamentary committee, replied, "So far as we have considered it, we have not had any official and authoritative means the Federation of the Muslims. Yet Coadlock was still not willing to drop this "chimerical" subject, pressing on with, "I have received communications about the proposal of forming a Federation of certain Muslim States under the name of Pakistan. I am not sure if it is Muslim or not. Dr. Khwaja Nazimuddin, perhaps, has been enough to say that no such scheme has been considered by any representative gentlemen or association so far."

If I had known about the Pakistan scheme at this date, there was no incident in his papers of such knowledge or of any personal interest expressed in it. Nor would he agree to meet with Rahmat Ali the following year, despite several attempts by the latter to discuss his ideas with Jinnah

in London.⁶⁰ Nor was Jinnah willing as yet to accept the Muslim League's invitation to return to India to preside over its annual deliberations in Delhi in April of 1933. "I cannot return to India before December next," he replied to that telegraphic invitation from Abdul Matin Choudhury in March.

Besides I don't see what I can do there at present. You very rightly suggest that I should enter the Assembly. But is there much hope in doing anything there. These are questions which still make me feel that there is no room for my services in India, yet I am sorry to repeat but there is no chance of doing anything to save India till the Hindus realise the true position. The Hindus are being fooled . . . by chance any scheme goes through, it will be worse than what is at present. . . . Thank you for your suggestion that I should try and stand for election as Sir [Rahmat Ali] is going to resign. Well I don't say I'll come to India as I am due in December at any rate for a few months.⁶¹

The scheduled December visit was for business, yet the prospect of reelection to the assembly clearly tempted him. It was not Pakistan and one day soon it might not be. Three days he was simply getting bored with Hampstead, Islington, Arkham, and his hostess, Begum, arrived that summer to add their voices to those seeking to help Jinnah home. They had come to London for their honeymoon and met Jinnah at a reception where he invited them to dinner in Hampstead. You must come back, Jinnah urged.

The people need you, Jinnah can put new life into the League and save it. Begum, I repeat, such like Begum Shab Nawaz, appealed to him with the same vibrant glowing beauty, idealism, enthusiasm and then we wrap that Ruthe had exploded during their exciting seven years of marriage. It's heart's fire as an auditor began to burn again with the revived brilliance of the twilight glow of fifty-seven years. Jinnah's preparations, orders of assistance, and flatters were of course all added faster for Jinnah always responded to a goals aimed at his goals, his unique capacity to "save" the nation. In London the only sound which led to him was one at which he and Begum did not care, speaking to one another and never speaking. Most evenings, except on these scarce holidays when a semi-civil hegemony, a civil lights of 11, 12, 13, and 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

London - Lucknow (1934-37)

Jinnah returned to Bombay in 1934 but did not close his Hampstead establishment or join in his City chambers. The next few years would be spent sailing back and forth between his two worlds that - met him seeking to parcel out his days between two basically incompatible tasks and trying to keep himself attuned to both the *ganges* which were flowing mostly in his blood.

On March 4 1934 the Muslim League met in New Delhi and resolved to heal the second major split which had fragmented the party one year earlier when its acting president, Minister Mian Abdur Aziz of Peshawar, "fired" all the secretaries and "attempted to transform the League into a party of his own." The Aziz Group - it came to be called - met at Howrah across the Hoogle from Calcutta in October 1934 in a new legitimacy but a month later the Hizavat Group named alternate president Khan Bahadur Habib Hidayat ul ussun, branded Aziz and his followers rebels. Hidayat ul ussun also attended the Round Table conferences where he had regularly met with Jinnah, Shaheed and the Aga Khan and had supported the unified Muslim consensus. One of the resolutions passed by his group in 1933 authorized the League Council to meet with Jinnah and the Aga Khan to discuss plans for "bringing about unity in the ranks of the League." Aziz readily agreed to bring his group back to the League's fold if Jinnah presided over a unified party. Hidayat was at first reluctant to surrender his post as president but finally agreed to step down for Jinnah, retaining honorary secretary of the League. Jinnah was authorized by the council in March to set the date and place of the 1934 annual session but he had already booked passages to sail for London on April 23, so he could meet with the council only on April 1 and 2 in New Delhi.

Jinnah was given "an enthusiastic welcome" by the forty-old members

of council who attended the proceedings that were closed to the press. After the council meeting ended, Jinnah granted the Associated Press an interview stating "The League is perfectly sound and healthy and the conclusion I have come to is that Muslims will no longer belong to any other community in serving the very best interests of India. To condense the White Paper and does not require special arguments one has only got to read the White Paper proposals - that is enough." Sir Sumner Hoare had presented his proposals for Indian constitutional reform, known as the White Paper to Parliament in March 1933. The federation of India was to be a union of governors, provinces and Indian states. All of whose "powers" would remain vested in the British Crown. Executive authority over the federation was to be exercised in India by a British king or emperor by a governor, nominal appointed by His Majesty's "pleasure" whose powers included a prime minister of the Indian states and a council in India, and who would personally direct and control the departments of internal external affairs and executive affairs. The "executive" powers were to be under his system of government derived directly from the King. Jinnah was one of their most outspoken critics. A national federal legislature was envisioned consisting of a council of state with not more than 200 members, 150 of whom would be elected from British India and a local assembly with not more than 375 members, 250 of whom would be elected from British India with the rest appointed to represent the princely states. There were to be eleven governors, provinces including Sind and Orissa, with the appointed governor over each representing the British king. The governor would be empowered to appoint ministers to assist him in running his province during his pleasure. He would, however be "empowered" to seek to select such executive aid in consultation with the person whom a "judgment is likely to command the greatest following in the Legislature" and to appoint those best qualified to command the confidence of the Legislature. Such was the nature of provincial autonomy envisioned by the White Paper. There were many elaborate safeguards and emergency powers provided for the governors "in the event of a breakdown in the constitutional machinery." Churchill led a vigorous Tory opposition to the White Paper in March 1933 but it passed through Parliament with a comfortable majority. Radical as it was, secure most Englishmen felt with the new Indian reforms.

Jinnah's strategy at this point was to turn back toward the Congress to see if its leadership might not, in fact, be prepared to concede all that MacDonald's Communal Award had promised Muslims thus clearing the way for Muslims and Muslims to join forces in a common front against the White Paper. Angered at the Tory party's rejection of his bid for a parliamentary

ticket, disgusted at the high-handed way in which Willingdon and Hoare were running India, Jinnah hoped the time was ripe for communal peace and was ready to launch a new series of talks aimed at weaning Congress from its dependence upon the Hindu Mahasabha position. "Can we even at this eleventh hour bury the hatchet and forget the past in the presence of a moment danger. Jinnah asked Congress in his statement to the Associated Press.

... nothing will give me greater happiness than to bring about complete co-operation and friendship between Hindus and Muslims, and in this desire, my impression is that I have the solid support of Muslims.

Muslims are in no way behind any other community in their demand for a national self government. The crux of the whole issue therefore lies in can we completely assure Muslims that the safeguards to which they attach such vital importance will be embodied in the future Constitution of India?

Jinnah's willingness to continue to work toward a united national platform had been the more pronounced in the League like Sir Fazlur Rahman and Quaid-e-Azam who joined with the sway of Chhatrapati Shahu Maharaj in a Muslim League against Jinnah as soon as his ship disappeared in the Arabian Sea horizon. They tried to form a Parliamentary Muslim League but was converted by the maharaja into a Hindu League which did not prove effective since they failed, despite Hindu's vigorous exertions to convene an emergency meeting of the Muslim League's council to validate the new constitution to represent most Muslims. Qaid-e-Azam's strenuous efforts and his nation were responsible for his death before the war ended. The League's rise to power was the result of that Muslim revolt against Jinnah's "policy of a 'wait-and-see' strategy" of swaying the balance of Muslim opinion in Congress to the British and then back again, which thus won him the status of a negotiator for Muslims at every stage of the long, tough struggle and a negotiated transfer of power remained his most effective negotiating technique.

When in London, Jinnah was re-elected that October by the Muslims of the United Provinces to represent them at New Delhi's assembly. There was no lack of content since he was the only name nominated for the seat he had first taken before World War I, and to which he would return as leader of the assembly's Independent party. He sailed back to Bombay in December 1934 and returned to New Delhi in January 1935. Jinnah soon thereafter met with Congress president Rajendra Prasad (1884-1963), a Bharat lawyer des-

igned to become India's first president but their "heart-to-heart" talks failed to resolve the communal deadlock. Pandit Madan Malaviya, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, who had also been president of the Congress, still adamantly refused to accept Jinnah's Muslim demands despite their equity. Thus, once again the fate of helpless Muslims was sealed by a few stubborn leaders who refused to stretch that extra inch of representational concession to close the gap dividing Indians philosophically surely and keeping the constitutionally fragmented. The Jinnah-Prasad talks came to "an unfortunate end," as Prasad put it, assuaging the one Muslim leader capable of riving his impatient high-spirited community into harness with Congress's bullock team.

In February, 1935 Jinnah stood on the floor of New Delhi's assembly to introduce an amendment in the debate that had just begun on Jinnah's constitutional reform. His three-part proposal was to accept the Communal Award segment of the White Paper, to substitute a "agreed upon" by the "minority communities concerned" to urge the removal of "objectionable features" from the provincial government section, particularly, the establishment of Second Chambers, the extraordinary and special powers of the Governors, provisions relating to Police, Rules, Secret Service, and Intelligence Departments which ended the real control and responsibility of the Executive and Legislature, and to reject the Hindu fundamental scheme proposed for the center as "the only rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable" (Maulana Durrani, 187-196). Instead of the assembly's Congress party spoke against Jinnah's proposal to support the Communal Award, but Congress did not vote against part one—it merely abstained. Jinnah proved himself the most brilliant parliamentarian in British India.

My amendment accepts the Communal Award . . . until a substitute is agreed upon between the communities concerned. Now I must say that our Hindu friends are not satisfied with the Communal Award but at the same time I can also tell the House that my Muslim friends are not satisfied with it either . . . and, again speaking as an individual, my self-respect will never be satisfied until we produce our own scheme. . . . But why do I accept it? . . . I accept it because we have done everything that we could so far to come to a settlement therefore whether I like it or whether I do not like it, I accept it, because unless I accept that no scheme of Constitution is possible.

Sir this is a question of minorities and it is a political issue. Minorities means a combination of things. It may be that a minority has a different religion from the other citizens of a country. Their lan-

quage may be different, their race may be different, their culture may be different, and the combination of all these various elements—religion, culture, race, language, arts, music and so forth—makes the minority a separate entity in the State, and that separate entity as an entity wants safeguards. Surely therefore we must face this question as a political problem, we must solve it and not evade it."

Jinnah's argument carried the House by a vote of 68 to 15, with the official opposition and elected Europeans voting with him. As for parts two and three of his proposal, they were voted upon together with Congress supporting him and the Government opposed. As those amendments carried by an "enormous majority," such rejection felt well that this was but a "paper victory" and that the British Parliament could ignore with impunity, but he at least demonstrated with a British Tory party and to the Congress "that its minority" vote could still be mobilised, and it indicated further, was enough strategic support to carry Jinnah's "Commonwealth of India" plan. Muslim League members did not support his motion. Yet it remained a precedent, trying to re-orient and define a position of national identity and where he was content for a few months of each year. He did not seek to be a member of the Congress or a Bombay but Chagla, who joined the Muslim League, rejected his old boss' appeals and instead by urging Jinnah to organize a thoroughly non-communal movement to occupy a position as a trustee of the people. Congress sat with Jinnah, however, Jinnah was hardly prepared to make any compromise that retained enough faith in him to carry him to the end of the road. He boarded the S.S. *Coromandel* to London again in late April, 1935, leaving behind a year between the poles of his establishment. Six months Jinnah was preoccupied with his legal work and his time was so lucrative that he reportedly earned 40,000 rupees per month (£22,000) at the Bar alone.

Before leaving for October 1935 he returned to Bombay to help the Muslim League secure separate electorates for Muslims that would be a part of the new British India provincial and central legislatures under the Government of India Act of 1935. That act was passed in August 1935, though as all India Federation scheme would never be implemented, the other portions of it served for the most part as the constitution for British India after 1937 and remained the basis of the Indian independence movement. The formidable Winston Churchill dismissed the act as the rotten fruit of half a decade of "tumultuous confabulations" and in the end, the act was a failure, marking "no advance towards efficiency, no advance towards stability, and

above all, no advance towards agreement." Jinnah felt about the 1935 act precisely the way he had about the White Paper that stated: "We all know that the new Constitution has been forced upon us," he said, on returning to India in 1935. "It is now the duty of the various leaders to put their heads together and chalk out a definite and common policy with regard to the Constitution." Jinnah's critique of the all-India Federation in New Delhi assembly in 1935 had been the strongest, a task again not it expressed in India for Gandhi who had announced his retirement from Congress in September 1934, devoted himself to the abolition of untouchability and village reforms as part of his *satyagraha* and the formation of a "Purna Swaraj".

I believe that it [the proposed federation] means nothing but absolute sacrifice of what British India has done for and developed during the last 50 years in the matter of progress in her representative form of Government. No province was consulted as such. No consent of the provinces has been obtained whether they are willing to federate as federating units on the terms which are laid down by the British Government. My next objection is that it is not workable."

And before retaking his seat in the important debate Jinnah explained why he proposed accepting the provincial autonomy section of the new constitution:

First of all, the franchise enlargement of the electors and voters. That is the foundation-stone of any Constitution. . . . Next, all members of the Provincial Legislatures will be elected that is an advance. You cannot get in the provinces will be the elected members responsible to the Legislature and the Legislature will be responsible to the electorates. That framework of the Provincial Constitution is undoubtedly an advance."

Jawaharlal Nehru had been released from prison in September 1935 and permitted to leave India to join his tuberculosis wife Kamala when living in London. Nehru, concerned in the political situation, left for London in February 1936, but not until he had and for long periods, where he avoided meeting with British officials. However, Lord Linlithgow, 1862-1940, the liberal parliamentarian and moderate, was in India who had joined the returns from the Congress and very late in his career, he went to his country house, where he and the British Prime Minister, Lord Lloyd George, now for eight minutes, hoped, unsuccessfully, to convince Nehru of the value of the new constitution. But Nehru, who had been a member of Congress once again, succeeding Prasad as president in 1936.

The Muslim League met in Bombay that April, with Jinnah as premier

and raising additional taxes Jinnah favored both measures but insisted on appropriate legal pavement for each. Hazrat Haq's *Krishak Prota Samiti* ran the slate of candidates for Bengal's Muslim seats and managed to capture as many as Jinnah's League did thirty-eight in its forty. It was not until just before the new provincial assembly met that Jinnah could negotiate an agreement with Haq, merging their parties and turning enough Muslim independents to join them in order to give the new Bengal Ministry, which Jinnah headed, a comfortable majority. And Jinnah made another important addition to the League. Next to Liaquat Ali Khan, who Jinnah most effectively as honorary secretary of the League, the voice of Mahatma Gandhi, 1914-75. Amir Ahmad Khan, was Jinnah's most trusted ally in the United Provinces. As the largest Muslim landlord of the province, he enjoyed an estimated income of some 2 million rupees a year. Jinnah appointed him treasurer of the League's central board. The ministry established by Jinnah's central board on which Muslim League candidates stood for election in January-February 1937 was much the same as that of Congress, including these advanced nationalist demands:

To make every effort to secure the repeal of all repressive laws; To meet all demands which are detrimental to the interest of India which encroach upon the fundamental liberties of the people and lead to economic exploitation of the country; To reduce heavy cost of administrative machinery, central and provincial, and allocate a substantial funds for nation building departments; To nationalise India's Army and reduce the military expenditure; To encourage development of industries, including cottage industries; To regulate currency, exchange and prices in the interest of economic development of the country; To stand for the social, educational and economic uplift of the rural population; To sponsor measures for the relief of agricultural indebtedness; To make elementary education free and compulsory; To take steps to reduce the heavy burden of taxation.²⁴

Each of these had long been integral to the Congress national demand, and all were anathemas to more conservative Muslim parties, such as the Agricultrist party of the United Provinces landlords, formed at Governor Sir Minto's instigation. The one clear divergence between the League's socioeconomic position and that of Congress, however, which reflected a basic difference in philosophy dividing Jinnah from Nehru and his Indian League, was the League's firm opposition "to any movement that aims at expropriation of private property." Even as Jawaharlal pleaded increasing until 1939 a bid to solve for Indians problems of poverty, Jinnah retreated more than ever behind the bastion of private property. His growing passion

for real estate and his constant preoccupation with details concerning the daily management of his ever proliferating portfolio of properties were, in fact, soon to rival his interest in public-private property, most of it forever rooted on Indian soil and became, ironically enough, almost as fascinating a diversion for Jinnah's mind and energies during the last lonely decade of his life as Pakistan itself.

By this time Rahmat Ali, the founder of the Pakistan National Movement, was residing at 16 Montague Road, a Cambridge, from which a massive quantity of strange telegrams, pamphlets and letters, appearing mostly to British lords poured forth between 1935 and his death in 1951. For example, "May I vent my address this appeal to your Lordships on behalf of the people of PAKISTAN at this critical hour?" he wrote on July 8, 1935, urging "My Lords to vigorously support our national struggle against the ruthless aggression of PAKISTAN, into the proposed and a Federation. The Government of India Bill based on the Indian Federal Scheme has created a serious crisis in the status of PAKISTAN and has raised a supreme issue—an issue of life or death for its national future." He continued:

I earnestly hope that you kindly will lend your fullest support to the unrelenting demand of PAKISTAN—a demand based on justice and equity for the recognition of a sacred right to a separate national existence as distinct from HINDOOSTAN. . . . PAKISTAN is not Hindoo soil nor are its people Hindoostani citizens. . . . The very basis and content of our national life is founded on fundamentals essentially different from those in which Hindoostanis are prospering. . . . We, the Pakistanians, have, more than once, emphatically repudiated the most shameful surrender of our national life made by the State, even at the hands of delegates to the Round Table Conferences and the Indian Federal Scheme. They were neither the delegates of PAKISTAN, nor the representatives of the Pakistanian people. . . . These distinguished exponents of the art of surrender in complete disregard of the warnings of history, sold our nationality and sacrificed our posterity. They will have to answer for this—the most contemptible betrayal of PAKISTAN—before history.²⁵

Jinnah's time was too busy to ignore Rahmat Ali and his angry attacks, which were to become even more personal and virulent by the eve of Pakistan's birth. He would not, however, be able much longer to ignore the political demand of Rahmat Ali's obviously well-funded movement sponsored from the heart of Cambridge. The platform adopted by the League's central board in 1939 included, indeed, a number of important concessions to Islamic fundamentalist groups within India if not as yet to the extremist ad-

of a Pakistan National Movement. Three out of fourteen planks were devoted exclusively to a appeal to special concerns of the Muslim minority. Among 182 separate electorate seats alone were among those contested by the League. The League's first plank was "To protect the religious rights of the Mussalmans in all matters of purely religious character . . . to be given to the opinions of Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind (Indian Council of Islamic Scholars)." Two later planks were "to protect and reorganize Urdu language and script," and "to devise measures for the amelioration of the general conditions of Mussalmans." The Indian League party born during the Khilafat Movement and the relatively dormant under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Madan and Marwan Ahmad Said had merged with the Khilafat Conference party in the United Provinces to constitute the Muslim League Board, presided over by the rajah of Seohar and with Chaudhury Khalid Jinnah as its secretary. In February 1927 Khilafat Conference members of his board met with Jinnah and were proposed as members on the League's United Provinces provincial committee. They joined forces. It was one of Jinnah's first moves to build a mass movement organized for political power. The next step he decided was that the Board candidates all run as Muslims. Thus the League's supporters' status while broadening the Muslim vote. He knew that he could not take parts capable of asserting themselves in the Congress and the British rule might have to consider political power to be a monopoly of local magnates. He never believed in the Congress and its negotiating from weakness. Undaunted to move forward that in the day his party would be in position to battle from a vantage point of strength.

Liaquat Ali Khan was, however, furious at having lost control over the Muslim League and fled from his own province and tried his best to replace its members for the C.P.'s Board, despite the fact that he was in a minority among the Lucknow seven on the League's Executive Committee. Jinnah was not a man who was so annoyed. The first meeting in Bombay, but he resigned from both parliament and retired off to England for a few months. Jinnah thus almost without a fight won the way to a new movement and a transformation in the Muslim League's second party to Congress and the British Empire. Yet he would rather risk so important a loss than go back on his word once it was given. Oxford-educated Liaquat later hailed him as "the greatest leader of his age . . . one of the greatest of his time." The wisdom of his political judgment even when he most disliked its impact on his personal base of power, Liaquat looked to Jinnah the way a British

public school boy looked to a headmaster, with emotional ambivalence but ultimate admiration.

Jinnah's judgment paid off handsomely by the year's end. His League and its allies captured 99 out of 35 Muslim seats for which its candidates competed while Congress retained not a single Muslim member on its own. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai was elected only because of Khalid Jinnah's help. It was an impressive show of strength and had the League done nearly as well elsewhere. Jinnah might have wasted some real concessions from Congress's haughty leadership. In the Punjab, however, only 2 out of 7 League candidates were elected, in Assam 9 out of 34, in Bengal 39 out of 117. Most of the League's efforts in Bombay and Madras were retired, and 109 Muslim League seats were captured for British India as a whole. By Jinnah's own estimate his party returned from 51 to 79 percent of its total number of candidates. Congress alone won 716 out of the 1585 seats in all eleven provinces, however, enjoying absolute majorities in most of the country but it elected only 26 Muslim members, a Achilles' heel it hoped to remedy through working much harder in future Muslim "mass" contests.

Nehru, stalling the campaign until 1937, made the mistake of refusing to take the Muslim League and the communal problem seriously, mistaking

There are only two forces in the country: the Congress and the government. . . . To vote against the Congress candidate is to vote for the continuance of British domination. . . . It is to Congress alone which is capable of fighting the government. The opponents of the Congress are united with each other by a commonality of interests. Their demands have nothing to do with the masses.²²

"I refuse to line up with the Congress" Jinnah insisted when he heard Nehru's simplistic analysis in Calcutta early in January. "There is no third party in this country and that is the Muslims!"²³ A few days later Jinnah publicly warned Nehru and the Congress to "leave the Muslims alone" but warning empty. Nehru refused to be intimidated and decided, instead of backing away from India's Muslim electorate to seek to convert the vast mass of them to Congress's platform, "Mr. Jinnah . . . objects to the Congress interfering with Muslim affairs in Bengal and calls upon the Congress to let Muslims alone. Why, then, do Muslims' Apparent and those who follow Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League?"²⁴ What does the Muslim League stand for? Nehru asked with gnatlike swift and acerbity he asked the question. Does it stand for the independence of India, for anti-imperialism? I believe not. It represents a group of Muslims, no doubt, but it represents a group of Muslims, no doubt, who are not the middle-classes and having no contacts with the Muslim masses and few

even with the Muslim lower middle class. May I suggest to Mr. Jinnah that I come into greater touch with the Muslim masses than most of the members of the Muslim League?"

It would not be the last of Nehru's political errors of judgment in his dealings with Jinnah, but it was one of the most fatal mistakes he ever made in a moment of hubris. More than Iqbal, it was Nehru who charted a new mass strategy for the League—prudence and cautioning Jinnah to leave the League room for politics to reach down to the hundred million Muslims who spent most of each day laboring in rural fields. There was, of course, no possible way for the League to stop the mass to weaken it, and to reach the masses without Muslim leadership. The cry of Islam—a danger of the League alone could merge as the sole stand of the Muslim League. No common principle or policy binds them," Nehru had taunted. Nehru's Jinnah's dependent" may be the assembly. And for Jinnah, Nehru's strategy of not trying to get immediately triggered by Nehru's hubris as he Congress non-cooperation resolution because he had said in 1929, "I don't think there was the secular ray or a leadership seeking in vain to reduce a "Mahatma" to mere "Mr." Now Nehru had used "Mr." before Jinnah's name as a sarcastic form of rebuke for that title was the badge of British rule. Jinnah appeared to pounce despite his own misgivings. It was a scathing attack that Jawahar had been at the All-Parties Conference a decade earlier. Jawahar had been a victim of Nehru's later attack and had reason to feel more confident of his supreme power over the masses, more hopeful about Congress's future. Nehru's attack was a repudiation of the past for neither his father nor his wife had lived to see his triumph, to hear the hoarse thunder of millions of voices cry "Jawahar! Jinnah!" ("Victory to Honoured Jawahar!"). He, moreover, was a man of many moods and the victim of his own passions. Nehru's attack from unsolicited meetings of sounder judgment by a rising impulse of the moment. It was Nehru's greatest weakness, a weakness which was to cost him leadership over all of India and which he never fully recovered from. He was "fit to rule" the world.

Jinnah, however, never lost his temper except for calculated political advantage. He used a lawyer as a barrister or an actor would, to sway his jury of allies, never from an uncontrollable flaring of passion. For personal passions had not been in him and was never to be released. The hatred he felt toward Nehru was cold, born of contempt rather than rage. "What can I say to the busybody President of the Congress?" Jinnah remarked of Nehru in an interview several months later. "He seems to carry the responsibility of the whole world on his shoulders and must poke his nose into everything except minding his own business." As Congress president,

Nehru called a national convention in Delhi that March, following the elections, to decide whether in fact Congress would allow its successful candidates to take the provincial offices they had won when the new constitution went into effect on April 1, 1937. For Jawahar this was another sore point of pride, since he had often decimated against that "charter of slavery" and insisted he would never have anything to do with helping implement any part of it. Gandhi, however, urged giving the constitution a try as most members of the Congress Working Committee wanted to do, and Nehru bowed to their advice. He refused absolutely, however, to invite any elected Muslim League or other non-Congress candidates to his conference, calling it "a dangerous thing to revert to an all party attitude" and insisting that Congress should not cooperate with "semi-Imperialist groups."

Khaliquzzaman, who belonged to Congress for two decades before merging his United Board with the League in 1930, hoped that a Congress-League coalition government, including himself, might be appointed to administer the United Provinces. Muslim Jafar Karam, the leader of the Congress at this time, had been Motilal's secretary and remained Jawahar's confidant in Nehru's home province. Karam and Khaliquzzaman were old friends and it was hardly surprising, therefore, for them to discuss a coalition ministry with Karam promising Khaliquzzaman "two Muslim Ministers to join the Congress Ministry" prior to his election. Nehru "famed down" the League after his victory. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was the only Muslim on the Congress Working Committee and managed to wear the provincial League party away from its commitment to the League in mid-March of 1936. Azad used the classic lures of a provincial cabinet office with all its seductive perquisites to achieve that brilliant deception. He, of course, won Nehru's gratitude and trust and was to preside over the Congress throughout World War II, serving in Nehru's first cabinet as Minister of Education. But he won Jinnah's undying enmity. To Jinnah, Azad's political treachery placed him in "beneath contempt." This was war to the knife. Jinnah remarked after learning of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema's flip-flop.

That Jinnah Azad visited Lucknow and tried to negotiate a settlement with Khaliquzzaman, offering to bring him into the United Provinces cabinet. The Muslim League group in the United Provinces Legislature shall cease to function as a separate group, its members all becoming "part of the Congress Party." The League would join a Parliamentary Board thus in effect, agreeing to "dissolve" Khaliquzzaman. Khaliquzzaman read these terms as a "death warrant" of the provincial party over which he presided and refused to agree. Meanwhile, Nehru called upon Congress committees throughout India to intensify recruitment among "the Muslim masses."

Jinnah had never liked the younger Nehru but at this point lost all hope

...ing to reach any agreement with him appealing instead to Gandhi ... withdrawn from active politics to his Wardha ashram retreat.

Mr. Jinnah sent a message to Gandhi through B. C. Kher, the leader of the Congress in Bombay's legislature and chief minister designate there. ... asked Jinnah to give his two members of his Muslim League to ... The League had done brilliantly in Bombay, capturing twenty out of twenty-nine Muslim seats, and Kher had the good sense to ... Jinnah's cooperation in administration would be a powerful ... a hopeless task. As to Jinnah's ... Gandhi personally enter negotiations to seek some sort of Hindu-Muslim agreement with him as the Mahatma replied: "I wish I could do ... but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is as bright as ever, ... but I see no light out of the impenetrable darkness and, in such distress I cry out to God for aid."³⁷

The first annual session of the League was to be held in Lucknow, and ... his speech ... must either galvanize his party to march toward a new destiny or would serve as its death knell. He must ... that for a person as vigorous as Jinnah for the League ... was always enough. Jinnah recalled "smoke ... thought of the smokers cough, or bronchitis. None ... it was too late!" He spent that summer ... and Sir ... Kashur, the legal ... in his time ... Muslim League's premier advocate, Fatima ... Kashur, ... as virtually everywhere from then on till the end of his life, as sister-confidante, nursemaid, sound- ... and before ... world. He presided before the ... Kashur high court in four cases: two criminal matters, two civil that summer. The most famous was the disputed marriage case of ... Jinnah won his ... appeal ... knowledge. M. Lora ... Authority, as an accurate interpreter of Islamic law.³⁸ His prestige in the community was ... that no one dared deny his claim, and, as usual, he won every case he ...

Wherever Jinnah went that summer and early fall he invited Muslim ... to ... to ... Besides Shafiq's son-in-law, Munn Bushir Ahmad, other powerful non-League sources including the new premiers of the Punjab and Bengal, ... Sir Sikander Hayat Khan (1892-1942) and Fazlul Haq, also came to Lucknow at Jinnah's behest, and before leaving that fateful session of the League they would agree to join forces in what was about to become a revitalized united Muslim movement, alarmed by Congress's victories and

Nehru's attempts to cut the mass base of their constituencies out from under their very feet if they failed to respond with alacrity and unity to that clear and present Hindu-atheist challenge.

Jinnah came by rail from Bombay, and as his train steamed into Cawnpore (Kanpur) Central Station "a vast crowd of Muslims mobbed his compartment," Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad recalled.

So exuberant was their enthusiasm and so firm their determination to resist Hindu aggression ... but Mr. Jinnah, otherwise so calm and unperturbable, was visibly moved. . . . His face wore a look of grim determination coupled with satisfaction that his people were aroused at last. He spoke a few soothing words to pacify their inflamed passions. Many Muslims, overcome by emotion, wept tears of joy to see their leader who they felt sure would deliver them from bondage.³⁹

He arrived that evening, October 13, 1937, in Lucknow, where twenty-one years before he had forged the pact that brought Congress and the League together in the first time ... a bright era at last. Muslim unity that lasted little longer than World War I. This one stormy clouds of conflict darkened the horizon replacing that dawn, even as the color of age gave a sepulchral look to Jinnah's drawn and tired face. ... and Mahmudabad had gathered a small ... of Lucknow ... to wait him at the station and they led their president and his sister on a torchlight or pageant procession through the winding streets of the former capital of Nawab-Viziers of Oudh where many a Moghul emperor had ... on bejewelled elephants. "There was a scuffle at one place between the volunteers and some hot-headed Congressmen," Khal-uz-Zaman reported,⁴⁰ noting one of the opening salons of what was soon to become the Congress-League civil war, India's political prelude to partition.

The Punjab's Sir Sikander met with Jinnah and the League council, next morning listing his demands for merging his powerful ... party forces with the League. He essentially insisted upon the retention of his party's total autonomous control over the Punjab, where the League had elected only two out of eighty-six Muslim members to the legislature. Jinnah had no option but to accept mighty ... Sikanders terms, gladly "stooping" to embrace and accept that Punjab ... The pact concluded that October 14 between British India's two most powerful Muslims was approved "with thunderous cheers" by the council of the Muslim League. And well should they have cheered, for without the Punjab the League had no real heartland of power, no core around which to build its potential claim to nationhood. The Punjab was more than just a large Muslim majority province: the Punjab meant Pakistan, made Pakistan possible. Bengal was too

you take any decision but once a decision is taken, stand by it as
one man."

As their great leader sat down every Muslim in that pandal rose to
their feet as if a new League had been born that by some "magic power"
Jinnah had taken his most "grave and momentous" decision and knew its
consequences would be "far reaching" that there would be no turning back.
Not for him. Not for his party. The Jinnah who had come to Lucknow still
existed in the same world no longer. He left the old capital of
British power firmly rooted in his Muslim party's soul as its new Quid
A.

12

Toward Lahore (1938-40)

Building a mass party became the Quid-e-Azam's primary occupation during 1938 and 1939. From its winter session at Lucknow in 1937, at the spring League meeting at Lahore in 1940, the Muslim League's membership multiplied from a few thousand to well over half a million. Membership rates were dropped after Lucknow to half the already nominal four annas fee charged by Congress, inviting any Muslim of means with two annas to his name to join the All-India Muslim League. The League's constitution was revised in many other ways as well and modernized into a vehicle of mass national capability under its inspiring new great leader.

At Lucknow, the League resolved to work toward "establishment in India of full independence in the form of a federation of free democratic States in which the rights and interests of the Mussabmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded." Congress was denounced for imposing its own party anthem, "Bande Mataram" ("Hail to Thee, Mother") as the official new anthem of government without Congress members took precedence, "invaluable disregard of the feelings of Muslims." The League considered this "song not merely positively anti-Islamic and blasphemous in its inspiration and ideas, but definitely subversive of the growth of genuine nationalism in India."² The League further resolved to "exhaust every possible means to make Urdu, rather than Hindi, 'the universal language of India.' Finally, a comprehensive program of socio-economic and educational reforms was proposed, including the League "to fix working hours for factory workers and other labourers; to fix minimum wages; to improve the housing hygienic condition of the labourers and make provision for slum clearance; to reduce rural and urban debts and abolish usury; to grant a moratorium with regard to all debts, whether secured or

otherwise," and ultimately "to devise measures for the attainment of full independence and invite the co-operation of all political bodies working to that end."

The week of demanding meetings at Lucknow took its toll on Jinnah's health. He ran a fever in his way home to Bombay and a hacking cough continued to plague him. It was more than a month before he felt strong enough to respond to letters from his provincial lieutenants, including Malik Barkat Ali, the League's only elected member of the Punjab legislature. "I have not been well enough to tackle the various details that are referred to," Jinnah replied in late November 1937, referring to Barkat Ali's many complaints against Sir Sikander and his Unionist cohort.

Sir Sikander was the true villain of the Unionist League pact, would remain Jinnah's thorniest problem for as Barkat, Iqbal and others with potential awareness in Lahore would saw the Unionists remained precisely as they had been before Lucknow. Proceeding party Sir Sikander assured his Hindu and Sikh colleagues that Jinnah was now in his pocket, not the other way round. He—Jinnah—in fact, capitulated to the Unionist chief as the price of enhancing his League's status. Was the cost of Sikander's cooperation really a grievous loss the League stood to gain from his nominal alliance? Jinnah at first believed it was not, yet the Punjab commandrum would not disappear even after Sir Sikander's death in December 1942.

Jinnah decided to shift the venue of his council's April meeting from Lahore to Calcutta, where he had been a late December 1937 inaugurator of the All-India Muslim Students Federation. Born out of a merger of the Lucknow Muslim Students Conference with the Aligarh University Union and Al-Bengal Muslim Students League, this federation was organized by Mohammad Noman, 34-42, at Aligarh. Noman had gone to Bombay to invite Jinnah to preside over his federation's first annual session. "To my great surprise, Noman recalled 'I did not have more than a minute to get his consent. I immediately requested him to allow me to release the news to the Press. He got up and said 'Do it just now,' . . . From Calcutta onwards, the Muslim student marched under his guidance." Jinnah and Fatima stayed at Ishpani's home in Calcutta, and some 300 Muslim students from all over North-West India gathered to assemble assembled to be a "big gathering" on 20 December 1939. He talked softly without dramatic gesture or emotion, expounding that at Lucknow, "I have only rung the alarm bell. The bell is still ringing. But I do not see the fire brigade. I want you to produce the fire brigade. And God willing we shall extinguish the fire."¹⁸ The most memorable of his statements to that newly organized Muslim fire brigade was that "We do not want to be reduced to the position of the Negroes of America." Jinnah now had the youthful muscle and cadre

of energetic volunteers his League required. The older All-India Students Federation, which identified closely with Congress, branded the new Muslim federation "reactionary and communal." The raja of Mahmoodabad was elected president of the All-India Muslim Students Federation, and Noman served as general secretary. The federation's constitution listed among its objectives "to arouse public consciousness among the Muslim students and to prepare them to take their proper share in the struggle for the freedom of the country, to work for the advancement of the economic and social conditions of the Muslims, and to popularize Islamic culture and studies and to strengthen the Islamic religion and faith by combating anti-Islamic forces."

Soon after returning to Bombay in January 1938, Jinnah returned again for Aligarh, where he received "a high royal reception" from admiring students, who assisted in making his carriage the focus of the station to Aligarh campus three miles away. The *Quaid-e-Azam* delivered a more eloquent than usual speech to his viceroyally cheering audience in that illustrious cradle of the Muslim League. "You, Mr. President, have said the Muslim is born free," Jinnah began. "When was he free? In the country at any rate we have been slaves for 150 years." This was the first time Jinnah used the word "slave" in a public address, and he went on farther dramatizing the plight of Muslims. Sure to be, however, Jinnah assured his wildly cheering audience the Muslim League had revitalized itself and "has freed the Muslims from the clutches of the British Government. But now there is another power which claims to be the successor to the British Government. Call it by whatever name you like, it is a Hindu and Hindu Government. He closed with the glowing promise that as we were "gathering the scattered stones, timber, and iron, and the scattered energy and talents of the Muslim community, and when you have got an artistic Jeweller to set them it will be a jewel which you will be proud of."¹⁹

In March 1938 Jawaharlal was succeeded as Congress president by Benegal Nihalani Chandra Bose, 40—forty-one years of age and heroically fresh from British detention. On the eve of assuring his mantle of leadership to Bose, Nehru wrote Jinnah: "We are eager to do everything in our power to put our entire resources at your disposal and to endeavor to solve every problem that arises in the way of developing our noble life along right lines and to put it to the service and progress of the Indian people."²⁰ Nehru asked Jinnah to "let me know what exactly are the points to dispute which require consideration," to which Jinnah replied, "But do you think that this matter can be discussed, much less solved, by and through correspondence?"²¹ Jawaharlal agreed that it was "always helpful" to discuss matters and problems face to face, but "Correspondence helps in this process and not at once

seven preferance as it is more precise than talk. I trust therefore that you will help in clarifying the position by telling us where we differ and how we would like our difference to end." Jinnah, however, was most reluctant to be forced into written debate or differences—insisting it was "highly undesirable and most inappropriate" trenchantly arguing "You prefer talking and I prefer whereas I prefer talking to each other. Surely you know and you ought to know what are the fundamental points in dispute."¹¹

Respecting Jawaharlal's repeated appeal for an updated brief on the Muslim League, Jinnah was not merely saving vital energy when dealing with a man who had escalated from his own commitments. He was also holding Jinnah was ready to accept him to talk knowing that ultimately Jinnah would be called in to approve any formula accepted by his Congress disciples, whether it was Jawaharlal, Subhas, Azad, Patel, or Mahatma. Of her regular progress to the Standard ashran, but it was not the nature to deal with Bhabha. In January 1936 Candler himself had said that he had accepted Abul Kalam Azad as his guide and that since he opened the first instance as between you and the Muslim League. But he never came again. He was at your disposal.¹² But Jinnah's reply to I find that there is no change in our attitude and our policy when you say you would be guided by Maulana Abul Kalam

Jinnah states not only a partial recognition of his League as the "one true political body" in India but a presenting of Muslims but Jinnah's own statement by Candler of his equivalent role as spokesman for the Muslim Congress perspective. Neither position was for a Muslim League. But was better way of avoiding debate? Recognition of Congress was what he was thing he wanted at this time. Nothing would be more to become his cause of creating the Muslim League as the clear and present danger of a Hindu raj. A Muslim Congress as the representative of 1935. Whether provincial or central, partial or even potential, would have taken the wind out of the Muslim League's sails as to the future of the Muslim growth in India. Jinnah was not a leader of things of stark contrast. And was in who curious for the future of his faith in a land ruled by hosts. He was. To Jinnah's own satisfaction, he had not a new strategy to pick up speed under his wind would have been suicidal to Muslim League prospects. Jinnah might easily have negotiated the concession of a few seats in the Bombay and other provincial cabinets, but he would certainly have lost Pakistan in the process.

Not about the degeneration of Jinnah's lungs be underestimated in explaining his reluctance to embark on a fresh round of negotia-

tions. He became more testy as the coughing and discomfort increased. He required more privacy although his tolerance for crowds had never been high. Unless he was on stage orating. "I shall be arriving on the 16th [April] morning with Miss Jinnah by the mail." Jinnah alerted Ispahani in the spring of 1938, adding

As to my reception, please see that some proper order is kept and that I get home within a reasonable time. I shall use these long processions, taking hours and hours, have a tremendous strain on one's nerves and physical endurance. Therefore you must try and see that I get home by 12 o'clock and have some rest at my rate in the afternoon. You must have read in the papers how during my tours to Allahabad, Meerut, and other places I suffered which was not because there was anything wrong with me but the regularities and over-strain told upon my health.¹³

Nothing could have been more damaging to his plans for the League than to permit rumors of his fragile health to take on a public. Personal well-being was indispensable to political power. The news speculated that Jinnah had spots on his lungs that would not be so simple would have shattered his charisma. He had to work to withdraw long enough in private places to alternate with his official and to free him a very with longer periods of convalescence when he was back in the field.

To help assure his future, Jinnah remodeled his palace in residence of Mount Pleasant Road atop Malabar Hill in Bombay which was over more than 15,000 square feet. This residence was more modern and spacious than the small bungalow on Little Colaba Road, where he and Laila had lived. He was also in the process of redecorating a completely new residence he bought at No. 10 Aungmye Road in New Delhi, a more diplomatic suburb. The last establishment, presently serving as Jinnah's headquarters, was furnished in Waring & Goring in much the same style as his first place. Some had been a new one was moreover required to go to the New Delhi residence and Jinnah selected a four-colored Packard Sedan with green leather upholstery, a rear curtain, a rear light, and a rear window. He also bought a new, sleek, Everedable Ispahani model 140 touring and paperwork through Kharat Motor Co. Ltd. in Calcutta and the car was a sleek, elegant, reported vehicle then came to the 140. Jinnah found this point was very well off financially. His net income for 1937-38 was Rs. 1,00,000. In some months' income of more than 2,000 rupees. His standard legal fee by then was 1,500 rupees a day the highest in India, and in addition he earned no less than 40,000 rupees in dividends from stocks alone in 1938,¹⁴ reflecting the value of his

... then required suspension of all preparations for federation while retaining that idea "as our objective." India's princes had, in fact, proved reluctant to commit themselves to federation of any kind, with less than twelve having expressed willingness to participate in the 1935 scheme. It was a large given then one-third of the seats in the Legislative lower house and two-thirds of the seats in the upper house. Congress worked hard at pressing states to democratize their representation, which was the League's more intransigent toward the federation "aim." The fact had begun to sound like just one more "Hindu raj" trap set for Muslims.

Nehru was in China when the war started. He returned to join the Congress Working Committee, chairing its three-man war committee that included Subhas Chandra Bose and Mahatma Azad. On September 11, Nehru went to Washington to contribute to the response to the victory's declaration. A letter from the committee, written the day before, was released by the press on September 13. The Working Committee Declaration on India and the War⁴⁹ was a surprise. It declared the Congress disapproval of the ideology and aims of the Axis and Nazis and their justification of war and violence as a possession of the human spirit. If the war is to defend the rights of peoples in their possessions, colonies, vested interests and privileges, the Congress has nothing to do with it. "Let them write Zetland, let them call Congress a traitor. Let them have their say. It is a tragedy of the world that we should have to do so important a part in this drama like Nehru with his amateur knowledge of foreign policy to call it a tragedy at all." This, with news that the "unknown priority" concerning the war was Gandhi, and on September 26 Liahdigow invited the Mahatma to see him.

"I'm off to Sri Lanka again," Gandhi wrote Jawaharlal, modestly adding, "I go only to act as intermediary. You will send me instructions if any. I do hope you will be ready to answer invitation, if it comes. Love, Bapu."⁵⁰ On October 1, 1941, at 10 a.m., on September 25 Gandhi received a message of

My personal reaction towards this war is one of greater horror than ever before. I was not so disconsolate before as I am today. But the greater horror would prevent me today from becoming the self-appointed recruiting sergeant that I had become during the last war. And yet strange as it may appear, my sympathies are wholly with the Axis. But assuming that God has endowed me with full powers which He never does, I would at once ask the English to withdraw arms from all their vassals, take pride in being called "Jahil-Lahjanders" and deny the totalitarianism of the world to do then

worst Englishmen will then die unresistingly and go down to history as heroes of non-violence. I would further invite Indians to co-operate with Englishmen in this godly martyrdom. It would be an undissoluble partnership drawn in the letters or the blood of their own bodies, not of their so-called enemies . . . even at the risk of being misunderstood, I must act in obedience to *"the still small voice,"*⁵¹

To Liahdigow Gandhi explained his decision "to stand aside" from the Working Committee because of his age, noting that had he been "ten or fifteen years younger" this might possibly have gone differently. "The victory helped to convince Gandhi not to support his idea of a defence liaison committee of leading Congress and League politicians as well as it primes to help fashion official policy throughout the war. Indeed, Liahdigow invited no fewer than fifty-two leading Indians to Simla at this time, including Jinnah whom he had hoped would join the meeting with Gandhi. Jinnah, however, dodged the Mahatma, explaining "that he was too busy to come until after October 1941." The victory explained to Gandhi that he could not disregard the legitimate claims of the Muslims and the "Princes" though he recognized the "intensity of our feelings" and "compatibility" of the policies of Congress and the League. Gandhi replied that Britain should leave Indians to settle the problem of achieving peace themselves. And after three hours of tense discussion Gandhi "begged" Liahdigow not to consult the Muslim League.

It is likely that the British Government will try to play off the Congress against the Muslim League and the princes. Azad wrote a friend Krishna Menon at this time⁵² "The day after Gandhi met Liahdigow, Secretary of State Zetland stated in Westminster that 'there has been a change in the leaders of the Congress for a reiteration of their earlier views.' Nehru, reported angrily on September 24 and once again his temper flared, his own worst enemy, saying Jinnah far better than Congress. He had misread the strength of the League's support in London and as he had long underestimated Jinnah's power, Gandhi's personal involvement and Liahdigow's support in the effort with "an English heart" would have proved a far wiser political posture for Congress throughout the war.

On October 5 Jinnah arrived at the viceregal palace, "friend," and co-operated and seems to be thanking Liahdigow for helping to keep the Muslim League out of the war. Liahdigow replied that it was of the public interest for the Muslim position to be known. Jinnah competently expressed "his feelings" to Liahdigow and then to the Mahatma. Liahdigow frankly informed him that after studying the charges of persecutions in Congress papers, Liahdigow had a "mild intention" to undermine the Muslim position, as

He explained to Krishna Menon while insisting "This is not being organized by the Congress as such. Though Congress Muslims will take a leading part in it." Rather than growing more receptive to admitting "Hindu" Congress had thus become more determined than ever to prove its thoroughly national character and was to remain so insisting that religion has played no role in its deliberations, policies, or programs. Jinna and his party were no longer willing to retain mere "minority" status as a capital of the Province had been chosen purposely as the place to announce the Muslim League's newborn resolve.

It has always been taken for granted and openly that the Muslims are a minority, and of course we have got used to it for such a long time that these settled notions sometimes are very difficult to remove. The Muslims are not a minority. The Muslims are a nation by any definition.

The problem in India is not of an inter-communal but manifestly of a communal character and must be treated as such. So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not treated any constitutional attempt to be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Muslims, but also to the British and Hindus. The British Government are really interested and sincere in the peace and happiness of the people of this Subcontinent. The only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands, by dividing India into "autonomous national States."

He did not use the word "Pakistan" nor would it appear in the forthcoming declaration. He had in excess of a year given much thought and study to the problem and solution for the Hindu-Muslim problem but a set of comprehensive international explanations of partition. Jinna no longer stood before a wisdom vial or after much impact of a bomb and could only whisper "1947" but this was the only long-term resolution to India's foremost problem.

And so now, across lowered the final curtain on any prospects for a single united independent India. Those who understood him enough to know that once his mind was made up he never reverted to any earlier position realized how momentous a pronouncement their Quaid-e-Azam had just made. The rest of the world would take at least seven years to appreciate that he literally meant every word he had uttered that important afternoon in March. There was no turning back. The ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity had been broken. All that remained was for his party first, then his echoic nation, and then his British allies to agree to the farman he had resolved upon. As for Chan-

dhi, Nehru, Azad and the rest, they were advocates of a neighbor state and would be dealt with according to classic canons of diplomacy. The crowd went wild with acclamation as he stepped from the microphone and returned to his throne to lead his sister from the pandit. He had crossed the high wire without falling. His hand trembled as he lit a fresh cigarette, but his lungs had held and his voice had remained and here he had been truly a stellar performance worthy of the lead role he alone could command in this company.

13

Lahore to Delhi
(1940-42)

The Lahore Pakistan resolution was hammered into final form at Lahore when Quaid-i-Azam resumed speaking. The League's Subjects Committee met all day over their draft through the early hours of Saturday March 3, and it was not until late afternoon that unanimity was reached. Sir Sikander found the concept of partition insupportable till the bitter end, for was it not repudiation of his League party's basic platform of Hindu-Muslim Sikh co-existence, and of his potential to win personal leadership of the League? After hearing how enthusiastically Jinnah's speech was received, however, Sikander must have known that his days of aspiring to a leadership of the Muslims of India were numbered. Even in the heart of his home province, that morning an angry crowd of young Muslims was shouting "Sikander Moradabad!" "Death to Sikander!" Hearing that his name had been connected to his own name in Lahore must have given him pause. When Jinnah appeared, however, the young men changed their cry to "Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad!" Whoever had trained and orchestrated that chorus had done an effective job.

Jinnah presided over the second day's session of the Lahore League. Maulvi Haq, who chaired the Subjects Committee, moved the first resolution, the most famous third paragraph of which stated

That it is the considered view of this Session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which

the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.¹

Pakistan was not explicitly mentioned, nor was it clear from the language of the resolution whether a single Muslim state or both "zones" had been envisioned or two separate "autonomous independent states, one in the North and the other in the East." Bangladesh, zone Sher-Bengal ("Lion of Bengal") Faruk Haq at least appears to have had the latter in mind when he drafted the resolution and read it aloud. But Jinnah was the leader, and when asked by reporters if this resolution meant one or more than one Muslim nation, his unequivocal answer sealed the fate of Bengal's Muslim majority. India's newspaper headlines next day pronounced the Lahore resolution a single "Pakistan Resolution" and so it remained.

Sikander held out for some form of federating central government to unite the "sovereign constituent units" and insisted, at his death in December 1942 that the Lahore resolution was only a "warning shot" for the League. For Sikander, indeed it was, but not for Jinnah. Panjab Governor Sir Henry Gurney reported the resolution to Lord Irwin as "a very effective response to Congress as it interpreted the Congress demand to speak for India."²

A few days later (and it was asked, "Do you think to start general civil disobedience, although Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah has declared war against this day and has got the Muslim League to pass a resolution favouring secession of India into two?") Jinnah's what becomes of our territory that there is no swara, without communal mit? To this he replied, "I admit that the step taken by the Muslim League at Lahore creates a baffling situation. But I do not regard it so baffling as to take disobedience as a possibility. . . . The Muslims must have the same right of self-determination that the rest of India has. We are at present a joint family. Any member may claim a division."³

Other leaders at Congress reacted more strongly. "I consider it a sign of a diseased mentality that Mr Jinnah has thought himself to look upon the idea of one India as a misconception and the cause of most of our trouble," argued (Jawahar Lal) Rajagopalachari. C. R. Reddy (1879-1972) of Madras, who was to become India's first High Commissioner General, wrote of the resolution that "Jinnah's demands require only regarding it as a cat's paw of British imperial ambitions." A leading Congress leader responded that "India's constitution must be based on independence, democracy and national unity," repudiating "attempts to divide India or to split up her national onhood."⁴

Jinnah Ali Khan convened the third day's proceedings of the Lahore League shortly before noon, announcing that the Quaid-i-Azam would ur-

was a little late" Jinnah, though exhausted, managed to muster strength enough to appear as the pivotal shortly after the meeting commenced. He was in the chair, in fact, when Dr. Mohammad Alam, a recent convert to Islam after having left Congress, seconded the resolution moved the day before. The resolution carried by acclamation. Another resolution asserting the League's "grave concern" at British "inordinate delay . . . in coming to a settlement with the Arabs in Palestine," also carried that final day. The session then adjourned and was reconvened by Jinnah at 9:00 P.M. when he had had several hours rest. He personally moved a resolution on behalf of Khaksars, urging the Punjab government to remove the "unlawful" possession of that militant Muslim organization and called for an "independent committee of inquiry" to investigate the tragic clash between Khaksars and the Police of March 19. Jinnah urged every one to "bring in evidence" to such an inquiry committee once it was appointed. "I'll rest well," he said, "and God will help us," in words of prophetic significance that night Jinnah called it a landmark—the history of India was being made that day. The more you organize you sell the more you win. We must get our rights in the session which is before us right with us and to the "Ameer-e-Zulmat." The next day before leaving Lahore Jinnah and his associates have thoroughly enjoyed our stay in Lahore because of the result otherwise it was worked to death.¹⁴

Lord Gow was present in April, reassuring him that His Majesty's Government were friendly and sympathetic to Muslims with the Muslim League members of whom indeed they are proud by alliance. Wounded by Jinnah's London's Caxton Hall speech before Congress by young Iqbal, Nehru was asked to assist the Muslim League. Lord Zetland, then official member of the League, was secretary of state for India was Secretary of State. Prime Minister Churchill's predecessor as first Lord of the Admiralty. With Churchill and Amery at the helm in London, Jinnah's stock rose much higher in New Delhi and Simla. The *Hindustan* newspaper in B. Shiva Rao reported from Simla in June on an important Jinnah conference which seems to stress the official and "topical" character of the visit. The first Mr. Jinnah should be off and so.

At this juncture, Sikander tried his best to negotiate a federal scheme with the Congress in order to shelter him and avoid working with Jinnah's tacit support. The viceroy sought a further round of discussions with Congress and Jinnah, but Jinnah was not in a hurry of the arguments and waited in any event till he had a chance to meet with Lord Amery, the British Secretary of State for India. Jinnah's mouthpiece Gandhi wrote to Lord Amery offering "to go to Germany or any where required in plenty for peace," since as he noted, "I do not believe

Herr Hitler to be as bad as he is portrayed. He might even have been a friendly power as he may still be."¹⁵ The viceroy did not, however, accept that offer.

Jinnah called his Working Committee to Bombay in mid-June, and after a stormy three-day meeting at which Sikander did his best to wrest leadership of the League for himself, he resolved first of all to endorse the Qaid-e-Azam's position as voiced in the May remonstrance to the British that "Up to the present moment we have not created any difficulty nor have we embroiled the British Government in the prosecution of the war."¹⁶ The League's high command then looked "with alarm at the growing menace of Nazi aggression which has been most ruthlessly depriving one nation after another of its liberty and freedom and regards the improvement asked by the Indian Government against the Axis as most unwarranted and unjust at a time when France was engaged in a brave struggle against very heavy odds."¹⁷

Jinnah visited the viceregal palace at Simla on June 27, 1940, conferring at length with Lord Linlithgow. Afterwards he wrote a memo reaffirming "in the Lahore Pakistan" resolution had become "the only basis for the Muslim League and that the viceroy had promised him "that, after it is a final scheme of new constitution would be adopted by the British Government without the previous approval of Muslim India."¹⁸ They had also agreed that "everything should be done that is possible to it only war efforts and mobilize all the resources of India for her defence for the purpose of maintaining international peace and tranquility and to ward off any aggression." Jinnah insisted that this could not be achieved provided the British Government are ready and willing to associate the Muslim leadership as equal partners in the Government both at the Centre and in all the provinces. Specifically, he recommended that for the duration of the war the Executive Council of the Viceroy be expanded to include at least as many Muslim members as Hindus "if the Congress comes in" otherwise Muslims, as I am to be chosen by the League, were to have the majority of additional council membership.

In mid-1940, with Britain's war against German invasion and its popular desire to survive an endless monsoon of bombs, Jinnah wisely argued that the time was not ripe for a power struggle "show down" with the British. Caxton at this time published an "open letter" to "every Muslim" urging cessation of hostilities.

Not a day goes by without our seeing some slaughter that is going on minute by minute. . . . I do not want Britain to be defeated, but I do not want her to be a power struggle "show down" with the British. Caxton at this time published an "open letter" to "every Muslim" urging cessation of hostilities.

needed a "third federation" of Indian states, since most princes, like Muslim rulers, were "anxious to maintain their integrity and sovereign rights." As for Jinnah himself, however, he felt it was "large" and "popular enough to merit the independent status with direct political relations with the Crown and the King." Jinnah was to rely heavily on this memo in the years of strenuous negotiation ahead.

The third session of the League was scheduled to start on April 12, and at Madras People's Park, where an estimated 100,000 Muslims gathered, Jinnah, the panda, to capacity being lost, tore their Quaid-i-Azam reached the stage. When a train was a few hours from Madras, he got "suddenly ill," "fainted," "collapsed," "dashed to his side, kneeling on the floor, and asked, 'Jin, what is wrong?'"

He said a word or so, "I suddenly felt very weak, exhausted. I felt . . . and my shoulder ached, and I staggered to his berth . . . the train came to a halt . . . and thousands of enthusiastic admirers were on the platform, shouting, 'Quaid-e-Azam! Quaid-e-Azam!' I pushed the door of our compartment slightly and pleaded, 'Don't shout. The Quaid is resting, he has a fever and is fatigued. Please get a doctor.'"

When the doctor arrived, examined him and said, "Sir, you have had a nervous breakdown, nothing serious, but I would advise you not to move about for at least a week. Please stay in bed."

We were soon in Madras. . . . The Quaid was too weak to address the opening session, but on the following day he insisted that he would deliver his presidential address. I advised him against it, but he would not be dissuaded. I begged him to make short speech. At right, I shall try to be brief," he said. He had no notes . . . once he began, he went on speaking for over two hours.²²

"Ladies and gentlemen, in the first place let me thank you and those who have made arrangements about my indisposition. I have received so many kind and kind letters that it is not possible for me to reply to them personally. . . . But I hope you will accept my heartfelt thanks. . . . Behind me is a long line of my countrymen and women, and I am sure they will support me in every decision I take. . . . The Congress is not a Hindu-Muslim party. E. V. Rameswami Naicker, the Periyar ('Great Sage') of the 'Dravidian' movement and other Tamilian luminaries including Jinnah's old friend Sir A. P. Pantu. 'Since the fall of the Muslim Empire, I think I am right in saying that Muslim India was never so well organized and so alive as in politically conscious as it is to-day.' Jinnah

had said, and it was a fact. . . . In his own words, 'The Congress is not a Hindu-Muslim party. E. V. Rameswami Naicker, the Periyar ('Great Sage') of the 'Dravidian' movement and other Tamilian luminaries including Jinnah's old friend Sir A. P. Pantu. 'Since the fall of the Muslim Empire, I think I am right in saying that Muslim India was never so well organized and so alive as in politically conscious as it is to-day.' Jinnah

as he spoke, bracing himself with the other bony-fingered arm on the speaker's stand, determined not to smoke or to fall. "We have established a flag of our own, a national flag of Muslim India. We have established a remarkable platform which displays and demonstrates a complete unity of the entire solid body of Muslim India." He spoke ex tempore in a faultless subdued English accent and his face, though rather skeletal, was brightened by the luminosity of his eyes.

We have defined in the clearest language our goal about which Muslim India was groping in the dark, and the goal is Pakistan.

That is our five-year plan of the past. We have succeeded in raising the prestige and reputation of the League not only throughout the country—we have now reached the farthest corners of the world, and we are watched throughout the world. Now what next? No people can ever succeed in anything that they desire unless they work for it and work hard for it. . . . What is required now is that you should take and take this part. . . . The gates of the All-India Muslim League who have gathered here from all parts of India—we must now think out a five-year plan and a five-year plan and part of the five-year plan should be how to build and to best the departments of the national life of Muslim India may be built up.²³

He needed and wanted more brains, more bodies, more brains and more bodies. For his own strength, his own energy, was flagging and failing. He was clearly feeling the strain of speaking in the first place and over-heated and but instead of a warning he got his feet and moved ahead, drawing energy it seemed from the crowd's attention and palpable devotion. The fever had returned to purgify his mind. He would stop. He would not abandon the podium or turn his back on so huge and receptive an audience.

He meandered over the political history of India since the war had started, returning again and again to his favorite subject,

what the Congress wants. The Congress has taken up a position about which there is absolutely no doubt. I would like to ask any man with a grain of sense, Do you really think that Gandhi, the supreme leader, commander and general of the Congress, has started this Satyagraha merely for the purpose of getting liberty of speech? Don't you really feel that this is nothing but a weapon of coercion and blackmailing the British, who are in a tight corner, to surrender and concede the Congress the independence?²⁴

Then Jinnah concluded his Madras address with a

real warning to the British Government because after all they are in possession of this land and the Government of this Subcontinent. Please stop your policy of appeasement towards those who are bent upon frustrating your war efforts and doing their best to oppose the prosecution of the war and the defence of India at this critical moment. . . . You are not loyal to those who are willing to stand by you and sincerely desire to support you. you desire to placate those who have the greatest influence in the political and economic fields.

If the Government want the whole hearted co-operation of Muslim India, they must place their cards on the table."

The great enthusiasm of that large gathering had served as a tonic. Fatima remembered, but only I knew that weakness, exhaustion and fever would follow.

Seeking pure air at higher altitudes for his tubercular lungs, Jinnah came to the Band Hills in Mysore State and Coimbatore to try to recover strength after Madras. What rest or tonic would only be temporary as acute illness that drained his energy was by now irreversible. Not only he stop smoking, Jinnah's health remained precarious all the time and in July he was still too weak to accept a telephonic invitation from Bombay's governor Sir Roger Lumley to come visit the Governor of Coimbatore. The governor's messenger had about March 1942, been in a hurry of London to plan for constitutional change. Sir Roger wrote "confidentially" to Jinnah on July 20.

It is in accordance with the approval of His Majesty's Government, a National Defence Council. This Council will consist of some 30 members, nine of whom will be drawn from Indian States. The Viceroy regards it as essential that the Great Muslim community should be represented in that Council by persons of the highest position and capacity. He has accordingly invited the Premier of Assam, Bengal, the Punjab and Sind to serve as members of it. He has considered whether he should invite you to let him have any suggestions as to possible personnel for this Council, but being conscious of your general attitude, he has concluded that it would be preferable not to embarrass you by inviting you to make suggestions.

Jinnah was not embarrassed, he was infuriated. He read the viceroy's invitation to Sir Sikandar Fazlul Haq and the League premier of Assam, Sir Mohamad Saadullah, as a direct challenge to his authority and power over each of them as president of the Muslim League. He had already written personally to the viceroy for the purpose of making it clear that he would not accept the invitation.



Muhammad Ali Jinnah
in his South costume 1942





Junah c. 1910



Ruthie Junah around the time of her marriage
c. 1918



Junah and Ruthie's home
atop Malaga Hill in Bonaville c. 1920



Junah c. 1927



Jinnah, c. 1932




Jinnah and Fatima, Hampstead, c. 1932



Jinnah ("Quaid-e-Azam"), c. 1939




Addressing the Muslim League in Delhi, 1943



John S. A. 1945



John S. A. 1945
on the way to the 1945



John S. A. 1945




At home in New Delhi 1945-46




100 Nehru, Simla, 1946



101 1946



Preparing to address India
on the eve of Pakistan, 1947



Two men in white traditional attire, likely Sir Sikander and Fazlul Haq, 1947



Patron and others mourning at Jinnah's coffin, 1948

to deal with than Jinnah. That August Jinnah called his Working Committee to Bombay to deal with this challenge from Sindia. Sir Sikander, Fazlul Haq and Saadullah tried in vain to argue that they had joined the viceroy's defence council as provincial premiers, rather than as representatives of the Muslim League. Jinnah gave them no option but to quit the council or leave the League. Sikander after a long pause, took with Jinnah, agreed to abide by the decision of the committee. Sikander's capitulation was followed immediately by his resignation and that of Sir Saadullah from the viceroy's defence council. Fazlul Haq however proved less pliable and though he promised to resign from the viceroy's council, he was most dilatory about doing so. But he did resign from both the National Defence Council and the Working Committee of the League. As a mark of protest against the arbitrary transfer of powers vested in its President, voicing the strongest opposition to Jinnah's leadership and articulating what may in retrospect be viewed as a nascent 'Bangladeshi' posture against West Pakistani dominance. The Muslim premier of Bengal argued that "recent events have forcibly brought home to me that the principles of democracy and autonomy of the All India Muslim League are being subordinated to the arbitrary wishes of a single individual who seeks to rule as an omnipotent authority even over the destiny of 33 millions of Muslims in the province of Bengal who occupy the key position in Indian Muslim politics."²⁰

Begum Shah Nawaz and Sir Sultan Ahmad, unlike Sir Sikander, Fazlul Haq and Aslam Saadullah, refused to resign from the viceroy's council and were therefore expelled from the Muslim League for life years. For the Begum it was a particularly bitter pill to swallow since she had been so close to Jinnah during the Round Table conferences in London. She was later to recant and would return to the League's fold only after an hell decade of ostracism. "The Government in the heat of our opposition tried to manoeuvre and wear some of our members by associating them with this scheme," Jinnah remarked during his 10 Day message that October

Three of them were provincial Premiers of whom two were members of the Working Committee. We all know what happened I am glad, and we have reason to be proud that the British Government have been taught a lesson. Out of evil cometh good! Muslim India from one end to another demonstrated that it was solidly behind the Muslim League. I hope in future our opponents will learn that it is futile to attempt to create disruptions in our ranks. That chapter is now closed.²¹

Jinnah withdrew the League's elected members from the Central Legislature at this time more forcefully to impress upon the viceroy his dissatisfaction

to deal with it on Jinnah. That August Jinnah called his Working Committee to Bombay to deal with this challenge from Sir S. Kander Fazal Haq, and Saadullah tried in vain to argue that they had joined the viceroy's defence council as provincial premiers, rather than as representatives of Muslim opinion. Jinnah gave them no option but to quit the council or leave the League. Sikander, after a long private talk with Jinnah, agreed to abide by the decision of the committee. Sikander's capitulation was followed immediately by his resignation, and that of Sir Saadullah from the viceroy's defence council. Fazl Haq, however, proved insubordinate, and though he promised to resign from the viceroy's council he was most difficult about doing so. But he did resign from both the National Defence Council and the Working Committee of the League, "As a mark of protest against the arbitrary use of powers vested in its President" among the strongest opposition to Jinnah's leadership and articulating what may in retrospect be viewed as a nascent "Bangladeshi" position against West Pakistani dominance. The Muslim premier of Bengal argued that never ever shall we forcibly brought home to me that the principle of democracy is a common one in the All India Muslim League are being subordinated to the arbitrary wishes of a single individual who seeks to rule as an omnipotent authority even over the destiny of 33 millions of Muslims in the province of Bengal who occupy the key position in Indian Muslim politics.²⁰

Begum Shah Nawaz and Sir Sultan Ahmed, unlike Sir Sikander, Fazl Haq, and Aslam's Saadullah, refused to resign from the viceroy's council and were therefore expelled from the Muslim League for five years. For the begum it was a particularly bitter pill to swallow since Sir S. I. Jinnah, so close to Jinnah during the Round Table conferences in London. She was later to relent and would return to the League's fold, but only after her half decade of ostracism. "The Government in the teeth of our opposition tried to manoeuvre and wean some of our members by associating them with its scheme," Jinnah remarked during his 12 Day message of 10 October

Three of them were provincial Premiers of whom two were members of the Working Committee. Well, you know what happened. I am glad, and we have reason to be proud that the British Government have been taught a lesson. Out of evil cometh good! Muslim India from one end to another demonstrated that it was solidly behind the Muslim League. I hope in future our opponents will learn that it is futile to attempt to create disruptions in our ranks. That chapter is now closed.²¹

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Pakistan Karachi, 1947



Official mourning at Jinnah's coffin, 1948

the with the government's behavior and he called for a "clear" declaration of British policy toward all Muslim countries, demanding that Great Britain affirm its non-intervention policy with regard to universal Muslim "sovereignty and independence." He appointed Ispahani to Fazlul Haq's seat on the Working Committee.

Lalithgow's startling victories in the wake of Pearl Harbor now raised the specter for this invasion of India from the East. Since expanding his external front, Lalithgow had seen pressing Churchill's cabinet for permission to release Netaji as well as other key Congress leaders from jail, in exchange of demands from his non-official advisers. The veteran was eager to have his new members that they could, in fact "get things done." But Churchill was reluctant, arguing but "I understood the real use of these prisoners as an act of defiance with the prisoners as a victory for Gandhi's cause. Now our leaders will commit fresh offences requiring whole process of trial and conviction to be gone through again. You will get no thanks from me after that." Still, Lalithgow insisted. They agreed most of the cabinet would back Gandhi then, so that early in December when Churchill gave the War Cabinet to debate the issue he sensed their mood much better. Lalithgow looking "round the room and said some what sorrowfully I give up," adding some once "when you lose India don't blame me."⁹⁰

On returning to Nagpur on his birthday to address the All India Muslim Students Association on December 28, 1941 "My young friends, to occupy ourselves with what was the position of the Muslims even three years ago," Jinnah told them,

Five years ago it was wretched. Ten years ago you were dead. . . . The Muslim League has given you a goal which in my judgment is going to lead you to the promised land where we shall establish our Pakistan. People may say what they like and talk as they like. Of course, he who laughs last laughs best.⁹¹

For the first time since his League membership in Calcutta, opting to head a coalition of all the League's members and Under Muhammad Ali led by the veteran Congress leader, Dr. M. A. Jinnah Prasad Mookerjee. He persuaded the majority of Congress men his new cabinet which Ispahani called going "over to the enemy."⁹² By that unexpected coup, Haq proved again his political dexterity and durability. "The old fox who is now called the black sheep of the League," he mourned Ispahani. And Jinnah asked at Nagpur,

And in Bengal, what is the Congress Party doing? The Congress Party has manifested this new coalition ministry formed by Mr. Haq, and by virtue of it he was able to form a government and continue to

be the Premier. . . . Now I make a Christmas gift of Mr. Haq to Lord Linlithgow! I make another New Year's gift of the Nawab of Dacca to the Governor of Bengal! I am very glad and I am happy that Muslim India is rid of these men who are guilty of the grossest treachery and betrayal of the Muslims.⁹³

Both Bengali leaders were expelled from the League, "wooded out" as Jinnah put it.

Lalithgow urged Sir Roger Lumley, the governor of Bombay, to invite Jinnah "to a meal" and he did so in mid-January 1942 when Oxford professor Reginald Coupland arrived on his unofficial tour in search of a "creative" constitutional settlement. "I asked Jinnah to lunch and he came today," Lumley reported, and

Jinnah was most friendly throughout and if there is any effect from this social contact with him, I think it would be favourable. After lunch I had a talk with him, which I had intended would be a short one, so that he could then tackle Coupland, but at the first opening he proceeded to give me an exposition of the Muslim League's position which lasted for three quarters of an hour. It was at least friendly, very logical, and well rounded. I am the Muslim League point of view but there seemed to me to be no indication at all of any change in his position. He appeared quite satisfied with our attitude, although he expressed some fears that the British Press and public opinion would be taken in by Congress and other Hindu propaganda.⁹⁴

Lumley was "considerably impressed" by the logic of Jinnah's arguments, but in the aftermath of their talk saw no prospect for any "solution" to the constitutional "deadlock." India is hopelessly, and I suspect immediately split by racial and religious divisions which we cannot bridge and which become more acute as any real transfer of power as draws nearer." Lalithgow reported to Amery before the end of January 1942⁹⁵ Amery was "distinctly disturbed" by Lalithgow's "defeatist" position and he informed Amery after reading it, that he had lost considerable "confidence" in the veteran's judgment, suggesting that perhaps "someone" from Home should now be sent to India charged with a mission to try to bring the political leaders together.⁹⁶ Lalithgow's candidate for that job was Sir Salford Cripps, who had returned from Moscow where he had served as the British ambassador.

Jinnah left Bombay on February 10, taking an all-day and overnight train to Calcutta. A jubilant crowd awaited him at Howrah Station and escorted him in gala procession to Mohammad Ali Park, over which he hoisted the Muslim League flag on February 13, 1942. "Up to the present

countless futile hours of intense negotiation. Perhaps it was just that with stakes so high, he could not resist a roll at this fatal game, suspecting as one his confidants put it that "if he brought this settlement off, Cripps would certainly replace Winston." His fate, however, that he believed himself omnipotent. Forgetting what K. P. Singh had written of his well-intentioned forebears, he hoped to "win the First".

At this juncture President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent his former assistant secretary of war, Colonel Louis Johnson, out to India as his personal representative introducing Johnson to Lankhgow as a man of broad experience with previous relating to other supplies who was selected for "a very important mission because of his outstanding ability and high character". Churchill, Amery and Lankhgow were all anxious about the possible political implications of a secret agenda for Colonel Johnson's mission. Lankhgow's representative in Washington wrote that Roosevelt seemed to think that the plan concerning armed force liberation did not go far enough and he felt that complete autonomy, including power to raise armies, should be given to Indians.²⁸

As soon as Lankhgow, Amery and Churchill learned that Johnson and Roosevelt would not intend to twist their political arms by way of conceding more to a non-cooperating "British-Indian" as Johnson put it. Congress, the Cripps game was over. Only Cripps refused to believe he was finished. In a last meeting with Indian leaders, his long press conferences, setting long and longer since his gross home and suggested blogging, the home that had now driven him. The once bright and rising star of his political career went to eclipse under Indian burning sun. On April 2, Azad and Nehru handed Cripps the Congress Working Committee's resolution rejecting his offer. Instead of thanking them, and Ryan, home Cripps wrote the text of the resolution to Churchill and set up a meeting with Azad, Nehru, and field marshal Sir Archibald Wavell. 1933-1950. The tight-lipped commander-in-chief, who needed Lankhgow as viceroy, the following year was then fighting a losing battle in Malaya and Burma, desperately hoping he could keep the Japanese from seeping through India's Eastern wall of ragged mountainous forests. He had no time and less talent for political gamesmanship. With one glass eye and little to smile about, Wavell's was hardly a personality to appeal to Nehru, Azad or Cripps. Nor was he ready voluntarily to release any of the military strings he controlled. Still Cripps was determined to try to bring Nehru and Wavell to a accord.

Jinnah left Delhi on Thursday, April 2, taking the night train to Allahabad where he was seated in the first class. He was accompanied by a large number of his followers. He was met by a large number of his followers.

Allahabad's Central Railway Station, then deserted, was thronged more than a hundred green tins decorated arches of triumph that led to the packed pandal in Mahanadabad's garden. Jinnah presented his brief of Cripps proposals in a clear, succinct manner, saving, now that the scheme was really dead, how "deeply disappointed" all Muslims were to find that the unity and integrity of the Muslim nation has not been expressed, recognized. Any attempt to solve the problem of India by the process of evading the real issues and by exemplifying the territorial, ethnic, or provincial divisions, which are mere accidents of British policy, and administrative divisions, is a fundamentally wrong. Allahabad will not be satisfied unless the right of national self-determination unequivocally be recognized.²⁹

On Easter Sunday of that year (1942) Johnson met Cripps on the first time at the viceroys' house over lunch and each congratulated a potential ally in the other, for both were liberal legal minds who felt as far removed ideologically from the viceroys and his commanders-in-chief as they were culturally from Nehru, Azad. Both enjoyed mutual confidence at high places in London and Washington, moreover than either in New Delhi or Simla. And each, this way was laid under the spell of Nehru's cosmopolitan charm. So in the spirit of Easter Sunday they joined forces, hoping to resurrect the dream that had truly expired on Good Friday. They moved with great energy, immediacy, and top secrecy meeting Nehru, Azad and other leaders of Congress at all hours of day in a secret, convincing themselves that there was adequate light at the end of this constitutional tunnel. They came to believe that if Congress really wanted was control over the Ministry of Defense, so they worked out a compromise, ingenious and a waste that was a compromise for the viceroys. Under a Indian, who all of its representatives would remain under the command-in-chief who would retain his status, master of war, and they already thought he would suffer to solve India's problem. Cripps have even drawn up a plan of a plan, a plan not systems for the new national government. He was going to talk and Congress freedom. Azad was his choice for home minister, a large of police. Azad, whom Jinnah was to not speak to and refused to accept, died in Meerut prison, a martyr to the cause. Nehru of the words of cooperation and of the same that he and the Congress would be together, who was a very close friend. It was all an illusion spun out of India's torrid heat.

Many cables were exchanged between London and India in the next few days, including one from Churchill informing Cripps that Johnson was not Roosevelt's representative "in any matter outside the specific mission to bring the Indian government and the British government to a settlement. All the cables were unnecessary. Congress turned down the proposals.

14

Dawn in Delhi
(1942-43)

Jinnah's position remained firm throughout the remaining years of World War II. He declined to co-operate with Congress and any council of government that might be set up for the Muslim right in Pakistan. Many of his supporters in the All-India Muslim League were hostile and non-co-operative. The government of India and His Majesty's Government looked upon him as a traitor. Muslim League leaders for the support they required. Jinnah's stock rose to new heights in London as well as in Simla and New Delhi.

Jinnah's political position was rarely mixed at Whitehall. "I don't suppose Jinnah will want to become less nationalist than Congress and therefore I don't mind his extreme position," Avery wrote L. P. D. G. "Thank you. Jinnah was a great tactician and speculating on possible future reforms."

If he does, I suppose you could give him certain seats, balancing him with Ambedkar and possibly a new Hindu or two, but still retaining the majority of your existing Executive? Or you may simply decide to discontinue the idea of bringing in political leaders from either of the two main parties? . . . The Muslim League, I suppose, will still be officially non-co-operative, but probably more co-operative than hitherto in practice in view of the definite concession to the possibility of Pakistan that we have made.²¹

In the wake of Cripps, the governor of the Punjab reported that "the Sikh community were very seriously perturbed by the potentially suspicious nature of the War Cabinet's proposals." Sikhs were afraid that if the Punjab refused to accede to an All India confederacy, that wealthy Muslim-majority

province once ruled by Sikh Maharajas would be enveloped by "the outer darkness of Pakistan. They regarded themselves as being in danger of everlasting subjection to an unsympathetic and tyrannical Muhammadan Ruler." Sikh Muslims implicitly had roots that went back to seventeenth century Mughal imperial rule. "We are doing what we can to cope with the situation," Governor Clancy assured the viceroy. "It was a most important warning passed on to Whitehall in London, since martial Sikhs numbered second only to Muslims in the British Indian army."

Blood and tears are going to be our lot whether we take them or not," Nehru predicted at the press conference in Allahabad in mid-April after Cripps flew home. "Our blood and tears will flow, maybe the parched soul of India needs them so that the first flower of freedom may grow again."

Cripps held a press conference in London on April 22 and insisted "The problem now becomes not a political one but the people's choice of defence of India and in that I have had the assurance of a majority of the leaders that they are going to co-operate in their efforts." Asked by the *Times* if he and Nehru and Jinnah would come to London, he replied negatively, "In my opinion," that neither of them would want to leave India in "existing circumstances" even if they were invited.

In Madras, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (C. R.) now dramatically sought to lead Congress in the direction of co-operation both with the British war effort and the Muslim League. He presided over a meeting of forty-six members of Madras Congress Legislature and proposed two resolutions, agreement on which was reached in late April. The first urged that since it was impossible for the people to think in terms of neutrality or passivity during invasion, "it was absolutely and urgently necessary" for Congress to "remove every obstacle toward establishing a National Administration." It therefore urged the All-India Congress Party to "acknowledge the Muslim League's claim for separation," thereby removing all doubts and fears in this regard, and to invite the League for "consultation for the purpose of arriving at agreement and securing of national Government to meet present emergency." The second resolution requested permission to the All-India Congress for the Madras Congress to unite with the Muslim League and "thereby provide a pathway to restore popular government, as a coalition of minorities in Madras. Both resolutions passed overwhelmingly. It was the first important break in Congress's non-cooperation policy, a significant victory for Jinnah's policy and the British, and a direct challenge to Gandhi and Nehru.

The All-India Congress met the following week repudiating C. R. and his Madras revolution. On April 30, 1942, he resigned from the Working

Committee Gandhi remained in Wardha, but sent his loving disciple Mahadevi, Madeline Stude to Allahabad with a resolution he drafted for presentation to the Congress, stating

Whereas the British War Cabinet's proposals sponsored by Sir Stafford Cripps have shown up British imperialism in its nakedness as never before . . . The A.I.C.C. is of opinion that Britain is incapable of defending India. It is natural that whatever she does is for her own defence. There is an eternal conflict between Indian and British interests. . . . The Indian army has been maintained up till now mainly to hold India in subjugation. It has been completely segregated from the general population who can in no sense regard it as their own. . . . India's quarrel is not with India. She is warring against the British Empire. India's participation in the war has not been with the consent of the representatives of the Indian people. It was purely a British act. If India were freed her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan. . . . The A.I.C.C. is, therefore, of opinion that the British should withdraw from India.⁴

Nel and I, but Colonel Johnson and Franklin Roosevelt might help. . . . The Congress were more supportive of the American cause. A resolution was agreed upon by the Working Committee. . . . It was clear that they were, through the resolution passed on May 1, also protesting India's participation in Nazism and Fascism as imperialism. On June 6, however, Gandhi wrote

I see no difference between the Fascist or Nazi powers and the Allies. All are exploiters, all resort to ruthlessness to the extent required to compass their end. America and Britain are very great nations, but their greatness will count as dust before the bar of dumb humanity, whether African or Asiatic. . . . They have no right to talk of human liberty and a hell unless they have washed their hands clean of the pollution.⁵

Two American journalists interviewed Gandhi that week in Wardha, and one asked "But what does a free India mean, if, as Mr. Jinnah said, Muslims will not accept Hindu rule?" The Mahatma replied "I have not asked the British to hand over India to the Congress or to the Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all the parties will fight one another like dogs, or will, when real responsibility among them comes to a reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that chaos."⁶ Gandhi was reminded by a reporter for *The Hindu* that at 11 recently, he had a ways said there could be no *Swaraj* without Hindu-Muslim unity, and then he was asked why he had of late insisted

there would be "no unity until India has achieved independence?" The seventy-three-year-old Mahatma answered

Time is a merciless enemy I have been asking myself why every whole-hearted attempt made by all including myself to reach unity has failed, and failed so completely that I have entirely fallen from grace and am described by some Muslim papers as the greatest enemy of Islam in India. It is a phenomenon I can only account for by the fact that the third power, even without deliberately wishing it, will not allow real unity to take place. Therefore I have come to the resultant conclusion that the two communities will come together almost immediately after the British power comes to a final end in India.⁷

Jinnah immediately responded to this with "I am glad that at last Mr. Gandhi has openly declared that every and every Muslim settler and can only come after the achievement of Indian independence and has merely thrown off the cloak that he had worn for the last 22 years."⁸

The All-India Congress met again in early August as Gandhi told his followers "This is a crucial hour. We shall get our freedom by fighting; it cannot fall from the skies. The Britishers will have to give us freedom when we have made sufficient sacrifices and proved our strength. At a time when I am asked to launch the *Quit India* slogan, I feel here can be no retreat for the British in my heart. The thought that for all they are a difficult lot, I should give them a push is totally absent from my mind." *Sardar Fateh* was reported to have said that the British army was ready to abandon India much the way they had Burma, and that the *Satyagraha* campaign would prove victorious in a week. "If it took a week it will be a miracle and if it happens it would mean striking the British heart," Gandhi said, adding

Maybe wisdom will dawn on the British and they will understand that it will be wrong for them to put in as the very people who want to fight for them. Maybe . . . a change may come in Mr. Jinnah's mind after all. I will think that those who are fighting are the sons of the soil and if he sits quiet of what use would Pakistan be for him . . . God has helped us. When I raised the slogan "Quit India" the people in India who were then feeling despondent felt I had placed before them a new thing. If you want real freedom you will have to come together and such coming together will create true democracies.⁹

The War Cabinet transmitted full authority to Linlithgow to arrest Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee at any time he deemed appropriate. London considered Congress's most recent resolution an open

rebellion" against the government of India. Sikander warned Governor C. J. Lawrence of his suspicion that Gandhi might try to "make terms with Jinnah in an out-and-out offer of Pakistan and then present a united front to Government."¹¹ Gandhi did, in fact, write on August 8 that

Provided the Muslim League co-operated fully with the Congress demand for immediate independence without the slightest reservation, the Congress will have no objection to the British Government transferring all the powers it today exercises to the Muslim League on behalf of the whole of India. . . . And the Congress will not only not obstruct any Government that the Muslim League may form on behalf of the people, but will even join the Government in running the machinery of the free State. This is meant in all seriousness and sincerity.¹²

So a letter might have tempted Jinnah if he had believed in or trusted Gandhi, but just a few days later he had to tell the press: "Mr. Gandhi's acceptance of independence is clearly different from ours. Mr. Gandhi is merely a Congress man. I ask Mr. Gandhi to give up the game of playing the Muslims by saying that we depend upon the British for the achievement of our goal of Pakistan. . . . Hands off the Muslims." On August 8, all was in readiness within the vast machine of the Government of India. The Aga Khan's selection Poonja was chosen as the most secure, comfortable and convenient prison for Gandhi and a number of his family and closest followers including Sanjay Narayan and Ahmad Ali, his daughter Madhuba. The rest of the Congress Working Committee was to be jailed in Ahmednagar Fort.

Every one of you should, from this moment onwards, consider yourself a free man or woman, and act as if you are free and are no longer under the hood of the "Mahatma." Gandhi told his Congress colleagues after they passed his "Quit India" resolution on the evening of August 8, 1942: "Here is a mantra, a short one, that I give you. You may imprint it on your hearts and let every breath of yours give expression to it. The mantra is: 'Do or Die.' We shall either free India or die in the attempt."¹³

Lalith-gow waited no longer. Gandhi and the entire Congress Working Committee were arrested next day before dawn. Gandhi's final message to the country was written at 5:00 A.M., shortly before he was taken into custody: "Everyone is free to go the fullest length under ahimsa. Complete non-cooperation with strikes and other non-violent means. Satyagrahis must go out and sit on the roads. The British should be asked to leave. The British should go out to die that the nation will survive. Karama ya mara, Awaaz de Du."¹⁴

I deeply regret that the Congress has finally declared war and has launched a most dangerous mass movement in spite of numerous warnings from various independent parties and organizations," said Jinnah on August 9, 1942. "I think Gandhi is doing it to speed the war to end swiftly, nor can he think the British would lose. He never believed, moreover, that *Satyagraha* could raise non-violence. He summoned his Working Committee to Bombay on August 16 to plan the League's strategy. They met in his house for four days and formally resolved to deplore the decision of the All-India Congress Committee to launch an "open rebellion" for the purpose of establishing Congress Hindu domination in India. The result was only lawlessness and considerable destruction of life and property."¹⁵ The League viewed the "Quit India" movement as an attempt to "force the Muslims to submit and surrender to Congress terms and dictation."

The violence started in Bombay a few days after Gandhi's arrest, quickly spread to the United Provinces, Delhi, and Bihar. The speed and secrecy of the government's pre-dawn sweep in Delhi had a deadly ring to it, and where there was the news seemed to report only its urban areas and strikes. By August 17, however, Lalith-gow wrote to a friend: "In Delhi there has been a good deal of trouble. Casualties may be heavy and some damage has been done to property. Here again I am not reporting to you. It is . . . due to millhands on strike, and the Chief Commissioner is quite confident that he can handle the situation."¹⁶

But by mid-August over thirty people were dead in Bombay, where the police reinforcements, working as a regular force of British and Indian troops, had found India was even India were torn up, and the British had been sent away. The army troops in the affected areas, with Lalith-gow authorizing, could be getting from air or submarine.¹⁷ No report of such martial law was made. A Bihar was even permitted to appear in many Indian newspapers. But in India, censors were kept busy keeping secret all movements. The names of the Indian army were at students and staff, as the British had Gandhi's *Satyagrahis* doing. Lalith-gow was disturbed by the situation. More disturbing developments are signs of extension of civil disobedience, telegraph and telephonic communications. This situation was still more difficult to dispose of effectively in a country of the size of India.¹⁸

A week after Gandhi's arrest, Lord Linlithgow was pleased to note that British action had "tidied up the Bombay position" and was "relieved" that things were relatively "quiet in Delhi, for serious and prolonged rioting in the capital city of a country is not a very good advertisement."¹⁹ Linlithgow's minister of information and propaganda, Sir C. P. Baraswami Aiyar, then reported that "The Muslim League has developed cold feet and desires

negotiate with Gandhi," adding "With my opinion on Junnah I feel that Government should forestall it. I go further and venture to assert that to seek as one Governor has spoken of crushing the organisation is to follow the wrong method." Ayer had earlier appealed to the viceroy to allow him to try to negotiate a settlement with Gandhi. But Linlithgow had refused to permit him to see Gandhi and then tried vainly to convince him to stay in a material harness. So Ayer, formerly Travancore State's prime minister, returned to his Malabar home, which he hoped would remain under the protection of Britain's paramount power.

"Junnah has taken advantage of the latest turn in events to raise his terms against us (not that that matters much), and also to raise them at the Congress," Linlithgow ordered Ayer to "take a new and high level of his movement." Junnah's game of poker, it seemed to me, was over. If the Congress could accept the principle of Pakistan by whomsoever it was backed, it remained pretty clear that there is going to be nothing to do either the Congress or the Muslim League while the war lasts."

Ambassador Lord Halifax (ex-viceroy Lord Irwin) cabled a most secret message from Washington in late August directly to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, informing him that the "S. Council Secret" Carnegie R. Anderson, New Delhi, had just reported to the State Department that the Muslim League received most of its "financial support" from "the Indian Hindu as well as Mohammedan, the great Mohammedan landlords and the English business community particularly that of Calcutta." This report was "to explain that the Indian princes and the British business community sided with the Muslim League for the same reason—that the Government does not wish to reveal to the present day India the amount of its power to avoid a definite settlement of India's problems and to prevent it from leading to a secondary reason why the Muslim League is interested in supporting the Muslim League is that they are secured of the Congress Party's belief in the national ownership of all India's resources."

At the end of August, Linlithgow wired Churchill complaining about a serious "intervention." The viceroy suddenly called the unrest

by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857, the gravity and extent of which we have so far concealed from the world for reasons of military security. "My violence remains rampant over large tracts of the countryside and I am by no means confident that we may not see in September a formidable attempt to renew this widespread sabotage of our war effort. The lives of Europeans in ordinary life are in danger. It is a matter of fact that we have damaged India irretrievably as a base for future Allied operations and

as a thoroughfare for U.S. help to China. . . These are the circumstances in which I am now threatened by visitations from Wendell Wilkie and Sherwood Eddy. The latter threatens to come to India in the hope of escaping by way of mediation. My experience of sympathetic Americans which is now extensive is that their zeal in teaching us our business is in inverse ratio to their understanding of even the most elementary of the problems with which we have to deal."

"Discussing the American invasion of Cabinet this morning much sympathy was expressed for you." Ayer assured Linlithgow on September 1 "and a clear conviction that you must, by your refusal to let anyone go and see the prisoners. On the other hand, Eden and others felt that it could only do good your finding time to take to the better type of American and get out as a loss. Wilkie is very well discussed and it would be especially unwise to the effect of a good change. . . . I have a sense of meeting Churchill's spoken of the present trouble as completely disposed of and as a sign of the fact which will be a way to restore upon the Congress really represents early anyhow, even a lawless money lenders and the Hindu priesthood."

By September 5, the Home Department of the government of India reported that excluding Bihar, at least 340 Indians had been killed by their own since August 1 and 630 wounded, and that the "total" and "to be" considerably higher. "Power had to be maintained against troops were not in our less than 150 places at most of which they would not go. Some fifty seven battalions worth of regular British army soldiers were used during that most bloody and fateful battle of World War II fought against their own people in India. There was no way of accurately estimating the total number of dead and wounded in Bihar, since British aircraft repeatedly strafed civilians with machine gun fire.

"I always dread a schismographic situation between the British Government and the Congress." Junnah told the international press assembled at his house in New Delhi on September 23. Asked if there was chance of any modification of his party's demand, Junnah replied "If you start bargaining for sixteen annas a rupee it is worth there a room for bargaining. The Muslim League may even go forward and demand a watch can by any reason. It can be hard to defend as unreasonable. The Muslim League stands for independence for the Indian as well as for the Mussalman. Hindu India has got the hands of the Indian people and is the India which is barred from the world. . . . We are not for our country or itself and diddle us out of it."

U.S. public pressure, urging Britain to "do something" for India, mounted as the war progressed and American arms, men and money

played an ever greater role in showing up Allied defenses preparing the launching pads from which to recapture Western Europe and China as well as Southeast Asia. Harry Hopkins spoke to me last night about his strong pressure now being exerted on the President," Halifax warned Eden, "The Cabinet should realize how strongly public opinion is moving on these issues and I hope to be able to say or do something to counteract it. Otherwise I fear American press, which on the whole has stood by us remarkably since we came in, will be rapidly and perhaps completely change its attitude much to the detriment of Anglo-American relations."²⁴

"What have we to be ashamed of in our Government of India?" Churchill asked American London garden party that September. "Why should we be ashamed of us? We are prepared to go out to the distance of some 10,000 miles? For eighty years we have given it peace and internal stability and prosperity which has never been known in the history of that country. We have looked after all classes, and we have protected the interests of all sections, and we are not going to leave part of a policy of action."²⁵

Churchill and his cabinet were most concerned about the rapidly mounting sterling balance deficit that Britain owed India as a result of war time production and accelerated export of Indian goods to all fronts. All this was India to always have contributed to Britain for raw materials and other important war works. Inflation solutions that had cost millions of sterling without making India's war troops serving overseas and Indian factories pouring in every variety of products for the war, the balance was reversed. Cripps found himself in a sterling bindage to her own shore for an estimated £400 million. Churchill agreed that something must be done quick to wipe the slate clean, arguing "As Arthur Balfour used to say 'This is a singularly ill-conceived war but not so ill-conceived as this.'"²⁶ American ambassador preferred to let sleeping dogs be "knowing what a devastating effect of currency and industrial Indian protest would be raised over an British. Whatever at this point to change the formula of India British payments now that the balance had tipped in India's favor.

In October of 1942, C. R. unveiled his plan for "resolving" India's deadlock suggesting that the Viceroy should act as the Crown would in crisis in England" and select the "most popular and most responsible" leaders of India to assist him in running what would, in effect, be a "national government."²⁷ Five "Important Congressmen" (including any currently in prison) should first be chosen, and then Jinnah could be invited "to join this Government with as many men of his choice" as he "liked." There might additionally, be three others to represent the lesser minorities. C. R. believed that neither Congress nor the League could reject his plan without "losing

the leadership." Jinnah, however, immediately categorized it with a number of other "late-flying" schemes and dismissed them all.

Jinnah addressed his party's council in New Delhi on November 9 and warned them of "propaganda to misrepresent the Muslim League" as allies of British imperialism in India, obstructing the path of its freedom and independence" which was, he claimed, currently circulating in the United States. "To those who have been correct in following the trend of events in India this allegation about obstructing the path of freedom is not only disgraceful but misleading," he insisted adding, "In these days the vicious methods of propaganda are capable of misleading even intelligent people."²⁸ He knew all the hazards, felt the pressures, and was keenly conscious of the passage of time adding, "The stars are running out. And two days later after C. R. and Jinnah had met Lathigo, whose twice-extended term as viceroy had also had a terminal date of April 1943, wired him to report that Jinnah had conceded nothing leaving C. R. "rather depressed."

Cripps found himself left with so little influence in Churchill's War Cabinet that he resigned on November 22, 1942 and left India as minister of a remote production but would never return to India's political stage until Attlee came to power. Attlee was America's choice to replace Cripps. As America urged Churchill to yield November to whom C. R. chose deputy premier to New Delhi since "He knew the Indian problem and had no secretarial knowledge as to any dramatic short cut to its solution."²⁹ And Churchill accepted America's advice. Attlee's rising domestic popularity followed Cripps into India's ocean deep, but Churchill's assembly mistrusted even the most conservative of Labour leaders too much for an direct personal responsibility, fearing they were all determined to settle India. None of his own party, although wanted the job, but finally decided to press Lathigo to stay on half a year longer than his promised April release.

Late in 1942 Lathigo received what he considered quite definitely reliable secret report of a recent talk with Jinnah, which he passed on to America as the clearest exposure of Jinnah's views on the "Pakistan issue." Jinnah had stated he would accept an interim government only "on an equal footing" with Hindus, since he viewed that "line" as "the only way in which he could safeguard Pakistan. To accept responsibility in a provisional government on any other terms would be to walk into the trap which Congress and Hindus generally were carefully laying for the unwary or impatient Muslims. It was a deep game, and he, at least, was not prepared to play. The present was a time when Muslims were faced with a 'life and death problem.' He did not say that in an official manner, he meant it in

By Muslims must either choose to assert themselves and win for themselves a place in the comity of nations or go under and accept a position of permanent inferiority. It was for them to say what they wanted. If the former he was prepared to fight for them till the last if the latter he was willing to take leave and concern himself with making money at the bar."⁹⁰

The U.S. victory at Guadalcanal coming so soon after Rommel's defeat North Africa raised Allied spirits the world over, especially in Whitehall. As Amery found "nothing but cheerfulness" predicting that "India will be entering upon 1943 in much better mood than she began in 1942." But not so in Bengal. Twin specters of Japanese invasion and famine were another in striking terror among Bengal's population. "The people are receiving daily attention from enemy aircraft," Isaphan reported.

"The situation in the province is growing more and more serious each day. In some areas, it is most acute. . . . Tens of thousands have died and millions have been rendered homeless and are starving. The disaster is really terrible. . . . The Japs have been overrunning the area. They have visited us four times. Half of Calcutta is in the ring."⁹¹

It was only the start of India's worst famine of the century, a tragedy that claimed between two and three million Bengal lives during the forthcoming year.

"Every day gouges the people to the point of madness," Gandhi charged writing Mr. Amery in Ladbrough in January 1943. They started famine violence in the shape of the arrests. . . . I must report to you the situation for satyagrahis' names—a fast according to capacity. I read in Amery's letter early morning breakfast of the 9th February the statement of the 2nd March.⁹² Ladbrough wired Amery soon after that Mohandas's letter "I have never wavered that Gandhi should not so should be allowed on his own responsibility, to starve himself."⁹³ Amery Ladbrough informed his contact in early February of Gandhi's letter and he was amazed to find them unanimously favourable. "There was as soon as the fast began. So the government of India decided to offer to release Gandhi if the starvation was as proposed last month. I ask him to join me in a detention. Ladbrough wired this decision to Amery. Amery responded now 'greatly distressed' the War Cabinet felt at the thought of releasing Gandhi, 'on a mere threat to fast.'⁹⁴

An emergency War Cabinet meeting was held on the next Sunday at which Amery reported

Winston . . . launched out on the Gandhi subject at once. At first . . . muttering away his dissatisfaction, but giving me the impression that he was going to agree with a shrug of the shoulder. Presently, however, he warmed up and worked himself into one of his states of indignation over India. I made efforts to try, and bring him to the point that whatever might or might not be the best method of handling so peculiar a situation as the Gandhi one, the issue was not that, but whether you were to override a Council and run the risk of resignations. That point he sharply brushed aside by saying that it would not matter if they did all resign, we could carry on just as well without them and this our hour of triumph everywhere in the world was not the time to crawl before a miserable little old man who had already been our enemy.⁹⁵

But Gandhi had already been informed of the government of India's offer to release him and pushed it aside. "I shall be content to take my just deserts as a detainee or prisoner," replied the "little old man" on the eve of his arrest. The impending fast had just been announced to be taken as a free man.⁹⁶ The viceroy heaved a sigh of great relief.

Jinnah felt as adamant about Gandhi's fast as the rebel "showing Isaphan to urge him to keep Bengal's wavering Muslim League members of the legislature from leaving a resolution opposing the government for the Mahatma's release. After the first week of Gandhi's fast Ladbrough was pleased to report that "Muslims continue to stand apart and I am in my paper *Dawn* to right the wrongs."⁹⁷ Amery's letter today a mention of Gandhi's suggestion was a letter of the 29th January that he was ready to see Jinnah form a national government which, in equivalent, it suggests, to a tenacity-at-will as a favour."⁹⁸

The League remained aloof from the mounting waves of protest and unrest throughout India triggered by Gandhi's fast. In New Delhi's legislative assembly As Khan retorted at the Muslim League's first general session "We have every sympathy for the sentimental concern of our Hindu friends," said the man who was to be Pakistan's first prime minister. "But we are unable to join them in this matter." Jinnah was visited by Sapru to a conference of prominent leaders in New Delhi to discuss the "situation arising out of Gandhi's fast" but he declined noting as Ladbrough was delighted to report that "the situation is really a matter for the Hindu leaders to consider."⁹⁹

Three British doctors, including the surgeon-general, who observed the Mahatma, predicted that he would probably not survive another week of his fast. The *London Standard* reported that "the situation is becoming

and with the old man's arteriosclerosis the doctors expected a heart attack at any moment. Three members of the viceroys' executive council resigned on February 21, 1943, in protest over the viceroys' decision not to release Gandhi unconditionally even when danger to his life accrued from the fast.⁴⁰ Lajpat Gowar accepted those resignations and found at least three other Indian members of his council "wobbly" but managed to convince them to "stay the course." The viceroys alerted the governors of the important provinces of Gandhi's death, the code word for which was "Rabboni" warning them that "considering Gandhi's position as our prisoner and official rebel there can be no question of half-mastings flags or sending official messages of condolence to his widow."⁴¹

A letter signed by six Calcutta doctors on February 21 warned that we had "entered a crisis" was seized with severe anxiety and almost fainter and pulse became nearly imperceptible. Much to every one's amazement however the little old man did not die. His staunch supporters the world over delighted his American friends who attributed his survival to divine intervention. Churchill, however, suspected "fraud" and urged Lajpat Gowar to "expose" these Congress Hindu doctors round him" who could so easily "slip away" at their nourishment to his food.⁴² Churchill himself was just recovering from pneumonia and felt particularly nasty toward Gandhi. Much as he searched for the truth, Lajpat Gowar could not discover "any firm evidence of fraud" in any of the medical reports issued. A Gandhi physician noted any treatment of that most famous of Indian patients.

Then on the morning of March 3 Gandhi broke his fast. His weight had fallen from 100 to 90 pounds, but the next day Lajpat reported from Bombay that "everything is now normal."⁴³

Meanwhile Fazlul H. of Bengal remained Jinna's worst personnel problem for as long as he continued pressing over a new League constitution. That Muslim-majority province he appeared to make the basic premises of Pakistan. Bengal's key premier admitted, survived at the head of a coalition of his own Progressive Muslim League, shifting Mahasabha, Congress and Forward Bloc. In less than sixteen months he obtained popularity as well as power despite having been ousted from the League. He finally sought reconciliation with British India in 1942 by going to the Gandhi Ashram in New Delhi in November. But he never went beyond a certain threshold of support for the British. He was never able to join the cabinet as a Muslim. He was a leader of the Muslim League in the province of Bengal and was a member of the Viceroy's Council. He was a member of the Muslim League and was a member of the Viceroy's Council. He was a member of the Muslim League and was a member of the Viceroy's Council.

I am going to sacrifice all, that I now possess, for the sake of my country and of the solidarity of my community. . . I have thought carefully over the situation and with a view to facilitate my coming back to the League, I am ready to tender my resignation which will mean the automatic dissolution of the Progressive Coalition Party. May I now get a line from you to tell me that I have understood you alright, and that the ban put on me will be lifted as soon as I tender resignation of my office as Premier? If so, I will take my step I have indicated.⁴⁴

Jinna reminded Haq that he had heard that promise before, the last November in fact when Haq had agreed to carry out these conditions within a fortnight.⁴⁵ Ispahani and his friends kept up pressure against Haq's coalition within Calcutta's assembly which together with the Japanese pressure mounting from outside shook popular confidence everywhere in Bengal against a government that appeared both incapable of governing its people or feeding them. Sir and Mrs. Fazlul Haq's modest friend, in Ispahani's presence, trying to clarify his prospects of resigning as Bengal's premier if indeed he resigned and rejoined the League. After speaking with Haq, Jinna privately assured Ispahani that he would not possibly have Mr. Fazlul Haq as leader of the Muslim League in the Legislature.⁴⁶

Fazlul Haq obviously saw that he resigned his days of power were over so he turned elsewhere desperately working round the clock to secure support as his forces broke ranks. In the last week of March, however, he achieved a no-confidence vote on the "food question" by one vote due to the absence of three Muslim League members. Three days later, Ispahani wired from Calcutta jubilantly to report that "Fazlul Haq has been routed."⁴⁷ The League appeared six seats contested against Haq's Progressives. Muslims were "crossing the floor" daily to join the once depleted ranks of the Muslim League. "Fazlul Masrur will cross the floor this afternoon," wrote Ispahani. "We are expecting another two to come over by tonight. Inshallah, our wound of having the majority of the Muslim MLAs on the opposite side, will soon be healed." Fazlul Haq looks a picture of misery.⁴⁸ And on March 29, Fazlul Haq's ministry fell. The following month Khwaja Nazimuddin, the leader of Bengal's Muslim League, was invited to form a new government.

That April the League held its annual session in New Delhi. A map of Pakistan adorned the dais, and a banner flew over it reading "Freedom of India lies in Pakistan." Jinna wore a white sherwan with a gold button engraved with "P" pinned to his starched collar. He was greeted with "tre-

and ovation and cheering" as he entered the packed pandit. "With his majestic majesties now running Bengal, the Punjab, Sind and Assam. Jinnah insisted, "This is only the starting point. . . . In the North-West Frontier Province . . . my information is—and it is based on very reliable sources . . . the Muslim public is entirely with the Muslim League. [That summer League Ministry under Asrar-ul-Khan would come to power in the NWFP.] Don't forget the Minor Provinces. It is they who have spread the light when there was darkness in the minority Provinces. It is they who were the open heads that the Congress wanted to crush. We have got a great deal to do. . . . Our goal is clear; our demands are clear."

Jinnah then reviewed the history of Muslim-Muslim conflicts from the 19th century, after which he indulged in a blistering attack upon the Congress, accusing the Mahatma of wanting to turn the whole of India into a Hindu ashram. He went so far as to suggest a new constitution and a "council" however, arguing "Nobody would welcome it more than Mr. J. M. Ghandi is even now ready willing to come to a settlement with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan. Let me tell you that it is a great pity as far as both Hindus and Muslims. If he has made promises what is there to prevent Mr. Ghandi from writing direct to me?"

Jinnah's speeches both in the meetings of the Working Committee and the Joint Committee, held in camera and in the Open Session have confirmed Congress's belief that if a bill would have been passing through a certain number of changes reported a Britisher attending all the League sessions. He is here no more aggressive, more challenging and more audacious. The session appears to be consciousness of power later acquired and "certain old injuries which can now be avenged thereafter."

He has finally warned the British, he has expressed his profound disillusion with their attitude; he has urged Provincial Leagues now to place themselves on a war footing in preparation for what is to come, he has castigated the Capitalists and pampered the masses (on whose sympathy and goodwill he has to base his future struggle) by his references to "social justice" and "economic reorganisation", he has tried to impress upon the Provincial Premiers the fact that their own future lies only in following his lead and above all he has, in order to show his *bona fides* to the neutral world, extended an open and a most final invitation to the Congress to approach him for a settlement if it so desires. Inevitably the next stage will be

Jinnah's shrewd appreciation of Indian politics and the ever-shifting interaction among its major parties had never been more clearly revealed. His greatly overrated estimate of British postwar power however reflected his far less sophisticated appreciation of U.S. Russian, and Chinese potential for more rapid expansion. Anticipating that the war could last "another three years," Jinnah wisely urged his followers to "put our house in order" during that interlude. Ingenious strategist that he was, he concluded with this warning: "The fight being inevitable we must make our preparations flawless."

Nor was this shrewdest of India's politicians unaware of how carefully his words were recorded, copied, and cabled the world over, a leap towards the sleep of officialdom. Great Britain's highest echelons of power Open, before the mass audience that listened to his presidential address at Delhi, Jinnah said

If they have got any honest and capable agents they ought to be kept informed in London. I once more draw the attention of the British Government to this fact. It is a very serious situation indeed, and I inform them from this platform that the world at large and disappointment—not to use any stronger language at the shabby treatment meted out to Muslim League is a danger to them. The Muslim League calls upon the British Government to come forward without any further delay with an unequivocal declaration guaranteeing to the Muslims the right of self-determination, and to pledge themselves that they will abide by the verdict of a plebiscite on the lines of the resolution passed at the Muslim League Session in Lahore in 1940.

I say to the Muslims . . . 100 million Muslims are with us. When I say 100 million Muslims I mean that 99 per cent of them are with us, leaving aside some who are traitors, cranks, supermen or lunatics—an evil from which no society or nation is free. The way to which I see them now is that the phoenix-like rise and regeneration of Muslim India from the very ashes of its ruination . . . is a miracle. The people who had lost everything and who were placed by providence between the two stones of a mill, not only came into their own in a very short time, but became, after the British, socially the most solid, militarily the most virile, and politically the most decisive factor in modern India. Now it is time to take up the constructive programme to build up this nation so that it can march on the path of our goal of Pakistan. . . . The goal is near, stand united, persevere and march forward."

Even before he ended his address, loud and prolonged cheers and cries of "Qud-i-Azam Zindabad" "Pakistan Zindabad" "Muslim League Zindabad" reverberated from thousands of throats that would carry his message to millions of Muslims beyond range of Jinnah's frazzled voice. Soon they would follow Jinnah's lead in the pain-filled march to their diseased land.

15

Karachi and Bombay Revisited (1943-44)

Jinnah's challenge to Gandhi in April elicited a letter from the Mahatma who read the challenge in the *Dawn* early in May. "Dear Qud-i-Azam, I welcome your suggestion. I suggest our meeting face to face rather than talking through correspondence. But I am in your hands. I accept that this letter will be sent to you and, if you agree to my proposal, that the Government will let you visit me."¹

Jinnah's hurried response was to "raise no objection if Jinnah wants to see Gandhi in a meeting with good reason. I doubt the Mahatma has more going wholly palatable to Jinnah."² A reply was less willing to acquiesce, however, than Jinnah's. The viceroy felt that he had refused to permit others, including C. R., to visit Gandhi.

Although Jinnah is a different case in some respects, refusal has hitherto been based on Gandhi's past behavior and if we once abandon principle that he is kept incommunicado because of his responsibility for rebellion and must remain so until he disassociates himself from that policy, I feel that we may be driven out of our whole position, which is of course Gandhi's object.³

Jinnah were loath, moreover, to deliver Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. The matter was to be decided by the cabinet, but Churchill had just sailed off to Washington on the *Queen Mary* with Wavell for an Anglo-U.S. joint chiefs conference code-named "Trident" to coordinate operations against Germany, Italy, and Japan. It was during this trip that Churchill felt he got to know Wavell well enough to believe he was the sort of man to replace Amintyev.

Presumably how much time the entire British War Cabinet devoted to this

single undelivered letter is incalculable but the secretary of state prepared an elaborate memorandum on the subject which was presented to the cabinet prior to its first meeting on the question of Gandhi's request to see Jinnah on May 18, 1943. A second meeting, also chaired by Attlee in Churchill's absence was held on the same subject next day. Churchill, of course, remained in telegraphic touch with Amery throughout the whole debate on this vital matter. The secretary of state officially wrote a most immediate cable to the viceroy after the second meeting ordering that Gandhi's letter should not go forward. The half-cent word electronically bounced around the globe over the next week with Amery vigorously protesting to wire the viceroy that it was considered wise enough to give the Indian viceroy. "It has been suggested to me that possibly a situation might be eased if you invited Jinnah to come and see you."¹⁰

Jinnah during this interval focused his time and energies on the strategy of seeking to make a larger more effective and reasonable to popular demands and needs of the Indian Muslims. The Pakistan slogan's gaining momentum in the Muslim League's governance toward the end of May. There has been a considerable amount of discussion in the Press as to whether Jinnah was justified in suggesting a Draft in April that the Punjab Cabinet set a League Muslim. The Nawab of Muzaffargarh, leader of the Muslim League, has sought to improve the occasion by a Press statement that the Sikanderpur pact has come to an end, the implication being that more active interference by the Muslim League in Punjab politics is to be expected.¹¹ Sikander's death in December of 1942 had left his largest party territory under the control of a much younger less experienced Muslim leader Khazir Hussain Khan Twarani.¹² By early June "Hindu indignation in the Jinnah" was reported as being as greater than ever. Jinnah himself was pleased so far as one can judge and there is no question that he has since his stock up still higher.¹³ In an most frank assessment of Jinnah, Lindlithgow remarked,

I do not however think he wants a row with Government. . . and his threats do not cause me any sleepless nights! As I have consistently felt and said both to Zetland and to you, Jinnah would be quite as bad a master as Gandhi. But Jinnah is not as strong a position as Gandhi and Congress, and he is never likely to be, in the near future, since he represents a minority, and a minority that can only effectively hold its own with our assistance. Nor, of course, is his organisation anything like as deeprooted as is that of Congress.¹⁴

His curse is personal vanity which at his age he is not likely to shake off.¹⁵

Churchill recommended Field Marshal Wavell to his cabinet in mid June 1943 as India's new viceroy. General Sir Claude Auchinleck who had followed Wavell in the Middle East command, was to succeed him as commander-in-chief of India. Labour ministers viewed Wavell as a "safe" or "stopgap" viceroy at a time when India needed sensitive intelligence, diplomatic skill, and imagination. Churchill's top priority however was to build India militarily at any cost. As Simla's immediate successor for the past year and a half, Archie Wavell had proved himself the good soldier through a silent.

The one thing King George VI "complained" about to Wavell at a Buckingham Palace lunch was the length of the viceroy's workday. Urging the viceroy to designate to keep them shorter than 14½ hours.¹⁶ Before leaving London to take over in India, Wavell attended a cabinet meeting focused on Indian problems. Several more and more in England's mind at the war did which he had 1943 (the viceroy's). Wavell was recognized as a statesman in his *Diary* as a "vision of India and everything to do with it" and as a "man of great vision." Winston Churchill's remark to him that "Winston . . . knows as much of the Indian problem as George VI and the American members of the Council of Ministers instructed Wavell to start work from problems of India, warning that "only over his head only will an approval of India be given."¹⁷

Jinnah visited Bombay in July and addressed the League's provincial conference "at the foot of a hill in a tastefully decorated pavilion . . . which included all the notables of the city numbered about 25,000."¹⁸ The Quaid-e-Azam exhorted the Muslims of Baluchistan to shake off their lethargy and march in line with their nation. He urged them to "Give up your mutual jealousies and sectional interests and differences over small things, petty quarrels and tribal notions." The following day he addressed the same conference after it had passed all the resolutions he advocated. Jinnah reiterated his pre-battle plan for Pakistan, seeking first to lay the foundation of reforms and growth, later to press his separatist demands. To the students in his audience he cautioned conservatively: "Do not run after cheap slogans or catchwords. Concentrate your whole attention on education. Get equipped and qualify yourself for action. . . . The better you are equipped the brighter are your chances of success."¹⁹

Even as Jinnah was speaking on the bleak but well-fed Western border of British India, famine darkened the dismal plains of East Bengal. "We cannot keep Bengal fed (certainly we cannot assume the responsibility of rationing in Calcutta or elsewhere) unless we can get large quantities of Ben-

pressure of work and therefore it is not possible for me to make any commitment which I may not be able to fulfil.²⁰ By minimizing public appearances, while seeing to it that all his statements received maximum press amplification, Jinnah continued to function, presenting a relatively vigorous façade to the world, or else enveloping himself in a cloak of such isolation that he enhanced his charismatic image by adding auras of mystery and perpetuating a measure of work to his persona. He had mastered a clever management technique of delegating responsibility to trusted lieutenants more brilliantly than any of his Indian contemporaries.

By February 1944 Jinnah was back in Bombay. He urged the Muslim Students Federation to erect pillars of hard work, industry and perseverance upon which the edifice of Pakistan could be built. He addressed his colleagues and Muslim League leaders that he should be made the President of the League, being born there, a privilege more in order to lead it and control the Muslims than to be confined to New Delhi at the end of the most important session of the assembly where Wavell's sudden speech as viceroy stressed the political homogeneity of India at central to its postwar constitution. Chaudhry Azam was outraged by that remark and he viewed it as an attempt to attempt a hijacking of Congress' implicit message of unity. He declared a fresh Black Day for the assembly upon the government's subjecting to the Wavell of the League's powers to prevent its government from establishing a Central Legislative Assembly majority. Speaking to the Muslim League that month, Jinnah called the vice roy's address provocative and thoughtless on the Muslim position, adding:

Lord Wavell like his predecessor has started fishing in the Congress waters. Lord Linlithgow happily failed but the viceroy does not think that he would succeed where his predecessor had failed in landing a big fish or a number of small ones sufficient for his purposes. This has created deep resentment throughout Muslim India.²¹

Wavell sought advice from the governors as how best to proceed and Sir John Lawrence of Central Provinces wrote to warn the viceroy against alienating Jinnah. "I know that many hard things are said about Jinnah," Lawrence noted, "But I often wonder where we should have been had not Jinnah foreseen how fatal it would be to Muslim interests to support Congress. Acting in our common Muslim interest, I have reported that thousands of men that 'what Jinnah was playing for' was nothing less than 'to get Pakistan without giving a *quid pro quo* to the Hindus... Government should make an unequivocal announcement of their unconditional accep-

tance of Pakistan. Jinnah arguing that a premiss would be a waste of time and lead only to riots in the Punjab and Bengal."²²

Wavell was puzzled by Jinnah and had no appreciation of his complex character or the force of his will or the deep wellsprings of history it drew upon for sustenance. He saw only the surface cosmopolitan appearance he recalled only Leninist dogma's piety and petty criticism of Jinnah's vanity. "I gather that Jinnah regards me as an enemy of the Muslim League and is determined to be as much of a nuisance as he can," the viceroy confessed to his journal early in late March. He does not really represent solid steady Muslim opinion. In fact Jinnah himself is hardly a Muslim. He can sway opinion and no one seems to have the character to oppose him."²³ The viceroy was certainly not ready to "concede Pakistan" to such a man.²⁴ Especially while the fighting still raged along India's eastern front and Bengal remained racked with famine.

One of the things Wavell wanted to do was to talk to Gandhi but by this time Gandhi's health had seriously deteriorated. After his wife died that February, the Mahatma appeared to have lost an will to survive the last of his long detentions. The viceroy who examined him that as well as Indian urged an early release. Wavell recommended unconditional release to America. May warning that "serious difficulties would result if Gandhi died in detention" and agreeing with the new opinion, opinions that Gandhi was unlikely to be an active factor in politics again.²⁵ This assurance helped win Churchill's approval on May 5, 1944. As soon as Gandhi was transported from the Aga Khan's bomb-proof palace where he had lived in seclusion to the nearby house of his old friend Lady Thackeray, he perked up and received many visitors. The Mahatma's sweet recovery prompted America's what Lord Borne had written in one of his letters:

My mother-in-law has been dangerously ill. She is now dangerously well. America can only hope that this is not going to be true of our old friend. The Churchill of course was outraged at the news of Gandhi's signs of resuscitation and feared his "naked fakir" had outfoxed him.

Within two weeks of his release Gandhi spoke of seeking talks with Jinnah who had, however, gone to Kashmir to rest and breathe the cool, refreshing air of Srinagar after a frustrating struggle with Khizar in Lahore. Jinnah journeyed to Lahore in late April, hoping to pressure Khizar into conceding his demand but with British support the young premier had firm refusing to knuckle under to the Quid-i-Azam. Shaikat Hayat Khan (Sikander's son) was, in fact, the only member of Khizar's provincial cabinet to go along with Jinnah's demand that it proclaim itself a Muslim League, rather than Unionist administration. Khizar then managed to get

Governor Glancy to dismiss Shaikat for some "injustice which had come to light" most conveniently, thus helping strengthen the Unionist Party. The Muslim League's Committee of Action voted to expel Khizar before the end of May. For the remainder of the war, the Punjab could no longer be counted among the League's provincial administrative assets. The final Shaikat pact was final and dead. Glancy and Wavel felt just "worried about the possible activities of the Muslim League National Guards" in the Punjab, and the viceroy wrote "we shall have to take a line with Jinnaah to prevent communal trouble." In June, Khizar assured that Jinnaah was "importing into the Punjab a number of Maulvis for the United Provinces to agitate against the Unionist Government on religious lines." Khizar asked the viceroy to keep "these people out" and "I would like to keep Jinnaah and other prominent Muslim leaders out of the Punjab too." Wavel liked Khizar very much but recognized he was a "strong character" and would add that these big Muslim and Hindu would be so dominated by a down-country lawyer like Jinnaah.⁴² Wavel's appraisal of Jinnaah's glowering revealed the viceroy's inability to understand his nature or true power.

United Provinces governor Sir Maurice Hallett, who considered Gandhi "a man of no account,"⁴³ monkeys' caricatured Wavel against Gandhi in the *Illustrated Weekly*.⁴⁴ The viceroy was in no rush to see either Gandhi or Jinnaah, but Sir M. Hallett, the secretary to his chief secretary, was not so sure. He was open but "no progress was possible. I and others were underground."⁴⁵ But a new round of Gandhi-Jinnaah talks was being arranged even as these harsh words were winging toward London on invisible pulses of electric power. C. R. published a political "formula" which he insisted Gandhi was prepared to "accept," if only Jinnaah agreed to it. That formula proposed a "plebiscite" for the Muslim-majority "united regions" in the north-west and east of India "to decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a separate state in Pakistan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join either state."⁴⁶ It sounded enough like "Pakistan" to arouse considerable speculation as to the Mahatma's new position.

It was in no rush to believe C. R.'s assurances of Gandhi's "acceptance" however, and awaited direct word from his old adversary, who finally wrote (the original was in Gujarati) on July 17, 1944:

brother Jinnaah

There was a day when I could induce you to speak in the mother-tongue. Today I take courage to write to you in the same language.

I had invited you to meet me while I was in jail. I have not written to you since my release. But today my heart says that I should write to you. We will meet whenever you choose. Don't regard me as the enemy of Islam or of the Muslims of this country. I am the friend and servant of not only yourself but of the whole world. Do not disappoint me.⁴⁷

Jinnaah replied from Simnagar on the eve of his departure from Kashmir, informing "Mr. Gandhi" that he would be "glad to receive you at my house in Bombay or anywhere else, which was probably by about the middle of August."⁴⁸ The War Cabinet was brought into the picture on "Gandhi's recent moves" with a memo circulated by Amery to his usual colleagues. Churchill was beside himself with fury at Gandhi's suggestion and the invasion of yet another viceroy "negotiating" with the Hindu Mahatma. A few days later, the leader of the Hindu Mahasabha and the guru to Gandhi's future assassin was equally upset at the Mahatma's attack upon "warring Amery by word." Indus-salt is an "never tolerate breaking up of union of India, the fatherland and holyland."⁴⁹

The Muslim League council met in Lahore on July 30, 1944. Jinnaah presided and reported on the current state of political developments concerning C. R.'s "formula" and the proposed summit. He was prepared to concede nothing, to accept nothing on faith as his forthcoming meetings with his old adversary. The League's council gave him unanimous support, and Quaid-Azam concluded that brief meeting with the proviso that "Insha Allah, Pakistan is coming."

The talks started on September 9. Gandhi and Jinnaah posed with broad smiles on the veranda of Jinnaah's Malabar Hill house before they went inside for three and a quarter hours of private and secret discussion. C. R. was so sure that he was, Jinnaah kept a record of their talk. Wavel reported a version of the first days talk to C. R., calling the meeting, "a test of my patience" and noting, "I am amazed at my own patience. However, it was a friendly talk." He then informed C. R. of Jinnaah's "contempt or sour front" and his contempt for "you" which Gandhi called "staggering."⁵⁰ He says you have accepted his demand and so should I. I said, "I know that you will not do so. You can call it Pakistan if you like. He talked of the Lahore Resolution." . . .⁵¹ Gandhi also reported that Jinnaah told him that if he conceded Pakistan he stood ready to "go to jail" or even "face bullets. . . . He wants Pakistan now, not after independence. We will have independence for Pakistan and Hindustan, he said. We should come to an agreement and then go to the Government and ask them to accept it, force them to accept our solution. . . . The Muslims want Pakistan. The League represents the Muslims and it wants separation."⁵²

Their second meeting proved no more fruitful than the first, though Gandhi, reported to C. R. that Jinnah "drew a very alluring picture of the Government of Pakistan. It would be a perfect democracy."²¹ Gandhi then reminded Jinnah of how often he had said "democracy did not suit Indian conditions," but Jinnah insisted "that was with regard to a democracy." The press corps waited for Jinnah and Gandhi as they emerged from that morning session, asking "Anything for us?" Gandhi replied, "I have nothing. . . . Yesterday you read something in our faces. . . . I should like you to read anything in our faces except hope and nothing more." Jinnah turned to ask Jinnah, "Am I right? Have you seen the papers this morning?" Jinnah's response was "Why bother?"²² Jinnah said by this time he felt that the Mahatma understood the Mahatma's game too well, writing curtly on September 13:

Dear Mr. Gandhi: When you arrived here on the morning of September 12 to resume our talks you were good enough to inform me that you had not had time to attend to my letter of September 11. We met again today without having received your reply, and I am still waiting for it. Please, therefore, let me have your reply as soon as possible with regard to the various points mentioned in my letter. . . . Yours sincerely M. A. Jinnah.²³

Jinnah wrote on September 14 that letter it was the first time he had written the word Pakistan out of quotation marks, or in any sense. . . . Jinnah's letter to Gandhi had encouraged Jinnah to think he was making a positive impact on the Mahatma's mind. At any rate, Jinnah wrote a lengthy, rather cordial reply immediately that afternoon.

Of course, I can quite understand that such a provisional interim government will represent all parties. . . . I can quite understand that when the moment arrives certain things may follow, but before we can deal with this formula in a satisfactory manner I repeat again that, as it is your formula, you should give me a rough idea of the provisional interim government that you contemplate and of your conception.²⁴

Gandhi's letter to "Dear Quaid-e-Azam" the following day began by stating, "For the moment I have shunted the Rajaji Formula and with your assistance am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League." Then he went on to pick that Lahore resolution apart, arguing "the Resolution itself makes no reference to the two-nation theory," which was, in any event, "wholly untenable. I find no parallel in

history for a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large part of her children."²⁵ So much then for the Mahatma's readiness to recognize Pakistan had lasted just one day. Gandhi's true feelings about that Lahore idea now came pouring forth and their audible impact on Jinnah's momentary hope of reaching a settlement may well be imagined.

"It is my duty to explain the Lahore resolution to you today and persuade you to accept it," Jinnah replied two days later. "I have successfully converted non-Muslim Indians into a small number and also a large body of foreigners, and I can convert an exceedingly vast lot of wandering infidels over Hindu India. I will be a small assistance to you." Jinnah noted, however, that much of Gandhi's letter was "a disquisition rather than genuine seeking clarification," and recommended to Gandhi a number of books including one written by the noted legal lumina Dr. R. R. Ashmole. . . . We must not and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two distinct nations by a definition or test of a nation. Jinnah was repeating the arguments he had made in 1940 in his Lahore presidential address. . . . The thing has then concluded. "By all canons of international law we are a nation. . . . We regard our final paragraph. . . . It is quite clear that you represent non-Muslim India. I am convinced that the two-nation theory is a Muslim bit of the rest of India. . . . The division of India as proposed by the Lahore resolution. It is for you to consider whether it is not your policy and programme in which you have persisted that has been the principal factor of the ruin of the whole of India and of misery and degradation of the people to which you refer and which I see done no less than any other." ²⁶

They met again the next day, but the much-sought talks had brought them no closer. Nothing was resolved, and no formula or Jugu, the ever-existing gulf between them. "The more I think about the two-nation theory, the more alarming it appears to be," wrote the Mahatma to his "Dear Quaid-e-Azam." Gandhi feared that once the principle is admitted there would be no end to claims for cutting up India into numerous divisions. . . . He would see India as a unit. . . . At the time his first public reference to Pakistan was by then advocating no less than ten separate "nations" within the framework of "All India" as he called India and its oceans "dependent." . . . Rahmat Ali's latest pamphlet, "The Millat and Her Ten Nations" was published from his All-India Milk ("Religious Nations") Movement headquarters at 18 Montague Road in Cambridge on June 10, 1944, and reissued on March 12, 1946.²⁷ Rahmat Ali's feverish brain conceived of such "nations" as Sikhistan, Farquistan, Hindustan, Muhistan, and Maphistan,

who would respectively represent the Muslims of Central India, Bihar and Orissa, Hindustan, Rajistan, and Southern India.

Jinnah had nothing to do with Mahatma A's or his proliferating plans for 'Pakistan', yet many leaders of Congress hesitated. Gandhi feared that mere acceptance of the two-nation theory might give credence to such tenacious readiness. It fell on September 23 in 1944 and the "summit" was all but over. "In deference to your wishes," Jinnah wrote Gandhi that holiday, "I said very little at these days, and in the course of our prolonged talks and correspondence, to convert you, but unfortunately it seems I have failed."⁶⁰ Gandhi agreed. Still he asked Jinnah to "give me in writing" what precisely "you would want me to put my signature to."

"It is not a case of your being asked to put your signature as representative of any body, but you clothe yourself with representative capacity and are expected to act accordingly," Jinnah wrote back the same day. "We stand as I have already said, the basic and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore resolution of March 1940. I appeal to you once more to revise your position and to accommodate the rights of this subcontinent and the welfare of the peoples of India demand that you should face realities."⁶¹

Gandhi answered this with his longest stride toward Jinnah and the League, and it seemed to indicate a change of heart on the Mahatma's part. Jinnah rejected it with almost disdainful haughtiness. "You have accepted the basic and fundamental principles of the Lahore resolution, . . . You do not accept that the Muslims of India are a nation, . . . You do not accept that the Muslims have an inherent right of self-determination, . . . You do not accept that Pakistan is composed of two zones, north-west and north-east, comprising six provinces."

At last, but far from conceding, and discussing I find that the question of a division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan is only on your lips and that you do not come out of your retreat and sincerely at the eleventh hour, you put forward a new suggestion . . . saying, 'Let it be a partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be.'⁶² This latter point, however, was one that Jinnah himself had recently used in seeking to clarify what he meant by Pakistan. His angry rejection when Gandhi seemed ready to concede was a years-old position. Jinnah had all wanted to put in

for a formal settlement with the Congress and was caught off guard by Gandhi's swift last moment reversal of position. A Congress-League pact at that point would, after all, have taken the wind out of the League's highly successful organising momentum, which relied for the most part on its passionate popular appeals to Muslim grievances against the Hindu Congress and the raj.

Jinnah did not, however, wish to slam the door absolutely on "unrepresentative"

representative" Gandhi's naked toes. He argued, therefore, at the end of his angry letter of September 25: "But now you have . . . made a new proposal of your own on your own basis . . . and it is difficult to deal with it any further, unless it comes from you in your representative capacity . . . Why not then accept the fundamentals of the Lahore resolution and proceed to settle details?"⁶³ Gandhi replied by asking Jinnah "to think fifty times before throwing away an offer which has been made entirely in the spirit of service in the cause of communal harmony."⁶⁴

Jinnah responded by rejecting all Gandhi's overtures, including his appeals to address the League council or open session, readily explaining that "only a member or delegate is entitled to participate in the deliberations of the meeting of the Council or in the open session respectively. Besides, it is a most extraordinary and unprecedented suggestion to make. However, I thank you for your advice. I regret I have failed to convince you and convert you, as I was hopeful of doing so."⁶⁵

I confess I am unable to understand your persistent refusal to appreciate the fact that the Formula presented to you by me in my letter of the 24th as well as the Formula presented to you by the League virtually what is embodied in the Lahore Resolution. (Gandhi persisted.) By final letter to Jinnah on September 28 "You know as I said and I don't accept certain things, while I have been contending that the decision for us who stand in our approach to the problem is to give body to the demand as it stands in the Resolution and work it out to our mutual satisfaction."⁶⁶

"The Gandhi-Jinnah talks are dragging on and the latest rumour is that they have broken down." Ward reported to Amery. "Gandhi is going to Warith for his birthday to receive the time collected in memory of his wife and some people think that a statement about his discussion with Jinnah will be issued from Warith."⁶⁷ Jinnah denied the rumour that day.

I regret to say that I have failed in my task of converting Mr. Gandhi. . . . Nevertheless, we hope that the public will not feel embittered and we trust that this is not the final end of our effort."⁶⁸ Gandhi addressed a larger press corps at Birla House insisting

The breakdown is only so-called. It is an adjournment *non die*. Each of us must now talk to the public and put our viewpoints before them. . . . My experience of the previous three weeks confirms me in the view that the presence of a third power hinders the solution. A mind enslaved cannot act as if it was free. . . . The chief thing is for the Press and the public to avoid partisanship and bitterness.⁶⁹

Asked about his own future plans, Gandhi professed to "act as my inner voice tells me." The next day Gandhi told the *Newspaper Chronicle* in Bombay

... to believe "Mr. Junnah is sincere but I think he is suffering from hallucination when he imagines that an unnatural division of India could bring either happiness or prosperity to the people concerned."⁷⁰

Wavell confessed to his journal, "I must say I expected something better. . . . The two great mountains have met and not even a ridiculous mistake has emerged. This surely must blast Gandhi's reputation as a leader. Junnah had an easy task, he merely had to keep on telling Gandhi he was talking nonsense, which was true, and he did so rather rudely, without bothering to use any of the wittanesses of his own position or define his position. . . . I suppose it may increase his prestige with his followers, but it cannot add to his reputation with reasonable men."⁷¹

16

Simla
(1944-45)

As late as October 1944 Wavell found it "difficult to believe that Junnah who whatever his faults, is a big game player, is sincere in the two national theory. . . . Pakistan seemed to be his only aim and objective. . . . In a proposal that the viceroy had almost accepted, Junnah was taking for his advocacy of it is mostly "I take on the extreme," Wavell noted in his letter to Amery. "The notion of a Muslim State would be about as good as about Calcutta, but Calcutta is in the middle of a Hindu city. . . . Junnah seemed to be arguing for something which he has not worked out." As for Amery, reflecting Churchill's feelings, he feared any "new attempt to wade into the old bog."⁷²

Sir Francis Mudie, Home member of the viceroy's executive council, met with Junnah in New Delhi on November 24, 1944, with the viceroy's permission, and found him "friendly and talkative. Junnah said the Muslims would never accept the Cripps procedure for settling the new constitution. . . . He showed no special hostility to a Representative Conference sponsored by Government and said that he was as in 1940, prepared to take part in a Coalition Government at the Centre. . . . He did not go into details about the relative strengths of Hindus and Muslims, but made it clear that he felt in the Muslim League and Congress were the same. He was prepared to co-operate even if the Congress refused to do so."⁷³ Wavell rightly suspected that "Junnah may have got more out of Mudie than he gave away himself."

Junnah met with Wavell on December 3, and the viceroy found him "quite forthcoming and friendly. . . . He said that India had never been a united nation and never could be. Indian unity was only a British creation and unity of India under one Native Government would have no historical

parallel. It was impossible from a practical point of view. It had been tried for the last 30 years and had completely failed. The viceroys, argued from a practical point of view, "and the unity of India" were right about it. British rule ought to be maintained, at least for security and economic purposes.

On 10 December 1944, Bengal's next governor, Richard C. Casey, had taken with enough leaders in Calcutta to conclude that Pakistan was more a matter of political wishful thinking than a potent reality. Casey hoped that "Mr. Jinnah will compromise before Pakistan turns into a tiger that he is riding." He believed it would be easy to "win" many Muslim Muslims "away from the Pakistan zone" but was sensitive to the risk of any of his being "accused of being a partisan house" wrote Wavell, seeking viceregal approval. "I believe that if he [Mr. Jinnah] could be got to realise that the inclusion of Greater Calcutta in Pakistan is a complete impossibility, then the idea of Pakistan's survival would receive a great boost." Nationalism of Muslim Pakistan was "an article of faith" much closer to the picture of a total, unimpaired sovereign state" such as would be desired by the British after 1947. For Nazimuddin and Suhrawardy, as well as most other League Muslims, according to Jinnah, the Bengal situation "is a case where Mr. Casey need not be one in which Muslims and Hindus would live in unity and share the responsibility for the business of Government and all else is approximate proportion to their numbers."

Pakistan's future is "a continuous suspicion represented by it is the main obstacle to constructive thinking," Wavell replied.

I do not believe that Pakistan will work. It creates new minority problems quite as bad as those we have now, and the Pakistan State or States would be economically unsound. On the other hand, like all emotional ideas that have not been properly thought out, it thrives on opposition. Some of the ablest Muslims may regard it as a bargaining counter but for the mass of the Muslim League it is a real possibility and has a very strong sentimental appeal. We cannot openly denounce Pakistan until we have something attractive to offer in its place.¹

Jinnah remained in New Delhi through mid-December, then returned to Bombay. On 15 December, he left for Karachi. The Muslim chamber of commerce in the city of his birth welcomed him with a banquet on December 27, 1944. There he urged the "Muslim commercial community to be not at all discouraged" and to remember that "the economic position was one of the strongest pillars of a nation. You have got in the Pakistan areas an

enormous field and enormous scope. If you only look around, if only you will see their property and serve them."² He had gone to Sind to patch up provincial disputes between League premier Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Mr. C. M. Syed, disputes which had almost deposed the League's ministers. It was more a question of a personal power struggle than ideological disputes, but Jinnah's presence was required to settle arguments over ministry appointments and candidates for elections. The round of contentious meetings in Sind left him exhausted. Back in Bombay early in January, Quaid-e-Azam issued a statement on Sind stating that "it is for the people of Sind now to build up a new organization in harmony, co-operation and unity."³ Jinnah visited Ahmedabad in mid-January and addressed the Gujarat Muslim Educational Conference, that was attended by thousands of young Muslims from all over the Northwest. I was round in a playgroup and some of us told them, "But I thrust myself and force myself on the thought and want to know just a little more on Sind and what is now the situation was different." As president of the conference, Mr. I. I. League had had some 1,000 letters to him and had to accept to accept invitations. We have reached a stage when we must direct and adjust our forces for the purpose of some constructive scheme for the educational, social and economic uplift of our people. A new school was born that we must noted that Education is a matter of life and death to our nation."

A month's time even in India's best weather left him very feverish, too feeble to attend the scheduled League conference in Farquhar was to have been held in New Delhi later in the year. He was obliged to cancel his commitments throughout February and March, meeting scheduled meetings with Wavell, and retreated behind the walls of his Malabar Hill estate, seeking to mend and accepting no calls. The visitor was told of his condition of illness and his inability to appear for some time. By the end of March he was still dictating short letters such as this:

I regret to inform you that it is not possible for me to undertake any public engagement for some time as I am ordered strictly to have complete rest . . . This breakdown was a serious warning to me and my doctor's advice is that in no circumstances am I to depart from what he considers complete rest.⁴

Candlish also suffered a physical relapse in January 1945, and with both of these aging titans on their backs, the younger leaders of Congress and the League hoped to fashion a new formula of political settlement. Bhulabhai Desai, the ablest Congress leader in the Central Legislative Assembly and Liaquat Ali Khan supposedly agreed upon that formula for an

"Interim Government at Centre"²⁴ whereby the League and Congress would each choose and control 40 percent of the cabinet, and leave the remaining 20 percent for Muslims and "touchables" to share while the viceroy and his confidential chief would remain British. Wavell and his secretary Sir Evan Jenkins were both assured by Desai that Jinnah and Gandhi "approved" of this formula, but it remains unclear whether or not Liaquat ever actually discussed the matter with Jinnah.

The Desai-Liaquat formula was, however, considered sufficiently important "in the pipe" to be argued three times by Britain's War Cabinet which ordered Wavell to refrain from committing himself to any new political "bridge" unless "strength and nature" were "carefully tested." Wavell was twice home for consultations with the cabinet and Jinnah was reported to have said he knew nothing of Desai's scheme.²⁵ Before the end of January, in fact, Jinnah told the Associated Press that "There is no talk in London for connecting in any way with such a scheme." He had taken place between Nazimuddin, Liaquat, Sir Khan and Mr. Bhabha. Desai's "Desai" repeated insistence in stating privately that he could guarantee the participation of Jinnah in his scheme of the government, accepted and rejected in and (separately) "to the effect that Jinnah might grumble about the food, but would eat it."²⁶

While Wavell, Amery and the cabinet floundered Bengal and India continued to burn from famine, war and bureaucratic incompetence that ranged unaverted across the land. Governor Casey noted and clearly the failure of the British administration in his March 1, 1945 letter to the viceroy, concluding that

In Bengal at least after a century and a half of British rule we can point to no achievement worth the name in any direction. But so, I think, can be said of India. The expenditure of public money is very low, taxation and no expenditure of loan moneys for developmental purposes. The result has been a pinchbeck policy under which the resources and potentialities of Bengal have not been developed . . . a suffocating system of red tape has . . . throttled initiative, and has created in the minds of the services . . . from whom plans ought to have been forthcoming a sense of frustration and stultification.²⁷

Despite the urgency and wisdom of Casey's criticism it was clear about the problems he noted; Wavell never so much as answered his letter. Before the end of March, Nazimuddin's ministry lost a vote of confidence in Calcutta, and Casey took direct control over the province under Section 93 of the Government of India Act of 1935.

In mid-March the Muslim League's ministry in the North West Frontier Province under Aurangzeb Khan also lost a vote of confidence and governor Sir George Cunningham turned to Congress leader Dr. Khan Sahib to ask if he wanted to try forming a government with ministers drawn from his own party. A "sealed letter" was reportedly sent by Gandhi from his Wardha ashram in the frontier, apparently instructing Khan Sahib to accept the governor's invitation.²⁸ For the first time in over five years, after all the Congress ministries had resigned in 1939, the Congress returned to provincial responsibilities. Peshawar, Jammu and Kashmir's personal treaty made it impossible for them to journey to the frontier. Several months earlier he had been requested a guest to come to the fact that Liaquat still there as he had to send it up to you. It was that you have to put your house in order," Qasim-i-Azam had written League president Jinnah in December 1944. "The Congress does not intend to help and guide, but the root is in the Province itself, and it is therefore up to you to arrange for the relief of the crisis and establish a government. How you intend to do it and create a government and do it for the people? I give advice of not doing so or doing so that brought the League ministry to a knowledge of the fact that the Congress has never before Congress Ministry for the province of Punjab accepted after having away a Government. I have been seen with Jinnah declared in his Pakistan Day message to the effect that March 23.

It is not possible to believe that any Muslim who has the slightest self-respect and an iota of pride left in him, can tolerate a Ministry in a Muslim majority province, which takes orders from and is subject to the control of Mr. Gandhi at Sevagram or the Congress who are deadly opponent, etc) to all Muslim aspirations and their national demand.²⁹

Jinnah's same Pakistan Day message contained many images of threats and warnings against conspiratorial "powers," hidden "intrigues," and impending doom—all of which could be overcome only through Muslim unity and aid with faith in God.

I see powers working around us and our enemies are active but let us go forward undaunted, fearless, without flinching. . . I have my finger on the pulse of Muslim India, and I feel confident that the voice of Muslim India will stand as one man at any critical moment and that the Muslim League will be the voice of that united Muslim India. I am assured by the powers in power . . . Pakistan will win in a group . . . Insha Allah, we shall win.³⁰

Wavell flew out of Delhi on March 20 and arrived in London three days later. Amery had suggested "a small dinner party at 10 Downing Street" to "welcome" his viceroy home, but the prime minister coldly refused. "My meeting with him had rather a punchy effect,"²⁴ Addressing the Viceroy's Indian Committee chaired by Attlee, Wavell requested that it choose his executive council from among its six political leaders, saying that "there was a steady pour of defections and a worsening of the administrative and general position."²⁵ He reported that Gandhi at seventy-five was "a fairly sick man, who according to some reports would not think consecutively for a few minutes." Wavell judged "Jinnah's sense of the Muslim League more acute than that it had been," reporting on the change of government in the North-West Frontier and the League's rejection of Asaf Ali and the Punjab. He also informed the cabinet that Jinnah "was not very fit, though his brain was as active as ever." And since "he was still in the 'cold' but saw how Nehru's line was working but thought he was still bitter and . . . in the Congress he probably would not be the political Left Wing but not the industrialists from which the Congress drew its financial support."²⁶

The war in Europe ended and Churchill's government resigned before Wavell set out for India, on his way to India. "What a crew they are for a perilous voyage!" the tired, frustrated viceroy commented on his departure.²⁷ Wavell was however granted permission to convene a conference of "Indian leaders" to help him form a new executive council that "would represent the main communities and would include members in proportions of Caste Hindus and Moslems."²⁸ He returned to New Delhi on June 7, 1945, and informed his current council of the impending changes. At first all of the Indian members of the council called upon the viceroy to make an immediate declaration of "complete dominion status" for India.

"This is not an attempt to obtain or impose a constitutional settlement," the viceroy announced in his New Delhi broadcast on June 14. "His Majesty's Government had hoped that the leaders of the Indian parties would agree amongst themselves on a settlement of the communal issue, which is the main stumbling-block, but this hope has not been fulfilled."²⁹ Members of the Congress Working Committee were all released from incarceration. In a press statement on the forthcoming conference, Gandhi called the term "Caste Hindus" offensive, inaccurate, and opposed to the "Muslim tendency in Hinduism . . . to abolish all caste distinctions." Jinnah's total rejection was reflected in Doon's comment that the "League would not participate in [an] Executive Council in which non-League Muslims were included."³⁰

Wavell reserved a suite for Jinnah at Simla's Cecil Hotel, inviting him to the viceroyal lodge for a private meeting on the evening of June 24 before the scheduled official opening session of the Simla conference. The next morning Jinnah accepted the invitation but suggested a two-weeks postponement of the conference to give him time to consult his Working Committee on the "clarifications" he hoped to receive from the viceroy concerning conference proposals during their previous meeting. Wavell refused to be drawn into any such negotiations, insisting that the conference had to start without delay.

"Gandhi and Jinnah are behaving like very temperamental prima donnas," Wavell informed his journal on mid-June. "And after a publishing his telegrams in the Press before I even receive them, Gandhi at least, and the others, to ask whether I agreed to a postponement."³¹ The viceroy was beginning to recognize that his optimistic hopes for a settlement were less realistic than he had assumed. But it was a matter they were. On June 24, Wavell met with Congress president Asaf Ali and then, with Gandhi, although it was his first conversation with the Mahatma, who was rather vague and disconcerting, but the whole gave a blessing to the proposals.³² As Gandhi left the viceroyal lodge, Jinnah arrived a few minutes later and a talk took place with the viceroy, who found him much more direct than Gandhi, but whose manners are far worse.³³

Later Wavell officially opened the Simla conference at 11:00 A.M. on June 25, 1945. Twenty-two political leaders of India assembled in the posh room of the viceroyal lodge. Present were Asaf Ali, Jinnah, Congress leaders, and many others. Jinnah spoke next for the League and Asaf Ali's points were largely accepted as the immediate proposals. Calling upon the viceroy to address himself exclusively to those "On the basis of the Congress party, I said that there was nothing in the proposals to treat it as a communal organization," Wavell reported to Amery. "I interjected here that Congress represented only Hindus, a statement to which Khan Sahib took vehement objection. I remarked that Congress represented Muslims and both Congress and Jinnah accepted this."³⁴ Jinnah then took the floor and, after first meeting adjournment, insisted the League would "not agree to any constitution except on the fundamental principle of Pakistan." He then, in the weeks ahead, he asked immediate concession of Pakistan as a prior condition to any cooperation, yet he was willing to participate in this sort of conference thanks to his faith in the "Viceroy's sincerity" and his belief that "the British Government and people really wished to give a fair deal to British India." Wavell felt much relieved and concluded that night that his "Conference has got away to a reasonably good start."

On the morning of June 29 the conference reconvened and the viceroy asked all party leaders to send him panels of names of candidates for his new council. Azad readily agreed. But Jinnah refused, arguing that he could not submit any lists before consulting the Working Committee. And so the conference adjourned until July 14.

Wavell spent the night and a half arguing with Jinnah on the evening of July 8, which tells us where we began, he reported. "He was obviously in a high state of nervous tension, and said to me more than once, 'I am at the end of my tether', he also said 'I am not going to wreck the League'. He is obviously in great difficulties but they are largely of his own making by his arrangement of a tripartite conference. He fears now to be made the scapegoat for the failure of the Conference and will not give up anything of his claim to represent the Muslims." At the end of their meeting Jinnah still refused to have a list of candidates that Wavell had requested for his committee. He told himself a last hope of a request for a letter from the viceroy spelling out precisely what it was he wanted. That letter came the next day and Jinnah placed it before his Working Committee on July 9, 1945.

I fully appreciate your difficulties, but regret that I am unable to give you the guarantee you wish, i.e., that all the Muslim members of the proposed new Council shall necessarily be members of the Muslim League. . . . I have to attempt to form an Executive Council representative, competent, and generally acceptable. . . . It will help me greatly if you will let me have names. . . . I asked for eight, but will certainly accept five if you do not wish to send more.³⁷

"The Committee, after giving its very careful consideration to the matter," Jinnah repeated the same day, "desires me to state that it regrets very much to note that your Excellency is not able to give the assurance that all the Muslim members of the proposed Executive Council will be selected from the Muslim League. . . . the Committee considers this as one of the fundamental principles and, in the circumstances, I regret I am not in a position to send the names. . . . It is not possible for us to depart from our fundamental principles."³⁸

The viceroy remained equally resolute and, "there was no this point" and wired Amery that night to propose his own list of new council members, four of whom were to be Muslim League members (Liaquat Ali, Khaliq-uz-Zaman, Nazimuddin and Ehsan-i-Sadr), and the fifth, a Muslim landlord from the Punjab, Sir Muhammad Nawaz Khan. The five "Caste Hindus" were to have been Nehru, Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Dr. M. S. Anand, and Sir B. N. Rai. Master Tara Singh was to represent the Sikhs, and Dr. Ambedkar and Muhammad Pasha, the Scheduled Caste (Untouchables).

Dr. Jai N. Mathai of Madras University. Later Nehru's private secretary was to have been the council's sole Indian Christian, thus bringing the total to sixteen with the viceroy and his commander-in-chief.

The British cabinet, being "rather petrified,"³⁹ insisted that Wavell bring Jinnah first and tell him the names of the Muslim members he planned to propose and to "try to persuade Jinnah" to put forward those names as his party's list. Good soldier that he was, Wavell met with Jinnah on July 11, moving again to alter his position. "He refused even to discuss names which he could be given to a sole right to select all Muslims and some guarantee that any decision which he Muslims or used a Council could only be passed by a two-thirds majority instead of one-third and secondly that these conditions were entirely unacceptable. Wavell resumed the interview ended."⁴⁰ The viceroy saw Jinnah an hour later and told him of the conference breakdown. Jinnah took the news calmly but said that the M. L. would have to decide sooner or later to accept or reject the Muslim point of view, since they were irreconcilable.⁴¹

The utter failure of Wavell's Simla conference served only to underscore the obvious and common realization that a final and decisive key point in the Indian Movement. Many British officials expected that this failure would diminish Muslim power in the League, but it has produced a position so much more difficult to grow strong was the demand for Pakistan. Wavell decided to travel across the land. At the closing session of the conference on July 14, Jinnah stated that "Pakistan and I need India were determined to have Pakistan." "So my efforts to bring better understanding between the two sides failed and have shown how wide is the gulf," noted the weary Wavell. "Whether I have been more good or bad by having only time and space to do this, I cannot say. I am not bringing the matter to an issue," and his final assessment of the Qaid-i-Azam was, "narrow and arrogant . . . actuated mainly by fear and distrust of the Congress constitutionally incapable of friendly cooperation with the other party."⁴²

Amery shrewdly reminded Wavell that thanks to Simla, the Congress leaders had, once again, been "brought right up against the fact that as in the Muslim League and not you or I who stand in the way of their aspirations. . . . they must now either acquiesce in Pakistan or realize that they have no other way or other to win over Muslim support against Jinnah, and that a mere facade of tame Congress Muslims does not help them."⁴³ The viceroy's state suggested holding elections that winter and argued that "If by no means follows that Jinnah will sweep the board in the Muslim Provinces. . . . On the other hand if he really loses then his claim that the Muslim members should all be members of the League would not so well

he resigned. Amery himself had, however, just fought and lost his last election campaign. Britain's postwar Labour landslide brought Attlee and his cabinet to power with a resounding majority of 200 in the House of Commons. When the viceroy learned that his new master in Whitehall was to be Lord Pethick-Lawrence (1872-1961), his initial reaction was to "fear he would have fixed and old-fashioned ideas derived mainly from Congress contacts."¹ That very day in early August of 1945, however, a more awesome catastrophe at Hiroshima inaugurated an age that was to accelerate the pace of change, bringing World War II to a end within the week and hustling Britain out of its deep ruts of stately bureaucratic stagnation.

17

Quetta and Peshawar (1945-46)

The aftermath of the Simla conference debacle was a governors' meeting in New Delhi to help Wavel and Weneen decide their next public move. After elections, most agreed, were now required. The decisions of a Governor-General Casey argued vigorously against any elections to an executive and a legislative conference could be called to express the sovereign wishes of Pakistan. Unless the Muslim League could be steered away from its own declaration of independence, there would be no unity in Pakistan and immediate Central elections might consolidate the Muslim League position.² Casey feared that Punjab Muslims would vote on what might appear to them simply as a religious issue and his concerns prompted Kaur's deep sceptic hesitations as Bengal's governor observed that some of his leading Muslims considered what Pakistan meant. In the last resort they took a far back on Jinnah's argument that Jinnah was satisfied that Pakistan was economically sound; therefore it must be so.³ Casey thought Jinnah an important actor, since he admitted that Jinnah was a very real force and argued that the "Pakistan idea might go to pieces without him."

"There are only two major parties in this country," Jinnah insisted, restating Nehru's famous 1937 formula in his first public pronouncement in Peshawar following the Simla conference. "Invitations issued to Mr. Gandhi and I have not reached the basis that Mr. Gandhi was far recognised leader of one of the nations and respect the wishes of the other. The British ruled them parties, but in fact they are two major nations."⁴ No other formula would satisfy him. A quarter of a century after his public humiliation at Nagpur he had risen from the dust of agony to stand erect at death's door proclaiming to the world that Mr. Gandhi was no better than Mr. Jinnah, merely his opposite number in a different "major nation." Jinnah

nah seemed to be obsessed with Gandhi and his behavior, minutely examining and questioning all facets of his activity.

When it suits him, he represents nobody, he can talk in individual capacity, he is not even a four-anna member of the Congress; he undertakes fast to decide the political issue; he reduces himself to zero and consults his inner voice, yet when it suits him, he is the supreme dictator of the Congress. He thinks he represents whole of India. Mr. Gandhi is an enigma. . . . How can we come to a settlement with him? There was so much venom and bitterness against the Muslims and the Muslim League at the Congress were prepared to go to any length with no objectives first to humiliate and to denigrate the Muslim League and every method was adopted to bully us, coerce us and to threaten us to surrender, the second was to see Muslim League ignored and bypassed and for that purpose they stooped to the lowest point that they threw up their pink slips to the winds.⁴

Many of the ambivalent fears preoccupying Jinnah's mind then were being generated as well by thoughts of Gandhi with whom he associated a certain intimacy, and what to Jinnah were the two most heinous objects "to hammer down to zero" "bitterness and envy" or "to ignore and to snub him. Whether it was because of his actions or of great contempt nothing could do more reflecting to his self-image or more painful to his sensitivity or hurt and pain. He considered it far better to do fighting in the lead of his own smaller party nation than to live in the shadow of an insulting an "enigma."

To fill the League's election war chest Jinnah spoke again in August at his home city, warning the Congress of trying "by hook or by crook" to lure Muslims into an "Indian union" and warning that they look to the British bayonets to perform the task for them and hence they resort to "harassing and varying methods, flattery and bribing abuses, crying and giving threats to the British Government. But we cannot agree to an arrangement, which means freedom for Hindus and establishment of 'Hindu Raj' and a slavery for the Muslims."⁵ His listeners donated over 300,000 rupees that day funds which Jinnah called the League's "silver bullets."

"The Labour Party is, of course, both by its convictions and by its public utterances, committed to do its utmost to regard the Indian problem," wrote Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell in his first weekly letter "I feel sure that my colleagues will welcome your proposal to hold elections, which I am supporting to them in a paper which should be considered within the next few days." The new secretary of state was "greatly attracted" to Indian thought and culture, he had visited India with his son

franchise wife in 1926-27 served as a member of the Round Table conference in 1931 and was the most sympathetic master of the India Office to Indian national aspirations since Montagu or Morley.

Glancy did his best to deride early elections, fearing Pakistan yet finding that throughout the Muslim districts of the Punjab since the Simla conference Jinnah's stock had been standing very high. He has been failed as the champion of Islam. I must confess that I am gravely perturbed about the situation because there is a very serious danger of the elections being fought so far as Muslims are concerned, on an entirely false issue. The re-united Muslim will be told that the question he is called on to answer at the polls is: Are you a true believer or an infidel and if not, Pakistan becomes an untenable issue; we shall be head-on straight for blows and on a wide scale non-Muslims, especially Sikhs, not believing they will not submit peacefully to a Government that is called Muhammadan Raj. No Englishman so clearly foresaw the racial implications of the partition of the Punjab yet Glancy's view of the situation showed no evidence of the racial corridors of Whitehall.

On August 20, 1945, Wavell was invited to dine for consultation with the new cabinet and authorized to announce that elections could be held in August or in India during the next cold weather. Before leaving India the viceroy sent Pethick-Lawrence his summary analysis of the Indian problem. First stating that what Glancy had written about the Indian situation was "completely applicable to Bengal." But the Muslims were "not Hindu Raj" and the Sikhs who were the rulers of the Punjab. "But we are not a world fight nation that see their Islam and pass over permanent Mohammed." He pointed out the seeming paradox that "just as the Pakistan idea was much stronger among Muslims in the Government it was weaker than in the Pakistan Provinces." Wavell recognized that he had always hoped to be able to "avoid" any full-scale political conflict, the feasibility and implications of Pakistan, since he anticipated that Jinnah would not insist on such a conference or communion and it might only stir up communal "feeling." He felt, however, that continuing to ignore the possibility of its birth would not make Pakistan fade away.

Wavell reached London before the end of August and found Pethick-Lawrence, who "looks old, is pleasant and amiable," wanting to welcome him home and motor with him to Clarendon. They conferred in Whitehall the next day for an hour and a half. Two days later Wavell met with the India committee of the cabinet chaired by Atlee. Sir Stafford Cripps, now president of the Board of Trade, was the committee's most formidable member. The viceroy reported that he "thought it most unlikely" that Jinnah would enter into discussions without a guarantee of acceptance of

Pakistan, at least "in principle" Wavel's own judgment was that "Jinnah spoke for 95 per cent of the Muslim population of India in their apprehension of Hindu domination. . . . The real strength of Mr Jinnah's position was the widespread and genuine fear among Indian Muslims of Hindu domination and Hindu rule. There had been a 'very great hardening' in the positions of the Indian parties since 1942, the viceroy argued and he saw no readiness on the part of any party in India at present to accept the Congress offer. As for the Constituent Assembly, Muslims would 'boycott it' unless the Pakistan issue was conceded. Yet to concede that issue might lead to 'a boycott by the Hindus'."

Except for Attlee who had less and less time for India as prime minister, Cripps and Pethick Lawrence were the only cabinet ministers to concern themselves directly with Indian affairs at the time and Cripps convinced his friends Hindu and Muslim right in downgrading Jinnah's power or political role. Like Wavel, however, seriously Wavel, on the other hand, trusting from reports of Jinnah's and Nehru's speeches that Congress was pursuing a more evolved policy of co-operation with the government as a result, sympathized toward Jinnah and the Muslim League, who might prove to be its only allies in the coming struggle for power. So despite his greater sympathy for Hindu and its strong stated interest in the Congress, Jinnah's very complex political problems thus inherent like the Congressmen's, a storm-buried and the Congress offer of 1942 and ignored Jinnah's own extreme changes wrought by three revolving years self-interest. It is saying that "If the future of India is to be decided by the Congress, the responsibility would be theirs," Wavel and Pethick Lawrence went back to their ruling boards to seek a better way to deal with India than Great Britain's new postwar policy was the same old Cripps position. The viceroy met with Churchill on the eve of the Congress and its capture for Lord Cripps and was shocked to learn that the "only reason" Churchill "had agreed to my political move [the first Simla Conference] was that the India Committee had all told him it was bound to fail."

Jinnah had taken his pre-election fund-raising tour to Karachi en route to Quetta where the dry cool air was thought to be best for his lungs. His message was simple and the same wherever he spoke—the Muslim League was "the only authoritative and representative" party of Muslims throughout India, and the sole platform of the League was Pakistan. Jinnah began to act like the head of a separate nation, moreover, he wired Attlee at this time to protest any sojourn of Britain's ban on Jewish refugees being admitted into Palestine, warning the prime minister "It is my duty to inform you that any a reminder to appease Jewry at the sacrifice of Arabs would be

deeply resented and vehemently resisted by Muslim world and Muslim India, and its consequences will be most disastrous."²⁴

With Jinnah obliged to remain in Baluchistan too weak to travel during the 1945 campaign, Liaquat Ali and other Working Committee members of the Central Parliamentary Board and Committee of Action actually ran the Muslim League from its New Delhi headquarters and ticketed candidates. Much provincial controversy, sickening, and backbiting ensued, especially in Bengal, Sind, and the North-West Frontier. In September Sir Feroz Khan Noon had resigned his defence seat on the viceroy's executive council to return home to the Punjab. In Quetta there was a League candidate, but a month later Wavel reported to Pethick Lawrence that Sir Feroz "has not been universally welcomed, and I doubt if the Party there [in the Punjab] is as united and cordial as it might be. The Muslim League have always suffered from lack of organization as compared with the Congress and if they waste their time in personal quarrels, they may suffer at the polls."²⁵

"Pakistan is the question of life and death for us," Jinnah told a public meeting in Ahmedabad that found week in October, stopping on his way home to Bombay, to pick up a check for 200,000 rupees collected from Quetta Muslims. "I had asked for silver bullets to fight the election campaign, and Ahmedabad had responded next to Bombay which was a richer city. . . . All Muslims believed in one God and were one nation. They wanted Pakistan and would attain it. It was their amulet, their charm which would increase their strength and glory. The moon of Pakistan is shining and we shall reach it," he assured the cheering crowd.

On November 2, Jinnah predicted a Muslim League "sweep" at the by-elections, a reporter from the Associated Press that he could not agree with reports of his Pakistan fan who contend it is unworthy. His next step will be a demand upon Britain for recognition. "Congress threatened to demand immediate independence for India as a whole and we determined to elect by the Congress, to elect and Wavel elected his officials and prepared to declare "martial law." Politician Pethick-Lawrence, however, read none of Wavel's anxious reports of Congress campaign rhetoric with great alarm, yet cabled the viceroy to ask "But will Jinnah be induced to accept a modified form of it [Pakistan] which it might be possible to concede?"²⁶

Cripps now advised the Cabinet committee to send a parliamentary delegation to India and urge the viceroy to meet with Gandhi, reporting "he understood that Gandhi was ready and willing to influence Indian opinion towards moderation" if, as anticipated after elections, Congress would be "the majority party" (it would no longer be possible to treat them,

responsibly, hence Labour's Pettkin-Lawrence and Cripps resolved to let the viceroy in reën on the rugged potholed road toward India's independent rule, rather than allowing him to bolt off on any smoother martial freeway.

Wavell, however, was losing all patience with India's growing political or political penchant for debate. His services became more ominous. Boredom and depression settled deep inside the aging marshals' souls, as he had earlier noted in a journal entry of mid-November 1945: "Back this evening from U.P. It was the dulllest tour I have done, tiring, boring, and hot." To Whitehall Wavell wired an "unedited top secret" reply: "I do not think it advisable that I should invite Gandhi to see me."

Most of Wavell's depression, and that of his commander-in-chief General Auchinleck, as well as most of the senior British martial and civil officers in India at this time, was immediately associated with the passivity and inaction against British rule that November as some of the leaders of the Indian National Army were brought to trial. Also a New Delhi Red Fort Bose and declared a plain-crack-on-over a scene of a young lieutenant and Hindu one Muslim and one Sikh and a white one were serving at the British army in Singapore when it surrendered, emerged now as national heroes. Nehru, Bhulabhai Patel, and J. B. Kripalani were ordered to defend Bose's officers, who were thought to be traitors and to be hated as pariahs throughout the land. In Bose's home city, Calcutta, riots of protest raged, leaving over ten thousand injured and many deaths. In support, businessmen in the South and the East, and many British officials realized that they had made a terrible mistake in giving the Indian National Army so much publicity and so prominent a platform.

General Sir Claude Auchinleck in a top secret letter to Wavell on November 24, 1945, wrote:

The evidence reaching us now increasingly goes to show that the general opinion in the Army (as opposed to that of certain units and individuals who have particular reasons for bitterness) is in favour of leniency. If you agree in the case of the present trials, the services will be commuted. It was clear from the evidence when the trials are concluded that the accused were carrying out what they believed to be their duty."

To Wavell more than any message he received from Whitehall this letter from a "Alek" convinced him that the days of the raj were numbered. The world war may have been won, but India was "lost." Jinnah personally

played no part in the great trial of the Indian National Army, though the League associated itself with the defense since, as British Intelligence opined, the rise of Muslims may make their effect increasingly felt on the Muslim Public and League alike."

For the first time since 1938, Jinnah journeyed to the frontier to campaign for a week. He addressed a Muslim League conference in Peshawar on November 24, 1945: "We have no friends. . . . Neither the British, nor the Hindus are our friends. We are clear in our own minds that we have to fight against both of them. If both British and Hindus are combined against us, we shall not be afraid of them. We shall fight them a day, a night and, Inshaallah, win in the end." When Jinnah spoke, he showed in the way he spoke and not, their answer came in deafening shouts of "Allah-o-Akbar" (God is Great). To the Pakistanis he assured them all they had to do was to vote for the League candidates. Then he seemed to lapse into a serious state. They then asked: What are the services of Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League? It is true that I have not seen to it. Never mind, I am a blind person, but I ask you: Who made sacrifices in 1920-2? Mr. Gandhi sends the *truth* through if leadership or or skills. The last statement came closest to revealing Jinnah's deepest grievance: revealing, in the worst language, his hatred for what he so truly, passionately felt Mr. Gandhi's doing to his "small" to assent the theme of Congress national leadership.

In Calcutta, Cases was beside himself with frustration and fear in the face of the pro-Indian National Army riots that had been and had been wounded, and he worked the case. Bengal's government met with Gandhi in Calcutta only to disagree and reported to Wavell that his public reasoning lacked reality and balance. However, there was no fear. As he would talk, Cases told Gandhi that what was standing in the way of a settlement for India was not the British but the Muslim League, which was "refusing to negotiate." Cases urged that Congress should make a "substantial movement" of a substantial part of the independence. For a settlement now, a substantial part of the Muslim League's "independence" was necessary. Gandhi responded that he had "conceded safeguard after safeguard" to Jinnah, who "constantly raised his price" until he reached what in essence was Pakistan, and that he had "conceded everything" to him. Gandhi also told Cases that "he believed Jinnah to be a very ambitious man and that he had vision of linking up the Muslims of India with the Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere and that he did not believe that he could be shaken off his dreams."

The League went all thirty central assembly seats (one of them Jinnah's,

that December, a stunning victory that validated Jinnah's prediction and appeared to prove the universal appeal of Pakistan among Muslims of the subcontinent. Congress thought it retained a majority of fifty-five, actually lost four seats. The first round was over. The "day is not far off," Jinnah promised his jubilant followers, "when Pakistan shall be at your feet."²⁴ He directed more criticism and sarcasm at Nehru, mocking him as "the nepotist Pandit who never unearns or earns anything and never grows old . . . nothing but Peter Pan."²⁵

Pethick-Lawrence wrote to Jinnah and Azad to inform them of the preliminary delegations' forthcoming visit and asked if they would meet with British to discuss matters with them.²⁶ Jinnah met the terms of the invitation issued by Laurence Professor R. Richards in New Delhi on January 3, 1946. Five days earlier Jinnah had taken with Wavell for an audience. Jinnah's refusal to allow Azad to meet with Wavell shows how little he trusted any of his opponents to participate in such negotiations with a governing power. He later felt confident in giving nothing away as he wrestled with Pakistan.

As the provincial election campaigns heated up, reports of Hindu-Muslim riots and of religious assassinations appeared in the Punjab. Pethick-Lawrence told Jinnah and Lawrence that it would be useless to start another round of political negotiations to the west of the line, adding less than a cabinet would seem to India was required to make a Hindu-Muslim "demarche." Three ministers with "full authority" to discuss the issue, he said, the secretary of state would have in the past and under previous governments in England and sometime in March. The secretary of state had that his mission might be his final card in the game. Jinnah's winning so sweetly to its tag line of negotiations, "leave us a good deal of time and things will sort themselves out," remained nonviolent. The army might even decide not to obey orders. Communalism of Indian National Army trial sentences had accelerated the metamorphosis of "mutineers" into national heroes. The total number of European officers in the army was just over 10,000, and more and more opted exercised their option of retiring on their pensions back home. Precious little time left.

The cabinet decided in February to send Cripps and first lord of the admiralty, A. V. Alexander to India to be, together with Pethick-Lawrence, their three wise men. Wavell was afraid Cripps would be the "operative element" among those magi and considered Cripps "solid to the Congress point of view" and not quite "strong" in his "method."²⁷ A month before he called upon Jinnah for the Indian parliamentary delegation led by

Richards returned to 10 Downing Street to report what it had found. Most members agreed that some form of Pakistan was to be conceded, and the sooner the better. Mrs. Muriel Nichol, who admitted that she began her visit to India "impressed by the strong necessity of maintaining the unity of India," found the Punjab "explosive." The Muslim population there was "all worked up in favour of Pakistan" and therefore it "must be conceded." She believed Jinnah would modify his demands but only if the "principles" were granted "at an early stage."²⁸ Brigadier Austin Law felt it "would be undesirable that H. M. G. should make a declaration in favour of Pakistan," he agreed that it might be necessary, but feared "Pakistan is not a viable proposition." M. P. Reginald Surtees "regarded Pakistan as wholly irrational" but was not sure that Mr. Jinnah could be regarded as a rational person, but in his view "necessary." Mr. Arthur Boscawen did not like Pakistan but thought it would be necessary to avoid widespread bloodshed. He also observed that his own trade interests, for whereas the strong tendency in the Congress majority "Provinces was to increase trade with the United Kingdom, the Muslims were eager to do business with us."²⁹

Pethick-Lawrence's brilliant private secretary, Francis Turnbull, then prepared a memorandum for the secretary of state, which helped set the agenda for discussion prior to the start of regular talks. "There is bound to be an enormous expense to pay for the satisfaction of the Muslim demand, a political and military," then weighed document, ratified primarily by Mr. Turnbull warned.

The division of India will be born in bitter antagonism and it will be only by rushing to assume that there will not be a general peace of India necessary to regulate the machinery of communications and of economic intercourse between the Pakistan States and the rest of India. . . . It is hard to resist the conclusion that taking all these considerations into account the splitting up of India will be the reverse of beneficial so far as the livelihood of the people is concerned.³⁰

Jinnah quashed India's problems, fought against famine in most of the provinces of the subcontinent, and grain shortages were starting to appear. In August 1946, a Frontier Works appeared in Canada and the United States to accept an official food delegation to London and to the United States. Jinnah responded positively. Wavell reported that Gandhi advised him to "speak for Azad and talk to him."³¹ With food grains rationed to twelve ounces per day, mass protest marches began in many Indian cities starting with Allahabad. Visible deterioration of

it" was widespread. The average Indian's rationed diet provided no more than 200 calories, fewer than half the minimum requirement for normal daily activity.⁷⁴

On February 18, 1946, most of the sailors in the Royal Indian Navy in Bombay harbor went on strike for higher wages. The next day 3,000 or more "mutineers," as the British considered them, marched around Bombay carrying flags of thousands of ardent steel supporters. The Congress flag flew from both the H.M.I.S. *Talwar* and the H.M.I.S. *Lahore*, as well as from the hats of many jubilant sailors, who called themselves members of the I.N.N. (Indian National Navy), in emulation of Bose's I.N.A. (Indian National Army). On February 22 the mutineers were told that only "unconditional surrender" would be accepted. General Sir R. M. Lockhart, commander-in-chief, had an interview with Wavell reported so that they would have to be sent to Valadabha. But when they were persuaded the mutineers to surrender without firing. Some of the mutineers had been the head of the Bombay command. However, and in the aftermath of both "mutinies" rioting left some 200 dead and as elections continued.

The results of the election in late February gave the League 74 of 88 Muslim seats, a clear mandate for Pakistan among Muslims of the province, though not enough votes to allow the League to form a ministry. The Congress support in Bengal the League sought was not the same, with 29 out of 34 seats, while in Assam though even a higher percentage of Muslim League candidates won (31 out of 34), Congress again refused to enter a coalition government with its most hated rival. Jinnah's party soon scored a singular victory in Bengal, however, winning 3 out of 113 Muslim seats. The League lost badly on the frontier, winning only 17 out of 38 seats. The overall provincial tally gave the League more than 88 percent of the Muslim vote nonetheless—quite enough to reject the Pakistan demand in the eyes of the world.

"The British Government and the British people desire, without reservation, to consummate the promises and pledges that have been made," Peter Freuchen stated as he and his Cabinet colleagues touched Indian soil on March 23.⁷⁵ Major Woodrow Wyatt returned to India with the Calcutta Mission as Cripps' assistant, and was the first member of the Mission to meet with Jinnah again, visiting him at home in New Delhi on March 24. Major Wyatt had "an old friend . . . who is quite close to Jinnah . . . about the long 'Taxi' Minister, Shah Nawaz, Sir Muhammad Shuja-ud-Din, who kept him informed of Jinnah's thinking and the internal dynamics of the League, to which she belonged. The Muslim League seems to be so close behind Jinnah," Wyatt reported to Cripps on

March 28.⁷⁶ Cripps met with Jinnah for an hour on the morning of March 30. "He was calm and reasonable but completely firm on Pakistan."⁷⁷ As a result of that conversation, Jinnah agreed to invite Gandhi to meet him. As was so often the case at the start of previous negotiations, Jinnah's opening posture was surprisingly cordial and disarmingly reasonable.

Gandhi appeared before the Mission on April 3, "naked except for a dhoti and looking remarkably healthy" Wavell reported.

Mr. Gandhi said that he had passed 18 days with Mr. Jinnah. He claimed to be a sincere friend of the Muslims but had never been able to appreciate the Pakistan which Mr. Jinnah says he means. . . . His Pakistan was a sin which he (Mr. Gandhi) would not commit. The substance of Pakistan as he understood it was independence of culture and a legitimate ambition. . . . The two-nation theory is far more dangerous. The Muslim population is a population of converts

all descendants of Indian-born people. Jinnah is sincere but his logic is utterly at fault especially as a kind of mania possesses him. He himself was called a maniac and he therefore honoured Jinnah for his mania. . . . He asked Jinnah whether his own son (Husain) Gandhi, who had gone over to the Muslim religion changed his nationality by doing so. . . . Let Mr. Jinnah form the first Government and choose its personnel from elected representatives of the community. The Viceroy would appoint them formally but, in fact, Mr. Jinnah would choose. If he does not do so then the offer to form a Government should be made to Congress. . . . The Interim Government must be absolutely national. Mr. Jinnah could choose who he liked for his Government. They would be subject to the vote of the Assembly from which they were drawn."

Peter Freuchen interrupted Gandhi at this point to note that Jinnah's party did not own a majority of the assembly seats since he would be asked to preside over a government most of whose ministers belonged to "parties other than his own." Gandhi said that was "inescapable." The secretary of state pointed out that "Jinnah's government" would, in that case, have to be predominantly Hindu. "Mr. Gandhi said he did not understand the difficulties of the situation which the Delegation had to face. If he were out an irresponsible optimist he would despair of any solution."

Jinnah arrived for his interview the next morning at ten and spoke to Cripps for three hours, "of which at least two were, to my mind," noted Cripps, "entirely wasted."⁷⁸ Jinnah began with an historical survey of India showing how rarely in its long past India has been unified. "A Hindu will wash his hands after shaking hands with a Muslim," he argued though he personally was probably more scrupulous in that particular habit.

been said he had not been able to get anything which would enable him to say that the Union idea was worth considering. . . . Mr. Jinnah said that no amount of equality provided on paper was going to work. . . . Would there, for example, be equality of each community in the Services?

The Secretary of State said that Mr. Jinnah seemed to be turning to the other alternative and asked Mr. Jinnah's views on that. Mr. Jinnah said that once the principle of Pakistan was conceded the question of the territory of Pakistan could be discussed. His claim was for the provinces but he was willing to discuss the area. . . . He could not possibly accept that Calcutta should go out merely for the sake of 5 or 6 lakhs of Hindus (largely Depressed Classes who would prefer Pakistan) most of whom were imported labour. The Secretary of State said he wished to emphasise that the Delegation did not consider that either of these two alternatives would be readily acceptable to the Congress. . . . Mr. Jinnah said that he thought with reason that the Congress stood to lose nothing. The unity of India was a myth.⁴⁷

Jinnah's legal acumen proved more than Pethick Lawrence, Cripps, or Alexander could outwit, though all three were British statesmen, the best.

Finally "the Secretary of State suggested that Mr. Jinnah should discuss the matter over further. After the Delegation's return from Kashmir perhaps Mr. Jinnah would let them know his position." Round Four was over. Jinnah knew how much down but early action on points before the bell sounded, giving him an interlude of much-needed rest.

18

Simla Revisited (1946)

Masterful leader that he was, Jinnah marshalled his forces, tightening his grip on the sword-arm of his embryonic nation, brought out the negotiations with the cabinet mission. A newly elected Muslim League legislators from provincial and central assemblies mustered in Delhi during early April 1946. Take and sign solemn pledges "in the name of Allah the Beneficent the Merciful" declaring, the constitution that "the safety and security, and the calculation and destiny of the Muslim Nation inhabiting the Subcontinent of India lies only in the achievement of Pakistan. . . and, believing as I do in the rightness and the justice of my cause, I pledge myself to forego all other material sacrifice which may be a hindrance to it." That pledge was unanimous, attested by every elected representative of the Muslim League, landlords and chieftains. Armed with those promissory oaths on the life of every Muslim League leader in British India, Quid-i-Azam returned to his followers. "We have made a solemn declaration in this manner and before the Convention. Just while we hope for the best we are prepared for the worst."⁴⁸

At a secret session Bengal's Subhraward, moving the pledge resolution that night, "We want to live in peace. We do not intend to start a civil war, but we want a land where we can live in peace. . . . I have long pondered whether the Muslims are prepared to fight. Let me honestly declare that the Muslim League is not at all prepared to lay down his life", and turning to Quid-i-Azam he demanded, "I call upon you to test us."⁴⁹ His (unpublished) answer was that he was not at all prepared to lay down his life. Quid-i-Azam spoke in Urdu, affirming that "Muslims will now decide their own destiny" and he turned toward his great leader, sitting on the platform in

an Anglo-Arabic Hali, wearing a cream-colored sherwani, white shawl, and regal fur cap, vowing, "We will lay down our lives for Pakistan."

The Punjab's nawab of Mamdot raised his mighty right arm as he spoke. "We are asked how we will defend Pakistan. I would say that if our soldiers of the Punjab could defend Britain against Nazi aggression, they could also defend their own hearths and homes." From the North-West Frontier rose Pathan leader Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan "anote unanimous applause" to shout "Thank God we have our flag, our leader, the path and one ideal Pakistan is high for. We are on—waiting for the order to do whatever seems necessary for the attainment of Pakistan. Young, brave Shaikat Hama Khan was there to assure his countrymen: "I speak for the Punjab soldier and I say that three quarters of the regularized soldiers of the Punjab are pledged to achieve Pakistan. You say are Hindu ragas back and we begot you to give the world a new order, let us prove it the doing how we can and how we mean to defend Pakistan." More restrained perhaps, he was older Sir Fazl Khan. "I would say that the Hindus and the British know well that we are on the verge of a great tragedy."

What are we fighting for? What are we aiming at?" Jinnah asked his friends. "I have a feeling that what they pledged was their aim at awakening from a dream to find himself at the edge of a dreadful precipice."

We Muslims have got everything—mass intelligence capacity and courage—virtues that nations must possess. But two things are lacking—individual character and character in these. One thing is true, our character in these and Hindu domination, particularly on our economic life, has caused a certain degeneration of these virtues in us. We have lost the fullness of our noble character. And what is character? The highest sense of honour and the highest sense of integrity, conviction, incorruptibility, readiness at any time to efface oneself for the collective good of the nation. And yet, we have done wonders. In five years our renaissance has been a miracle of achievement. I begin to think it has been a dream."

The Muslim returned from holiday in Srinagar on April 24 and asked Cripps to meet with Jinnah "informally" that evening to put to him their latest plan. "The Muslim League would like to see a federal structure federation with provinces grouped to embrace the areas of Pakistan dominated by the League, with the rest of British India going to Hindustan and the princely states being permitted to join either. The All-India Federation at the top of the federation would have controlled defence, foreign

affairs, communications, and minority problems. The federated groups of Hindustan and Pakistan were to have had their own flags and internal security forces, and they would have been governed by central legislatures, each electing equal numbers of representatives to an all-India union. Minority problems and complaints would have been referred to a union court representing the major communities. The Muslim League and Congress would each have appointed drafting committees of their own to draw up group constitutions. Congress leadership argued for such a plan actually created Pakistan before an one real—when the extent of the desire for such a new state is among Muslim representatives. The movement then proposed electing a special commission from between 150 to 200 members from all the newly elected representatives of every assembly and province, Pakistan to a vote—final body. It is least 20 percent of the commission voted for Pakistan, then Muslim representatives of the provincial assemblies of the Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier, Bengal and Assam, Sylhet district, could elect separately to vote whether they wished to opt out of an Indian union. If at least 75 percent so voted they would remain outside and to Sind to Punjab and the North-West Frontier opt out to separate, then Hindustan would also become part of that Pakistan, as would Bengal and Sylhet. Nor Muslim—its districts within these provinces, as in East Punjab and West Bengal, could vote to remain in the Indian Union, and if 75 percent of their representatives preferred it those border provinces would be so partitioned.

Cripps found Jinnah "an unresponsive mood." Jinnah did, however, write down the points Cripps proposed and "he said that if Congress would accept these proposals he would put them to his Working Committee." Knowing how cautious and generally negative Jinnah could be when he disliked a proposal, Ward observed that Jinnah's mere willingness to present a plan to his followers constituted "practical, very provisional, acceptance." Cripps was therefore authorized to see Nehru "informally" and to sound him "on the Muslim's proposition, but Jawaharlal "turned down the proposal." The women were sequestered and that evening Cripps returned to Jinnah's house and once again put to him the previous A and B plan. Jinnah did not reject the Muslim sovereignty Pakistan" embodied in plan B, but was "unimpressed" by it, and in a three-tiered federal system, "for his Working Committee if he could be assured that Congress would be prepared to consider it." Cripps was so heartened by this that he took plan A to Azad the next day (though Nehru had just agreed to become his successor as president of Congress the next month), and the Maulana proposed a summit meeting of four Congress and four League leaders to hammer out details of that "solution." Cripps

He had just went back to Jinnah with his "good news", however Jinnah reminded him that what he had previously expressed was merely his "personal opinion and not necessarily that of the League" though he was willing to put that idea before his Working Committee.⁸ The mission and Wavel had drafted a letter to both Jinnah and Azad proposing a summit meeting at Simla. New Delhi by then was sweetening, and everyone agreed that chances of reaching closer were bound to be brighter in the cool, rarefied, more rational atmosphere of a Himalayan hill station.

The rendezvous at Simla on May 5, Wavel's own third birthday, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, 1889-1953, and Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan, 1896-1958, to join Jinnah at the summit. Azad, who had Nehru, Patel, and Klean Anjum Chaudhri Khan as Congress leaders, took along Masani and half Hindu Jinnah refused to shake hands with Azad, but otherwise the meeting got off on a high note. Wavel noted, "I think the first point of controversy arose over what Congress wanted the Government to have powers of direct taxation and the other points where Jinnah advocated that it should be given. Jinnah said it would have to go to the groups if it wanted more."⁹ The main point of controversy was a central legislative Congress insisted on having one, and Jinnah was negative, "his arguments . . . weaker and less convincing" as Wavel later. Jinnah merely wanted his legislative authority over the groups of Pakistan where Congress was up to the neck in the form of parliament. The underlying cause of every argument and conflict at Simla remained the basic differences between the Congress and Muslim League's contrary government philosophies of political life.

On the morning of May 6, Nehru and Jinnah crossed swords in what was to evolve into the most deadly duel in Indian history.

Nehru said that . . . The Union of India, even if the list of subjects was short, must be strong and organic. Provinces would not be prevented from co-operating among themselves over such subjects as education and health, but they would not need a Group Executive. He appealed to the League to come into the Constitution-making body on the assurance that there would be no compulsion. Mr. Jinnah replied that he could not accept that invitation. But if the Congress . . . would accept the Groups, the Muslim League would accept the Union. . . . Nehru pointed out that Mr. Jinnah had accepted no feature of the Union. The Union without a Legislature would be futile and entirely unacceptable.¹⁰

While Nehru and Jinnah faced, "Pale's face of cold angry disapproval was a study" worthy of viceregal notice.¹¹ That afternoon Nehru said that

"the question of grouping would arise after the constitution had been formed, insisting that "The first question is, whence was the character of the Union. After that Provinces might exercise their autonomy subject to the Union constitution and Provincial representation might be set up in the All-India Constitution-making Body proposals for grouping."¹²

Cripps drafted a new "points of agreement" document, which he planned to show Gandhi that evening asking Wavel to take Jinnah. The Mahatma was living in Simla's "Chadwick" bungalow with Patel and Gopal for Khan, but he had not come to an audience with Cripps (Cripps had hoped to win Gandhi's support, but he struck out. Gandhi argued that the proposed solution was worse than Pakistan, and he could not recommend it to Congress). He seemed quite unmoved at the prospect of civil war," Wavel noted, concluding, "I think Mr. Gandhi had adopted lately the view that if we are firm the Muslims will not fight."¹³ The following evening Wavel met with Jinnah for over an hour. He was friendly, but showed his concern and his distrust of Congress and all their works. He is convinced of the intention to split the Muslims and secure a Hindu domination. He said finally that we must do what we think just and fair, but not pass up an opportunity. Meanwhile Cripps returned to Simla. Gandhi's plan came and the Mahatma gave his approval to a tentative proposal of the three systems.¹⁴ Wavel who did not get this Congress and who had insisted Gandhi was not at all prepared that Congress could lead the way, . . . more likely that G. has led C. down the garden path.¹⁵

On May 8, 1946, Pethick Lawrence and Jinnah and Azad identified some suggestive points of agreement that started with "There shall be a central Indian Government and Legislative Council with foreign and defence (common) powers, fundamental rights and having the powers to obtain for itself the finances necessary for these subjects." They added "All the remaining powers to the Provinces" and as some three or four groups of Provinces may be formed and said groups may determine the Provincial subjects which they desire to take in common."¹⁶ Jinnah replied the same day from "Yarrows," the bungalow he occupied in Simla.

We are of the opinion that the new suggested points for agreement are a fundamental departure from the original formula embodied in your letter of 27th April, which was rejected by the Congress. . . . In these circumstances, we think no useful purpose will be served to discuss this paper.¹⁷

Gandhi also rejected the written points of agreement for various other reasons, but primarily because 80 million Muslims would enjoy "parity"

Details of the new constitution were to be worked out by an assembly representing "as broad-based and accurate" a cross section of the population of India as possible. An elaborate method of assuring proper representation of all communities was outlined with due consideration given to the representation of states as well as provinces.

"To the leaders and people of India who now have the opportunity of independence we would finally say this," the mission's statement concluded:

We and our Government and countrymen hoped that it would be possible for the Indian people to take over the reins of government upon the method of framing the new constitution under which they will live. Despite the labours which we have shared with the Indian Parties . . . this has not been possible. We therefore now lay before you proposals which . . . we trust will enable you to attain your independence in the shortest time and with the least danger of internal disturbance or chaos. These proposals may not of course completely satisfy all parties . . . We ask you to consider the alternative to acceptance of these proposals . . . a grave danger of violence, chaos, and even civil war. The result and duration of such a disturbance cannot be foreseen but it is certain that it would be a terrible disaster for many millions of men, women and children. . . We appeal to all who are interested in the future of India to extend their vision beyond their own community or interest to the interests of the whole four hundred millions of the Indian people . . . we look forward with you to your ever increasing prosperity among the great nations of the world, and to a future even more glorious than your past.²⁶

When the mission came to India by British rule, Gandhi commented that day: "If the statement of the Mission was genuine, as he believed it was, it was a surprise to them that they had declared the British rule in India, namely, to get off India's back. It contained the seed to convert this land of sorrow into one without sorrow and suffering."²⁷ Pethick-Laxton and Alexander called the following morning for a meeting. Three hours and reported to Wavell and Alexander that "At the outset Mr. Gandhi had seemed very content with the Government's Statement but later he had raised a point over which the Secretary of State felt some difficulty . . . the question whether the procedure laid down for the Constituent Assembly was subject to alteration . . . whether it was open to Congress representatives in the Constituent Assembly at the opening meeting to deal with procedure to raise the question whether the Assembly should in fact divide into the three regions, or whether it should decide the future constitution first . . . Mr. Gandhi indicated that his support

for the Statement would hinge on this point."²⁸ The viceroy "was not very clear" what was at the back of Gandhi's mind in raising this question but argued forcefully as Jinna had that he was "quite convinced" that the primary objective of Congress was "to get power at the centre in the Interim Government" so that it could then "at any time torpedo the Constitution-making Body by raising some crucial communal issue."

Jinna phoned from Srinagar on May 18 to report that "the reaction of the Muslims against the Statement is very strong,"²⁹ and requested a meeting before coming to any decision "in order to have time to consult his Working Committee. He was obviously highly critical of two points: his own fragile health taxed by visits and by two week-hikes and his concern about extremists in his own party who were ready to launch a jihad without further delay. If the thing was rushed everything would be spoiled," Jinna warned Wavell's private secretary in their telephone conversation. Next morning the mission met with Liaquat Ali Khan and reported that it was impossible for them to wait four weeks for Jinna's response. They pressed him to urge Jinna to return to Delhi at once and to authorize the Nawabzada (Liaquat Ali) to negotiate.³⁰ Liaquat refused to do so but informed that afternoon after a telephone call to his telephone and said that "I was calling the Working Committee for June 3 and 4 and the Council for June 5 and begged them to be hurried as it would take time to persuade his people to accept the proposals." The mission agreed, though rather reluctantly, "Jinna planned to return to New Delhi on June 2, cutting his much needed vacation in the hills short by a week."

On May 19, the very day Liaquat Ali met with the mission, Gandhi wrote Pethick-Laxton from Varanasi Maadhi where he was staying. "New Delhi, to ask further attention on the same subject," he had asked in earlier consultation with the secretary of state. "Do you regard a recommendation as obligatory or advisory of the constituted Constituent Assembly?" required the Mahatma. "I know a legal position," Gandhi added. "My question has reference to the homogeneity or otherwise of the group." Wavell read that letter as "the first of the Congress efforts to wreck the Groups of Provinces."³¹

Cripps drafted a reply to Gandhi which explained: "We have stated publicly that we cannot further negotiate these proposals which are—as far as we are concerned—in their final form."³² On May 20, Gandhi wrote again, this time at greater length:

I would put on record my conviction that independence in fact would be a force, if the British Troops are in India even for peace and order within, or danger from without . . . If this point is also a little possible, "Independence next month" is still a business of a thought

less cry. Acceptance of 'Quit India' by the British is unconditional, whether the Constituent Assembly succeeds or fails. . . A drastic revision of the attitude is a necessity. . . As to the Interim Government, the more I think and observe, the more certain is my feeling that a proper National Government responsible in fact, if not in law, to the elected members of the Central Legislative Assembly should precede the summons for the election of members of the Constituent Assembly. . . Without it, deep and universal corruption cannot end, without it the psychological effect will not be produced. . . Every day's delay in forming such a government is agony to the famished millions of India.⁶⁵

First Lord Alexander was then convinced that "Gandhi had two objects—to influence the British Government and to promote a policy of scuttling the Muslim League's power claims. . . . The Muslim League was not to be abandoned the just claims of the Muslim League."⁶⁶

The mission wired Attlee that the "situation has taken a turn for the worse. . . . It is impossible to make an attack on the growing proposals. . . . they object to parity in the interim Executive. These two points may be crucial in securing Muslim co-operation. . . . We may therefore have to begin long with threat of direct action by Congress if we do not get our way. . . . We are going to wait and see what our position will be in that event."⁶⁷ While the mission waited for the League to meet, a series of events in April and May came in from the Punjab and Karachi, where "the accidental dropping of an onion from a verandah by a Hindu nearly started a communal fracas," reported the viceroy. "If the Muslim League were to reject the scheme. . . there would undoubtedly be widespread communal riots."⁶⁸

Governor Sir Frederick Burrows of Bengal informed the mission on May 24 that Bengali Hindus and Muslims were both much "relieved" that their provinces would not have to be partitioned if the plan were accepted. He warned, however, that rejection of the proposals by Jinnah would lead to resignation of the League ministry and serve as a "signal for a Jalandhar. . . There had already been 'a serious situation in Chittagong started by students' protest against the rejection of Pakistan,"⁶⁹ controlled only because of Muslim ministers going personally to that port to exert mollifying influence.

Woodrow Wyatt spoke with Jinnah on Friday, May 24, and was informed by Quaid-Azam that "What was required was a surgical operation."⁷⁰ Jinnah must have known by then that his lungs were unsuitable for a surgical operation. He offered to transmit some advice to the mis-

sion through Major Wyatt "as to how they should proceed," if he thought the mission would not breach his confidence. Wyatt reassured him on the confidentiality point and reported his belief that what Jinnah wanted to tell the mission was that the British should remain as the buying forces in the Indian Centre for some 15 years and deal with defence and foreign affairs for Pakistan and Hardistan consulting the Prime Ministers of each State.⁷¹ This seemed a sensible solution from Jinnah's point of view since that would have created the least havoc and provided the most security and stability to all Indians, especially the minorities. He tried not say a word, of course, and he did not trust Cripps to keep it from Nehru. Nor was he certain that Pethick-Lawrence would put up his hand to Gandhi yet with time running out and his energy as weak as it was. Jinnah obviously felt almost desperate to convey this advice to the mission before it was too late. He was very anxious. Wyatt noted about the strong Muslim reaction "against the mission's statement and his most hesitant to support it openly."

Wyatt cleverly concluded by asking Jinnah in view of all that had happened since the 1946-47 election and manner in which the League's Working Committee might not "possibly" pass a resolution on an follow-up plan.

The British had exceeded their limit in pronouncing on the merits of Pakistan. They had no business to try down what millions of people wanted. Their analysis of Pakistan was outrageous. But the Muslims had never expected the British to give them Pakistan. They had never expected anyone to give them Pakistan. They knew that they had to get it by their own strong right arm. The solution outlined in the Cabinet Mission Statement was impracticable and could not work. But nevertheless in order to show that they would give it a trial, although they knew that the machinery could not function they would accept the Statement and would not go out of their way to sabotage the plan. . . . but they would accept the Statement as the first step on the road to Pakistan.

With this proposition he was delighted and said, "That's what you've got it, and I am completely convinced that that is what the Muslim League will do," Wyatt quite rightly, most precisely, predicted.⁷²

"Cripps is still in hospital though better, and Alexander is gone to Ceylon to inspect the Fleet," Pethick-Lawrence wrote Attlee on May 26.

What is going to happen I don't know. Gandhi is provokingly enigmatic. . . . He is not at all sure that the Muslims want a settlement. But already we are up against the second hurdle. . . . Azad and Nehru and the Congress generally are willing to waive

any formal or legal change in the Interim constitution, but they want almost absolute power in reality and they want something to be able to say about it to their people. Jinnah not only does not want the Viceroy to relinquish his authority but he positively wants him to retain it. The Viceroy is now I think convinced that he must go to the limit of what is possible in satisfying the Congress. . . . I have not abandoned hope that we may surmount this difficulty and that both Congress and Muslim League may both express a grudging acquiescence in our plan sufficient to enable us to go ahead with summoning the Constituent Assembly . . . on or before June 15th. There are many people who would welcome our positively getting on with the job.⁷²

Not lost among them, Patrick-Lawrence himself

Jinnah returned to New Delhi on June 2, and Wavell met with him the following morning finding him in good heart. He said he would no longer act as the Interim Government until after he had seen his Council, but got the impression that the M. L. would probably come in. . . . He then . . . stressed the fact that the Muslims had not been given part in the Union Legislature and stressed the very great concession he had made to agreeing to a Union at all. . . . He then asked what we should do if the M. L. . . . I told him that the M. L. would certainly not suffer . . . I asked him to work for . . . to go ahead . . . with any party who would work for it. He asked for something more specific before he met his Working Committee at 6 p.m. . . . I asked me to do so.⁷⁴ Wavell got the delegation's "permission to give Jinnah a verbal assurance" that afternoon.

The League council met on June 5, and a "secret" British Intelligence report noted that "Mr Jinnah said that he and other members of the Working Committee were worried as to what would happen if the Muslim League accepted the proposals and the Congress did not. The Viceroy replied that he would brook no refusal from Congress and that if they decided against acceptance he would hand over the interim government to the Muslim League and gave them all the support they required. . . . The point was raised by some members to the Council meeting and Mr Jinnah took them into confidence and gave the same reply."⁷⁵ Next day Jinnah spoke to his League council, informing them "It is now up to you as the Parliament of the Muslim Nation to take your decision. . . . I repeat . . . this delay is not good either for the British Government or the Hindus if they lose freedom, if they lose the independence of India, if they want to

be free, then the sooner they realise the better that the quickest way is to agree to Pakistan."⁷⁶ Jinnah then discussed both internal and external relations, calling upon the Arabs to "see that not one more Jew and one Muslim live" condemning the "Dutch imperialist hold on Indonesia" and concluding that in India most Muslims had "wind in their heads." "There is no remedy for a disease of the kind. When a man is under a delusion, the only place for him is a lunatic asylum. With his delusion, the Hindu is arrogant, selfish and oppressive. But I look at this and sober down. If it does not, then we shall have to do something to make it sober down."⁷⁷

Before June 6 ended the Muslim League council, accepting the cabinet mission's plan. "In a large majority," Wavell noted. "Now the real battle began and the great question is whether the Delegation will stand up to Congress or no. . . . The Interim Government will be the same."⁷⁸ Francis Tarbush had heard both Jinnah and J. B. reporting how excited he was at Jinnah's demand for Muslim League parity in an interim government. "Tarbush noted that he thought Congress had come out of this meeting with a bad taste in its mouth and that he assured the situation had been very difficult for reporting an emergency war time government and now with various having given Congress most of the 'general seats' there could be no question of parity for the League."

Jinnah wanted to have all the members on June 7 and during Wavell's interview the Defence Portfolio for himself and Krippl. Allais and the Minister for two of the provinces.⁷⁹ In an interim government composed of the Muslim League, Congress, and others, and only two others. It was the first time since the 1930s that the Congress was in a minority government office and would not control. In his last Jinnah asked the viceroy what would happen if he sat in the Assembly. He became a member of the Interim Government" and "said he hoped there was no objection to his remaining a resident of the Muslim League. . . . and the Interim Government."⁸⁰

Nehru and Azad came to speak to the cabinet mission on June 10, arguing vigorously against parity. Wavell, Alexander and Patrick-Lawrence tried to argue for greater tolerance and more cooperation with the League, but Nehru insisted "it was frankly beyond the power of Congress to agree . . . parity. . . . Then I said: 'I recovered the scene setting the known to Patrick-Lawrence and Cripps through intermediaries that he was willing to see them. Alexander like Wavell, was 'completely mistrustful now of G. and all his ways.'⁸¹ Cripps suggested that the viceroy tackle Jinnah and Nehru, Patrick-Lawrence wanted to go off to see Gandhi, but the first sea lord "was dead against it."⁸² With his health faltering, Cripps came up with the idea of "two vice-presidents" on the interim government cabinet, one from

each party. Jinnah and Nehru—rotating office. It was also possible under this arrangement to have Nehru and Jinnah as Ministers without portfolio.

It was agreed that the viceroys should ask Nehru and Jinnah to come to dinner that evening for a discussion on the position of the Interim Government. Everyone agreed it was essential to get these two leaders to talk before their party positions froze incompatibly.

That night Cripps was personally to persuade Jinnah to meet with Nehru and Wavel, the following evening. He spent several hours with Jinnah⁵² alone in his Duffin house recording an "unsigned" note of their conversation which has been incorrectly labelled "Note by Mr Wavel"⁵³ but was clearly the record of this most critical Jinnah-Cripps summit conference that failed.

Mr Jinnah said that he was not prepared to discuss parity with anyone. He had had great opposition in his own party to accept the Muslim proposals. He did not think the opposition was likely to be overcome, no matter how long it took. The only way he had been able to persuade the Muslim League Council and Working Committee to accept the Statement was by promising them that he would not join the Interim Government unless the Muslim League had parity with Congress. He was now pledged to that. He could not go back on that. He was not his own master.⁵⁴

A singular confession for Jinnah, yet one he knew would appeal to Cripps. It was not compared to Nehru or anyone else from Congress. At least about the Interim Government and Congress had accepted the Muslim proposals. Then any side took you have to be on the basis of parity. The moment that Congress accepted, he would of course, be willing to meet Nehru and the Viceroy and put before them the names of his nominees with the suggested portfolios.⁵⁵ It was one of Jinnah's key arguments for sparing himself any saving of parity to carry off important business by ways insisting upon prior acceptance of a principle he seemed to have negotiated before taking on the burden of a face-to-face meeting with the "other side." Especially when he considered the extreme doubtful or had no faith in his opposite number.

Jinnah now reassured Cripps of how sensible and reasonable he was, having just taken so intransigent a stand on this key issue. He expressed "shock" at having "got an impression" (from whom he does not say) that it was being reported that the League's nominees for the interim government would be "any old people from the Muslim League Working Committee." Jinnah insisted "He wanted the best men. This was an important matter. . . . He was not going to put up as his nominees people who

were popular or well known in the Muslim League if they could not do the job. He had many able men in the civil service and he would put some of those on even though no one had ever heard of them. The problem was to get the right man for the right job. He was quite prepared to take over the portfolios with Nehru and make adjustments with him so that they could get a workable team which was what was needed. It added nothing but more reasonable? Now that barrister Jinnah re-established his image of sensible moderation in negotiations matters, he could return to his party demand, but this time he put the onus of having announced "parity" on Congress.

He seemed slightly interested in an idea that had been put to him of an interim cabinet of six with parity for Congress and the Muslim League. Something based on these lines was to be put out.⁵⁶ The previous day Cripps's note to himself and his Mission colleagues, for Jinnah's sake, coming up with such big and bold solutions to what everyone else found intractable problems. Cripps's decision that "parity" was not "with any notion of how much he personally had been swayed and moved by Jinnah's quiet advocacy, and how open his own mind remained to very small variations." "I have now heard of four different versions" put from Mr Jinnah, that Jinnah did promise the Muslim League Council and Working Committee that he would not go into an Interim Government unless they believe that he could not have to then give a good deal of support to his party.⁵⁷ That coming commitment sounds positively unchangeable in Jinnah's position and the pressures under which he was working. He had waited this long way from Nehru's side without conceding on anything from the position to which he was going to reach. At which Jinnah's word in this case a letter with the issue's most important Congress member, Nehru, Patel, and Gandhi were leaving (regarding a final impression on the Muslim League as well as Congress) who would then immediately as petition or petitioning haggardly Nehru brought a list of fifteen names for the interim council, but only four were from the Muslim League. The other eleven were Congress nominees. One Congress member, Sir Asaf Ali, and one Congress woman, Wavel, again informed Nehru that "this list would be quite unacceptable to Mr Jinnah." Next day Jinnah arrived and gave the viceroys some names for the Government. The League's name, Nehru, returned that afternoon and "seemed depressed, worked himself up to one outburst about Jinnah's refusal to meet Azad and described Jinnah as a wreck."⁵⁸ Later that evening Patel returned and "talked volubly without listening to any argument" and sang a continuous hymn of hate against Jinnah and the League. He said, "that no Government formed by the Viceroy would be acceptable," that

day Gandhi wrote to Wavell, urging him to "Dare to do the right" in dealing between Congress's list of nominees and the League's. "You must make your choice of one horse or the other," the Mahatma advised the field marshal. "So far as I can see you will never succeed in riding two at the same time. Choose the names submitted either by Congress or the League. For God's sake do not make an incompatible mixture and in trying to do so you will have a fearful explosion. Anyway fix your time-limit and tell us all to leave when that limit is over. I hope I have made my meaning clear."⁴¹ Wavell, however, was thoroughly disenchanted with Gandhi, whom he regarded as an exceedingly stupid obstinate domineering double-tongued, single-minded politician; and there is little true saintliness in him.⁴²

In London the British cabinet considered the "military implications" of proposed articles in the negotiations. It rejected a proposal that the British should cooperate with the Congress plan to grant independence ("scuttle") to Central and Southern India and fall back to the North-West Frontier Province, seeking to hold Pakistan. The prime minister, however, did not dismiss the proposal. He urged that it be stressed the importance of "safeguarding against leakage" the fact that any such move would leave the British in a position that no further action and children should be embarked for India.⁴³

In a statement on the foreign policy implications of any action by His Majesty's Government which appears to suggest that we are abandoning our position in India" and was warned by Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin that

As regards American public opinion, such sympathy as we might hope to get—and it would not be much—from liberal internationalist circles for a policy of abandonment would be infinitely outweighed by a disadvantage by the confirmation that far wider circles would see in such a policy of the assumption that we no longer had the capacity or resolution to face our responsibilities. To sum up . . .

any appearance of abandonment of our position in India without an alternative would worsen our world position.⁴⁴

In New Delhi British cabinet mission continued laboring to put a new interim government in place before India's summer heat melted the hearts of all kinds of those three exhausted wise men. On June 16, Wavell noted "the Delegation's (the ?) attempt to induce the children to play together in a school . . . All this wheedling and haggling by Congress has shown their complete inability to take a broad or statesmanlike view. Jinnah has shown up well in comparison."⁴⁵ Azad kept reminding him long, de-

tailed, demanding letters. Gandhi kept meeting with Pethick-Lawrence, Nehru with Cripps, Wavell with Jinnah. They were arguing over one or two names on an interim cabinet that never met—designed to keep a land of 400 million from drowning in an ocean of blood and poverty. Was it that all of them understood now, hopelessly a task they would face once they agreed to make "power"? Wavell was bored sick of them all by now, not adding Jinnah, with whom he reported a "not very pleasant interview on June 19" concerning "The more I see of these Indian politicians, the more I despise them." He said that the Working Committee were meeting tonight but indicated that he thought we were being very weak with Congress and giving way to them on every point and that at least it was being pointed down beyond endurance. Jinnah gave me the impression of being rather depressed and tired, and of feeling that he had been rather let down.⁴⁶

Cripps was prepared to ask Jinnah "for a list of names" for an interim government. Congress opted to reject the proposal, and Wavell, however, would never hear of giving Jinnah responsibility for running the whole Government. He would refer to ask him to come in on the basis that he would get the same sort of new proposals. If responsibility for his Interim Government would be the Ministry and Jinnah would not be Prime Minister, he offered to offer to give who they preferred to take over the government as well as away from the other children.⁴⁷ Cripps responded that it seemed to him reasonable, but that should have the opportunity of expressing his views as to the importance of the Government, and he would be glad to serve on reasonable terms. But as we were we should then ask Congress to form a Government. The Viceroy said we could not agree. He would rather have a Government as officials. The first lord of the Admiralty agreed with Wavell. Pethick-Lawrence "somewhat surprised somewhat" Sir S. Cripps and did not want a free long winded over he was as I had heard of a case of choosing Jinnah he would have to consult Atlee and his colleagues back home.

The mission met with Nehru, Azad, Patel, and Rajendra Prasad on Sunday, June 23. Pethick-Lawrence explained that he and his colleagues "quite understood" why the Congress had asked for the recognition of their national character, but they did hope that in this particular instance Congress would see their way not to make a demand for the inclusion of a Muslim among the Congress representatives in the Interim Government, though without in any way creating a precedent or approving a principle.⁴⁸ Nehru protested that "the Delegation appeared to start with the presumption that progress could only be made with the co-operation of the Muslim League. The Congress disagreed," Cripps tried to argue that Con-

cross Moslems being included in provincial governments sufficed to demonstrate the "national character of Congress" but Nehru would not budge. A word of Patel or Azad. Fethick Lawrence quite cogently remarked that

The greatest obstacle to India going forward towards independence was the inability to get started. . . . Suppose that the Congress representatives persuaded the Delegation to agree to the inclusion of a Congress Muslim. If that occurred he did not believe that Mr. Jinnah would accept it, and there would be no Coalition Government. He believed it was really in the best interests of Congress and of India to act courageously and to begin by accepting the conditions under which a coalition would be possible. A solution of the communal problem in India had to be found, and for the parties to work together on practical problems provided the best hope.⁶⁹

The vision of Fethick Lawrence's final paragraph made no positive impact however. Nehru felt that the leaders of Congress had been seeking a solution to the communal problem for fifty years, but had always been rebuffed. By the time a guarantee was to be conferred, "Moslems who spoke in favour of India and the Congress could not desert those Moslems who were not so." Patel added that capitulation on this point would mark the "collapse" of the Congress. But on June 25, 1946 the Congress accepted the "back to back" solution to meet the demands of the Muslim League. A reservation of the Congress was made. The formation of the central authority, as contained in the proposals, as well as the system of grouping of Provinces.⁷⁰

"We are now precluded from trying to form an Interim Government with the participation of the Muslim League but without that of the Congress," B. R. Ambedkar later wrote Nehru in the session after receiving the Congress response, "and Congress will claim that in any fresh attempt all the original bases and the assurances given to Mr. Jinnah have disappeared. We have in fact been outmanoeuvred by the Congress and this ability of Congress to twist words and phrases and to take advantage of any slip in wording is what Mr. Jinnah has all along feared, and has been the reason for his diffident attitude. The success of the Congress, which he will feel has been mainly due to their continuous contacts with the Mission . . . will increase his distrust, both of the Congress and the Mission, and of the Viceroy . . . Tempers are frayed, the Muslim League feel that they have been betrayed, and the Congress feel that they have gained an advantage of which they will not be slow to make capital."⁷¹ Wavell would soon be left to form a caretaker government of officials, an alternative far

more congenial to his nature and experience than trying to preside over a coalition cabinet would have been.

That evening the Mission and Wavell met with Jinnah to show him the Congress resolution. That final meeting lasted almost three hours and after 9:00 p.m. Wavell informed Jinnah that he would appoint a "caretaker government" for a "short interval" and they could go ahead with the Constituent Assembly and constitution-making during that period since the cabinet mission was returning, to Eng and Jinnah was "sorely shocked" by what he heard, asking "Did he understand that the Delegation did not now wish to form an Interim Government? He had understood that one party rejected the offer of June 16th we should go ahead with the offer."

The Muslim League had accepted. Mr. Jinnah said he disliked the suggestion for a postponement of the formation of the Interim Government. He thought it was bad for the prestige of the Delegation and also for his own prestige. It would destroy both.⁷² How significant that moment of "truth" must have been for him, how frustrating after all these years all these decades. Once more he told Wavell yet still not quite ready for you. But next month, perhaps, or next year. Would he try another year? It was "a deplorable interview," Wavell reported, noting that by the time we got down to real business . . . I was in a thoroughly evil mood, accused us of bad faith and of saying we had said to Congress and considered that he should be given the opportunity of entering the Government."⁷³

Next day Alexander went round to see Jinnah to tell him how "damned" he was not to "part" with his feelings between them. But Jinnah's feeling of friendship, empathy, and trust for the British and all they had always stood for since his first trip to London, would never be put back together again—after that fatal fall.

19

Bombay to London (1946)

There was sufficient power created that power of final charge by League council in Bombay in late July "All efforts of the Muslim League to find a position over negotiation and pressure have had no response" . . . the Congress the Cabinet Mission have played into the hands of the Congress . . . has played a game of its own . . . I had lost faith in Congress. Then more than a quarter-century later, he about . . . the British whose postwar problems and pressures obliged him to "play" into Congress's hand.

"Throughout these negotiations the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy were under terror and threats of the Congress," Jinnah told his 450 followers, who were packed into a sweltering hall crowded with members of the press, both foreign and domestic as well as delegates from every province.

The Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy . . . have gone back on their pledged word and abandoned what was announced as their final proposals. . . . Congress really never accepted the long-term plan. Its conditional acceptance was communicated to the Cabinet Mission by the Congress President on June 25. . . . The Cabinet Mission like a drowning man ready to catch hold of a straw treated this conditional acceptance . . . as genuine. . . . Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, as the elected President . . . at a Press conference in Bombay on July 10, stated the policy and attitude of the Congress towards the long-term proposals . . . that the Congress was committed to nothing. What is the use of bringing things and dreaming?

Jinnah convened a council to re-examine "the whole position" in the light of broken "all edges" and of Congress's delinquency of the League

and rejection of the mission's plan. "I can tell you this without fear of contradiction that of the three parties throughout the negotiation the Muslim League behaved as an honourable organization," Jinnah assured his backers. "We worked with clean hands. The Muslim League is the only party that has emerged from these negotiations with honour and clean hands."⁹ Clean hands had always been a prime virtue to him, and they seemed then to symbolize a postscript surgeon's final preparation before entering the operating room where the hopeless sick patient lay waiting to die. Nothing short of radical surgery would suffice when even the great British mission went back on its words . . . cowed down and paralysed" before a Congress which had neither "decency" nor "any sense of honour and courage."

All these facts have cleared beyond a shadow of doubt," Qasim Azhar continued, "that the only solution of India's problem is Pakistan. So long as the Congress and Mr. Gandhi insist that they represent the whole of India . . . so long as they deny . . . and the absolute truth that the Muslim League is the only authoritative organization of the Muslims, and so long as they continue in this vicious cycle . . . there can and will be no compromise or freedom. . . . Mr. Gandhi now speaks as a universal adviser. He says that the Congress is the trustee for the people of India. We have enough experience of one trustee that has been here for 150 years. We do not want the Congress to become our trustee. We have now grown up. We are the trustees of the Muslims, the Muslim nation."¹⁰

Jinnah now accused Cripps of trying to wriggle out of simple definitions in his Committee talk about the matter, resorting to "euphemisms, words and misleading the honest man asking in what for him was perhaps the deepest cut of all. "I am sorry to say that Sir Stafford Cripps debased his legal talents. To Patrick Lawrence, who had entered London's House of Lords that he Jinnah could not have a monopoly of Muslim Non-nation. Jinnah shouted "non-ent-trade. I am not asking for succession in the oil money. I beggling and haggling like a *canya*. His fierce rejection of the business of his fathers and not commercial compromise underscores how bitter he felt about the failure of the negotiations that ended the mission for a dozen fellow Muslims, for whom commerce, trade and interests . . . of the . . . were pure and was . . . he had proudly professed himself . . . that . . . "I beggling and haggling" is the strictest, Sayyid Mulla. The . . . that . . . he had . . . non . . . that had . . . linked him . . . that . . . it is . . . Mr. Durrani . . . and . . . was shattered, swept away by torrents of self-interest that gushed from . . . like a . . . flood of frustrated despair.

Next day the Muslim League council met to consider over a dozen resolutions that had been tabled by members, trying to decide "what steps" the League should take "in view of the Cabinet Mission having gone back on their word," as Jinnah told them. Liaquat Ali read each of the resolutions aloud, and then general discussion began, lasting two whole days. "He hesitates or is frankly to admit that we made a mistake in accepting a Union of some sort proposed in the Scheme and go back to our Pakistan," urged Sir Feroz Khan Noon. "The arch of history lies in the total rejection of the constitutional proposals . . . let there be one guiding beacon before us—a fully sovereign, separate State of Pakistan." Maulana H. I. Khan rose to shout amidst wild cheering. If the Quaid Azam said a given word, the Muslims of India will rise in revolt at a moment's notice. Other madanias, khans, and melahs reiterated those chants, and Jinnah for a moment promised that "If Mr. Jinnah gave the call Muslims would lay down their lives for him." He would come forward to carry on the struggle for the attainment of Pakistan.

On July 28, 1946, Jinnah and his Working Committee presented two resolutions to the Council after hearing the council's opinions. The first was a categorical acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's May proposals; the second charted the League's course of future direct action.

Whereas Muslim India has exhausted, without success, all efforts to find a peaceful solution of the Indian problem by compromise and constitutional means; and whereas the Congress is bent upon settling the Indian problem in India with the connivance of the British; and whereas recent events have shown that power politics and not justice and fair play are the deciding factors in Indian affairs; and whereas it has become abundantly clear that the Muslims of India would not rest contented with anything less than the immediate establishment of an Independent and fully sovereign State of Pakistan . . . the Muslim has come for the Muslim nation to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated future Hindu domination.

After both resolutions were enthusiastically adopted, Jinnah concluded. "We have taken a most historic decision. Never before in the whole history of the Muslim League did we do anything except by constitutional methods and constitutional talks. We are today forced into this position by a move in which both the Congress and Britain have participated. We have been attacked on two fronts. . . . Today we have said good-bye to our old and constitutional methods. Throughout the painful negotiations, the two parties with whom we bargained held a pistol at us, one with

power and machine-guns behind it, and the other with non-co-operation and the threat to launch mass civil disobedience. This situation must be met. We also have a pistol."

Pethick Lawrence urged Wavell to meet Jinnah as soon as possible and to "press him even now" to permit members of the Muslim League to join an interim coalition government with Congress. Wavell underestimated Jinnah's anger and the imminence of violent League action. He wired home on August 1 that there was "no indication of any immediate attempt at a mass movement" and asked Pethick Lawrence to inform the cabinet that "it would not be advisable to send for Jinnah immediately. . . . If I send for Jinnah at once it will be regarded as a panic reaction to a threat and will put up Jinnah's stock. . . . I should propose to leave Jinnah alone." So the game continued, move by Machiavellian move.

After the League council had sent a correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph* to interview Jinnah to ask what he meant by "direct action" and Jinnah at first replied that "there would be a mass legal movement", but when the correspondent showed him the text of his statement in which Jinnah changed "legal" to "constitutional", Jinnah's secretary reported that the Working Committee set the date for a universal Muslim hartal for Friday August 16, 1946. The viceroys' deputy private secretary felt a strike had "possibilities of working up mass hysteria" but Wavell refused unperturbed, mistakenly believing that "J" has no real idea what to do.¹⁰

On August 6, 1946, with Pethick Lawrence's approval, Wavell wrote Nehru as president of the Congress, inviting him "to submit to the proposals for the formation of an Interim Government . . . it will be for you to consider whether you should first discuss the matter with Mr. Jinnah. . . . I am sure you agree with me that a Coalition government can best direct the affairs of the Muslims of India at this critical time. Time is short." Nehru replied from Gandhi's ashram at Wardha on August 10 accepting the "responsibility" offered. On August 13, Nehru wrote Jinnah to ask Wavell to seek your cooperation in the formation of a coalition provisional Government.¹¹ Jinnah's response was acute surprise.

I know nothing as to what has transpired between the Viceroy and you, nor have I any idea what agreement has been arrived at between you two. . . . If this means the Viceroy has commissioned you to form an Executive Council . . . and has already agreed to accept and act upon your advice . . . it is not possible for me to accept such a position. . . . However, if you care to meet me on behalf of Congress, to settle the Hindu-Muslim question and resolve the constitutional difficulties, I am at your disposal.

police . . . slow to get out of their vehicles and before they had come into net on three people were beaten down and lay dead on the road."⁸

On Monday, August 19, one of Major Lavenmore's platoons removed 150 dead bodies from a single street crossing.

The stench in this area had become appalling and one citizen was so grateful for the removal of at least part of the cause that he pressed two bottles of champagne on the platoon responsible. . . . At about 9 p.m. that night we received orders that the main streets at least must be clear of bodies by the time the curfew lifted at 4 a.m. next morning. Stench masks and gas capes would be sent to aid us in lifting the decomposing corpses, the location of Muslim burial grounds and Hindu burning ghats would reach us as soon as possible. . . . "How the hell do I tell a Muslim from a Hindu when they've all been dead three days?" . . . It took two more days and nights to finish my own area—a total of five hundred and seven corpses in the one Co. Punjab sector most of which came from a locality less than four hundred yards square. . . . Already there was a threat of a cholera outbreak.⁹

On the night of August 9, rotting corpses posed so serious a threat to Calcutta that the British Government offered to pay troops five rupees for each one killed. . . . One of those who pitched in was Major Dobson of the Calcutta Fortress Staff.

Except for the occasional band of British troops the city was literally a City of the Dead. . . . All the streets were well lit showing the rotting piles of humanity and rubbish. Handcarts were piled high with bodies and had been left abandoned at the curb-side. . . . Once it was known that the mad Englishmen were collecting the dead, more bodies appeared from the labyrinth of houses and hovels. . . . All night the horrid task went on.¹⁰

No one knows exactly how many people were slaughtered during the Calcutta Killing, but General Tucker estimated the toll ran "into thousands." Unofficial sources claimed that as many as 16,000 Bengalis were murdered between August 16-20, 1946, and many times that number led over the bridge across the Hughli, which for days remained "a one-way current of men, women, children, and domestic animals headed toward the Howrah railroad station," Margaret Bourke-White reported. Finding the trains could not carry them all, the people settled down to wait on the concrete floor, dividing themselves automatically into Hindu and Muslim camps.¹¹ It was only the beginning of partition.

On August 21, Wavell informed Patrick Lawrence that "the present estimate" of casualties was 3,000 dead and 7,000 injured. Congress was

"convinced that all the trouble was deliberately engineered by the Muslim League Ministry" but the viceroy had as yet seen no satisfactory evidence to that effect.¹² The latest estimate of casualties was that "appreciably more Muslims than Hindus were killed."¹³

Jinnah was asked about the Great Calcutta Killing by a foreign news agency later in August and replied:

If Congress regimes are going to suppress and persecute the Muslims, it will be very difficult to control disturbances. . . . In my opinion, there is no alternative except the outright establishment of Pakistan. . . . We guarantee to look after non-Muslim and Hindu caste-minorities in Pakistan, which will be about 25 millions, and protect and safeguard their interests in every way. . . . That is the quickest way to Hindu's real freedom and to the welfare and happiness of all the peoples inhabiting this sub-continent.¹⁴

On August 24 Wavell announced that Viceroy and cabinet colleagues of his office would form a new interim government starting on September 2. "The recent terrible communal riots in Calcutta have shown us that in order that a more greater measure of tranquillity be essential, India must survive the transition to freedom," stated the viceroy. A week later Sir Sikandar Amjad Khan, one of three non-League Muslims named to Nehru's cabinet, was stabbed seven times by two young Muslim League fanatics in Sylhet.

Two days after Wavell's broadcast, Jinnah announced that the Muslim League had struck a severe blow to the Muslim League and Muslim India, but I am sure that the Muslims of India will bear this with fortitude and courage and learn lessons from our immediate future as a responsible position in the interim Government. . . . I still maintain that the step he has taken is most unwise and unstatesmanlike and a disgrace to a Government and nation. . . . I am sure that he has only added a further injury to a nation of three Muslims who he knows do not command either the respect or confidence of Muslim India.¹⁵

Wavell now appeared to Nehru and Gandhi to accept a new formula on the subject, "making not to convene the constituent assembly until they did not." "Several times last evening," Gandhi wrote the viceroy on August 25,

you repeated that you were a "plain man and a soldier" and that you did not know the law. We are all plain men. . . . It is our purpose, I think, to devise methods to prevent a repetition of the recent terrible happenings in Calcutta. The question before us is how best to do it. Your language last evening was unhelpful. As a representative of

the King you cannot afford to be a military man only, nor to ignore the law. Nor can the Congress be expected to bend itself and adopt what it considers a wrong course because of the brutal exhibition recently witnessed in Bengal. . . . I say this neither as a Hindu nor as a Muslim, I write only as an Indian. . . . You will please convey the whole of this letter to the British Cabinet.¹⁸

The same peace-loving Gandhi took suggestion that Congress should assume a more assertive role in the Grouping categorical, saying how well understood in India was to combat their previous assurances on the subject. "We have taken Lawrence as his own matter concerning Gandhi's massive address," "It is to my mind convincing evidence that Congress always meant to put their position in the Interim Government to break up the Muslim League. . . . The Congress will be able to destroy the Grouping scheme. . . . It is one effect of the Congress for the Muslims. The secretary of the Congress is a very wise man. We fully appreciate gravity of the situation and widespread communal trouble. Patrick Lawrence would be a response. "At the same time we must ask you not to take any action which would lead to a split in the Congress." (19) Wavel was not at all to be surprised and regretted having abandoned Jinnah's position, sensing that to work in harness with Nehru would prove more going and less congenial.

"As long as Jinnah feels he can get his veto through the Viceroy, he will not be a danger to the British Empire. . . . The next day, . . . Jinnah was a danger to the British Empire. . . . The danger was in leading them to the wilderness," Birla noted.²⁰ And in his 18 message from Bombay on August 20, Jinnah appealed to his followers to "rally round the Muslim League. . . . let us stand as one united nation under our flag and on one platform and be determined and prepared to face the worst as a completely united and great people with our motto: unity, faith and discipline. God is with us and we are bound to succeed."²¹

A few days later on September 1, the eve of Congress taking over the interim government, communal rioting rocked Bombay as Muslim houses all along Sandhurst Road blew black flags of mourning. Curfew was imposed, troops were called out, but in that one orgiastic night of violence 35 were killed and 175 injured. Sporadic rioting in Bombay would continue for over a week, and by September 10 more than 200 Hindus and Muslims were dead as a result of communal violence. There was violence in Karachi, as well, but League premier Quaid-e-Azam broadcast an appeal for calm and tolerance which helped subside Muslim passions in the city. "The horrors of Calcutta have begotten an attitude ofullen sympathy in the Hindu side and in hostile points on the other," stated a British

chief secretary reported, noting that both communities were busy surreptitiously arming themselves.²²

The "door to Purna Swaraj has at last been opened," Mahatma Gandhi told his prayer meeting at Birla House in New Delhi, on September 2, 1946 as their "freedom king, Jawaharlal" and his colleagues took oaths of office in that flower-decked capital. Nehru was now chairman of the prime minister of India, and he placed Patel in charge of home affairs, police and Baldev Singh in charge of defence (or war). "A new Government cannot bring in this ancient land," Nehru broadcast from New Delhi a few days later, "the Interim or Provisional Government we called it. . . . This is our old dear land, . . . is facing heretofore through rain and suffering. She is doubtful again with the bright eyes of dawn in and with faith in herself and her mission."²³

On September 8, Wavel "very urgently" transmitted his "breakdown plan for British India. . . . Lawrence is stating that we cannot govern the whole of India for more than a year and a half."²⁴ The viceroy's plan of withdrawal depended, as he put it, "on a whole firmness by the M.C." and Wavel requested permission to withdraw his own troops from India. He wanted a decision to know that the British were ready to pull out their troops from south to north, disarming from the viceroy's office through Karachi and Allahabad, with selected officials flying out of New Delhi. Approximately 100,000 European civilians and another 100,000 British troops would have to be evacuated from India.

Wavel tried with Jinnah's old friend Sirpur Narda, on September 10, and he had a long talk on politics and on the present of Gandhi, Jinnah and the M.L. in and the difficulties of Jinnah's character. Mrs. Narda was Jinnah's rather as a lawyer, a friend, a friend, one who had once been a member of the Congress, but who had not been out of the Congress heaven.²⁵

The *Daily Mail*, whose correspondent in Bombay interviewed Jinnah, reported his remarking,

The wound is too deep and the negotiations have led to too much bitterness and rancour for us to prolong the present arguments. The state must be wiped clean and we must begin from the beginning again. I shall never plead my case but were the British Government to invite me to London to start a new series of conferences on an equal footing with other negotiators I should accept. . . . If the British must on doing nothing more than support the present interim Government with their bayonets all I can say is the Moslems can endure it. If they want to arrest me now I am ready to go to prison immediately.²⁶

With riots in Bombay, Calcutta smoldering, and Nehru running the show in New Delhi, the prospect of a visit to London must have looked quite appealing to Jinnah through ultra monsoon haze atop Malabar Hill. Or did not London, why not prison? Rather the extreme of glory, or the other than the limbo of obscure uncertainty, cut off from power, from the glitter of the viceroys' magic circle, where he had once held center stage and from the achievement of Pakistan which hardly anyone mentioned nowadays except with a shudder or shrug.

The viceroy met alone with Jinnah on September 18 for seventy-five minutes, and earlier the same day with Nehru and Patel, both of whom discussed his overtures to Jinnah's Congress leadership, by now disgraced. Wavell and advisers Peter A. Lawrence, Cripps and Attlee to remove him from power, considering his record too supportive of Muslim League demands, a dangerous precedent a background of training to the resolution of crises rather than political problems. The conversation in the afternoon of his mission to London, however, was hardly read to Luke. And it was indeed a political struggle. At Nehru's insistence Wavell agreed "provisionally" to convene the constituent assembly on December 6, by which time the viceroy hoped a settlement with the League would be reached.

The mission ministers met with Attlee at 10 Downing Street on September 23 to consider the viceroy's breakdown plan. The prime minister pressed "strong objections" to Wavell's proposals, which he considered "unrealistic." Cripps agreed, saying that "the moment our withdrawal was announced everyone in India would start scrambling for position. . . . Civil war would come upon us at once."⁷⁰ He favored convening the constituent assembly at once, with or without the Muslim League. Peter Lawrence felt that "the Viceroy's proposal would make an administrative breakdown a certainty." Attlee could not understand why Wavell wanted to abandon Madras and Bombay, "two of the best places from which to withdraw Europeans," leaving the British troops to hold "the most difficult part of India" where "an attempt to set up Pakistan . . . would cause civil war."

Wavell spent almost two hours with Jinnah on September 25, reporting him "very quiet and reasonable" and "anxious for a settlement if it can be done without loss of prestige."⁷¹ Jinnah hoped Congress would refrain as a "gesture of good-will" from appointing any Muslim, and he was inclined to rotating the vice-president's position in the cabinet with Nehru. The next afternoon, Nehru and Gandhi came in tandem, each talking for an hour with the viceroy and receiving him "they do not want Jinnah in the League," and Gandhi at the end exposed Congress policy of domineering

him more nakedly than ever before. The more I see of that old man," Wavell admitted, "the more I regard him as an unscrupulous old hypocrite."⁷²

By October 1, Wavell was convinced that "it is no use trying to squeeze the Congress any further on the nationalist Muslim issue." The viceroy then decided his "best tactics would be to 'warn' Jinnah, simply to give me five names for the Muslim seats."⁷³ It was in the "obvious interest of the Muslims League" to come into the government as soon as possible. Wavell now believed.

So Wavell met Jinnah next day and spelled out his strategy for bringing the League into the interim government. Mr. Jinnah said nothing at all on the nationalist Muslim issue and did not attempt to argue for the viceroy's plan, but he said that if he was to have any chance of success with the Working Committee, it must have some success acknowledged on the other points he had raised. Wavell explained that the election function of the vice-president was to preside at cabinet meetings as a balance act, that would arrange for the leader of the Muslim League to be summoned as vice-chairman of the C.C.C., which was really a more influential position.⁷⁴

Wavell understood well how important matters of prestige were to Jinnah and clearly revealed here the imperiousness powers retained by him as governor-general. By the end of their meeting, he "got the impression" that Jinnah was "anxious" to "come in." Jinnah, moreover, by then may have been at least partly impressed at how much the viceroy would do for the League's currenting and existing influence to Nehru, Patel and the others inside the viceroy's council, and the efforts of Datta and Sinha.

Whether it was Wavell's ardor in wooing him or Jinnah's current frustrations at having missed the leadership of the interim government that emboldened Nehru with so much seeming power and pomp, those October negotiations in New Delhi would accommodate what had ended the hours of the cabinet mission for three months earlier in the year. Perhaps it

was the tragic volcanic reality of the Great Calcutta Killing and the blood-bathed Bombay riots or his own's experience of his own deteriorating health that made Jinnah that not flexible at reaching a settlement that was entering the League into an interim coalition government with Congress in a record-breaking mere two weeks of negotiation. Nor did Nehru and Congress court him or pander to his ego. Such negative signals from old adversaries may have served only to convince Jinnah that it was, indeed, high time to scuttle excess baggage and climb aboard while there was still a rope to catch and a ship's master to welcome him so warmly.

The nawab of Bhopal, Jinnah's old friend and chamberlain of the Chamber of Princes since 1944, then entered the room. "I showed in a rather primitive way," as Wavell put it,⁷⁵ inviting Jinnah and Nehru to meet in his

pleased to discuss their residual differences. "I have consulted some of my colleagues about the matters discussed by us yesterday," Nehru wrote Jinnah on October 8.

We all agreed that nothing could be happier and better for the country than that these two organisations [Congress and the League] should meet again as before, as friends having no mental reservations and bent on resolving all their differences by mutual consultation, and never desisting or allowing the intervention of the British Government through the Viceroy or some other . . . We would therefore welcome the decision of the League to join the interim Government for it to work as a united team in behalf of India as a whole.⁴²

Nehru later admitted that the problems and concerns he had with various Muslims in Congress, as noted in their conversation in Jinnah's residence, were "unavoidable" and reproduced the same sentiments. When required to sign a "Memorandum," he considered the points noted in Nehru's letter concerning "I am anxious that we should come to . . . settlement without . . . Nehru's explanation of Jinnah's letter was also similar and Wavell reported on October 8, "There has evidently been some hitch."

But the letter he was given was a secret report he had just received from Jinnah's secretary, and Jinnah's secretary was a Hindu in which none of the Muslim League's representatives was willing to sign. As a result, at the instance of the Viceroy, Jinnah and Nehru agreed to meet the day after the two parties would agree to a coalition. They would never agree to present the subject to the Governor-General. Inevitably the rider was unacceptable to Jinnah. . . .⁴⁴ Wavell and Nehru had been at pains to assure Nehru that he was not calling in Jinnah to push him and the League into a coalition cabinet in order to create a "King's party" inside the new government, but now he admitted fearing that Congress and the Congress were seeking to secure Muslim League acceptance in an arrangement to eliminate the Governor-General's influence in the Cabinet and reduce him to a figure-head.⁴⁵

The viceroy had what he called "a crucial interview with Jinnah" the next afternoon, when he learned that the League was ready to join the interim government but that Jinnah was going to pitch "a surprise half" at Congress by proposing a member of the Scheduled (Untouchable) Caste as one of his five "Muslim" ministers for the cabinet. "I said that it would look rather like a bit far," Wavell noted, "in contrast to the green nomination of a nationalist Muslim, and would therefore be rather an embarrassing situation to me. . . . I gathered that the main thing had in mind

to nominate was . . . at present a Minister of Bengal."⁴⁶ J. N. Mandal was then Minister of Law in Bengal an advocate whose greatest attraction to the League appears to have been that he was born "untouchable." Jinnah personally decided to remain outside, leaving Liaquat to head his party's team with I. I. Chundrigar of Bombay, Abdur Rah Nishtar from the frontier and Ghaznafar Ali Khan of the Punjab to complete the League's interim government. Nehru dropped two of his Muslims, Shariat Khan and Syed Zahir and Nehru's choice of Sarat Bose from his cabinet thus making room for Jinnah's choices. The new coalition was officially announced on October 15. But as communal rioting spread from Bengal to the North-West Frontier, the Congress-League coalition was off to a most precarious start. A major starting block was that the League insisted on participating at least one of the three most powerful cabinet positions for its affairs: home or defence held by Nehru, Patel and Baldev Singh, respectively. Congress was unwilling to relinquish any of those jobs. Nehru was also upset about reports of a speeded-up plan to invade Kashmir on October 30 when he reportedly said the League had decided to enter the government because "Congress in its recent was adverse to the League's efforts and that as before Muslims must continue to prepare a 'fight' for the winning of their goal—Pakistan."⁴⁷ Nehru demanded recognition of both demands and wanted affirmation of the League's long-range intentions as well as a definite assurance by them that there will be cooperation and team work.⁴⁸ Wavell feared that Congress resolved to "say all they can to prevent the League coming."⁴⁹ Nehru had earlier indicated that Congress was ready to turn over finance then headed by South India Christian leader J. B. Mathias to the League. A hurried Wavell insisted whatever the outcome, that "I must . . . come home at once for consultation."

On the evening of October 21 Nehru confessed that Congress and demands to resign. Patel's Home ministers portfolio went to the League. The viceroy called in Jinnah at 7:30 p.m. to ask if he would accept finance.

J. was not in a very accommodating mood, . . . but he agreed . . . with the usual proviso that it was subject to the decision of his Working Committee. I then sent for Nehru at 9:30 p.m. and told him that the League would accept Finance, and asked him to let me know what alternative portfolio he proposed for Mathias. Nehru, who looked very tired and worn, accepted this quietly, and said he would let me know after consulting his colleagues. . . . Neither party has the least trust in the other. . . . It is all very wearying and for almost the first time in my life I am really beginning to feel the strain. I had not sleeping properly and letting these wretched people worry me.⁵⁰

Jinnah announced to the press on November 22 that "No representative of the Muslim League will participate in the Constituent Assembly." Wavell sent for Liaquat next day and "argued" with him for over an hour, trying to persuade his finance member to get his party to attend the assembly. "I utterly failed to convince him," Wavell wrote Pethick Lawrence. "As I had previously failed . . . with Jinnah."²⁶ It was finally clear to Lord Wavell that his last great push, getting the League into government, was only a Pyrrhic victory. Nothing had changed.

The secretary of state invited Wavell to return home at once with two close friends of the Congress and two from the League to discuss the situation and seek a new settlement for India. The viceroy suggested inviting A. S. K. Bhopal Singh, his finance member Nehru, Congress leaders on the Working Committee, and on behalf of Congress turn down the invitation. Baldev also declined a day later. Jinnah, however, was prepared to accept and agreed to fly to London with Liaquat, and the two Attlee then were personally appealed to Nehru, pleading with him to consider to help in this way to make rapid and smooth progress towards the goal of Indian freedom.²⁷ Congress met again for a final session and Nehru and Baldev Singh decided to go to London after all. On the eve of their departure, Jinnah changed his mind after learning that A. S. K. Bhopal Singh was among "What an impossible set of people they are!" Wavell noted. "I sent Ian Scott off to see Liaquat, and by midnight he returned that we had got it for him. Liaquat had agreed to come with us to Karachi tomorrow to see Jinnah and try to persuade him to come."²⁸ The next day when they flew from Delhi, Liaquat was "greeted for Europe." Jinnah received a midnight cable from Attlee, personally appealing to Congress and urged "rather late" he finally climbed aboard the viceroy's plane in Karachi. The crowd that had come to see Liaquat off at the airport shouted "Pakistan Zindabad."

20

London—Final Farewell (1946)

London in December was cold, wet, and bleak. How redolent it must have been of his first arrival there, fifty-four years ago, so much had changed, yet so many feelings were the same. Jinnah still felt lost and alone, cut off from all those who once loved him, forced on his fight tremendous battles with hated strangers and of whom he wanted to cheer him of the starting role. How different his life would have been had he remained with the company of Shakespearean despairs with whom he had performed years ago. The company he traveled with in 1946 was a far less congenial troupe. And how bitter the final act had become. At 60, he had black Jinnah cap but the rest of his emaciated body was clothed in a double-breasted British wool suit and a heavy gray coat.

Wavell had prepared a "top secret" note for discussion with the cabinet during the Attlee-Pethick Lawrence and Alexander visit the start of their first meeting on December 3.

Present situation is that Congress feel that B.M.C. dare not break with them unless they do something quite outrageous. Their aim is power and to get rid of British influence as soon as possible after which they think they can deal with both Muslims and Hindus: the former by bribery, blackmail, propaganda, and if necessary force; the latter by stirring up their people against them, as well.

Wavell wrote and arranged a luncheon for Jinnah that day with a number of other M.L.s. He expected Jinnah was still harping on the Muslims' betrayal.

[He] feels very bitterly that he should have been allowed to form a Government when Congress turned down the short term plan. He

vehemently sticks to the view that Congress have never accepted the long-term plan, never meant to accept it and never will accept it. . . . He says repeatedly that all they are after is to seize power. . . . He will do all he can to prevent that. He now refers to the Cabinet Mission plan as a fraud and a humbug. . . . He has now returned to the proposition that only the creation of Pakistan can deal with the situation. Any lingering thoughts that he had at Simla of a central government with three subjects appear to have gone for ever. . . . "You don't realise," he said, "how far the situation has gone in India since you were there." His theme song on this issue is what he calls the demand for the "hijrah" of Muslims by Hindus in 1947. When asked for a constructive proposition, he said that the only thing that could be done immediately was to restore law and order. . . . They must all co-operate, particularly the British, in restoring law and order. . . . Then, for Pakistan. . . . I do not ever remember seeing him before in a worse mood. . . . His last words to me as he got into his car were "There is no time any more for argument."

The only hope now, I am sure, is to frighten him badly and to say that if he won't accept the Constituent Assembly, then his people must leave the government, and he will get no support from the British.

Pethick-Lawrence tackled Jinnah and Liaquat after lunch and reported much the same about Jinnah's attitude.

The Cabinet discussed it with Wavel and Attlee at 10 Downing Street. Both of them said that he felt that the position had now come to the stage where the course of events would depend on the action taken by the British Government. It looked as if it had got beyond the point where it could be dealt with as if it was got beyond the possibility of compromise, if Jinnah was in the frame of mind indicated there would be no chance of an adjustment or of Jinnah accepting one. . . . Jinnah was playing for full Pakistan which he expected to get as the outcome of a breakdown. . . . He [Cripps] thought the vital thing now was for HM Govt. to make a declaration of what they were going to do. He thought that the Opposition would agree that our position in India was now becoming untenable.

Alexander was not sure of this latter point, remarking that at a dinner for Jinnah and Liaquat, "Mr Eden had expressed the view . . . that possibly we might say that we had gone too fast and that, while we adhered to our pledges, it was necessary to give a breathing space for law and order to be restored and for constitution-making to proceed in a calm atmosphere. Otherwise we should be unable to fulfil our obligations to the people." This Conservative party line was, of course, the same as con-

ment Jinnah had used with Pethick-Lawrence. Alexander suggested "that this general line might be taken by the Opposition and might command some support in the country. Moreover the case might be made that we were a loving India to fall into chaos and that this would be a danger to world peace."

Attlee left the cabinet meeting to see Jinnah and Liaquat immediately after which he reported to his colleagues that the burden of Mr. Jinnah's discourse had been that it was a mistake to have tried to introduce self-government into India. . . . Mr. Jinnah seemed convinced that the Congress did not mean business in regard to the Constituent Assembly; his own aim was simply that of Pakistan, within the British Commonwealth. He held out no prospect of coming to an arrangement with the Congress.

While the prime minister met with the Muslim League leaders at 10 Downing Street the next day and the viceroy went across Whitehall to convene inside the secretary of state's old office for a meeting with Nehru, Pethick-Lawrence opened that meeting by saying how anxious they all were to help to enable India to achieve independence as soon as possible. The secretary of state confessed that the cabinet was in a "rather a 'silly' position" seemed to be losing its hold on the thought of India's future. He added dropping something of a bombshell to Nehru that "The question now was whether that broad general basis was any longer sufficiently accepted to make it worth while to proceed upon it. And Nehru said that it might be that that was the basis on which everything was proceeding. Nehru said there was tension."

Here Wavel jumped in to say "that a limit of seven thousand killed indicated something more than tension." But Nehru replied that the real and so many deaths was that steps had been taken which encouraged violence. He had the right that in essence of the Cabinet Mission's proposals was that they were to be put through. Was it now suggested that the executive was that one party enjoyed the proposals and that we would Pethick-Lawrence tried to explain that it was not the MLC's policy that one party should have a veto on progress, but clearly if one major party declined to cooperate it raised a very difficult situation. Nehru said I seemed a bit off colour, never expecting this information that his British hosts had given and that his labors and troubles might suddenly turn their backs on him, simply cutting their losses.

Cripps then asked what Nehru thought were the "fundamental reasons" the League would not come into the constituent assembly. Nehru insisted that the League had "never been prepared to co-operate," being totally negative about everything, wanting only a veto. The Congress wanted "co-operation" because everyone knew that nothing could be done without

or politically if co-operation among Hindus or Muslims was lacking. Nehru argued, however, that the Muslim League was "not interested" in either social or political "advances." Cripps next asked whether Nehru thought that if the Muslims could "be assured that a three-tier system would eventually" out of a constituent assembly, that might induce them to come in? Nehru said he thought the Muslims would come in anyhow "sooner or later" provided that they felt the assembly was going to be convened. But even if the Muslim League came in, Nehru predicted, it would not be to work harmoniously with Congress, but merely as a step to a conflict the way it had done in the interim government.

On August 3 Jawahar failed, the cleaver it became to all of them that Nehru and Congress would not be able to work harmoniously with Jinnah and the League not in the same cabinet and probably not in the same country. Still they tried, for another hour to convince Nehru that it might be possible. But neither Jawahar nor the League of a third hand in its sections to force the groups that would have satisfied it three months ago than to make a country try to birth a constitution with the interference of its population. Jawahar said Nehru "could not see why the Muslim League should not come in and put any questions of interpretation to the Federal Court. The only other test was the test of battle."

Later that evening I took Lawrence, Cripps, and Alexander met with Jawahar and Cripps asked Jinnah if he would join the constituent assembly. He refused to enter down an interpretation favorable to the Muslim League about "procedure in the Sections?" Jinnah replied that his League "could not be a party" to any such judicial appeal, concluding that it would be unwise to plunge India into constitutional problems. Presentations by Lawrence and Alexander convinced the British would stand firm behind their mission plan. But they did not set Jinnah's mind at ease or budge him from his intransigent position.

At this time Cripps favored a public declaration that the British would leave India in a year or, at the most, eighteen months, insisting it would be necessary to hand things over to any government set up by the constitutional assembly. Pettick-Lawrence believed that Nehru was anxious to reach a settlement "fair to the Muslims" but suspected many "more communal elements" within Congress would not let him do so. Wavell agreed, insisting there was "no chance at all" of Congress showing "generosity" toward Muslims. They discussed the possibility and wisdom of referring the "Indian problem" to the United Nations, with Atlee suggesting that it might be brought up as a matter "endangering world peace." Wavell reminded them that Jinnah had always emphasized that Pakistan would remain

within the Commonwealth and presumably hoped to get British assistance to deal with the Frontier problem."

Friday, December 6, 1946, was the last day of London's India conference, since Nehru had insisted on returning to New Delhi for the opening session of the constituent assembly on December 4. Jinnah and Liaquat, however, were in no rush to get home and opted to remain in London a few more weeks. The Cabinet met by themselves and approved a statement which began: "The conversations between His Majesty's Government with Pandit Nehru, Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Liaquat, Mr. Khan and Sardar Baldev Singh came to an end this evening concluding that 'Should a Constitution come to be framed by a Constituent Assembly and a large section of the Indian population had not represented His Majesty's Government could not of course condemn a course the Congress have started they would not contemplate issuing such a Constitution upon any new wing parts of the country.' That evening, Prime Minister Attlee informed the Indian guests:

The British Government had done their part. They had secured acceptance of this country to a line of policy argued for many years by leading Indians. They were entitled now to ask for Indian co-operation. In the present series of meetings they had been equal to get acceptance by either side of the view held by the other. They proposed therefore to issue tonight a Statement.¹⁰

Nehru flew home the next morning. Kany Dwarakadas who had just arrived in London from New York after six months in the United States studying "labor problems," called on Jinnah at Claridge's.

I found him sick and depressed. . . . I told him that I was away from India for about seven months and I was, therefore, not able to understand what was happening to the country. "Country, what country?" Jinnah asked. "There is no country. There are only Hindus and Mussalmans." I found that Jinnah wanted no settlement except on basis of Pakistan. He wanted to keep the fight on because he was badly handled and treated and abused by the Congress leaders. . . . I put it to Jinnah that the Muslim League and the Congress could carry on their quarrels outside the Government . . . but was it not essential that they should work together inside the Government and do as much as they possibly could for the country? Jinnah replied: "What do you mean? How can it be possible? Do you mean to say that you and I can kiss each other in this room and go out of the room and slay each other?" I felt that if the Congress leaders had not broken away from him in personal relationship, he would not have been so embittered. His self-esteem, his pride and his feel-

ing of being personally hurt had embittered him and he had created ghosts of suspicion and distrust all round him. At the same time he had kept his shrewdness and he knew the art of not speaking too much as also of upsetting his opponents. He had found in the impetuous and conceited Nehru an easy victim.¹¹

Black Lawrence's parliamentary undersecretary Arthur Henderson, who met with Kaaq that December, also seems keen about Jinnah being a "leader" which must have been common knowledge by then in the corridors of the British Raj as well as among the leadership of both Congress and the League. "Henderson . . . told me that he had sat next Jinnah at the Kings Hotel and was surprised to see that Jinnah did not fit the usual moulded Kaaq. He concluded that Jinnah was a sick man. I must be added: Don't think that our troubles would be over if Jinnah disappeared. Liaquat and Suhrawardy are worse. . . . I agreed. He said that Jinnah, no matter how farward, would be able to keep the Muslim League together. . . . as Jinnah had been able to do."¹²

On 10th December the constituent assembly met for the first time in New Delhi with dignity and decorum, "acting victoriously joined together upon the 14th day, and also had a gift of a London. Dr. Sachdev was the convening president of the assembly, elected Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who was to be the Indian republic's first president, to succeed him. The Congress generally asked the "major concession" as the culmination of "that popular awakening to a sense of national solidarity and high destiny which began nearly a century ago."¹³ The Muslim League boycott, however, proved totally effective, with 70 of the seats in that assembly left remaining empty while almost 300 congressmen and women took their places as representatives of their inchoate nation.

Benjamin Shah Nawaz and Ispahani had gone to New York to present the League's case to as many delegates of the UN as they could meet, returning through London to spend mid-December with Jinnah and Liaquat. Shah's shrewd Punjabi daughter recalled how

Ispahani was in luck about the Punjabi Muslims, the so-called sword-arm, who had done nothing to achieve Pakistan. I listened quietly for two or three days and then I could not stand it any more. I said that it was not the rank and file but the leaders who were responsible for it. The Qaid asked at once: "What do you mean by leaders? Today every Muslim League is a leader." I said if that is so, then Punjabi is not lag behind other provinces.

While in London, Dr. Buchman, founder of the Moral Re-Armament Movement, invited the Qaid-i-Azam and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to see their play and have supper with him, and wanted me to persuade the Qaid to accept the invitation. [Ispahani] and I had seen the play in New York and liked it immensely. Mr. Jinnah agreed, and after the play when we went to Dr. Buchman's house, I said that I had asked the Qaid to attend the supper because I wanted Londoners to know him. On that one of the guests said, "London knows Mr. Jinnah." How that perked him up! Mr. Jinnah was the life of the party, talked of his grand-children and gave us a number of anecdotes.¹⁴

Jinnah was there with Liaquat Ali Ispahani and the regency of December 11, when the prime minister informed the Commons that "the conversations with Indian leaders which took place during last week have unfortunately ended without agreement. . . . I am sure I am speaking for all parties in this House . . . making appeal to all concerned in India to co-operation in framing a Constitution." "What a Church I face, however, to note that His Majesty's opposition have shown over the last few months great forbearance and restraint not showing a Debate upon India but I must give the Leader of the House notice that we feel a Debate just now upon these matters are necessary so great in aspect that it is a heavy burden upon all large small have as a nation concentrated upon them."

The India Debate ran for the next two days. Crisp is kicked off at 1:52 p.m. moving "That this House . . . expressed its hope that a settlement of the present difficulties between Indian Parties will be effected." At 4:39 p.m. Churchill rose to respond

I warned the House as long ago as 1931 . . . that if we were to wash our hands of all responsibility, ferocious civil war would sweep it break out between the Muslims and Hindus. But this, like other warnings, fell upon deaf and unregarding ears.

Indeed, it is certain that more people have lost their lives or have been wounded in India by violence since the interim Government under Mr. Nehru was installed in office four months ago by the Viceroy, than in the previous 90 years. This is only a foretaste of what may come. It may be only the first few heavy drops before the thunderstorm breaks upon us. These frightful slaughters over wide regions and in obscure uncounted villages have, in the main, fallen upon Muslim minorities.

I must add my own belief . . . that any attempt to establish the reign of a Hindu numerical majority in India will never be achieved

without a civil war, proceeding, not perhaps at first on the fronts of armies or organised forces, but in thousands of separate and isolated places. This war will, before it is decided, lead through unaccountable agonies to an awful abridgement of the Indian population. . . . The Muslims, numbering 80 millions, . . . comprise the majority of the fighting elements in India . . . the word "minority" has no relevance or sense when applied to masses of human beings numbered in many scores of millions. . . .²¹

These remarks of Churchill made Jinnah take even a tougher line than he had with Attlee and Cripps as well as with Woodrow Wyatt. This final doubt, but he had reassured him of the strength of the Conservative party in support he still enjoyed, and it confirmed his resolve to let Nehru and Churchill face the consequences of their own track some stirring animosity. . . . Jinnah's official statement was that he was not a Muslim who wanted to see a Muslim state in India. On December 13, 1946, Jinnah said in a speech in the House of Commons that "The constituent Assembly comes to form a new state in India. . . . It is a federal state. . . . Sovereign Republic. . . . Wherein all power and authority are derived from the people."²²

On the evening of December 18, Prime Minister Attlee called Lord Louis Mountbatten to 10 Downing Street and invited him to succeed Viceroy A. E. Woodhouse as Governor-General of India. Mountbatten was deeply impressed with Jinnah's attitude towards him. He said that "It was not very careful, we might well find ourselves handing India over not simply to civil war, but to political movements of a definitely totalitarian character. Urgent action was needed to make the Indian people and the members of the Cabinet had reached the conclusion that a new personal approach was perhaps the only hope."²³ Everyone agreed that "Dickie" Mountbatten alone possessed the requisite charisma. Mountbatten's "fatal charm" was by now known the world over, his liberal ideas made him generally acceptable to Labour and his royal blood more than acceptable to Conservatives. As Empress Victoria's great grandson, Mountbatten was viewed as the perfect last viceroy for India. His ambition and desire, however, was to return to active duty with the navy, and his appointment as rear-admiral-in-command of the First Cruiser Squadron was to have started in April. Mountbatten knew enough about India, moreover, to appreciate how impossible his new assignment was, so he "put up a stiff fight against the Prime Minister's pressure and blandishments, stressing his extreme tiredness, and the folly of wearing himself out too young" his trusted press secretary and Boswell, Campbell, soon realised that he had him some time but it did not matter. As soon as possible.

Jinnah and Liaquat flew into Cairo for a few days of Pan-Islamic meetings en route to India. It is only when Pakistan is established that Indian and Egyptian Muslims will be really free. The Quaid-e-Azam insisted to Egypt's prime minister Nokrashy Pasha on December 17 "Otherwise there will be the menace of a Hindu Imperialist Raj spreading its tentacles right across the Middle East."²⁴ Jinnah was a guest of the Arab League in Cairo and told a press conference on December 20 "If India was ruled by Hindu imperialistic power it will be as great a menace for the future as not greater as the British imperialistic power has been. . . . the whole of the Middle East will fall from being a part to the fire." Asked about his talks with Egyptian and Palestinian Arab leaders, Jinnah explained:

I told them of the danger that a Hindu empire would represent for the Middle East and assured them that Pakistan would tender co-operation to all nations struggling for freedom without consideration of race or colour. . . . If a Hindu empire is achieved, it will mean the end of Islam in India and even in other Muslim countries. There is no doubt that spiritual and religious ties bind us inexorably with Egypt. If we were drowned all will be drowned.²⁵

On December 22, 1946, Jinnah was back on Karachi's soil. He had some full circles in the seven decades of his life. Home again from London to the day of his birth which was soon to merge as the day of his death and then to remain his first resting place. Pakistan was waiting to take him home to Quaid and care for him properly as she alone could do. But soon after the longest and toughest negotiations still lurked up the steep road ahead. His heaviest battle had yet to be won.

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New Delhi (1947)

As the new year dawned practically every one seemed to know it was time to have a change of Great Britain's relationship with India, but what was to be done? And how? Jinnah had returned home a sick man, too exhausted to say anything, back going over to meet with his Working Committee before January 29 "I hope that Jinnah does not interpret our statement of December 6th to mean that if he only sits back and does nothing, I will go to Pakistan." Patrick Lawrence wrote Wavel on January 11, possibly suggesting that his letter would be called a Jinnah attention. "It may also be interpreted to mean a Provincial autonomy which would be far less to his liking. I agree with you that Pakistan is a quite reasonable proposition."

Again on January 1, Attlee appealed to Mountbatten to take up the viceroy's burden, and Mountbatten replied two days later.

I have thought over very earnestly all that you said. . . . It makes all the difference to me to know that you propose terminating the British "Raj" on a definite and specified date or earlier. . . . If the Indian Parties can agree. . . . I could not have gone out there with confidence if it had been possible to construe my arrival as a perpetuation, at this moment, of the viceregal system. . . . I deeply appreciate your offer to give me every assistance in forming my new staff. I told Sir Stafford. . . . how honoured and trusted I was that so should have offered to come to India with me, but I made it clear to him that I felt the presence of a man of his prestige and experience could not fail to reduce me to a mere figure-head in the eyes of the people. . . . I shall be able to go home as often as I feel it really neces-

sary to do so. . . . Although it would be our intention to observe the Protocol necessary to uphold the position of Viceroy and Vicereine, my wife and I would wish to visit Indian Leaders, and representative British and Indian people, in their own homes and unaccompanied by staff; and to make ourselves easier of access than the existing protocol appears to have made possible."

Lady Edwina Mountbatten's charm was at least as potent as her husband's, and Nehru's romantic fascination for her was to play a role in the frantic last minute negotiations that often kept at least one of the Mountbattens in touch with Jawaharlal "unaccompanied by staff."

The British director of central intelligence, Sir Norman P. A. Smith, informed Wavell that from the "British angle,"

the game so far has been well played. . . . both Congress and the League have been brought into the Central Government. . . . The Indian problem has been thereby brought into its proper plan of communalism. . . . an opportunity for orderly evacuation now presents itself. The fullest advantage should be taken of our present breathing space. . . . Secretary of State's control over civil officers should be relinquished at the earliest possible moment. It is only fair to the officers and to the political leadership that a decisive gesture of this kind will help to solve the problem on its correct communal plane. . . . Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reintroduce anti-British agitation. . . . The former is a natural and of ghastly process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem."

Such neo-Malthusian concern was rarely put into written form by any twentieth-century British officials.

A few days before the League's Working Committee was scheduled to meet in Karachi, Kitchener ordered his Punjab police to attack leaders of the active League national guards in his province. The Muslim guards were viewed as a safety army of his far flung German-trained Lancers before the war and compared to Mussolini's Black Shirts. A England by Governor James, reporting the officials, said to Patrick Lawrence: "More than a thousand steel helmets were found in national guard headquarters at Lahore, and the general commanders of the guard were all arrested. The League packed the streets, and protesters in the streets demanding an end to the violence. . . . The Punjab was a scene of lawlessness. The Punjab's Muslim 'swordsmen' into violent operation, as Begum Shah Nawaz promised to do. . . . The Punjab was a scene of lawlessness and it might be could not hope to restore provincial peace elsewhere. Too late. League leaders now angrily demanded Kitchener's immediate resignation, must meet

ngs were attended by huge crowds in Lahore and other Punjab cities. Jinnah, Jinnah proclaimed that the Muslim League was ready to "put out 15 million Muslims to break [the] law," if Khizar's ministry refused to resign.⁶ At midnight Khizar struck again, arresting all the most powerful provincial League leaders, including the nawab of Mamdot, Feroz Khan Noon, and Mian Mumtaz Daultana. Riots erupted in every district of the Punjab. On January 31 the League's Working Committee resolved against calling the council to reconsider its rejection of the mission's plan, thus closing any residual possibility of the League opting to enter the constituent assembly.

Nourul saw Wavell the next day and vowed that the constituent assembly would carry on, saying he would have to consult his colleagues as to whether or not enough Wavell could anticipate that Congress can now take the lead and demand the withdrawal of the League Members from the Cabinet.⁷ Before that request of February 6 came, however, Atlee told Wavell to ask Jinnah to resign, not being sure that his successor had been chosen. The British cabinet recognized that the danger of civil war in India could not be ruled out and feared that perhaps "it was Mr. Jinnah's intention to bring it about . . . there was no telling what the consequences of their [Muslim League] actions in the Punjab might be. It seemed that they were developing the technique of civil disobedience . . . in the long run, the extent to which the League would be able to cause disruption would depend upon what their activities caused the Indian Army to disintegrate." In New Delhi, astute observers like V. P. Menon now considered India's partition "inevitable."⁸

On February 20, 1947 Prime Minister Atlee informed his peers in the Cabinet that

His Majesty's Government desire to hand over their responsibility to authorities established by a constitution approved by all parties in India . . . but unfortunately there is at present no clear prospect that such a constitution . . . will emerge. . . . His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that it is their definite intention to take the necessary steps to effect the transference of power into responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948. . . . It is therefore essential that all parties should sink their differences in order that they may be ready to shoulder the great responsibilities which will come upon them next year.⁹

Congress and the League both welcomed the new statement. "The British Government have at last seen the light and taken a historic decision which will finally end the Indo-British conflict in a manner worthy of civilized

nations," wrote the *Hindustan Times* next day. "The Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah are now face to face with reality. No Indian wishes to deny the Muslim community its rightful place in India; it is not possible to do so now that the third party is quitting. There is no alternative to a mutual settlement."¹⁰ But Dawood did not agree, arguing in his lead article the same day. Mr. Atlee and his colleagues appear to have realized at last what the Muslim League has repeatedly asserted that the hope of framing an agreed constitution for a united India was an idle dream. All attempts made to that end have failed because they were based on an unreal assumption.¹¹

Wavell met with Nehru and Liaquat on February 21. Nehru was obviously impressed by the Statement and conscious of the responsibility thrown on the Congress, reported the matter. "He spoke on the possible partition of the Punjab and Dehra if agreement was not reached."¹² Liaquat was not prepared to react for the League, and Wavell suggested it might be best for him to advise Jinnah "to come to Delhi." A week later Liaquat informed Wavell that Jinnah was sick and had gone to Bombay and would not be in Delhi for a while in the month of March.¹³

During the last week in February the Punjab erupted with intensified violence. It had a dozen major cities including Lahore in a state of anarchy with mobs of young Hindu schoolboys "running through and private houses and coming to meet Muslim League flag-bearers of Union Jack." Several deaths of police as well as civilians and hundreds of injuries shook Atlee's resolve and made him decide to "settle" with the League by releasing all prisoners taken in the month-long ban on public meetings and leaving to organize a "partial" coalition government, which Congress leaders viewed as most reprehensible. The League had also begun direct action in the North-West Frontier province and Punjab's sacrosanct and hallowed most of the windows of the Congress premier Dr. Khan Sahib's house in Peshawar while police stood by and refused to obey orders to "open fire."

Khan resigned on March 2 after consulting with Zafarullah Khan and other friends he trusted in Lahore. He concluded to Governor Jenkins

that the Muslim League must be brought up against reality without delay. . . . They [League leaders] had no idea of the strength of Hindu and Sikh feeling against them and so long as he and his Muslim Unionist colleagues acted as a buffer they would not change their fantastic and arrogant ideas. . . . The outlook for Mamdot [Punjab League leader] was very bleak, and . . . if he failed to secure adequate support from the Hindus or Sikhs or both, it would be my duty to go into Section 35 [Governor's Raj].¹⁴

s marked the end of Punjab unity: the political demise of the "Land of Five Rivers." Sikh leader Swaran Singh told the governor that his party had no intention of joining a coalition government with the League since they had no intention of allowing themselves to be "treated as serfs under Muslim masters, and felt that they were strong enough to defend themselves." And League meetings spread the following week and Congress and the Akali Sikhs announced plans for mass rallies for March 11 and 12 in Lahore and Peshawar, days to be held throughout the Punjab. Violence spread and more deaths were reported daily.

The India debate was launched in the Commons on March 3 by Cripps. He criticised the government's policy and noted how "unfortunate" it was that

just at the moment when the Muslim League was about to reconsider the situation with a view, possibly, to coming into the Constituent Assembly at Karachi, events in the Punjab boiled up. . . . We can only hope that tolerance and good sense will bring about some settlement. . . . This is just another one of those factors which make it so difficult to predict the course of events in India today.¹¹

On 4 March he rose the next day to speak the opposition's mind. He criticised the government's adherence to the 1942 Cripps offer and accused the government of having departed a severe basic respect from the 1942 proposal. He launched a bitter attack on the "Government of Mr Nehru," which he called "a complete disaster," insisting that "It was a fatal mistake to entrust the government of India to the caste Hindu. Turning to 'the new Viceroy,' Churchill argued

India is to be subjected not merely to partition, but to fragmentation, and to haphazard fragmentation. A time limit is imposed. . . . kind of guideline—which will certainly prevent the full, fair and reasonable discussion of the great complicated issues that are involved. These 14 months will not be used for the melting of hearts and the union of Muslim and Hindu all over India. They will be used in preparation for civil war, and they will be marked continually by disorders and disturbances such as are now going on in the great city of Lahore."¹²

After, in a tepid attempt at rebuttal, admitted that "There is gross inequality of wealth in India, but unfortunately, that social and economic system was continued during all the time of our rule. We did not go in for the revolutionary business of turning out the landlords who do nothing whatever. We did something to repress the moneylenders, but not much

We accepted that social and economic system. Why are we told now at the very end of our rule that we must clear up all these things before we go, otherwise we shall betray our trust? If that trust is there, it ought to have been fulfilled long ago."¹³ The House of Commons divided late that night on March strictly along party lines, with a majority of 337 Labourites closing ranks behind their prime minister and 185 Conservatives voting the other way with Churchill. Muslim-baiting with its attendant stuff of exports was soon to be launched on the fastest mission of major political surgery ever performed by one nation on the pregnant body-politic of another.

Communal rioting in Multan left twenty dead and many more injured, as Jinnah took direct control of his Punjab province under Section 93 of the fast-fading Act of 1935. The news of Muslim workers' fatalities, so just a Muslim League assembly together but could win the support only of several Scheduled Caste and Indian Christian members of his assembly as well as three non-League Muslims, could to his shock if a unity party swarms. This left the sold Hindu and opposition almost evenly balanced against him. Meanwhile in New Delhi, interim cabinet Finance Minister Liaquat Ali accepted official advice and presented a heavy budget designed to secure financial control and commercial confidence by means enough to meet skyrocketing defence costs, to allow loaning the salt tax and by paying retiring service pensions to underdeveloped soldiers. Ward noted to Patrick Lawrence: "The Budget is cleverly calculated to drive a wedge between Congress and the rich merchant supporters like Birla."¹⁴

Anarchy was my main anxiety yesterday," Jenkins wrote: "Wavell on March 1." By the evening the city was completely out of control. The British does not seem to govern a ghazal but the figures we have are only for the corpses which have passed through the hospital mortuary. Most of the deaths seem to have produced arms. Many buildings are burning. Masses of people . . . running away from the city added to the confusion and rioting. Police reinforcements were despatched by road and two British Battalions. . . . Bad rioting is reported from Rawalpindi with 25 dead and perhaps 100 injured. Rioting has continued in Sialkot and Jullundur. These affairs always go through three stages: (1) fear, funk and recrimination. . . .¹⁵ The frenzy was to continue all year.

Congress Working Committee met in emergency session on March 15 and resolved that

The transfer of power in order to be smooth, should be preceded by the recognition in practice of the interim Government as a De facto Government with effective control over the services and a limit on its functions. The Central Government must necessarily function in a

Cabinet with full authority and responsibility. Any other arrangement is incompatible with good government and is peculiarly dangerous.

In this hour when final decisions have to be taken . . . the Working Committee earnestly call upon all parties and groups . . . to discard violent and coercive methods, and co-operate peacefully. . . The end of an era is at hand and a new age will soon begin. Let this dawn of the new age be ushered in bravely, leaving hates and discords in the dead past.²³

When forwarding these Congress resolutions to the viceroy the next day Nehru expressed our intention to urge the Muslim League to join Congress in the assembly and to work together amicably toward reaching a final settlement. He added with an almost audible sigh of resignation:

If unfortunately this is not possible, we . . . have also suggested the division of the Punjab into two parts. This proposal would of course apply to Bengal also . . . not pleasant for us to contemplate, but such a course is preferable to an attempt by either party to impose its will upon the other. Recent events in the Punjab have demonstrated . . . that it is not possible to coerce the non-Muslim minority in the Province, just as it is not possible or desirable to coerce the others. . . In the event of the Muslim League not accepting the Cabinet Delegation's scheme and not coming into the Constituent Assembly, the division of Bengal and Punjab becomes inevitable.²⁴

Congress was now ready to concede Pakistan including only Muslim-majority districts, but Pakistan nonetheless. It was early March of 1947 when the Punjab had won. We have got to stand on our own legs. Quaid-Azam told Muslim journalists in Bombay on March 12, saying that "our ideology, our goal, our basic and fundamental principles . . . are not only different from the Hindu organisations but are in conflict. . . There is no common ground for co-operation. . . There was a time when the idea of Pakistan was laughed at, but let me tell you this there is no other solution which will do credit and bring honour to our people. . . Insha Allah ("God Willing") we shall have Pakistan."²⁵

Communal "tension," Jenkins reported was "acute in almost all districts" of the Punjab, with the major cities, Lahore, Amritsar, Multan and Rawalpindi, key "danger points." But the "trouble" was spreading to villages, farming out across the once prosperous countryside like cancerous cells of fanaticism. Hatred cut loose and growing at no discerning a rate there seemed to be no control possible, no useful force available to stop them.

In Amritsar Master Tara Singh was reported to have told his Sikh fol-

lowers that "Civil War" had "already begun."²⁶ Sikh defence commander Baldev Singh wrote Wavell, "I make no secret of my conviction that Muslim League's onslaught on the Constituent Ministry had been engineered in the way it was because the League had despaired of bringing about a defeat by constitutional methods."²⁷ There were 15 or 20 firm casualty figures for the Punjab; the rank and file stated that about 1,000 persons had been killed in the last month of rioting and many more hundreds of half-figure wounded. The rains would be late that year, but the Punjab's fields were to be flooded with blood.

Meanwhile over almost daily with the cabinet in London, seeking answers to thorny problems from those who had grown old failing to solve them. His search was to discover his perspective of Indian politics for the future. He thought as he reviewed the calendar in early March "that the Indian leaders themselves would sooner or later realise that the retention of the Indian Army under central control was vital both to the external security of India and to the maintenance of internal law and order."²⁸ He decided to warn the interim Government that he would not allow them to force British payments to keep law and order solely to protect British lives. That evening they met at 10 Downing Street. The viceroy resigned his civilising orders, and there were still many "amendments" to be considered.

Nehru's old friend rising ambassador V. K. Krishna Menon, also met the Mountbatten that March 3, offering her one of the current solutions in demand. Congress suggested solutions. On the question of Muslim demands Krishna Menon proposed two "Pakistan's," one in the Northwest partitioning the Punjab as well as Sindh, the other in the North.

To achieve the division of Eastern Bengal which are predominantly Muslim, and certain areas of Assam, thus partitioning Bengal . . . I believe that partition is the price that has to be paid for any stability in Bengal . . . any solution which hands over Calcutta to Pakistan will be unstable and impractical. . . On the other hand, the League has to be given a port on the East, and the solution is that as part of the compromise settlement India should build a large . . . and port in Chittagong, that is, provide the money for it however many millions it may cost.²⁹

Calcutta financial interests thus were prepared to pay for retention of their capital, and this formula was ultimately accepted by all parties.

Tens of thousands of refugees began pouring into Rawalpindi from sacked villages in the countryside. "Attacks on non-Muslims have been

organized with extreme savagery. Jenkins wired on March 17 "Deputy Commissioner Rawalpindi believes that in his district alone there may be 5,000 casualties" ¹⁰ As information flowed in from outlying regions of the Punjab a pattern of organisation and conspiracy seemed to emerge. wrote the governor, "In parts of Rawalpindi outbreaks . . . have occurred almost simultaneously . . . carefully planned and carried out. All Muslims in the affected districts seem to be involved ~~and sympathetic~~ to the movement. The Commander JH Division told me when I saw him yesterday that attacks on non-Muslims have been led in some cases by retired Army officers—some of them pensioners . . . The Muslim section of the local notables to whom I spoke . . . were extremely sulky . . . non-Muslims are vehemently bitter against the services and particularly against the Police." ¹¹ The League's "Swordsmen" was being wielded now with a vengeance.

On March 18, Mountbatten received his predeparture orders from the prime minister:

My colleagues of the Cabinet Mission and I have discussed with you the general lines of your approach to the problems which will confront you in India. It will, I think be useful to you to have on record the salient points. . . . It is the definite objective of His Majesty's Government to obtain a unitary Government for British India and the Indian States, if possible within the British Commonwealth, through the medium of a Constituent Assembly . . . and you should do the utmost in your power to persuade . . . Parties to work together to this end. . . . If by October 1 you consider that there is no prospect of reaching a settlement on the basis of a unitary government . . . you should report to His Majesty's Government on the steps which you consider should be taken for the handing over of power on the due date. . . . You will do your best to persuade the rulers of any Indian States in which political progress has been slow to progress rapidly.

It is essential that there should be the fullest co-operation with the Indian leaders in all steps that are taken as to the withdrawal of British power so that the process may go forward as smoothly as possible. ¹²

On March 22, 1947, Mountbatten reached New Delhi, where he met with Wavell.

There was some discussion of the failure of the Indian politicians to appreciate how little time there was to arrange the transfer of power before June, 1948, and the question was raised whether the partition of Punjab and Bengal could take place inside the Cabinet Mission's plan. LORD MOUNTBATTEN . . . said he thought there must be

some strong authority to which to hand over in India, and that any solution must be based on the Indian Army. ¹³

Wavell quit New Delhi early the next morning but remained viceroy till he flew out of Karachi, the following day. I went round to Mountbatten's suite and had a discussion with the Viceroy designate, clad in his under-suits and vest—press attaché Alan Campbell-Johnson recalled. "I showed me this morning's newspaper on the front page of *Dunedin* is a photograph of Bonnie Bruckman [of Mountbatten's staff] and Elizabeth Ward, once Mountbatten's private secretary in which they are of course described as 'Lord and Lady Louis arriving'." ¹⁴

The nineteenth and last of the British viceroys was sworn in by Lord Chief Justice Sir Patrick Spens on the morning of March 24, 1947, with a reduced version of pomp and paraphernalia for New Delhi's ceremony. Wavell and Lord Mountbatten welcomed his audience by speaking in an easy and pleasant manner. For several minutes after his remarks, ¹⁵ according to Nehru and the Congress ministers seated to his right, and to Lord Mountbatten and his League cabinet colleagues on the other side. The afternoon got to work, turning first with Nehru and then with Wavell. He had a long written personal statement and a long speech of his to read to New Delhi at the earliest convenience to meet with the Jinnahs who was still recuperating in Bombay.

Nehru had spent some time with the Mountbattens in Maraya during his tour and admired Dick's natural engaging character, as a manner and urbanity, and conviviality. They had "hit it off" beautifully. Mountbatten used Nehru as his primary Indian sounding board for vital information, asking, for example, "his own estimate" of Jinnah.

Nehru said the essential thing to realise about Jinnah is that he is a man to whom success has come very late in life—at over sixty. Before that he had not been a major figure in Indian politics . . . was a successful lawyer, but not an especially good one. . . . The secret of his success—and it had been tremendous, if only for its emotional intensity—was in his capacity to take up a permanently negative attitude . . . He knew that Pakistan could never stand up to constructive criticism, and he had ensured that it should never be subjected to it. ¹⁶

This negative analysis of his leading rival reveals Nehru's intense hatred of Jinnah more than it helps illuminate the true source of Jinnah's powers. Mountbatten's own rather negative assessment of Jinnah was, in some measure, probably influenced by Nehru's singular aversion to the Quaid-i-Azam and all he represented.

The new viceroy next met with Liaquat Ali Khan, whose attempt to solve India's economic problem had met with such strong Congress opposition that he had finally agreed to cut his proposed excess profits tax from 25 to 16 percent. But Mountbatten did not find Liaquat as intellectually stimulating or personally appealing as Nehru, and no hour of real intimacy ever developed between them.

Mountbatten spent over ten hours talking as private with Gandhi at five separate meetings from March 31 through April 4, during which the Mahatma proposed that

Mr Jinnah . . . be given the option of forming a Cabinet . . . If Mr Jinnah accepted this offer the Congress would guarantee to co-operate freely and sincerely so long as all the measures that Mr Jinnah's Cabinet bring forward are in the interests of the Indian people as a whole . . . asks referee of what is or is not in the interests of India as a whole will be Lord Mountbatten. . . . Mr Jinnah must stipulate, on behalf of the League . . . that, so far as he or they are concerned, they will do their utmost to preserve peace throughout India. . . . There shall be no National Guards or any other form of private army. . . . Within the framework hereof Mr Jinnah will be authorized free to present for consideration a scheme of Pakistan, even before the transfer of power, provided however that his successful or his appeal to reason must be the force of one which heads off, or a plea for this purpose. This act will be no compulsion on this matter over a Province or part thereof. . . . If Mr Jinnah rejects this offer, the same offer to be made mutatis mutandis to Congress.¹²

When Gandhi initially proposed this ingenious formula, Mountbatten admitted it "staggered me. I asked what would Mr Jinnah say to such a proposal?" The reply was "I would tell him I am the author, he will reply 'Why Gandhi?'" Mountbatten then remarked "And I presume Mr Jinnah will be right?" To which he replied with great fervour "No, I am entirely sincere in my suggestion."¹³ Gandhi's offer would never be conveyed to Jinnah. Mountbatten opted first to discuss the matter with Nehru whose reaction was totally negative. Nehru was shocked to learn that his Mahatma was quite ready to replace him as premier with the Qandil-Azam. After telling Mountbatten how "unrealistic" Gandhi's "solution" was, Jawaharlal said "he was anxious for Mr Gandhi to see a few of his leaders in Delhi, as he had been away for four months and was rapidly getting out of touch with events at the Centre."¹⁴ Nehru and Patel hoped quickly to bring the unpredictable old man back into "touch" with their conclusions

on how best to handle Jinnah and the Muslim League. Perhaps even if Jinnah were offered the entire central government on a platter with the whole cake under his personal control, he might have dismissed it with a negative wave of his long-fingered hand. Yet it was an exquisite temptation to place before him. It was a tempting solution to India's political troubles, creates a political problem. The Mahatma alone was capable of such a subtle connotation, such instant reversal of political position. Gandhi understood Jinnah well enough moreover to know just how potent an appeal it was that sort of singularly generous offer would make. It might not have worked, since this was a long simmer solution. But Nehru had feared the cup of power too long to offer its seductive and one case last of it to that seductive law of the "transfer of power" from the Mahatma. It was in any good Congress leaders thought of Jinnah. Nehru notified Mountbatten, but the scheme was quite impractical, even less realistic now than a year ago, when Gandhi had suggested the same idea to the cabinet mission.

Mountbatten met Jinnah for the first time on April 5 finding him "cool, courteous and calm."¹⁵ The two gentlemen came before dinner started when the air raid was stopped and had walked and had had Mountbatten enter garden and Mountbatten recalled "I had obviously appeared his part on the dress expecting Jinnah to pose between the two but when we started to bring the stand in he made his way and waited long enough to sit down and he said what a relief was a relief. A time between two things." "Was Jinnah's mind perceptive work?" "I don't think so," Mountbatten suspected. The Mountbatten said "I had no fatality to dinner the next evening and the Jinnahs obviously spent it staying till well after midnight by which time 'the ice was really broken.'"

Mr Jinnah claimed that there was only one solution—a "surgical operation" on India, otherwise India would perish altogether. I replied by reiterating that I had not yet made up my mind, and pointed out that an "anaesthetic" must precede any "surgical operation." He gave me an account (which worries me a great deal) about his previous negotiations with Mr. Gandhi. . . . He emphasized, and tried to prove from this account that on the Muslim side there was only one man to deal with, namely himself. But the same was not true of the representatives of Congress—there was no one man to deal with on their side. Mr. Gandhi had openly confessed that he represented nobody. . . . had enormous authority with no responsibility. Nehru and Patel represented different points of view within Con-

gress: neither could give a categorical answer on behalf of the party as a whole. He also spoke of the emotionalism of the Congress leaders. He accused Congress leaders of constantly shifting their front. They would stoop to anything. . . . At the end of our interview, after he had told me a succession of long stories about how appallingly the Muslims had been treated, I informed him that what fascinated me was the way that all the Indian leaders spoke with such conviction.⁴²

The conviviality of that intimate dinner party, which obviously loosened Jinnah's tongue and "wounded" Mountbatten "a great deal" seems to have so diminished his confidence in Jinnah that he decided provisionally against transferring Gandhi's offer, thus thwarting his last hope of preserving Indian unity. Jinnah's own negative assessment of Gandhi's powers to "deliver" Congress Congressmen, a doubt to that most tragic decision yet dramatically shown on Mountbatten's personal judgment of Jinnah's state of mind and kind of which he considered dangerous and independence "threat" for that first marathon meeting. It was not simple that he and Jinnah as much as he had Nehru. It went deeper. He never did trust Jinnah's judgment and appears to have found those "long stories" symptomatic of senility.

They met again on April 7, when Lord Isma, joining the discussion that afternoon, Mountbatten tried by every means to get Jinnah to say "would accept the Cabinet Mission plan and enter the Constituent Assembly."⁴³ Jinnah remained adamant, however.

Next evening they met for two more hours, and Mountbatten explained his resolve to recommend to the British government how best to transfer British power after hearing the views of all major parties. Jinnah's answer was: he did not wait for the parties to reach "agreement" as the terminal date had been set.

I then asked him what, if he were in my place, his solution would be; and he repeated once more the demand for Pakistan. . . . I invited Mr Jinnah to put forward his arguments for partition. He recited the classic ones. I then pointed out that his remarks applied also to the partition of the Punjab and Bengal, and that by sheer logic if I accepted his arguments in the case of India as a whole, I had also to apply them in the case of these two Provinces. . . . he expressed himself most upset at my trying to give him a "moth eaten" Pakistan. He said that this demand for partitioning the Punjab and Bengal was a bluff on the part of Congress to try and frighten him off Pakistan. He was not to be frightened off so easily, and he would be sorry if I were taken in by the Congress bluff.⁴⁴

On April 9, Mountbatten and Jinnah talked again for over an hour. Jinnah insisted that the "Begin and end all" of Pakistan was to have its own army.

I told him that I regarded it as a very great tragedy that he should be trying to force me to give up the idea of a united India. I painted a picture of the greatness that India could achieve. . . . I finally said that I found that the present Interim Coalition Government was every day working better and in a more co-operative spirit, and that it was a day-dream of mine to be able to put the Central Government under the Prime Ministership of Mr Jinnah himself. . . . Some 35 minutes later, Mr Jinnah, who had not referred previously to my personal remark about him, suddenly made a reference out of the blue to the fact that I had wanted him to be the Prime Minister. There is no doubt that this great remark showed his vanity, and that he had kept turning over the proposition in his mind.

Mr Gandhi's famous scheme may yet go through or the pure sanity of Mr Jinnah! Nevertheless he gives me the impression of a man who has not thought out one single piece of the mechanics of his own great scheme, and he will have the shock of his life when he realises that he has come down to earth and try and make his vague idealistic proposals work on a concrete basis.⁴⁵

And after three more hours alone with Jinnah on April 10, Mountbatten reported to his staff that he considered "Mr Jinnah was a pathological case."⁴⁶ The victory had

brought all possible arguments to bear on Mr Jinnah but it seemed that appeals to his reason did not prevail. . . . Mr Jinnah had not been able in his presence to adduce one single feasible argument in favour of Pakistan. In fact he had offered no counter arguments. He gave the impression that he was not listening. He was "impossible to argue with. . . . He was, whatever was said, intent on his Pakistan—which could surely only result in doing the Muslims irreparable damage. . . . until he had met Mr Jinnah he [Mountbatten] had not thought it possible that a man with such a complete lack of sense of responsibility could hold the power which he did."⁴⁷

Lord Ismael's words described the dominating feature in Mr Jinnah's mental structure was his hatred and contempt of the Hindus. He apparently thought that all Hindus were sub-human creatures with whom it was impossible for the Muslims to live.⁴⁸

All the while communal rioting had continued to rack the Punjab. By mid-April, official estimates of some 3,500 dead in 146 cases than a month

them counted approximately six Hindus and Sikhs for every Muslim. He remarked "One of my troubles has been to get an complete placency of the League leaders in the Punjab who say in effect that 'boys will be boys,'" remarked Jenkins, who estimated by then that "Every British official in the I.C.S. in the I.P. in the Punjab including myself would be very glad to leave it tomorrow . . . we feel now that we are dealing with people who are out to destroy themselves." The North-West Frontier was also all set with at least ten of Dera Ismail Khan razed by "barbarians" that blood-drenched Sindh Bombay was placed under dusk-to-dawn curfew, as was Bombay. Calcutta too simmered at the heat of communal violence which daily grew more intense, fired by rumors of imminent partition.

Chief Minister S. B. Hawarthy hoped to save Bengal the agony of a second partition. It was his last for a century by proposing a coalition government of the Congress and Forward Bloc opponents, advocating independence and unity for the Bengalis. With designs on saving the virtual world monopoly of job and buying (Calcutta highly developed) over a million tons of steel a week, the British as well as American capitalists, who by no means came to a sudden halt. We Bengalis have a common mother tongue and common economy. The Hindus, S. B. Hawarthy argued, "Bengal has very little in common with the Punjab. Bengal will be an independent state and a state of India. I have never viewed it as a state with Pakistan." If this would have been the case, the emergence of an independent United Bengal with open arms to the Noor and Pabna considered it a anathema to Congress and Indian interests and feared that a national "Bangladesh" led by a Muslim premier, would form closer alliances to Pakistan than India.

Mountbatten found Liaquat Ali Khan much easier to deal with than Jinnah in that he was more reasonable in his demands and relative reasonableness. He met with Liaquat for two hours on the evening of April 1, talking him into confidence, as to

how my mind was beginning to work towards a solution. . . I started off with Pakistan and complete partition of the Punjab and Bengal and Assam. I told him that I had no doubt that the Indian leaders and their peoples were in such an hysterical condition that they would all gladly agree to my arranging their suicide in this way. He nodded his head, and said "I am afraid everybody will agree to such a plan, we are all in such a state." I told him that the worst service I could do to India, if I were her enemy or completely indifferent to her fate, would be to take advantage of this extraordinary mental condition to force the completest partition possible upon them before going off in June 1948 and leaving the whole country in the most hopelessly chaotic.¹¹

That talk with Liaquat sealed India's tragic fate. Mountbatten was completely sincere in what he said after Liaquat mountbatten admitted that even Jinnah would accept the triple partition plan, for Mountbatten was wise enough to anticipate the horrors of slashing a superstitious so tormented by religious fanaticism into competing national factions. He understood indeed too well the pitfalls and dangers of dividing the area of withdrawing the foreign troops and impartial assessors and of leaving the unlettered, prejudiced, fearful, superstitious masses to battle it out, to fall onto one another venting their fears and spleen on neighboring village and urban ward. He sensed, in fact, that "the worst service I could do to India, if I were her enemy or completely indifferent to her fate" was precisely what he would do—last a few months at the very least—those dire days. He did not want to do this. Quite the contrary, of course. He had gone out to save India to heal its wounds, to offer peace, not the sword of partition. He and Lady Mountbatten loved India and the Indians. They were ready to risk their lives and those of their family daily in the service of these impassioned, emotional, most unconverted people. But there was no other solution.

Calcutta's mad plan, the only exception would have been to let the very land and all the people Mountbatten loved must part. India, he felt, over to Jinnah would be considered "psychopathic." Pakistan alone would be the state of mind, but Liaquat's decision to the sheer logic of a promise partition of the Punjab and Bengal as well. "The best servant" Indian ever sent out to India would soon find himself obliged to part in the worst service I could do to India. And that night after Liaquat left him, Mountbatten sought some consolation in hope writing, "I have a impression that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan intends to help me find a more reasonable solution than this mad Pakistan."¹²

A British journalist who saw Jinnah at this time reported to the vice-private secretary his "most disturbed state of mind" which made General Alfred Lytton Mountbatten, "It was possible that Mr. Jinnah was Jinnah, probably that he was bewildered by the impact of events."¹³ The private secretary Ian Scott also got the impression that Mr. Jinnah was becoming seriously troubled by the prospect opening up before him. He felt that this process should be allowed to take its course, there would be a psychological moment in which to take advantage of it. All wishful thinking. None of those "clever" strategies worked.

Krishna Menon continued to keep in touch with Mountbatten, who found he had "very shrewd views" on world politics, warning Mountbatten against America's "object in India . . . to capture all the markets, to step in and take the place of the British, and finally . . . to get bases in India for ultimate use against Russia."¹⁴ Mountbatten was at least equally

shrewd" in return, however cautioning Nehru's closest adviser on foreign affairs that unless India remained in the British Commonwealth Pakistan would be most anxious to do so—might soon build up its armed forces extensively superior to those of Hindustan—and I presumed that places like Karachi would become big naval and air bases within the British Commonwealth. Krishna Menon "abruptly shuddered" at that prospect and promised to do all he could to help convince Nehru and Lax to request dominion status for India as a fact they soon did despite "firm previous Congress commitments that India would become a completely independent sovereign State."

Vasudevaswami Mountbatten tried to befuddle Fatima, inviting her to join in a meeting to "cheer the conversation" on such occasions away from politics, but Fatima always returned to her favorite subject "and more violent attacks on Congress and the Hindu community as a whole." Late Mountbatten reported: "She asked dozens of tactical, made frequent references to the fact that 'the Muslims were fighting for separation and their rights were not agreed to.' Late Mr. Jinnah she was, it is true, 'independent' and it is obvious, convinced that the Hindu attitude to rights and duties was the Muslim community's." Late Mountbatten tried to get Fatima to explain to her how Pakistan "would really work." But "Miss Mountbatten to give any definite answer save all the time that the problem involved would be quite easy, once Muslim demands had been agreed to."

By the end of April the Muslim League had a clear majority in the Punjab and the award of Mountbatten demanded that Governor Jenkins call upon the Chief Minister instead of continuing autocratically to rule under Section 93 of the 1935 Act. Jinnah finally went to Mountbatten to reiterate that demand but the viceroy, like his governor, refused to state a preference for the Punjab League. I would not be over-optimistic to think that the Sikhs. During this same period the viceroy informed Jinnah of Subramanian's recent expressed hope that the right to elect to keep a united Bengal or to sever it should be joined rather than a Hindu district. I asked Mr. Jinnah straight out what his views were and he replied unmitigatedly at the price of its remaining out of Pakistan."

He said, without any hesitation, "I should be delighted. What is the use of Bengal without Calcutta, they had much better remain united and independent; I am sure that they would be on friendly terms with us."

When I mentioned that Mountbatten had said that the province should remain united and independent, they would wish to remain within the Commonwealth, Mr. Jinnah replied "Of course just as I indi-

cated to you that Pakistan would wish to remain within the Commonwealth." I corrected him and said, "No, you told me that if the Pakistan Government was formed, its first act might well be to ask to be admitted to membership of the British Commonwealth." He corrected me, and said I completely misunderstood the position, it was not a question of asking to be admitted, it was a question of not being kicked out. He said that Mr. Churchill had told him "You have only to stand firm and demand your rights not to be expelled from the British Commonwealth, and you are bound to be accepted. The country would never stand for the expulsion of loyal members of the Empire."³⁴

Whatever Mountbatten and his staff thought of Jinnah's moral status, he could not resist the use of sharpness in his legal analyses and proved perfectly correct in his far-sighted legal opinion of the much confused and belabored issue of commonwealth membership.

Mr. Jinnah told me that he had asked Sir Stafford Cripps what form a statement on the transfer of power was likely to take. Mountbatten continued to report on that late April meeting, "could be content on the fact that it would be in the form that India or Pakistan India would be granted the same privilege as other members of the British Commonwealth, the right to secede if they so wished. Finding where he would not admit that to be so. For Sir Stafford Cripps replied that he was not in position to answer that question at that time. Mr. Jinnah said 'This is like a lawyer, he evades the question. It is impossible for me to see that you or I kick one another is no precedent for foreign parts for the Empire to go against their will.' Jinnah could hardly have paid Cripps a higher compliment, of course, than to call him "a true lawyer."

Jinnah explained that his reasons for insisting that Pakistan must remain within the British Commonwealth were not merely legalistic, however, arguing that the leaders of Congress are so dishonest so envious, and so obsessed with the idea of domination by the Muslim League that there are no lengths to which they will not go to do so, and the only way of giving Pakistan a chance is to make it an independent nation of the British Commonwealth, with its own army, and the right to argue cases at any Central Council on this basis." That was to be his trump card in defence of his newborn nation, no matter how "moth-eaten" a state it might be.

Jinnah's hopes for Bengal remaining united were shared by Liaquat, who informed Sir Eric Muirhead "that he was in no way worried about Bengal as he was convinced in his own mind that the province would never divide. He thought it would remain a separate state joining neither Hindustan nor Pakistan."³⁵ Liaquat also "hinted" to Muirhead that "there was a

chance that 'Sikhistan' might join up with Pakistan, and that the Muslim League would offer them very generous terms. Jinnah had several secret meetings with Sikh leaders including the maharaja of Patiala and Baldev Singh, and tried to induce them to join Pakistan. Nehru and Patel were in position to offer more, however, keeping the Muslim League as well as Master Tara Singh, loyal to India, and Baldev was to retain control over Indian affairs in the province. Nehru's cabinet Jinnah thus tried his utmost and actually believed till the bitter end that he might be able to avert the bloody disaster of a partitioning but Bengal and the Punjab would be joining Pakistan and North-western provinces from the Indian Union, thus leaving a unified Eastern Bangladesh on its own.

"Then now I look at the problem in India the more I realise that all this partition business is just madness and is going to reduce the economic efficiency of the whole country immeasurably," Mountbatten wrote him on May 1. "No-one would ever induce me to agree to it were it not for this fantastic communal madness that has seized everybody and leaves no other course open . . . one small horrifying example my wife had Miss Jinnah to tea yesterday. She told us Jinnah that she had spent last evening at the Lady Irwin College and was delighted to find how happy that institution was working and on what excellent terms the Hindu and Muslim girls were. . . . To this Miss Jinnah replied 'Don't be misled by the apparent contentment of the Muslim girls there - we haven't been able to get our propaganda in that college yet'. . . . The Hindus are nearly as bad. . . . The most we can do . . . is to put responsibility for any of these partition decisions fairly and squarely on the Indian shoulders in the eyes of the world for one day they will bitterly regret the decision they are about to make."⁸⁰

The Mountbattens flew up to Simla for a week's holiday, taking Nehru and his daughter Indira as house guests. "Having made real friends with Nehru during his stay here," Mountbatten wired his chief of staff, Lord Ismay, "I asked him whether he would look at the London draft [of the plan for voting on partition], as an act of friendship and on the understanding that he would not utilise his prior knowledge or opinion to his disadvantage that he had seen it. He readily gave this undertaking and took the draft to bed."⁸¹ Next morning Nehru wrote Mountbatten that the plan he had previewed "frightened me . . . much that we had done so far - undermined and the Cabinet Mission's scheme and subsequent developments were set aside and an entirely new picture presented - a picture of fragmentation and conflict and disorder, and . . . of a worsening of relations between India and Britain. . . . If my relations were so bad, I can well imagine what my colleagues and others will think and feel."

It will be a disaster.⁸² Mountbatten reported Nehru's "bombshell" to Ismay suggesting that in view of the reaction some "rebutting" of the plan would be required. At this point Atlee asked Mountbatten to fly home unless he preferred having Cripps, Alexander, or the new secretary of state, Lord Islowell fly out to New Delhi to consult with him on the spot. Mountbatten chose to go to London.

Before flying from New Delhi in mid-May Mountbatten showed his revised proposed plan to Lord Atlee. He then asked him whether the Muslim League was going to accept partition of the Punjab and Bengal, to which he replied: "We shall never agree to it but you may make us say so if it is inevitable." I told him it was essential that if it did become inevitable, all wars should give the public agreement to avoid bloodshed, and that I proposed to raise this with Mr. Jinnah.⁸³

Jinnah's reaction to the Mountbatten plan was even more negative than Nehru's. "The Muslim League must agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab," Jinnah wrote. "It cannot be justified historically, economically, ethnically, politically or morally. These provinces have built up their respective lives for nearly a century . . . and the only ground which is put forward for the partition is that the areas where the Hindus and Sikhs are in majority should be separated from the rest of the provinces. . . . he said it will be disastrous for the Hindus in the two provinces and the communities concerned . . . if you take this decision—which in my opinion is a fatal one—Calcutta should not be torn away from the Eastern Bengal. . . . if worst comes to worst, Calcutta should be made a free city."⁸⁴

At 10 Downing Street on the evening of May 19, 1947 Mountbatten cleared Prime Minister Atlee and his Cabinet colleagues so that "It was made clear that the Muslim League would resort to arms if Pakistan's demands were not conceded."⁸⁵ Jinnah was interviewed by Reuters the next day and demanded an 800-mile long "corridor" of land West and East between the provinces, promising a "friendly, beneficial" relationship between Pakistan and India and offering Hindustan a "friendly and reciprocal alliance."⁸⁶ Congress reactions to the "corridor" demand proved so strongly negative that it never became a serious issue, receiving even less attention than the idea that Calcutta should emerge as a free port. Then Jinnah wired the cabinet demanding that before Bengal and the Punjab were partitioned, a referendum should be held in each province to determine the will of its people in this vital regard. Mountbatten, however, spoke against that proposal, insisting it "would merely result in delay."⁸⁷ The cabinet agreed,⁸⁸ and the imperial steamroller moved ahead in high gear.

Arishna Metton flew to London to inform Mountbatten on May 21 that

Nehru and Patel were "ready to accept" Jinnah's status if it were offered to him in 1947. "As I am anxious that there should be no misunderstanding I am writing to you even though I have seen you this morning," Nehru's confidant wrote Mountbatten from India House that same day. "If Mr. Jinnah wants a total separation and that straight away—and if we agree to it for the sake of peace and dismember our country—we want to be rid of him so far as the affairs of what is left to us of our country are concerned. I feel sure you will appreciate this, and also that it is not a matter of detail but is fundamental."¹⁰¹ Congress has begun to fear that in another six months they would lose the Eastern Punjab and Sikh support, as well as Columbia and Western Bengal, possibly some of the princely states, and especially Hyderabad and Bhopal, for the danger Jinnah argued the stronger and greater his demands became. Nehru was sick and tired of arguing reality, as he put it, "involuntarily" to Congress Pakistan, and the theory that if "cutting off the head we will get rid of the headache."¹⁰²

After a few hours' respite, Congress and the Conservative opposition in Parliament who could easily have led to the Indian independence of India, in a prolonged and acrimonious Commons debate that would have made transfer of power in 1947 impossible. Mountbatten went round vs. "Mr. Churchill" and "asked him to explain the reasons for his attitude and his wife's fatal charm for independence. He is a weak power, a very objectionable old man who asked so deceptively that I have been asked to then asked him if he would advise me how I should proceed if Jinnah's intentions get it." Mountbatten reported, "He said that about 100 for a long time and finally said, 'To begin with, you must take away all British officers, Government officials without British officers. Make it clear to them how impossible it would be to run Pakistan without British help.' Mountbatten agreed to try and follow some such plan. He more important actually managed to get Churchill to give Lord 'personal' message for Jinnah, stating "This is a matter of life and death for Pakistan. If we do not accept this offer with all hands."¹⁰³ Churchill's words are given weight with Jinnah, than those of any other living person, as Mountbatten knew. The final obstacle was now removed from the path to partition. With Churchill on board, it was "full ahead" for the Mountbatten plan, which was to bring two "motivated" states into independence and put a bitter new dominions into the British Commonwealth.

On Monday morning, June 2, 1947, India's leaders drove into the New Court of the viceroy's house in New Delhi. Liaquat and Nishtar, accompanying Jinnah, Patel and J. B. Kripalani (Congress president for a year), and Baldev Singh, with Nehru. That meeting at which these leaders were briefed on the plan brought back from London, lasted only two hours.

"The atmosphere was tense," reported Mountbatten, "and I got the feeling that the less the leaders talked the less the chance of friction and perhaps the ultimate breakdown of the meeting. . . I reported on the most helpful attitude of His Majesty's Government and the Opposition. . . I asked the leaders to let me have their replies before midnight. . . Jinnah said he would come in person at 11 p.m. after they had seen their Working Committee. I kept back Jinnah after the meeting. . . to impress on him that there could not be any question of a 'No' from the League."¹⁰⁴ That must have been when Mountbatten delivered Churchill's message. The viceroy, by now thoroughly disenchanted with Congress, possibly took to an undelivered "message" from Churchill, wrote "He may be a saint but he seems also to be a disciple of Trotsky." The Mahatma arrived at Mountbatten's back door half an hour after the others had gone off to read their copies of the plan. It was Churchill's direct advice, so far as his comments on bits of paper. Jinnah had also done some doodling, but nothing as good as a scrap behind that seemed to show rocks, trees, packets, and had some good ideas and had "Governor Mountbatten" with a "No" across the corner page. The Guards' Army apparently enjoying the sight of its future title.¹⁰⁵

At 11 o'clock that night Jinnah came round the open half an hour, conveying the protest of his Working Committee against the partition of the Provinces. . . I then asked him straight out whether his Working Committee were going to accept the plan. He replied that they were "hopeful." I then asked him whether he intended to accept it himself, to which he replied that he would sign a personal and undertook to use his very best efforts to get the All-India Muslim League Council to accept. . . He had called an urgent meeting next Monday. . . I finally asked him whether he felt I would be justified in advising the Prime Minister to go ahead and make the announcement, to which he replied very firmly "Yes."¹⁰⁶

Mountbatten met to confer with his staff the next morning and reported that the British got Jinnah to accept the plan by using "the amount of pressure" would make him agree prior to his council's meeting.

Mountbatten then reminded Jinnah that the Congress Party were terribly suspicious of this particular tactic, which he always used, whereby he waited until the Congress Party had made a firm decision about some plan, and then left himself the right to make whatever decision suited the Muslim League. . . Nothing Mountbatten could say would move him. . . "If that is your attitude, then the leaders of the Congress Party and Sikhs will refuse final acceptance at the meeting in the morning, chaos will follow, and you will lose your Pakistan, probably for good." "What could he, must be," was his

only reaction, as he shrugged his shoulders. . . "Mr Jinnah! I do not intend to let you wreck all the work that has gone into this settlement since you will not accept for the Moslem League I will speak for them myself. . . I have only one condition, and that is that when I say at the meeting in the morning 'Mr Liaquat has given me assurances which I have accepted and which satisfy me,' you will in no circumstances contradict that, and that when I look towards you, you will nod. . ." Jinnah's reply to the proposition itself was to nod.⁷⁴

The formal announcement was made on the night of June 3. Bhopal, Patiala, and the prime ministers of a dozen major princely states joined the viceroy in his own office to get the copy of the plan before it was broadcast to the world. At 11:00 p.m. Indira Prasad carried the public announcement to the world first by the viceroy the two were by separate speakers from Nehru, Jinnah, and Baldev Singh. The viceroy announced,

On February 20th 1947 His Majesty's Government announced their intention of transferring power by June 1947. We had hoped that it would be possible for the two parties to cooperate. This hope has not been fulfilled. . . the procedure outlined below indicates the best practical method of ascertaining the wishes of the people. . . to determine the authority or authorities to whom power should be transferred.⁷⁵

Then followed a provincial and district breakdown of "Pakistan" with similar lists as to how legislative assemblies would be held to decide by "a simple majority" for or against partition. Provincial assemblies as national "to avoid the difficulties provinces or parts of provinces would 'proceed independently' and the existing constituent assemblies as well as the new constituent assemblies formed should proceed to form Constitutions." These bodies would be "free to fix their own rules. His Majesty's Government were now willing to 'accept' the June 3rd plan and envisioned settling a permanent independent government or governments" by an even earlier date. Accordingly, His Majesty's Government proposed introducing legislation "during the next session for the transfer of power this year on a Dominion Status basis to one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken as a result of this announcement," Mountbatten concluded.⁷⁶

"I am glad that I am afforded an opportunity to speak to you directly through the radio from New Delhi," he began. He let Nehru, Mountbatten and Nehru had finished their speeches, "It is the first time I believe that a non-official has been afforded an opportunity to address pro-

ple through the medium of this powerful instrument on political matters. It is a rare well-earned hope that in the future I shall have greater facilities to enable me to voice my views and opinions which will reach you directly and rather than in the cold print of the newspapers." How pleased he must have been, how proud to be seated there addressing millions of listeners—a veritable viceroy at long last.

Jinnah's speech had a mild, dignified aspect and as one "expert" in League "diplomacy" wrote, "put it. This means peace."⁷⁷ Mountbatten's press secretaries were however more cautious: "His assessment of Jinnah's last words had a . . . [sic] Jinnah closed with Pakistan Ambedkar said such a speech over the same startled listeners though, at first that . . . [he] pronounced 'Pakistan's in the bag!'"

On the morning of June 5, Mountbatten, with the political leaders again in the audience, made an offer to discuss the administrative consequences of partition as an official basis for the transfer of power. Jinnah was at pains to explain that both States would be independent and equal in every way. Nehru pointed out that he was the leader of a government and he different India was emerging never with the same but he said that different Principles were employed in the same must not except for lack of the Government of India's forego policy. Jinnah was very tense.⁷⁸

The last meeting of the All-India Muslim League was held in New Delhi's magnificent Imperial Hotel on June 6-10 1947. Some 125 Muslim leaders gathered at a ballroom grand hall overlooking the city. The hall was filled with ten thousand Muslim men, women, and children from the whole of India. The hall was one of those sumptuous places of peace and quiet that long reflected British interests in India. The hall was a grand hall. At first, the Muslim League leaders might have been the tranquility of this civilized retreat. During its history, however, the Muslim League proved partition had been free day. But not for long. Militant Muslim opposition from every province, orthodox mullahs and clerics, and the most to the right from the Muslims themselves, even if they were the ones who urged the thought of giving Calcutta to the British, erupted out a gale of fire. A room against the plan, calling it "betrayal" and a "tragedy for Pakistan." Khaksars rushed in, waving their swords, brandishing belahs, or sharpened spoons . . . shouting "Get Jinnah! . . . half-way up the staircase leading to the ballroom where Jinnah and the Council were in session before . . . League National Guards could grapple with them and turn them back. It took police with tear gas to bring the disturbance to an end.⁷⁹ Some fifty Khaksars would be wounded, arrested,

and hotel guests in the orange "ran helter-skelter" while those in the "dining hall" sat down for their dinner with tearful eyes as the tear gas spread in it. Had Mr. Jinnah, however, continued the proceedings of the meeting untrammelled by the disturbances on the ground floor. A few demonstrators, who found their way into the meeting hall, were soon ejected. On the 1st floor of the Hotel, Muslim League National Guards and Khaksar demonstrators clashed . . . broke furniture and smashed glass panes . . . & a few persons sustained injuries."⁴¹ morning news reported.

Inside the grand ballroom, Jinnah was hailed as "*Shahenshah-e-Pakistan*" (literally, "Emperor of Pakistan") in the Persian style of Iran's monarch, but he was quick to disclaim that title, urging his supporters not to exult and insisting, "I am a soldier of Pakistan, not its Emperor." Then, the learned orator, Quaid-e-Azam Late sent a transcript of shorthand notes on the proceedings, presumably taken by a Congress spy⁴² to Mountbatten soon after the meeting ended. The League's council gave full authority to President Quaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah, to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan as a compromise and to leave it to him, with full authority to work out all the details of the Plan in an equitable and just manner. . . . [Italics added].⁴³

That League resolution caused a howl of indignation from the Congress press and even a letter of protest from Nehru and Patel "who were Mountbatten's express fears that they would not be able to manage the All India Congress Committee in view of the failure of the League to make a definite announcement that they accepted the plan as a *settlement*." [Italics added]⁴⁴ Muslim zealots were, however, even more outraged at how far from the original Pakistan demand Jinnah had gone toward accepting the plan and Rahmat Ali's Pakistan National Movement in Calcutta, now denounced it as "**The Greatest Betrayal**" to the "**whole Millat (Muslim Community)**," writing:

It has now been completely betrayed, bartered and dismembered by Mr. Jinnah, whose act of accepting the British Plan shatters the foundations of all its nations and countries and sabotages the future of all its 100 million members living in the Continent of India . . . unless nullified, it will forever cripple the life of the Pak Nation, blight the existence of the Millat in India, and compromise the freedom of the Fraternity throughout the world. . . . We will carry on the fight to the end. . . . We will never quit or capitulate. . . . It shall never be said of us that, when the time came to choose between the great offer of the All India Muslim League and the British we too followed the quislings and chose betrayal. *Long Live The Millat!*⁴⁵

The first meeting of the interim government's cabinet following the announced plan almost led to a fight between Nehru and Liaquat over Jawaharlal's appointment of his sister Madam Cama to be an ambassador, at which point Mountbatten shouted, "Gentlemen, what hopes have we of getting a peaceable partition if the first discussion leads to such a disgraceful scene as this?"⁴⁶ The answer, of course, was "*None!*"

Karachi—"Pakistan Zindabad" (1947)

On June 20, 1947, members of the Bengal legislative assembly voted for partition of their province by a large majority. Three days later the Punjab assembly voted for a similar decision. A similar vote in the provincial assembly of the United Provinces of A. & O. P. was also secured. The Sindh legislature also voted, 33 to 20, to join Pakistan. "Thus we can look upon the creation of Pakistan on the 15th August as legally foreseen upon," Mountbatten reported on June 27.

Jinnah was invited into the viceroy's office that day to sit with Nehru and Patel as well as Lord Mountbatten to discuss a new partition commission which addressed itself to the creation of boundary commissions. Four judicial officers were chosen by Congress and two by the Tories were to sit on each commission for partitioning the Punjab and Bengal. Jinnah suggested a distinguished barrister Sir Cyril Radcliffe to chair Congress boundary commissions. Radcliffe, who has never been an official of India and expressed no known opinions on its problems was unanimously accepted and would decide the destiny of millions of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims by the power of his repeatedly requested casting vote. Nehru subsequently expressed his misgivings about Radcliffe because of his close Conservative associations, and he urged that the federal court serve instead as final arbitrator, but Jinnah was adamantly opposed. Radcliffe reached New Delhi on July 1, giving him precisely five weeks to draw new national boundaries across whose lines a tense dispute in both countries developed. In the end, refugees would run terrified in opposite directions.

Separate committees went to work to partition the army and other elements of the vast administrative machine that had kept British India

running for some ninety years. Mountbatten hoped and indeed expected to be asked to stay on as governor general over both new dominions at once symbolizing their freedom and continued cooperation in the expediting the process of the final division of assets. In an equitable manner Jinnah could hear nothing of that, however, insisting he must become governor-general of Pakistan himself. Jinnah suspected both Mountbatten's of open favoritism to Congress, knowing how unfair they were not. Nehru, also, feared that Pakistan might be compromised or possibly suffer as a straw child under Mountbatten. Jinnah was also acutely conscious of the inherently consuming his hopes and dreams at the time remained to his life. He was eager to enjoy at least a taste of power to which he had never been accustomed to. As Prime Minister however he would never have been suited with dash political as well as administrative responsibilities and preferred to leave those to a stronger man. But, governor general would make him even more with Mountbatten, Attlee, Smuts, and all the other heads of dominions of the Commonwealth work over. It was very unusual and unworthy of a Prime Minister. And it was not a fitting first and only just reward for his to hold in the nation he had created.

It will be remembered that I reported to the Cabinet Committee that Jinnah had put in a request to me to return to me as the Governor General of India. Mountbatten wrote on July 4, "I would want to know from you that although he thought the Governor General would be better than me, he asked me specifically to stay as it was a very important position and over the other two." Mountbatten could not get out of me a reply that perhaps perhaps perhaps he and his staff out there press him for "an answer" to the most governor general idea they were all so anxious to impose.

India like Pakistan depended initially on British officers to head all important services, while Field Marshal Auchinleck and his command over both dominion armies for almost half a year following August 15. Nehru, like Jinnah, depended on several British governors, including Sir John Colvin of Bombay and Sir Arthur Adams of Madras to serve independent India in their same official capacities. Nothing Mountbatten could say made Jinnah budge from his resolve to take direct control of Pakistan. After much soul-searching, considerable misgivings and further consultation with London, the Mountbattens decided, nonetheless, to remain in New Delhi for almost another year, as originally planned.

"In moving the Third Reading of this Bill," Crisp informed the Commons on July 18, when he opened the final debate of the Indian Independence Bill, "I am introducing what will be the last Debate in this House on

courses from which India is suffering . . . is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures as soon as it is possible. . . . Black-marketing is another curse. . . . I know that black-marketeers are frequently caught and punished. Judicial sentences are passed or sometimes fines only are imposed. Now you have to tackle this monster which today is a colossal crime against society in our distressed conditions, when we constantly face shortage of food. . . . A citizen who does black-marketing commits, I think, a greater crime than the biggest and most grievous of crimes. These black-marketeers are really knowing, the agent and certainly responsible people. . . . I think they ought to be very severely punished, because they undermine the entire system of control . . . and cause wholesale starvation and want and even death.

The next thing that strikes me is this. Here again it is a legacy which has been passed on to us . . . the evil of nepotism and jobbery. This evil must be crushed relentlessly. I want to make it quite clear that I shall never tolerate any kind of jobbery, nepotism or any assistance directly or indirectly brought to bear upon me. . . . I know there are people who do not yet agree with the division of India and the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Much has been said against it, but now that it has been accepted by the decision of everyone, if you have not been honourably acting according to the agreement which was made, then you are hindering it. But on most matters as you said that this rightly revolution that has taken place is unprecedented.

But the question is, whether it was possible or practicable to act otherwise than what has been done. . . . A division had to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there are sections of people who may not agree with it, who may not like it, but in my judgement there was no other solution and I am sure future history will record its verdict in favour of it. And what is more it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that that was the only solution. . . . Any idea of a United India could never have worked and in my judgement it would have led us to terrific disaster. May be that view is correct, may be it is not, that remains to be seen.¹²

He seemed unable to move his mind from that awesome question. For the first time he seemed challenged by the judgement of you and I. It might not have been correct, sensing perhaps that the worst part of the dream—the true tragic nightmare of partition was about to begin, the one that came waiting behind this “cyclical revolution.” All the same, he continued in this uncharacteristic trouble of momentary reflection before the people picked up his, pita, mawaib, rajas shahs, and khans trying to lather out

well as follow his every word. In this division it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or the other.”

Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solution. Now what shall we do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. You change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.

I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time we will see a Pakistan in the major and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community, because even as regards Muslims we have Itharis, Itharis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmans, Vashnavs, Khatrias, so Bengalis, Madrasis and so on, will vanish. Indeed it is the best thing that has happened in the history of India that we are all the citizens of one State and that for this we would have been free peoples long long ago.¹³

What a remarkable reversal it was, as though he had been transformed overnight once again into the old Ambassador of Hind-Mustaf-Urdu that Sarojin Nandan loved. His mind was racing too swiftly for logical coherence, almost free associating as he rambled extemporaneously. Was it in fact, over now? Or was it all just about to begin?

You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. . . . You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State. . . . We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government. . . . Today you might say that it is not the same as it was in the past, but it is now. It exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and all members of the Nation.¹⁴

What was he talking about? Had he simply forgotten where he was? Had the cyclone of events so disoriented him that he was arming the opposition's brief? Was his pleading for a united India on the eve of Pakistan's birth those hundreds of thousands of terrified innocents were slaughtered among their homes, and their ancestors' graves and tombs and the cries of children or a refugee camp, a strange land? Now the governor-general-designate continued, "I think we should keep in front of us our idea, and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State. I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fairness without any bias as to the particular language, prejudice or I would say other words, partially or favouritism. My guiding principle will be to see and do what is just, fair, equitable and I am sure I did with your support and co-operation I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest Nations of the world."¹⁸

Yet even as he concluded on so optimistic a note, rumor had reached Liaquat Ali, as well as Jinnah, that the strategic Muslim major to C. I. has not disavowed the possibility of attacking the on-coming road access to Kashmir, was going to be awarded a trust largely by British Liaquat was a Muslim but such a trust a Jew would be sworn by Muslims as to grave a breach of faith as to impair future friendly relations between Liaquat and the British. Mountbatten insisted however that he had "resolved to keep himself out of the whole business" at the boardroom commission and had not so much as seen the final maps, which were then brought to his office by Radcliffe after he and his wife had flown from Delhi to Karachi on August 13 to begin their formal transfer of power here, welcoming His Majesty as well as his own official greetings to the new Dominion.

Jinnah and Fatima awaited the Mountbattens not at Karachi airport but inside the entrance hall of government house, which had been decked up to look just like a Hollywood film-set, and all four were subjected to takings and re-takings under the dazzling light and sizzling heat of the arc lamps. Jinnah remained strangely aloof at the banquet which he had for the Mountbattens there that night. Liaquat and the other League leaders who had listened to his disappointed ramblings before the constituent assembly, then insisted that he read from a prepared text, since the entire diplomatic corps as well as world press would be represented in the banquet hall. He rose to adjust his monocle to his eye, unfolding the text and reading softly, slowly, "Your Excellency, Your Highness, and Ladies and Com-

mons, I have great pleasure in proposing a toast to His Majesty the King."¹⁹ The words had been fashioned for him by the best of his bright young clerks. Nothing on this coast was fresh—only the fra' voice that read it aloud in such perfect upper-class English accent. Here I would like to say, Your Excellency Lord Mountbatten, how much we appreciate your having carried out wholeheartedly the policy and the practice that was laid down by the plan of 3rd June. Pakistan and Hindustan will always remember you. Perhaps he did not hear the word "Hindustan" insisting upon using it as a way of showing his old-fashioned feeling as a more appropriate appellation for Pakistan's neighbor than "India" which was after all, at an English corruption of the name of Pakistan's major river artery, the Indus.

Mountbatten sat at dinner between Miss Jinnah and Begum Liaquat Ali Khan interpreted. They both pulled a leg about the ridiculous ceremony, as Jinnah was saying that it was astounding that a responsible Government could be guided by astrology. I refrained from retorting that the whole idea to propitiate the gods had to be changed because Jinnah had forgotten that it was Bahá'is and had had to change the word hourly. Jinnah had himself suggested to a dinner party."²⁰

Next morning the Jinnahs drove from the government house to the legislative assembly hall among a throng of cheering anti-imperialist soldiers as well as police armed to watch for possible assassins. Since reports of a Sikh plan to assassinate Jinnah on the day Pakistan was born had reached Mountbatten and Jinnah several days earlier, the angry shouts of Pakistan Zindabad and Qutub-uz-Zamin Zindabad were heard at his carriage. The Mountbattens dined in a separate carriage and missed the awarded senatorial chamber of Pakistan's parliament which had been so far legislative assembly. Lord Mountbatten graciously indicated Jinnah Liaquat's message from his cousin King George welcoming Pakistan to the Commonwealth. Jinnah replied reading again from the carefully hammered out words of a text prepared by his staff.

Your Excellency, I thank His Majesty on behalf of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and myself. I once more thank you and Lady Mountbatten for your kindness and good wishes. Yes, we are parting as friends. . . and I assure you that we shall not be wanting in friendly spirit with our neighbours and with all nations of the world."²¹

Lady Mountbatten pressed Miss Jinnah's hand affectionately as Jinnah sat down after giving his address, a witness reported. "If Jinnah's personality is cold and remote. It also has a magnetic quality—the sense of lordship. . .

almost overpowering. Here indeed is Pakistan's King Emperor, Archbishop of Canterbury, Speaker and Prime Minister concentrated into one formidable Quid-e-Azam."²²

Munibbatten was both worried about a possible assassination attempt and feared that if it was going to be tried against Jinnah then was the time when he as governor-general should be driven back to the government house in an open carriage. "It occurred to me that the best way for me to protect him would be to insist on one riding in the same carriage you see." Munibbatten recalled, smiling. "I knew that no-one in that crowd would want to ask should I be. And luckily it worked beautifully. But such was Jinnah's power, I know that to someone did we get inside the gates of Government House then he tapped my knee and said, 'Thank God I was able to bring you back alive!'"²³

The Munibbattens flew to New Delhi that afternoon for another round of independence negotiations at the Constituent Assembly and Red Fort where the tricolor of India's dominion was raised at midnight. "Long ago we made a vow to destroy Nehru, informed his nation, and now that time comes when we shall redeem our pledge." At the stroke of midnight, when the world sleeps, India will wake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to a new dawn, when we end old ways and when the sun of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance."²⁴

The next morning British "barons" were revealed, and a new breed of men and then the slaughter began. In and around Ambala hundreds of men, Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims, they could fire, while in and around Delhi Muslims, Hindus, many of them "police" shot and their knives and swords cut down the British and Sikhs, the traitors and the traitors were killed and burned into burning coffins, fumes, pines on wheels, food, the mounted valtures who darkened the skies over the Punjab and were sated with human flesh and blood in those final weeks of August till the traitors were then enjoyed in a century.

In Bengal Gandhi fasted on Independence Day knowing how many were condemned to premature death by that double-dominion birthday. In Calcutta all businesses closed in terror for two days, August 15-16, the latter deemed so "inauspicious" by Hindu astrologers that no religious Brahman dared to leave the safety of his home. The Mahasabha raised black flags in opposition to partition, the vivisection of Mother India. *Akhbar Hindustan*, Calcutta, Muslims fled, ahmuk, and hid in panics, "crawling together for sanctuary in certain predominantly Muslim areas of the city," General Tucker reported, "deserted, leaderless, depressed and on the down-

sive." Sanity was restored to that premier city of eastern India a week later. Gandhi undertook a fast unto death to help stop the killing of innocents.

The austere Muslim month of *Ramazan* ended on August 18 and Jinnah broadcast an Id day message to his nation, announcing that

This day of rejoicing throughout the Muslim world so aptly comes immediately in the wake of our national state being established and therefore, it is a matter of special significance and happiness to us all. . . . I fervently pray that God Almighty make us all worthy of our past and hearty in our and go forward strength to make Pakistan truly a great nation amongst all the nations of the world. No matter what we have achieved Pakistan has not stood still. We are going forward and great responsibilities have been placed on us and a great burden on our determination and endeavour to discharge them."²⁵

But the strength had gone out of him. He could carry on only after longer and longer interludes of rest in his lonely way of the government house where only Fatima, the secretaries and servants were permitted. Fatima saw it most clearly. She knew he was close enough to see that at

even his hour of triumph the Quid-e-Azam was gravely ill. I watched with sorrow and pain. He had little or no sleep and had even lost his ability to eat himself. . . . It is recorded with reports from both sides of the border of the tower going on, mass rape, rape and looting. He began as day discussing these matters, things with me at breakfast and his handkerchief nervously often went to his moist eyes.

The Constitution had to be framed, and he applied his mind to this as often as he could. . . . He worked in a frenzy to consolidate Pakistan. And of course he took a toll of his health and his coughing and slight temperature were becoming more and more. At my insistence he agreed to be examined by Colonel Ralston, his personal physician, who diagnosed a slight attack of malaria. The Quid, who had an aversion to medicine, said, "I don't have malaria. I am just run down." Asked to rest he replied flatly, "I have too much to do."²⁶

He did not in fact have malaria. He had consumption, soon to be compounded by cancer of the lungs.

In Karachi his working day usually started at 8.30 A.M. when he seated in a well before him a large table with his papers were stacked, with his Grand Calender, a clock, a box of pens and a box of 100 gaudy pencils. . . . He would sit at his desk in a room "Jinnah's aide-de-camp, Brigadier Hussain recalled.

Jinnah's fragility had been, of course, well known, but since the birth of Pak stan he had better reason perhaps than ever to guard each supper for he found, as he told Begum Shad Nawaz, "from twenty crores [200 million] rupees in the restaurants and nearly a peck forty crores of gold lying on the table." Nor was India willing to part with substantial funds worth assets of Pakistan by the formula agreed in 1947, and for that the assets of the British Raj Patel and Bhabha were specially loath to part Pakistan with the wherewithal to high India—whether in the Punjab, Sind, Kashmir or Bengal.

Jinnah knew how precarious Pakistan's position, like his own health was, and issued a statement in the press on August 24, 1947, urging calm in the face of the "grave unrest" created by the daily news of the "outrages, persecution, and slaughter of Muslims in India's East Punjab. He assured the people of Pakistan was doing all in its power to "give succour and relief to the victims and to help evacuate Muslims from terrorized districts and States."

In the last week of August, the Mayor of Karachi and his council also presented an "address of welcome" on vellum encased in silver to the Qasid-Azam who responded in the old Muslim Corporation Building. In his brief address, he said, "I would like to say that people in Karachi have kept their minds cool and lived as usual. I must so much to tell 'Jinnah' in other parts of his government. Refugees, workers, merchants and their businesses and capital flowed into Karachi from everywhere by sea and air, as well as along new roads. Property and sources of goods and services were in such demand that prices skyrocketed. For Jinnah to negotiate the hot issues of national defence, agriculture, and as the Punjab withered and writhed in post-partition torment and pain, he began to blossom with Karachi both in the vanguard of growth and development. Pakistan's entire navy, consisting initially of a single frigate and a few minesweepers and smaller craft, was based at Karachi, for Chittagong was still a village lit by kerosene lanterns, a "port" with dock only for two ships at a time, at the landing of the British Club in Bengal, the one building as yet capable of generating its own electricity.

Even as remoteness from the Punjab border offered Karachi breath of space in which to prosper, proximity left Lahore a shambles, the target of endless streams of destitute refugees, much as Amritsar and Delhi then became. The sick and dying brought every need, demand, and physical fight with their battered bodies to a city whose housing shortage had been tripled by arson and whose water supply was infested with the worst diseases of dead and disintegrating corpses thrown into its arteries. Its streets now rose and once beautiful Mughal gardens were turned into crowded camps for Muslim refugees fleeing Sikh persecution. Much to

"everyone's surprise," Jinnah attended a Joint Indo-Pak Defence Council meeting, chaired by Liaquat Khan, at the end of August. His doctor's orders and fever notwithstanding, the Qasid-Azam flew into the Punjab capital to see for himself how much dread damage had been done since his last visit. Governor Sir Francis Maud, former the governor of Sind, had been appointed to Jinnah to replace Sir Asaf Ali Khan on the eve of independence. Jinnah liked Maud and lived with him in Lahore.

Jinnah insisted on dismantling the Punjab Boundary Force that Mountbatten had created a month earlier, and had proved virtually useless in the face of the tragedy that ensued. He preferred to have the Muslim troops of that 50,000-man unit back inside Pakistan's borders, should they be required elsewhere in the near future. Kashmir's ill-fated effort to remain independent by vacillating, ultimately playing a waiting game that was to prove fatal, exposed him to a further serious setback. A telegram from the Muslim League had been refused to join India and the Congress "intention" reported early in September that the Muslim government was testing the "paradoxical" theory of "Czechoslovakia and a general to hand up its sword" were given. "Whether or not it is a sword, it was a sword," Jinnah said, "and I think the sword into close alliance with it, it actually under the sovereignty of Pakistan."

As detailed in a chapter later, the minister M. Raza Ali Khan, Jinnah's most intimate disciple in the nizamat's inner circle, recalled

On more than one occasion we discussed the Pakistan Plan . . . and what would happen to the rest of the Muslims and the Muslim States, particularly the State of Hyderabad. One evening, early in September (1947), I received a long-distance call from Karachi, the Governor-General . . . He . . . told me that the first delegation of Pakistan to the United Nations would be leaving shortly for Lake Success and he had included me . . . I mildly protested that I . . . was too involved in my affairs and suggested that it would be more appropriate if some one from Pakistan takes my place. . . I met Mr. Jinnah in Karachi . . . at the very start elaborated that Pakistan . . . was in urgent need of finances. . . He was aware of my personal contacts with the financial circles . . . in the USA and some parts of Europe. . . He said Pakistan would accept any reasonable terms and offer "quid pro quo" short of affecting its hard earned sovereignty. . . when I returned towards the end of October, I . . . managed to journey to Lahore, and saw him along in bed. The doctors had forbidden visitors but I was allowed to meet him for no more than half an hour. I briefly reported the return to Mr. Jinnah. Pakistan was faced with another serious situation . . . India had withheld the agreed share of . . . Reserve Banks

cash balances amounting to some Rs. 55 crore. There was hardly any money to meet the day-to-day expenses and the position was really critical. India, believed that this very first blow would finish Pakistan. Could Hyderabad state or the Nizam advance adequate loan to Pakistan to tide over the crisis?

... Never in my life had I seen Mr. Jinnah emotional except on that day. He asked me if I had seen the refugees as I drove from the airport. ... I had of course. Tears rolled down his cheeks several times as he spoke of the mass human misery. ... Soon after that the Nizam sanctioned a loan of Rs. 20 crore to Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah lost no time in publicly announcing that Pakistan had received a loan of that sum from Hyderabad and ... had no further financial problems. ... the leaders of India were just wild and furious over it.²⁰

Jinnah had also sent Isphahani to the United States as Pakistan's ambassador and deputy leader of the UN delegation which future foreign minister Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan and Isphahani purchased a book going to Washington for \$50,000 to serve as Pakistan's "Chancery" and wrote Jinnah from New York in mid-September to report having

met the top executive of General Motors Company who have taken prompt note of your requirement of a Cadillac super-limousine. ... General Motors has assured that arrangements would be made for the delivery of the car at Karachi as soon as possible and will override all other prior bookings. ... In regard to the special aeroplane my friends and I have contacted some leading manufacturers. ... I hope you are keeping good health.²¹

The super-limousine cost \$60,000 and was "cavern green." A converted B-24 Bessiecraft was to cost more than the limousine, owing to its Jinnah needed on a Vickers Armstrong, instead, the price of which was "not unreasonable."²²

Jinnah ordered Liaquat to move his cabinet secretariat to Lahore in September and joined him there the following month, as relations with India deteriorated to the point of virtual "war."²³ Armed "convoys" of Muslim refugees saving their souls pass through India's borders only with special instructions from Nehru and official Indian "escorts." Ismay flew to Karachi in mid-September to meet with Jinnah for no less than eleven hours during his two-day visit, reporting himself to have been "the first guest at Government House since the 15th August," winning over Jinnah enough to be called "a good fellow" by the Quaid-i-Azam in his

face.²⁴ But the more disturbing part of Ismay's report to his chief was that "Jinnah was full of wrath against Congress, saying that he could never understand these men's hatreds and was now beginning to feel that there was no alternative but to fight it out."

The Muslim nabab of Junagadh, a small princely state on the coast of Kathiawar, acceded to Pakistan that September, though his domain was surrounded by India and the vast majority of its subjects population was Hindu. The apostate nababs showed disdain was Sindh landowner Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, the overpowering father of Pakistan's ace prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who drafted the documents of accession and personally delivered them to Jinnah. Nehru and Patel were outraged when they learned of Junagadh's "treachery" and demanded martial invasion until November, driving Muslim leaders like the Bhuttos to sail from Veraval port to Karachi with their families and to work hard at Pakistan's service.

Before the end of September, Jinnah appeared directly to his closest wealthy colleagues for help in Pakistan's tragic disputes with its closest neighbour. The flood of refugees continued to deplete Punjab and each new arrival brought blood-curdling tales of alleged "atrocities" that fuelled the hatred of Muslims throughout the Northwest and the main focus for revenge against the "infidels," igniting passions with which communal pressures for retaliation and downing conditions of peace of India. Sir Archibald Cooper, permanent under-secretary of Commonwealth Relations Office, visited Karachi at this time, and London became more conscious of the urgency of Pakistan's plight and the potential outcome of Indo-Pak war. The first flew to Delhi and remained for several nights as Morarji was eager in the government house, partly to save war-torn Lahore from fleeing back to Lahore. "Let India go, honest men committed act of war and see what happens!" Ismay understood Jinnah's thinly veiled threat as apparent, named at Kashmir. Morarji's chief-of-staff returned to London in early October, and again in November, with Jinnah in Karachi, on October 2, Gandhi's seventy-eighth birthday.

The procastinating nabab of Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, signed a truce agreement with Pakistan that permitted petrol supplies and other vital needs of that northernmost state of South Asia to continue flowing over the Pakistan roads that served as its major highways to the world. Hari Singh knew that time was running out. Muslim peasants in Kashmir's northern province of Poonch were the first to revolt. That September and early October, neighboring Pakistani Muslims crossed the Poonch border to help their co-religionists fight against the maharaja's forces sent to put down the revolt. By mid-October Pakistan stopped all shipments of vital

supplies to Kashmir. New Delhi then "decided to step into the breach and try to send such things as salt, kerosene and sugar" to "unlocked" Srinagar.⁷⁶

On October 23, British trucks and jeeps of the Pakistan army, loaded with some 5,000 armed Pathan, Afghani, Waziri and Mahsud tribesmen, of the North-West Frontier crossed the Kashmir border and headed east along the Muzaffargarh-Baramulla road, but did not enter Srinagar itself. That a vast "volunteer" action had taken place, "spontaneous" by state troops rushing to the aid and support of Muslim brothers. But the trucks, petrol, and drivers were mostly standard tribal equipment and British officers as well as Pakistani officials along the northern Pakistan route they traversed knew and supposed even if they did not actually organize or instigate that violent October action by which Pakistan seems to have been "triggered" into integration of Kashmir into the action whose historic name gave rise to "Kashmiri" tribal warriors' reports of the tribes burning and sacking Muzaffargarh and reaching New Delhi on the night of October 24 and the ex-military Pakistan army headquarters. He had returned to New Delhi's sister dominion command that "tribal volunteers" had "entered Kashmir." Their advance guard, only 35 to 40 miles from Srinagar. Mountbatten summoned an emergency meeting of the Indian Defence Committee that Saturday morning and they agreed to assemble at the army area where they could be far from a "discrete" despatch to Srinagar. V. P. Menon was sent through the Mahajan's heights to see if he could convince Hari Singh to sign an accession agreement at this point. Menon returned early Sunday morning, October 28, to report to Mountbatten. He said, and "told the Mahajan" had given pieces of cloth and could "come to no decision." His state's prime minister, M. C. Mahajan, later chief justice of India, however, proved receptive to Menon's mission and returned with him to New Delhi, where he met with Nehru and Patel.

"I requested immediate military aid on any terms," Mahajan told Nehru, "Give us the military force we need. Take the accession and give what ever you desire to the people." By to save Srinagar this evening or else I will go to Lahore and terms with Mr. Jinnah.⁷⁷ Mahajan reported that Nehru "became upset" and "angry" at the mention of Jinnah's name and ordered him "away." Patel detained him, whispering, "Of course, Mahajan, you are not going to Pakistan." Then Sheikh Abdullah, who appears to have been "from an adjoining bedroom in Nehru's Delhi house, sent in a message" to Mahajan in which which words changed Nehru's "attitude."

The next morning the defence council met and decided to airlift the First Sikh Battalion from New Delhi to Srinagar. "In the early hours of the morning of the 27th," Mahajan wrote, "I could hear the noise of the planes flying over Sardar Baldev Singh's house where Mahajan spent the night and carrying the military personnel to Srinagar. At about 9 a.m. I got a message from . . . Srinagar that troops had landed there and had gone into action. On receipt of this message, I flew to Jammu with Mr. V. P. Menon. . . . Mr. Menon and myself met His Highness [Hari Singh] had driven down from Srinagar, he came to the night to his winter capital at the palace. . . . After some delay, a document was signed, which Mr. Menon took back to New Delhi. . . . I stayed at Jammu. This was a narrow shave."

Mahajan's autobiography account of his most important sequence of events is at critical variance with previous reports published by V. P. Menon and others close to Nehru and Patel and associated with the Government of India at the time. Menon insists that Kashmir's "instrument of accession" was signed and delivered to New Delhi before Indian troops were flown into action in Srinagar. Mahajan reports the exact opposite. The actual sequence of events, the "critical moment" in India's case to Kashmir was, in legal terms, based on having secured "legitimate instrument of accession" in plain text, lifting any troops into the Vale of Kashmir, at least understanding that to risk at least some sending troops would be considerable" and if that occurred then two Commonwealth armies, each trained and led by British Commonwealth officers, would move and the first test of a battle, a test of one army on a battlefield. It would have been so enormous a victory for the British conclusion to the last "climber in India," that Mountbatten had to move heaven and earth to avoid so tragic a development. He had, in fact, struggled over a hundred times to get the "accession" as well as the "accession" with less than a day's notice, and packed India's best Sikh regiment inside those planes, loaded and kept ready to take off before dawn on October 27. At that he lacked was the signed accession, which would, he rightly reported to his colleagues, "take the accession position and come back with an armed clash with Pakistan forces to the minimum. I shall relate a little further on how lucky it was that this accession was accepted."⁷⁸ The crisis situation Mountbatten faced during that last terrible week in October obviously did not permit the luxury of holding a plebiscite or referendum. The tribes were burning, looting, raping, shooting, and within a day's march of Srinagar, where hundreds of thousands of people were virtually unprotected or as Mountbatten quite accurately put it, "time did not of course, permit the will of the people being ascertained first," prior to letting those guard-

an troops over the Hindu as an wall that separated Delhi from Srinagar. By the same token, how should time permit the decision of an atrocious maharaja who had gone to pieces" died Srinagar and abandoned his own subjects to a fate worse than death, to stand in the way of their salvation?"

"Even after this decision had been reached Lord Mountbatten and the three British Chiefs of Staff of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks involved in the operation," V. P. Menon reported. "But Nehru asserted that the only alternative to sending troops would be to allow a massacre in Srinagar, which would be followed by a major communal riot across India. Moreover, the British residents in Srinagar would certainly be murdered by the rioters since neither the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief nor the Supreme Commander was in a position to safeguard their lives."⁴¹ What else could Lord Mountbatten possibly have done in the face of such dire warnings, threats, and advice? To hesitate for even an hour might have proved fatal to so precarious an operation.

On October 27, as soon as Governor-General Jinnah learned of India's airlift to Srinagar, he ordered his acting British Commander-in-Chief General Macgregor to leave. General Sir Douglas Gracey to lead two brigades of the Indian Army into Kashmir from Rawalpindi and another from Sialkot. The Sialkot army was to march to Jammu, take the city, and make the Maharaja a prisoner. The Rawalpindi army was to march to Srinagar and capture the city.⁴² Such strategic action could have secured Kashmir for Pakistan, while saving Srinagar from tribal attacks. General Gracey refused, however, to accept these orders from his governor-general, warning Jinnah that "he was not prepared to issue instructions which would inevitably lead to armed conflict between the Dominion and the withdrawn British Officers without the approval of the Supreme Commander."⁴³ [Field Marshal Auchinleck.]⁴⁴

Having just flown in from Karachi, Jinnah was in Lahore at this time and saved with MacGregor who was "most aggressive and anxious to go over the phone, wanting to know 'Why the hell Gracey was not carrying out Mr. Jinnah's orders. What had it got to do with the Supreme Commander? What did it matter if the British Officers were withdrawn? Could he not send the troops on without British Officers? Mr. Jinnah insisted on the orders being issued at once." Gracey informed Auchinleck the next day that he thought "Mudie had been drinking," and Mountbatten added to his report of this unpleasant incident to the King, that Sir Francis had apparently "lived up to his reputation." General Gracey informed Field Marshal Auchinleck from Rawalpindi by phone at 1.00 A.M. on October 27-28 that he had "received orders from Jinnah which if obeyed would mean 'Stand Down' order."⁴⁵ Auchinleck wore his chiefs of staff

London on October 28. A "stand down" order meant the automatic withdrawal of all British officers from a Dominion army.

The "Ank" flew into Lahore from Delhi that fateful morning of October 28 and was met at the airport by Gracey, who stated that the orders Gracey had not obeyed were nonetheless issued to Pakistani troops "to seize Baramulla and Srinagar also Pothohar Pass and to send troops into Mirpur district of Jammu."⁴⁶ The supreme commander and General Gracey went to confront Jinnah immediately to explain the "chaos among British officers very clearly." Auchinleck reported to London. Gracey also emphasized military weakness of Pakistan which I pointed out "incalculable consequences of radical isolation of what now is eastern India. The consequence of Kashmir's sudden accession." His approach to Jinnah, Mountbatten reported of Auchinleck's "extra confrontation" in Lahore was based on the fact that India's acceptance of the accession of Kashmir was not a legally proper and correct decision. Kashmir's accession of Jinnah's accession that India had a perfect right to send troops in to settle in response to the Maharaja's request, and on the extreme urgency of the Pakistan Army and its need to act without delay. Jinnah withdrew orders. Auchinleck was able to report at the end of his longest day in India's service.

Mountbatten and Ismay flew to Lahore without Nehru on November 1, 1947, and met with Liaquat, who was quite sick with a fever that morning in his bedroom.

He was sitting up with a rug round his knees looking very ill. I began by giving Liaquat a copy of a statement which had been signed by the three India Commanders-in-Chief intended to dispel the impression in the minds of the Pakistan Government that India had planned the sending of military assistance to Kashmir before the tribal invasion began. . . . I then went on to explain . . . the whole position of Junagadh . . . and of Kashmir, as I saw it. I used the same arguments as I later expanded to Jinnah whom I saw in the afternoon. The burden of Liaquat's reply was that the Maharaja had brought about a serious situation by allowing his Hindus, and in particular his State forces, to massacre Muslims particularly in, and across the border of, Jammu. . . . Liaquat appeared to be very depressed and almost disinclined to make any further effort to avoid war, Ismay and I did our best to cheer him up. . . . he . . . bade us a very friendly adieu.⁴⁷

Mountbatten and Ismay went off directly to lunch with Jinnah, and after finishing their food, accompanied the Qaid-i-Azam to his room.

and had 3½ hours of the most arduous and concentrated conversation, of which Kashmir formed the main theme. . . . I handed to Jinnah a further copy of the Chiefs of Staff statement of events. . . . he expressed surprise at the remarkable speed at which we had been able to organize sending troops into the Srinagar plain. . . . Jinnah's principal complaint was that the Government of India had failed to give timely information to the Government of Pakistan about the action they proposed to take in Kashmir. I pointed out, in reply, that Nehru had telegraphed to Liaquat Ali Khan on the 28th, immediately the decision to send in troops had been taken. Ismay agreed that the Government of Pakistan should have had the earliest possible notification. . . . To the best of his recollection, Nehru had told him on the 28th that he had kept Liaquat Ali Khan in touch with what was happening. . . . If this had not been done, the oversight must have been due to the pressure of events, and not because the Government of India had anything to hide.

Jinnah continued in his interview that the Government had arrived after the troops had entered and that it did not contain any hint of a suggestion for co-operation between the two Governments in this matter, it merely informed him of the accession and the landing of troops. Continuing, he said that the accession was not a bona fide one since it rested on "fraud and violence" and would never be accepted by Pakistan. I asked him to explain why he used the term "fraud," since the Maharajah was fully entitled in accordance with Pakistan's own official statement about Junagadh. . . . to make such accession. It was therefore perfectly legal and valid. Jinnah said that this accession was the end of a long intrigue and that it had been brought about by violence. I countered this by saying that I certainly agreed that the accession had been brought about by violence; I knew the Maharajah was most anxious to remain independent, and nothing but the terror of violence could have made him accede to either Dominion; . . . the violence had come from tribes for whom Pakistan was responsible. . . . Jinnah repeatedly made it clear that in his opinion it was India who had committed this violence by sending her troops into Srinagar; I countered as often with the above argument, thereby greatly enraging Jinnah at my apparent consensus.⁴⁰

Jinnah told Mounbatten and Ismay that he had "lost interest in what the world thought of him since the British Commonwealth had let him down when he asked them to come to the rescue of Pakistan." At the end of the interview he became extremely pessimistic and said it was quite clear that the Dominion of India was out to terrorize and choke the Dominion of Pakistan.

birth and that if they continued with their oppression there would be nothing for it but to face the consequences. . . . he was not afraid, for the situation was already so bad that there was little that could happen to make it worse. Ismay tried to cheer him up out of his depression but I fear was not very successful. . . . We parted on good terms.⁴¹

A mood of lonely resignation and fatalism shrouded Jinnah throughout the rest of that last October year of his life. His hopes of bringing an end, by the aid of Srinagar, to the Indian forces and to the prolonged fighting as more and stronger Indian forces sent flying over him, to the Muslims and regular Pak. soldiers who managed without British support to hold a narrow strip of Mazharabad but would never reach the coveted Vale Park forces, both inside and out of Pakistan, were after and seeking to win off his own feelings and to make his political offspring cry a week earlier on the eve of his leaving Karachi. . . . The report of Jinnah's death had been made by two men who, at lower times, are free-masjed and wearing moon and crescent hats who are placed at the government house and police headquarters, and would have been police officers before they could be frightened off a street. . . . Were they Muslims? Or were they . . . still more . . . do Muslims who consider that he "knew" . . . W. H. Lawrence said his bleeding ulcer and Mohi-ud-Din's sorrow and the Punjab's with whites and water. Jinnah longer and longer through . . . night marked his body with coughing and a sloughed more blood. . . . His scarred and tired lungs.

"That he could ever be attained by a nation without suffering and weather has been . . . home out by the recent tragic happenings. . . . This is what . . . Jinnah told a mass rally of his compatriots from the platform of Lahore's University stadium on October 30.

We are in the midst of unparalleled difficulties and untold sufferings, we have been through dark days of apprehension and anguish. . . . The systematic massacre of defenceless and innocent people puts to shame even the most heinous atrocities committed by the worst tyrants known to history. We have been the victims of a deeply laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of the elementary principles of honesty, chivalry and honour. We thank Providence for giving us courage and faith to fight these forces of evil. . . . Do not be afraid of death. Our religion teaches us to be always prepared for death. We should see it bravely to save the honour of Pakistan and Islam. There is no better salvation for a Muslim than the death of a martyr for a righteous cause.⁴²

"It was in this speech that I first heard him speak of death," Fahma recalled. "The sufferings of the refugees affected him deep, and he went to bed again, exhausted and weeping. But first kept pouring in ministers and secretaries came to seek his instructions, so peace and rest were impossible."¹²

23

Ziarat
(1948)

[illegible]

Not everyone was satisfied, however. Maulana Jamil Mian angrily rose up, not at that "Pakistan could hardly take pride in making a Muslim State." He found many un-Islamic things in the State from top to bottom. . . . The behaviour of the Minister is not like that of Muslims. The poor cannot enter the houses of the Ministers, the needy and the lowly cannot see them. Only the courtiers can enter, those who possess large bungalows can enter. The name of Islam has been disgraced enough." "We are only a four-month-old child," Jinnah responded, feeling not much stronger himself. "You know somebody would like to overthrow us. I know you would say we have not done such and such a thing, but we are only four months old."

In addition to resolving to divide itself and electing Laughton Ali Khan "governor" of the Pakistan Muslim League the Council passed on record

its deep sense of sorrow and its feelings of horror at the widespread acts of organized violence and barbarity which have taken place, resulting in the loss of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives, colossal destruction of property, wanton outrages against women, and mass migration of populations, whereby millions of human beings have been uprooted from their hearths and homes and reduced to utter destitution.

The Council also views with grave concern the rising tide of communal antagonism against the Muslim minority in the Indian Union where, in spite of the repeated declarations by the Congress that minorities will be dealt with justly and fairly . . . Muslim life and property continue to be insecure.²

Liaquat flew to Delhi for a meeting of the Joint Defence Council on December 22 at which Prime Minister Pandit Jawahar charged that the tribal "raiders" of Kashmir "have free transit through Pakistan . . . Food and other supplies are also secured from Pakistan; indeed, we have collected reports that the raiders get their arms from the arms stores in Pakistan."³ The government of India demanded an end to all such aid, access, supplies and training. Liaquat promised to reply; and on December 30, 1948, Liaquat's secretary issued an official response from Pakistan. India submitted its formal complaint to the UN Security Council, as urged by Mountbatten but one which Nehru and his cabinet would not regret having to face. Liaquat's reply requested the security council to "call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to all 'assistance' it was providing frontier tribes invaders of Kashmir: 'a State which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is part of India,' or 'the Government of India' can be compelled to allow no to enter Pakistan territory in order to take military action against the invaders."⁴

Pakistan replied to India's complaint on January 15, 1949, and in its sound legal position. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan cross-examined Liaquat's first brief argued "the Pakistan Government emphatically states that they are giving aid and assistance to the so-called invaders or committed any act of aggression against India."⁵ And "Pakistan's Case Against India," filed the same day in the security council, and no longer document called "Particulars of Pakistan's Case" served to place number of broader issues and problems still festering between the new born neighbors on the Council's agenda.

an extensive campaign of "genocide" directed against the Muslims by the non-Muslim rulers, people officials, police and armed

forces of the States concerned and the Union of India . . . still in progress . . . large numbers of Muslims—running into hundreds of thousands—have been ruthlessly massacred vastly larger numbers maimed, wounded and injured and over five million . . . driven from their homes . . . Brutal and unmentionable crimes have been committed against women and children. Property worth thousands of millions of rupees has been destroyed.⁶

Concluding its cross-complaint Pakistan asked the security council to call upon India to "desist from acts of aggression against Pakistan" and to appoint a commissioner or commissions of the UN to investigate all of its charges and to arrange for "cessation of fighting in the State of Jammu and Kashmir" and elsewhere in the subcontinent. A bill of "particulars" added documentation to support these various charges.

Jinnah had no strength of will to New York to defend his India and Pakistan but for Ignatius Sir Mohamud Ziauddin Khan performed brilliantly as Pakistan's advocate before the security council. He was judicious, articulate and often eloquent in presenting his case against India's charges. The security council met in emergency sessions initially of three and later five members, who managed to effect a ceasefire by year's end, but it never won agreement to withdrawal of all the Indian forces that kept pouring into the war-torn State and that could never inaugurate a State-wide plebiscite.

"The first World War of 1914-18 was fought to end war," Jinnah recalled on January 23, 1948, launching the I.M.L.S. Plebiscite "Sword" Pakistan's first modern destroyer.

This led to the birth of the League of Nations and the idea of collective security, but the League of Nations proved only a pious hope. . . . The destruction caused by the first world war pales into insignificance as compared to the devastation and havoc resulting from the last world war and now with the discovery of the Atom Bomb, one shudders to think of the pattern of future wars. . . . Pakistan must be prepared for all eventualities and dangers. The weak and the defenceless in this imperfect world invite aggression from others. . . . Pakistan is still in its infancy and so is its Navy.

But this infant means to grow up and God willing will grow up much sooner than many people think. You will have to make up for the smallness of your size by your courage and selfless devotion to duty for it is not life that matters but the courage fortitude and determination you bring to it.⁷

A few days earlier, Mahatma Gandhi won the last of his fasts-unto-death, persuading India's cabinet to pay its debt of 55 crores of rupees to

Pakistan: helping to put an end to the slaughter and looting of Muslims in and around Delhi, which has become so tragic a scandal. Angry Sikhs and militant Hindus marched round Birla House with black flags shouting "Let Gandhi die" calling him "Mohammad Gandhi" since he so often advocated Pakistan's cause at prayer meetings and read from the *Quran*. And on January 30, a bomb exploded in Birla House compound, but Gandhi had already finished his prayer meeting.

Three days later his assassin did not miss. At his last prayer meeting on January 29, Gandhi said:

If a man was in distress the key to his happiness lay in labour. God did not create man to eat, drink and make merry. . . . Millionaires who ate without work were perishing. Even if they should earn by the sweat of their brow or sweat it go without food. The only person such exception was the disabled. . . . Gandhi's then spoke about peasants. If he had his say, our Governor-General and our Premier would be drawn from the *kisans* [peasants]. . . . As real producers of wealth they were verily the masters while we have enslaved them. . . . It was true, we were all labourers. In honest labour lay our salvation and the satisfaction of all vital needs.⁸

The next evening, before he could reach his prayer platform Mahatma Gandhi was shot to death by a hate-crazed Hindu Brahmin named Nathuram Godse.

"He was one of the greatest men produced by the Hindu community," wrote Jinnah in his first message of condolence. How ironic must have seemed to him that an orthodox Hindu should have killed his most trans-gent opponent, believing the Mahatma an "Agent of Pakistan" and a "Muslim-lover." Norbert Bogdan, a vice-president of Schroeders' Muslim Group in New York, met with Jinnah in Karachi just a few days after Gandhi's assassination and reported that Jinnah "spoke in a (and) much more generous terms than he saw fit to use in his message, acknowledging . . . how great was the loss for the Muslims. Jinnah added that . . . the real trouble was with the extremist groups, and he had been favourably impressed by the Indian Government's firm handling of the following on Gandhi's assassination."⁹ New Delhi outlawed the *Razakars*, Swamy Seva Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha, putting many of their leaders under immediate "preventive detention" arrest.

Mir Laid Ali now became premier of Hyderabad, and India's government was most worried by news of the rumors of a move from Pakistan. Because of that, of course, Pakistan remained solvent, and its financial position was sound.

Chaudh Muhammad on February 28. Defence expenditure was projected to be no less than £27.9 million out of the total estimated expenditure of only £39.4 million. Revenues were so meagre moreover that a deficit of £23.1 million was expected. Similarly, the government of India, located over 50 percent of its total budget to arms and projected a deficit of some £20 million. Pakistan did its best to encourage imports from the sterling bloc and the United States, but because of its minimal industrial development, the continuing influx of refugees, and poor agricultural output in 1948, revenues fell below anticipated totals with its deficits soaring higher. Jinnah appealed again for U.S. support, private as well as public. General Motors was interested in installing plants in Pakistan. Ambassador Jinnah reported to his government that March, "The 'treacherous war clouds' over Kashmir kept holding these back." The World Bank and Export Bank were also worried about international financial stability by proposed projects and reported "lost business" because they had not been regularly broken down by the government's out-of-expenditure and income before doing out any loans. Pakistan was as yet unprepared to present such detailed proposals.

Jinnah himself had no more left to work on state matters. He could not even answer Jinnah's letters anymore. An old Parsi friend from Bombay visited him in Karachi at this time and found him "sorrowing in his garden at the government. . . . After Jinnah himself wore up at work, period. I am so tired Jinnah said so often. . . . At present, even he had not yet won his greatest son but had outlived his foremost rival. It was high time for him to rest, was it not?"

Nonetheless, his government insisted that he fly to Dacca that March to address the masses of Pakistan's population from their own "group" soil. He had not even gone to the East or set foot in Dacca, the economic capital of his nation. Great leader that he was, Jinnah answered the call of his cabinet and addressed a crowd estimated to be over 300,000 in Dacca's maidan on March 21, 1948. That was his last major public address. Jinnah delivered it in English, though he spoke to a Bengali audience and informed them "in the clearest language" that "the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language."¹⁰ This was, of course, the most volatile, divisive issue in Pakistani politics.

Any one who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State Language, no Nation can remain tied up solidly together and function. Look at the history of other countries. Therefore, so far as the State Language is concerned, Pakistan's language shall be URDU. . . . I tell you once again, do not fall into the trap of those who are the enemies of Pakistan. Unfortunately you have

fifth-columnists and I am sorry to say they are Muslims—who are financed by outsiders . . . you must have patience. With your help and with your support we will make Pakistan a mighty State. . . No amount of trouble, no amount of hard work or sacrifice is too much or to be shirked. . . I wish you God speed.¹⁴

He did not live to return, however, or to see East Pakistan metamorphosed through fire into the separate nation of Bangladesh where Bengali would become and remain the sole official language.

The frontier grew more restive as well. Pathans continued to cling about a state of their own "Pashtunistan" and even the British kept stirring up a "Greater Baluchistan." So in April Jinna had to travel to Peshawar where he had been at Islamia College and to send forceful letters to Rawalpindi to the six officers at the government house and then to an open-air meeting in Peshawar where "He was dropped to the bone," Khanna recalls. "That night I was disturbed to find a had caught a chill and he coughed some time before he died," he said. "I am just a collector. This cold was the beginning of the end. It started as a cough and ended and only when I forced a doctor on him did we learn that he had bronchitis. . ."¹⁵ Jinna knew it was much worse than either a cold or bronchitis but did not want to see him die more than was absolutely necessary. He understood too well by then that there was no cure for a sick man so simple patent medicine to take his pain away or make a coughing stop.

Jinna's relations with his closest colleagues deteriorated rapidly in the final months of his life. As he grew weaker and more conscious of the imminence of death he was less patient with inefficiency and incompetence. He was increasingly angered by the usual excuses for not getting anything done. Before long, he naturally wanted to see significant progress in his struggling infant land. In mid-April at a "private audience" which he gave in the name of Basawalpur House, Jinna called "our premier" to a luncheon conversation with M. A. Khuhro, the then chief minister of Sindh. Relations between the governor-general and his prime minister could hardly have been less than strained perhaps in that era of unrelieved national calamity and stress, financial stringency, and virtual war. Liaquat reportedly wrote Jinna in January and offered to "resign" as prime minister after learning from his begum of Jinna's angry and openly expressed dissatisfaction with his work. Jinna expressed equal frustration and disgust at the way the nawab of Mandol, then chief minister of the Punjab, "was uninterested in the fate of the refugees." He called M. A. and Governor Mudie to Karachi in May and told Liaquat, who had lost his right arm in helping the Punjab for the League, that "he was useless as

a Prime Minister which" Mudie reported "was only too true. He [Jinna] therefore nominated Mian Murtaza Daultana" to take control of the Punjab ministry but Daultana refused protesting that he had complete confidence in Mandol. . . I [Mudie] knew and he [Daultana] knew that if he did become Prime Minister Mandol would do just about anything he wanted. Jinna was very angry and the meeting was adjourned. . . Jinna . . . rounded on me. . . "Your policy is weak. You've lost your nerve. I asked what his orders for me were. He said 'None.' I then asked what his advice to me would be as a friend. He replied 'Was a good friend of mine as I am going to do.' . . . It was clear . . . that Jinna was far from well. Indeed he had to lie down immediately after our meeting."¹⁶

In June, Jinna and Fatima flew to Quetta, where he could breathe the cool bracing air of Baluchistan, a mountainous region. Within a few days of his arrival, he was almost sleepless and would be coughing so severely that his frequent trips to the bathroom were "exhausting" for the first time in many years. "I was tired and relaxed," he said. "On June 21, I had a headache. The officers of Quetta Staff College, relieving me, who has been a great anxiety about the growing strain in his relations with the cabinet and other official colleagues.

You, along with other Forces of Pakistan, are the custodians of the life, property and honour of the people of Pakistan. The Defence Forces are the most vital of all Pakistan Services and correspondingly a very heavy responsibility and onerous task is yours shouldered. . . I want you to remember and if you have time enough you should study the Government of India Act, as adapted for use in Pakistan, which is the present Constitution that the executive authority flows from the Head of the Government of Pakistan, who is the Governor-General, and, therefore, any command or orders that may come to you cannot come without the sanction of the Executive Head."¹⁷

The next day he told the Quetta municipality, which presented him with a handsome floral garland, that "in Baluchistan was spared the tragedy which the Punjab went through on the establishment of Pakistan. . . Quetta may be as great a civil station as a cantonment. . . For a large part of Western Pakistan it will be the natural summer resort. . . That is why it is important to find a centre of provincial administration away from any section of Pakistanis. Pakistan must be rid of this evil. It is a relic of the old administration. . . British control. . . We are now all Pakistanis—not Baluch, Pathans, Sindhis, Bengalis, Punjabis and so on. . . and we should be proud to be known as Pakistanis and nothing else."¹⁸

Fatima tried to "talk him out of" agreeing to fly back to Karachi to

speak at the opening ceremony of the State Bank of Pakistan on July 1, 1948, but Jinnah insisted on going. The flight so "exhausted him" that he could hardly get out of bed to deliver the speech that was written for him. As Fatima noted: "Those who saw and heard him must have realised that he was not in good health; his voice was scarcely audible and he paused and coughed his way through his speech. When we returned home he collapsed into bed with his shoes on."⁷⁰ He had earlier accepted an invitation from the Canadian commissioner of trade to attend a reception that evening to celebrate the eight first anniversary of the dominion that was to be the last social function Jinnah would ever attend.

On July 6, Jinnah and his sister flew back to Quetta, but he continued to run "a slight fever," so the doctors advised moving him to even more restful atmosphere. Ziarat, a small British-built station forty miles and several thousand feet above Quetta, boasted a residency bungalow built by the British. The hill station was perched like an eagle at the top of the hill. It was Jinnah's last retreat in the search for a pure enough air to save his life. "A line of tall trees and bushes of flowers and the beauty of the place," Fatima recalled, "seeing how her brother whose condition was deteriorating," liked "its quiet charm."

Lieutenant Colonel Ilahi Bakshi of the Indian Medical Service was sitting out on [his] lawn in Lahore after dinner on July 21, when Mr. Jinnah came. At the secretary's request, the governor of Pakistan phoned Karachi ordering him to fly "immediately" to Quetta. Dr. Bakshi was met at the airport there on Friday afternoon by Major General M. A. Khan and Colonel K. Jinnah, who drove with him in the governor-general's car to Ziarat. "Nobody knew what he was suffering from," recalled Bakshi. "At the airport I gathered that he had some rejection and patent medicines and preferred to be addressed as 'Sir' and not as 'Your Excellency.'"⁷¹

Fatima brought him to his great leader's bedroom the next morning.

I found the Quaid-i-Azam lying in bed facing the door. He looked shockingly thin and weak and had an ashen grey complexion . . . his appearance that morning frightened me. He must have known what was in my mind, for he diverted my attention by motioning me to a chair and enquiring if I had a pleasant journey. I sat down and asked for a detailed account of his present and previous illnesses. . . . "There is nothing much wrong with me," he told me, "except that I have got stomach trouble and exhaustion due to overwork and worry. For forty years I have worked for 14 hours a day, never knowing what disease was. However, for the last few years I have been having annual attacks of fever and cough. My doctors in Bombay regarded these as attacks of bronchitis, and with the usual treat-

ment and rest in bed, I generally recovered within a week or so. For the last year or two, however, they have increased both in frequency and severity and are much more exhausting." While I was listening to him I found him losing breath after every sentence and sometimes pausing in the middle. His mouth was dry and he moistened his lips many times while talking. The voice lacked tone and was . . . almost inaudible. He had a couple of fits of coughing, . . . which left him exhausted. . . . After a short pause during which he closed his eyes and looked more dead than alive, he continued, "About three weeks ago I caught a chill and developed fever and a cough for which the Civil Surgeon of Quetta prescribed powder lozenges. I have been taking these since my condition is better. The fever is less, but I feel very weak. I don't think there is anything organically wrong with me. . . . If my stomach can be put right I will recover soon. Many years ago I had a rather bad stomach trouble for which I consulted two or three London specialists, but they failed to diagnose my illness, and one of them even advised operation. I didn't submit to the operations and on the advice of another London doctor went to Germany and consulted a famous doctor. He told me that I had no organic trouble and only needed rest and a regulation of diet. I stayed in his clinic for a few weeks and recovered completely. In 1934 I was diagnosed as having a duodenal ulcer suffering from heart disease, but a heart specialist in Germany assured me that my heart was perfectly normal."

The doctor asked the governor-general to remove a silk pyjama top so that he could listen to his heart; "I observed with distress that he was much thinner than he appeared with clothes on and could no longer eat. How he had managed to survive and work in such an advanced stage of emaciation. . . . I had seen equally severe cases among the prisoners of war at Singapore. . . . The physical examination . . . dimmed my hopes, although I did not reveal my fears to the patient. . . . I expressed a desire to have him investigated further before I let the governor-general go, but later that he had lost all the route he appeared to me to be in his case and not his stomach. The Quaid-i-Azam still believed, however, that his primary trouble was the stomach, and urged me to pay more attention to it. . . ."⁷² Bakshi did not ignore his patient's concern and prescribed a "high caloric . . . low residue diet." Fatima "appeared to doubt" the "advantage" of inflicting such a diet on her brother but said nothing, and for a day or two Jinnah seemed to eat better, for the wise doctor also prescribed "a digestive mixture."

Bakshi did the best, in fact, that any medical professional could have done. He "rang up" the civil surgeon from Quetta, who drove up to Ziarat

next morning with his clinical pathologist and brought along his microscope and reagents to test Jinnah's blood sputum and do the usual laboratory work. Their lab findings confirmed the colonel's suspicions. With so important a patient, however, further corroboration was considered essential before succumbing hope to the fatal disease that was consuming his lungs. So Baksh went to his own hospital in Lahore and ordered three of his best specialists to fly to Zariat, telling one of them to bring a gas portable set along. Then he flew Karachi to spend a few hours. Within the week most of Pakistan's advanced medical progress (born or bred) 5,500 feet above sea level to Zariat, having concentrated in the dying old man who coughed without respite in that remote spot whose strange name means "burial" like the ancient Egyptian burial of Moses, having reached at the dawn of civilization to house the remains of a great king. Bakshhs recalled:

While I was telling him the grave news I watched him intently. He . . . remained quite calm and all he said after I had finished was, "Have you told Mas Jinnah?" I replied, "Yes, Sir . . . I had to take her into confidence." The Quaid-Azam interrupted at and said, "No, you shouldn't have done it. After all she is a woman." I expressed regret for the pain caused to his sister . . . The Quaid-Azam listened patiently and in the end said, "It doesn't matter, what is done is done. Now tell me all about it. How long have I had this disease? What are the chances of my overcoming it? How long will the trouble last? I should like to know everything and I must not hesitate to tell me the whole truth." . . . I replied that I . . . felt confident that with the aid of the latest drugs there should be a fair chance of a considerable improvement.²⁶

Spokane flew in from New York that week and offered to arrange for any "insurance and from America" that might be needed, which he was ready to bring in a "special plane" if Dr. Baksh felt right to advise it. He enquired about the nature of the illness—which, of course, I could not reveal. Baksh noted, knowing Jinnah's friend to see him alone, however. "After his interview he came downstairs visibly moved. I hoped he had not betrayed his anxiety before the patient. In the evening he . . . repeated his offer of medical help from America. . . ." But there was nothing any American doctor could have done that Baksh was not trying to do. No cure had been discovered for the tuberculosis-turned-to-lung-cancer that had by then almost totally consumed both of his lungs.

Laquat arrived shortly after Spokane left and spent about half an hour alone with Jinnah. He must have seen what anyone allowed close enough to look could have seen—the governor general was dying. The

Quaid-Azam would soon be no more, and the burden of leading Pakistan would fall upon his shoulders, his niece, his life, Fatima, who had never really liked either Laquat or his legation. Perhaps she blamed them both for helping Jinnah back to India from his Hampstead retreat where she and her beloved brother might have lived their lives out in peace and quiet contentment. Subsequently reported that after Laquat left, Jinnah told her with trembling voice, "Do you know why he has come? He wants to know how serious my illness is. How long I will stay? It was doubtless true, yet hardly as apprehensions as Fatima considered it, under the circumstances. There was, after all, still a nation to be run—millions of displaced persons to be fed and a few for to under areas was in Kashmir a battle for a constitution to be drafted. His friends, the Pathans, Baluch, Sindhis and Hindus so close to be trusted. To Laquat a displaced Nawab from the United Provinces and Oxford, it must have seemed odd to be there in Zariat, still a mere "courtier" to that supertious royal couple though he was not just a figure. The prime minister would have left more than three years after Jinnah died or even a third assassin's bullet claimed his life on 30 October 1951 atawal, and Dr. Bakshhs remarked of Laquat:

Downstairs in the drawing room I met the Prime Minister. He anxiously enquired about the Quaid-Azam, complimented me on having won the first round by securing the patient's confidence, and expressed the hope that I would contribute to his recovery. He also urged me to probe into the root cause of the persistent disease. I assured him that despite the Quaid-Azam's serious condition there was reason to hope that if he responded to the latest medicines which had been sent for from Karachi he might yet overcome the trouble, and that the most hopeful feature was the patient's strong power of resistance. I was moved by the Prime Minister's deep concern for the health of his Chief and old comrade.²⁷

Streptomycin arrived and was administered, but "miraculous" drug that it was, it could not reverse the impossible. Nor did the prayers of Jinnah's nation, voiced from every mosque in Pakistan and elsewhere throughout the Muslim world on August 7, suffice to turn the inexorable tide of his illness. So severe that chest operation has been refused. A great oedema of the feet set in, and the medical staff surrounding the Quaid decided it would be best to remove him to a lower altitude. Zariat's rarefied atmosphere appeared to be imposing too great a strain on his failing heart and kidneys. Injections of curamine and ultraviolet therapy proved useless. Jinnah, however, was reluctant to move anywhere especially on the eve of Independence Day, which was precisely when Bakshhs advised driving,

him down to Quetta. "This is impossible," the governor-general replied. "The earliest would be the 15th." They feared that date might be too late enlisting Fatima's support in pressing him till at last he agreed.

Jinnah's final journey home began on August 13 at 3.30 p.m. He insisted on wearing "a brand new suit" to match, and a handkerchief in his vanity pocket. Fatima recalled: "I helped him put on his polished pump shoes. He was brought down on a stretcher and was placed in a semi-reclining position in the back of the big Hummer car in which we arrived to Quetta."²⁸ Though many precautions had been taken to keep the move "on secret," cheering crowds lined the road along their winding descent. The Hummer had seven cars and a jeep front and rear, so it was quite a convoy with the governor-general's handsome blue flags flying as they bumped over the creaky surfaced road that had seen a home so momentous and imposing a departure before. They stopped for a while about a mile past the Rest House, since Jinnah had noticed "about a dozen men" standing there and wanted no intrusive eyes seeing how weak he was. Dr Bakht remembered:

We reached Quetta just before sunset after about four hours' driving. The Residency had been cleared of all visitors, and we shifted him on stretcher to his bed-room on the first floor. . . . I examined him on stretcher and found that even though his breath was weakening, I noticed he showed it in his pose in the exhibition of the journey and hoped it would disappear with rest. . . . Next morning, August the 14th was the 4th anniversary of the establishment of Pakistan. We visited the Quaid-i-Azam at about 8.30. . . . I said: "Sir, we are very fortunate in having brought you down to Quetta without any mishap. It was risky to shift you from Ziarat in such a weak state. . . ." The Quaid-i-Azam smiled, saying, "Yes, I am glad you have brought me here. I was caught in a trap at Ziarat."²⁹

A statement published that morning in Pakistan's daily newspapers was credited to the Quaid-i-Azam's "Message" to the "Citizens of Pakistan" but was obviously composed in Karachi not Ziarat.

Today we are celebrating the first anniversary of our freedom. We have faced the year with courage, determination and imagination, and the record of our achievements has been a wonderful one in warding off the blows of the enemy. . . . I congratulate you all—my Ministers under the leadership of the Prime Minister.³⁰

Jinnah had written none of it, of course. He wrote nothing any longer and barely glanced at the morning newspapers. How remote that glorious marriage ride with Mountatten must have seemed to him on this first anniv-

ersary the air ringing with shouts of "Pakistan Zindabad" and his most pressing fear of death from an unknown assassin's bullet. The countless "traps" set for him, some based so handsomely provocative, governor prime minister kinship he had electric team and Diggers guns, bombs all of them had missed the Grey Wolf. He had proved himself too fast, too elusive, too strong for them.

The third week of August Jinnah's appetite proved slightly. He asked for halva and pusses, two delicacies his doctor usually had feared might be too "hot" for him to digest but Fatima wisely led the other two favorites, and they seemed to cheer him up. The doctors tried to get him to move as much as possible by sitting him up in bed two days, then standing him on his feet, walking him a bit, trying to keep his muscles from atrophying, and trying to help his digestive system to function. He became more irritable, he yelled at everyone for not being more "practical" and Fatima explained that her husband attached great deal of importance to modesty and had a his been most punctilious in it.³¹

Jinnah's doctor was "shocked" to find that his patient weighed only eighty pounds. It was clear to all that at that stage Azam's health was, if ever to reformative to be a capital one would have to be down back there very soon. Jinnah asked for permission to resume smoking. He had smoked an average of fifty or more Gaiwan 4 cigarettes a day over the last thirty years. The doctor permitted him to have one cigarette a day, ordering him not to inhale. Soon, however Bakht agreed to do the "ritual."

It did us good to see him enjoying it. . . . since in a habitual smoker the first sign of recovery was commonly a return to smoking. . . . Next morning I noticed four cigarette stumps in the ashtray on the table by his bedside. . . . the patient had exceeded his allowance. . . . Looking at the ashtray, I remarked that he appeared to have enjoyed his cigarettes. The Quaid-i-Azam took the hint, and ingeniously replied, "Yes, but didn't you tell me there was no harm in smoking if I didn't inhale?" . . . his mind was regaining its old legal quality, and we welcomed this additional sign of recovery.³²

Cigarette smoke did not help heal his lungs, however, so the doctors continued advising him to moderate his smoking and return to Karachi. But he did not want to go "home" to the governor-general's mansion as an invalid. He suggested a few quieter places on the plains: Sibi and Malir, but both of those were hot, dusty, and remote.

He said to Bakht: "Don't take me to Karachi on Saturday. I want to go there when I can walk from the car to my room. You know, from the porch

you have to pass the A.D.C.'s room and then the Military Secretary's before you reach mine. I'd like being carried in a stretcher from the car to my room. He wanted some of his Kashmiri staff to see him this was too weak to stand up. Jinnah practically stopped eating after August 25 and whenever Bakshi urged him to take some food, he was told, Doctor has overruled me. I have never taken so much food before, even when I was quite well. Some years ago we had a European diplomat to dinner in Bombay. I did not take the soup which was served. I noted this but thought perhaps I was not in the mood of soup. When he was brought back, then, I was surprised he kept quiet. But when the food was served, he ate it and I could not refrain from asking him the reason of his behaviour. Our guest replied that he had been a long time in India and was a little more surprised to see he appeared to be in very good health. Now do you think I can survive for such a long time on lettuce and maintain good health?⁹⁸

Jinnah gave a few sips of tea and coffee and some plain water to swallow his pills. He lay in bed with a distressing apathy. He expressed "Fatima no longer interested in living. This woman is the mother" he confessed before he months ended. It does not matter whether I live and die. I took Bakshi on August 29. Bakshi arrived tears a flowing and was startled by this man's statement of feeling in one generally known upon an unconditional unbending. . . . I had always felt that he had never kept his lips tight, his mouth tightly by a discipline will know how to explain that when a patient goes up the light no material power could do it. Bakshi was the first greatly distressed to find that the man of iron will had given up the fight.⁹⁹

By September further deterioration was such that Jinnah could not sit up. His temperature rose to about 100° with his pulse comparatively higher and his heartbeats were irregular. Dr. C. G. Cooper, a general practitioner, was required to be present. Dr. Cooper was called to the Mushawir at the Mayo Clinic in Manchester to his immediate attention for consultation.¹⁰⁰ Bakshi also sent Dr. M. A. Mistry from Karachi. Mistry arrived the next morning, September 9. Mistry and Bakshi had been classmates at Guy's Hospital, in London, where both had received their M.D.s in 1891. After examining the patient, Mistry made a diagnosis, treatment and advice, judging that there was really not much more any American doctor could do. Jinnah was heard muttering aloud he tossed about uncomfortably in bed. . . . "The Kashmir Commission has an appointment with me today why haven't they turned up? Where are they?"¹⁰¹

The governor-general's Viking and two Dakota airplanes to carry the

staff and luggage arrived at Quetta airport and were ready to take off by 2:00 p.m. on September 11, 1948. "As his stretcher was taken into the Viking cabin, Fatima recalled, 'the pilot and crew lined up around him. He in turn lifted his hand feebly. . . . A bed had been improvised in the front cabin and I sat with him along with Dr. Mistry. Oxygen cylinders and a gas mask were ready. . . . After about two hours flying, we landed at the Air Force base at Muzaffargarh at 4:15 p.m. Here he had landed just over a year ago, full of hope and confidence that he would rebuild Pakistan into a great nation. Then the sands had begun to wash away. I know. But today, as instructed, there was no one at the airport, Colonel Knowles greeted us as we came out of the plane.'¹⁰² Knowles was Jinnah's military secretary and had brought the army ambulance into which the governor-general was carried by his stretcher. Fatima and a Quetta nurse, Sister Dunham, sat beside the seat of the governor-general while the doctor followed. The doctor gave him his new bed and his knowledge.

"After we had covered about nine or fifteen miles the ambulance coughed and came to a sudden stop. Five minutes later I asked, 'I get out and go to the toilet.' The driver refused to get out. The car was a so-called 'bug' with the engine. There was no brake and the hand-brake was oppressive. To add to his discomfort some of the passengers and his wife and he did not have the strength to hold the wheel. Sister Dunham and I fanned him in turn, waiting for another ambulance to arrive. Every minute was a matter of agonies. I could not be shifted to the Cadillac as it was not big enough for the stretcher."¹⁰³

"Wondering what had happened," wrote Bakshi, "I got out and found that there had been a breakdown. The car was in a terrible state. The driver assured us that he would come out and get the car fixed with the engine for about twenty minutes and he said he would not start. Miss Jinnah sent the Military Secretary to fetch another ambulance. Dr. Mistry went with me."

"I examined him [Jinnah] and was horrified to find his pulse becoming weaker and that his temperature was rising. I gave him a flask containing hot tea. Miss Jinnah quickly gave him a cup. . . . What a catastrophe if, having survived the air journey, he were to die by the road-side."¹⁰⁴

It was a lonely stretch of highway leading south toward Karachi. "Nobody could be left in the car to see the car go," noted Fatima "who went about their business, not knowing that their Quaid, who had given them a homeland was in their midst lying helpless. Cars honked their way past, buses and trucks rumbled by, and we stood there immobilized in an ambulance that refused to move an inch. . . . We waited for over one hour and no hour, in my life has been so long and full of anguish."¹⁰⁵

The trip from the airport to the government house took half as long as the return flight from Quetta. They reached the governor-general's mansion at 6.10 p.m. He slept for about two hours. Fatima noted "then he opened his eyes and . . . whispered, 'Fati . . .'. His head dropped slightly to the right, his eyes closed. I ran out of the room crying. Doctor, doctor. Come quickly. My brother is dying. Where are the doctors?" In a few moments they were there, examining him and giving him injections. I stood there, motionless, speechless. Then I saw them cover his body, head to foot, with the sheet . . . and fainted on the floor."

Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah died at 10.20 p.m. on September 11, 1948. At that time one of him weighed only seventy pounds. Wrapped in a simple shroud, he was buried in Karachi, where a handsome mausoleum now stands, housing the remains of one of his country's most remarkable, tenacious, enigmatic figures.

Fatima Jinnah, who inherited most of her brother's estate, remained in Pakistan till her death on July 9, 1967. In 1946-48, the *Mother of the Nation* ("Mother of the Nation") tried to follow her brother's political footsteps, for president of Pakistan against Field Marshal Ayub Khan. She ran a vigorous campaign as the candidate for Ayub's hated opposite and won great support in the east, but she was defeated because of Ayub's "basic democracy" technique of electing the electors. After that she resigned her formal role of his political adviser, spending the final years in voluntary service and reflecting on the remarkable man to whom she had devoted herself.

Jinnah's daughter Dina never joined her father in Pakistan while he lived; she came to Karachi only for his funeral. When Dina married Neville Wadia, a Parsi-born Christian, Jinnah tried his best to dissuade her, going almost as far as Sir Denchaw Pataudi with his daughter Asma. She recalled "Jinnah, in his usual imperious manner, told her that there were millions of Muslims in India and she could have among the class. Then the young lady, who was more than a match for her father, replied: 'Father, there were millions of Muslim girls in India. Why did you not marry one of them?'"⁴¹ Jinnah never spoke to his daughter after she married. And though they did correspond, he was always very strict. "Mrs. Wadia" and never talked of her to his friends, insisting, indeed, that he had "no daughter."⁴²

Dina and Neville Wadia kept house in Bombay and had two children soon after which they separated. Neville, who presided over the Wadia companies, and testle empire there, passed control of his business on to

his son Nushi, who chairs the board of Wadia Industries, Ltd. and has two sons. Jinnah's only great-grandchildren, who live in Bombay as citizens of India. Dina and Neville had a daughter as well, who apparently lives in Manhattan as something of a "recluse" but was "too young to remember Jinnah" and saw little of him, according to her father. Neville Wadia left India after divorce, Dina choosing to reside in Switzerland. Dina moved to New York City and lived alone in a splendid apartment on Madison Avenue until at least 1982. Thus, none of Jinnah's direct descendants ever opted for Pakistan.

Notes

CHAPTER 1 KARACHI

- 1 Fazl-e-Rahman: *Islam: Character of the Day* (1969), pp. 213-9.
- 2 A. A. K. Khan: "Mohammedanism: A Cultural History of India" ed. A. L. Basham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), chap. 9.
- 3 C. Athina: *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah: The Story of A Nation* (Lahore: Freezsons Ltd, 1961), p. 3.
- 4 Jinnah's sisters Rahnmat, Maryam, Fatima, and Shireen, followed in that order, while the youngest of his siblings were his two brothers, Ahmed Ali and Burhan Ali.
- 5 M. A. Haque: "Quaid-e-Azam: What's his date of birth?" in M. A. Haque, *Quaid-e-Azam 1954* (Karachi: Times Press, 1976), pp. 47-53 is the best primary source evidence concerning the puzzling question of Jinnah's actual birth date.
- 6 Fatima Jinnah: "My Brother," an unpublished personal memoir preserved in the Nation Library of Pakistan, Islamabad, P.F. 143.
- 7 Akbar-ul-Haq: *Bhai-e-Karachi: Past, Present and Future* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 4.
- 8 M. H. Surana: *Mohammed Ali Jinnah* (Lahore: S. M. Ashraf, 1948), p. 2.
- 9 Jinnah: "My Brother."
- 10 Hector Bolitho: *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan* (London: John Murray, 1954), p. i.
- 11 Jinnah: "My Brother."
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 John Evelyn Wrench: *The Immortal Years, 1937-1944* (London: Hutchinson, 1945), p. 132.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Jinnah: "My Brother."
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid.

18. President Dadabhai Naoroji's address to the Calcutta Congress, December 1889. in *The Indian National Congress* 2d ed. (Madras: G. A. Natesan & Co 1917), p. 19. Hereafter cited as INC
19. Jinnah, "My Brother"
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Stanley Wolpert, *Morley and India, 1905-1910* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 10.
23. President Alfred Webb's address to the Madras Congress, 1894, INC [19], p. 187.
24. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 23.
25. Jinnah, "My Brother."
26. Syed Shafiquddin Pirzada, *Some Aspects of Qasid-i-Azam's Life* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), p. 11.
27. *FOR Photo Eur 127*

CHAPTER 2. BOMBAY (1898-1910)

1. Jinnah, "My Brother"
2. Sarojini Naidu, "Mohammad Ali Jinnah Ambassador of Hind Muslim Unity," in *Quaid-i-Azam as Seen by His Contemporaries*, comp. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1960), p. 89.
3. There were several influential and wealthy Peerbhoy families settled in Bombay since the time of which was Sir Asaf Peerbhoy's 1863-1933. *Forth* Muz., *Forth* by Jinnah's aunt was not the case. Sir Asaf's but her three sons Akbar, Aziz, and Yusuf, at a later date, were in their own right. Akbar was a barrister, Aziz a doctor, and Yusuf a lawyer and collector. Professor D. R. Sanjana of Bombay and Los Angeles for the above information.
4. Sayid, *Jinnah*, p. 8.
5. Allana, *Quaid-i-Azam*, p. 27.
6. Jinnah, "My Brother"
7. President Badruddin Tyabji's address to the Madras Congress, 1887, INC [19], p. 25.
8. G. A. Allana, ed., *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (Karachi: Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, 1967), p. 1.
9. Ibid., p. 1.
10. A contemporary Bombay "advocate" of Jinnah's quoted in Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 18.
11. Josephine Alva, *Leaders of India* (Bombay: Thacker & Co Ltd., 1943), pp. 63ff.
12. M. V. Chagla, *Rises in December: An Autobiography* (Bombay: Shriharsha V. Chagla, 1974), p. 53.
13. President Pherozshah Mehta's address to the Calcutta Congress, 1890, INC [1, 19], p. 65.
14. Ibid., p. 72.
15. C. Y. Chintamani, ed., *Speeches and Writings of the Honorable Sir Pherozshah M. Mehta, K.C.I.E.* (Allahabad: The Indian Press, 1903), pp. 8, 14-15.
16. Ibid., p. 823.
17. B. R. Nanda, *Gokhale: The Indian Moderates and the British Raj* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 127, 84.
18. Sarojini Naidu's words, quoted in Shafiq Ali Mirajid, *Quaid-i-Azam* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), p. 11.

19. President Gopal K. Gokhale's address to the Benares Congress, 1905, INC [1, 19], p. 798.
20. Allana, *Pakistan Movement*, pp. 7-10.
21. Mary Countess of Minto, *India, Minto and Morley, 1905-19* (London: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 47-48.
22. Amrita Nazar Parikh, October 4, 1906, quoted in M. N. Das, *India under Morley and Minto* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964), p. 173.
23. Aga Khan to Dunlop Smith, October 29, 1908, S. S. Pirzada, ed., *Foundations of Pakistan. An India Muslim League Documents vol 1 1906-24* (Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1969), p. 4. The next quote is from ibid., p. 24.
24. Ibid., p. 5.
25. Ibid., p. 8.
26. H. H. The Aga Khan, *The Memoirs of Aga Khan* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954), pp. 122-23.
27. President Dadabhai Naoroji's address to the Calcutta Congress, 1908, INC [1, 19], pp. 637-38.
28. Ibid., p. 633-34.
29. Sarojini Naidu's title for him in Naidu, "Ambassador"
30. Ibid., pp. 158-59.
31. Minto to Morley, November 11, 1909, in Wolpert, *Morley*, p. 199.
32. Morley to Minto, December 6, 1909, ibid., p. 199. The following quote is from ibid.
33. Sayid, *Jinnah*, p. 64.
34. Resolution XVI, Allahabad Congress, 1910, INC [1, 19], pt II, p. 142.

CHAPTER 3. CALCUTTA (1910-1915)

1. Mary Minto, *India*, pp. 371-72.
2. Resolution IX, Lahore Congress, 1909, INC [1, 19], pt I, p. 35.
3. February 23, 1910, Calcutta, in Fazal Haque Qureshi, *Every Day with the Quaid-i-Azam* (Karachi: Shriharsha V. Chagla, 1974), p. 66. The following quote in the same paragraph is also from the source.
4. Mohammad Yusuf Khan, *The Glory of Quaid-i-Azam* (Lahore: Caravan Book Centre, 1976), pp. 23-24.
5. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, p. 358.
6. Ibid., p. 242.
7. Sarojini Naidu, ed., *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: His Speeches and Writings, 1912-1917* (Madras: Ganesh, 1918), p. 11.
8. Ibid., Naidu, "Ambassador"
9. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 58.
10. Resolution IX, Calcutta Congress, 1913, INC [1, 19], pt II, pp. 159-60.
11. Resolution IX, Calcutta Congress, 1913, INC [1, 19], pt II, p. 159.
12. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, p. 316.
13. Lord Curzon to Lord Hardinge, 14 May 1910, in *Viceroy Lord Hardinge Papers*, Box 1, 37, Cambridge University Library, Cambridge. Hereafter cited as *HP*.
14. At a reception for him in the Cecil Hotel, London, August 14, 1914, *India* (London: British Committee Weekly of Indian National Congress), p. 71.
15. Bombay, January 14, 1915, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (Ahmedabad: The Gandhi Smriti Trust, 1963), p. 11. Hereafter cited as *WC*.
16. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, pp. 330-31.
17. Ibid., p. 330.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 353.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
20. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 25.
21. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, pp. 353-54.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

CHAPTER 4: LUCKNOW TO BOMBAY (1916-1918)

1. L. F. Rushbrook Williams, "The Evolution of the Qauid-e-Azam As Observed," in *Papers Presented for the International Conference on Qauid-e-Azam* 19-25 November 1976, 5 vols. Islamabad: Quaid-e-Azam University, 1976, vol. I, p. 115. Hereafter cited *Papers*.

2. S. M. Edwards, *Memoir of Sir Dinshaw Manockjee Petit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 3.

3. K. F. Dwarkadas, *Radi Jinnah* (Bombay: Kanti Dwarkadas, 1963), p. 9.

4. Sayid, *Jinnah*, appendix II, p. 842.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 848.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 851.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 854-55.

8. *Ahmed Pakistan Movement*. All quotations in the following paragraph are from Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 849-50.

9. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 41-42.

10. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, pp. 371-73.

11. The portion of Jinnah's address does not appear in this, which used the Muslim League's *Osman Pamphlet* report of Jinnah's presidential address as its primary source. The quoted passage was deleted in a pamphlet but has been preserved in Sayid, *Jinnah*, appendix I, pp. 872-89, esp. 873.

12. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 878-79.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 879-80.

14. President A. C. M. Jinnah's address to the Lucknow Congress, 1916, *ICC* [I, 19], p. 1274.

15. Quoted in Stanley A. Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), p. 275.

16. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 110.

17. Edwin S. Montagu, *An Indian Diary*, ed. Venetia Montagu (London: William Heinemann, 1930), November 26, 1916, pp. 8-10.

18. *Ibid.*, November 23, 1916, pp. 8-10.

19. *Ibid.*, November 29, 1917, p. 58.

20. Quoted, *Every Day*, p. 394.

21. Sayid, *Jinnah*, p. 150.

22. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, p. 427.

23. Budget Debate, 1917-18, *Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council*, Government of India, p. 388.

24. Raja of Mahmudabad, "Some Memories," in *The Partition of India*, ed. C. H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1970), p. 335.

25. M. K. Gandhi, *The Story of My Life*, trans. with English (Gandhi's *Autobiography*) trans. Mahadev Desai (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 539.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 541-42.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 543.

28. April 24, 1918, Sayid, *Jinnah*, p. 181.

29. Willingdon to Montagu, April 30, 1918, *Montagu Papers*, 1917-18, p. 50.

30. Chelmsford to Montagu, September 17, 1918, *Chelmsford Papers*, v. 4, Reel 2, 379.

31. Sayid, *Jinnah*, p. 184.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

33. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 75.

34. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 199-200.

35. Gandhi to Jinnah, July 4, 1918, *Syed Sa'aduddin Pirzada et al., Qauid-e-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence* 3d rev. ed. (Karachi: East and West Publishing Company, 1971), p. 82.

36. Gandhi, *My Experiments*, p. 545.

37. Gandhi to M. K. Gandhi, August 9, 1918, *Chelmsford Papers*, 20, 48.

38. Gandhi, *My Experiments*, pp. 551-54.

39. C. H. Philips, ed., *The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858 to 1947: Selected Documents* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1962), pp. 267-68.

40. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 223-25.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

43. The marble plaque inscription on the wall, Syed Hashim Raza, "The Charisma of Qauid-e-Azam," in *Papers* [IV, 11], vol. V, p. 207.

CHAPTER 5: AMRITSAR TO NAGPUR, 1919-1921

1. Mohammad Yusuf Khan, *The Glory of Qauid-e-Azam* (Lahore: Caravan Book Centre, 1976), pp. 30-31.

2. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 238-39.

3. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, p. 478.

4. Chaman Lal, "The Qauid-e-Azam As I Knew Him," in Ahmad, *Qauid-e-Azam*, p. 167.

5. Jinnah to Montagu, June 12, 1919, *Montagu Papers*, Reel 5 MSS EUR D 523/24.

6. This and the following notes from the same interview were reported in the *Bombay Chronicle*, November 17, 1919, in the *Chelmsford Papers*, Reel 2.

7. Gandhi to Jinnah, June 28, 1919, CWMG, [III, 15], vol. XV, pp. 398-99.

8. Lady Dhanavati Rama Rao's personal recollections of Ruttie who, in the 1940s in Los Angeles, March 4, 1979. Another old friend of Ruttie, Mrs. P. Jayappa, reported much the same characteristics as dominant in an interview in Los Angeles on May 15, 1981.

9. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, pp. 517-27.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 543-44.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 544.

12. John Brown, *Gandhi's Rise To Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 273.

13. Jinnah's letter dated 20-20 is reproduced in M. R. Jayakar, *The Story of My Life* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965), vol. I, p. 405.

14. Gandhi to Jinnah, October 25, 1920, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XVIII, p. 372.

15. Sayid, *Jinnah*, pp. 264-65.

16. CWMG [III, 15], vol. XIX, pp. 59-62.

17. *Time*, October 1, 1962, p. 92; Harris, *Qauid-e-Azam*, p. 28.

18. *Newsweek*, October 1, 1962, p. 129.

19. *Time*, October 1, 1962, p. 92; Harris, *Qauid-e-Azam*, p. 28.

20. *Time*, October 1, 1962, p. 92; Harris, *Qauid-e-Azam*, p. 28.

21. *Time*, October 1, 1962, p. 92; Harris, *Qauid-e-Azam*, p. 28.

22. *Time*, October 1, 1962, p. 92; Harris, *Qauid-e-Azam*, p. 28.

CHAPTER 8: RETREAT TO BOMBAY (1921-1924)

1. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 120
2. *Ibid.*
3. Saiyid Jinnah pp 269-72. The quotes that follow are from Chagla, *Roses in December* pp 275-9.
4. *Young India*, 18-8-21, in CWMG [III, 15], vol. XX, p. 527
5. Jayakar, *Story*, vol. I, p. 504.
6. "Notes" December 20, 1921 CWMG [III, 15] vol. XXII, pp 66-67
7. Pirzada *Foundations*, vol. I, p. 557
8. *Bombay Chronicle*, January 14, 1922, CWMG [III, 15] vol. XXII, p. 178.
9. *Young India*, 17-1-21, *ibid.*, p. 218.
10. *Young India*, 10-2-22 *ibid.*, pp. 418-16.
11. Jayakar, *Story*, vol. I, p. 555.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, p. 567
14. Dwarikadas, *Ruthe*, pp 24-25.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
16. Chagla, *Roses in December*, pp. 118-19
17. Raja of Mairathidand "Some Memories" p 185

CHAPTER 7: NEW DELHI (1924-1928)

1. K. M. Panikkar, A. Dethlefsen, eds. *The Voice of Freedom Selected Speeches of Pandit Motilal Nehru* London: Asia Publishing House, 1961 p. 101
2. M. Rafique Afzal, *Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah Speeches in the Legislative Assembly of India, 1924-30* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1978) p. xxi.
3. February 14, 1924 *ibid.* p. 8.
4. February 11, 1924 *ibid.* p. 5.
5. February 14, 1924 *ibid.* p. 8.
6. *Ibid.* pp 21-22
7. *Ibid.* p. 56
8. *Ibid.* p. 57
9. Pirzada *Foundations*, vol. I pp 576-77
10. *Ibid.*, p. 577
11. *Ibid.*, p. 581
12. Gandhi to Motilal Nehru, August 9, 1924 CWMG [III, 15] vol. XXIV, p. 508
13. Fattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress 1885-1935* Bombay: Padma Publications Ltd. 1937 vol. I p. 269
14. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Toward Freedom* New York: The John Day Company, 1941, pp. 105, 25.
15. Sitaramayya, *Indian National Congress*, vol. I, pp. 272-73.
16. August 31, 1924, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XXV, p. 6.
17. Dwarikadas, *Ruthe* p. 27
18. *ibid.* pp 27-28
19. *ibid.* pp 29-30. In next parts is a note.
20. April 2, 1925 *ibid.* p. 11
21. April 2, 1925 *ibid.* p. 11
22. June 1, 1925, *ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
24. December 19, 1925, Qureshi, *Every Day*, p. 394. "Plain Mr. Jinnah" is the title of vol. I of selections from *Shamshad Hasan Collection* by Syed Shamsul Hasan, secretary to the Muslim League Karachi: Royal Book Company 1978
25. Dwarikadas, *Ruthe*, p. 43.
26. *Ibid.* pp. 45-46
27. Hasan, *Collection*, p. 83.
28. Onr Clement Attlee: one of the two Labour members on the commission, strained great distinction
29. Second Earl of Birkenhead, F. E. *The Life of F. E. Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1960), p. 514.
30. July 4, 1927 National Archives of Pakistan, F. 15, 20.
31. Pirzada *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 114
32. *Ibid.*, p. 127

CHAPTER 8: CALCUTTA (1928)

1. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 94.
2. *Young India* February 2, 1918, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XXXVI, p. 15.
3. Birkenhead to Irwin, January 19, 1928, Second Earl of Birkenhead, F. E. Smith, p. 515
4. *Ibid.* p. 516.
5. Report of the Committee All Parties Conference, 1928 All-India Congress Committee, 1928 p. 21
6. Nehru to Gandhi: February 23, 1928 CWMG [III, 15] vol. XXXV, p. 58.
7. The pamphlet is in Jinnah's pamphlet, "History of the Origin of Fourteen Points" in Ashraf Saeed, *Writings of the Quaid-e-Azam* (Lahore: Progressive Books, 1978) pp. 48-49
8. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
9. Irwin to Birkenhead, March 15, 1928, IOL, MSS F18 C 152 20, in Walshed Ahmad, *Jinnah Irwin Correspondence 1927-1930* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1989), p. 9
10. Second Earl of Birkenhead, F. E. Smith, p. 519
11. Ruthe's letter was written on Taj stationery, 30-3-28. National Archives of Pakistan, 20.
12. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 400-2.
13. Lal, "Quaid-e-Azam," p. 172.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 95.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
18. All Parties Conference, p. 42.
19. Press conference, October 28, 1918, in Qureshi, *Every Day*, p. 337
20. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 413
21. Motilal Nehru to Jinnah, October 28, 1928, National Archives of Pakistan F. 15.
22. Jinnah to Motilal Nehru, November 2, 1928. Pirzada, *Quaid-e-Azam*, p. 289
23. Muhammad Asad Khattab, "My personal contacts and impressions about Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah" in *Shamshad Hasan Collection* by Syed Shamsul Hasan, secretary to the Muslim League Karachi: Royal Book Company 1978 p. 274-30
24. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 96

26. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 98.
27. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 419.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 426-27.
29. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 428-29.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 432-33.

CHAPTER 9: SIMLA (1929-1930)

1. Aga Khan, *Memoirs* [II, 26], p. 221.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
3. Dwarkadas Rastogi, p. 58.
4. Lau, "Quaid-i-Azam", pp. 172-73.
5. Dwarkadas Rastogi, p. 57.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
7. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 12.
8. March 12, 1929, Qureshi, *Every Day*, pp. 85-86.
9. Hasan, *Collection*, p. 48.
10. Though originally fifteen in number, the last two points were merged in order to limit the number to that which echoes President Wilson's famous "Fourteen Points".
11. Hasan, *Collection*, p. 48.
12. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 437-38.
13. Hasan, *Collection*, pp. 48-49.
14. Irwin to Dawson, May 20, 1929, Ahmad, *Correspondence*, p. 13.
15. Parkkari and Pershad, *Voice of Freedom*, p. 62n18.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 54n11.
17. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, pp. 450-51.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 453. The following quotes are from *ibid.*, pp. 450-59.
19. Irwin's report given at Second Fair of Furkenhead, F. E. Smith, p. 522.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 523.
21. MacDonald to Jinnah, August 14, 1929, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/5.
22. Jinnah to MacDonald, September 7, 1929, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/7.

23. Irwin to Jinnah, October 1929, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/7. The following quote is *ibid.*, p. 78.

24. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 465.

25. Gandhi to Nehru, November 8, 1929, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XLII, p. 16.

26. Minutes of that meeting taken by Sir George Cunningham, and Irwin's remarks, were mailed to Jinnah on December 27, 1929 (National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/39, from which all quotes of the meeting are taken). The mail that rocked the viceroy's train was planted and ignited by the revolutionary Yashpal, 1903-76, a leader of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Army, an autobiography, edited and translated by Crime Prince, was recently published as *Yashpal Looks Back* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981).

27. National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/54.
28. *Ibid.*, F/15, 55-58.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
30. *Ibid.*, F/15, 58-59.
31. Sitaramayya, *Indian National Congress*, vol. 6, p. 303.
32. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 466.
33. Siraj to Jinnah, January 8, 1930, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/41.
34. Siraj to Jinnah, January 10, 1930, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/41.

35. Gandhi to Irwin, May 18, 1930, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XLIII, pp. 411-16.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 416.
37. Jinnah to Irwin, June 24, 1930, Ahmad, *Correspondence*, p. 41-42.
38. July 23, 1930, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XLIV, pp. 42-43.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
40. Jinnah to Irwin, August 8, 1930, Ahmad, *Correspondence*, pp. 43-44.
41. CWMG [III, 15], vol. XLIV, p. 81.
42. Jinnah to Irwin, August 19, 1930, Ahmad, *Correspondence*, pp. 46-47.
43. Appen, III, CWMG [III, 15], vol. XLIV, pp. 470-71.
44. Jinnah to Irwin, September 9, 1930, Ahmad, *Correspondence*, p. 51.

CHAPTER 10: LONDON (1930-1933)

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2. Hailey to Irwin, November 14, 1930, Indian Office Library, London, MSS FURE 220-34.
3. K. J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 126.
4. Aga Khan, *Memoirs* [II, 26], p. 228.
5. *Indian Round Table Conference, 18 November 1930-19 January 1931* (Proceedings, 1930-31), London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1931, p. 32.
6. Vrench, *Immortal Years*, p. 133.
7. *Round Table* [X, 5], p. 148.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
10. *Round Table* [5] November 21, 1930, p. 182.
11. Hailey to Irwin, December 13, 1930, Indian Office Library, London, MSS FURE 220-34.
12. Hailey to Irwin, December 15, 1930, *ibid.*
13. MacDonald to Jinnah, December 23, 1930, India Round Table Conference, 1930-31, *MacDonald Papers*, His Majesty's Stationery Office, Kew, 30/79, 578 II.
14. *Pravda*, 1930, vol. 1, p. 159.
15. *MacDonald Papers*, Public Access Office, X 13.
16. *Kam Dwa Khaty, India's Fight for Freedom 1913-1937* (Bombay: Populair Prakashan, 1968), p. 165.
17. Ziauddin Ahmad, ed., *Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Founder of Pakistan* (Karachi: Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1976), p. 89.
18. *Round Table* [5], January 10, 1931, p. 512.
19. Simso to Dube, National Archives of Pakistan, February 26, 1931, F/15/92.
20. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 101.
21. P. C. Merville, Jinnah's private secretary, to Jinnah, March 17, 1931, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/109.
22. Sir A. P. Patro to Jinnah, March 19, 1931, *ibid.*, p. 110.
23. MacDonald to Jinnah, June 18, 1931, *ibid.*, p. 141.
24. Henderson to Jinnah, May 5, 1931, *ibid.*, p. 135.
25. Raza, "The Charisma of Quaid-i-Azam" in *Papers* [IV, 1], vol. V, p. 209.
26. Haroon to Jinnah, March 24, 1931, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/111.
27. Patro to Jinnah, March 19, 1931, *ibid.*, p. 112.
28. Jinnah to Sir A. P. Patro, March 19, 1931, National Archives of Pakistan, F/15/113.

29. *Ibid.* p. 368n1
30. Wilington to "My dear Prime Minister," May 20, 1931, *MacDonald Papers*, Public Record Office Kew 30/99/1/578 II.
31. Rushbrook-Williams, "Evolution," vol. I, p. 191.
32. "Statement of Mr. M. A. Jinnah on the Prime Minister's Declaration," National Archives of Pakistan, F/15, 163.
33. *Round Table* [5], p. 356.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 361.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 368.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 390-98.
37. Aga Khan to Jinnah, March 29, 1931, National Archives of Pakistan F/15, 117.
38. Barga Das, *India: from Curzon to Nehru and After* (London: Collins, 1969), p. 157.
39. *Round Table* [5], p. 416.
40. National Archives of Pakistan, F/15, 163-64.
41. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 103.
42. *Dus, India*, p. 154.
43. Begum Laila Ali Khan in an interview in Karachi, February 1990 at her home.
44. Balitho, *Jinnah*, p. 102.
45. K. K. Aziz, ed., *Complete Works of Rahmat Ali* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), vol. 1, p. 4.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
47. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, June 15, 1933, to the Joint Committee on the Constitution, *Reforms since 1933-34: Minutes of Evidence* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1934), vol. I, p. 4.
48. *Ibid.* vol. I, p. 496; q. 9508. *Ibid.* p. 496. The figures are from this, q. 9508, 600.
49. National Archives of Pakistan F/17.
50. Jinnah to Chittibhai, March 30, 1933, *Asana, Pakistan Movement* pp. 91-92.

CHAPTER 11: LONDON LUCKNOW (1934-1937)

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2. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 226.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
4. Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms since 1933-34, *Report Cmd. 4268*, vol. I, p. I. *London: His Majesty's Stationery Office*, 1934, p. 320.
5. Muslims were proportionate to the Central Legislative Assembly seats and the following provincial legislative allocations: Assam, 1 out of 14; Bengal, 19 out of 25; Bihar, 12 out of 22; Burma, 10 out of 15; C. P. 14 out of 112; Madras, 29 out of 210; NWFP, 38 out of 50; Punjab, 1 out of 14; Sindh, 34 out of 60; and UP, 68 out of 228.
6. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 233.
7. Hasan, *Collection*, p. 60.
8. Speech of Mr. M. A. Jinnah in the Ahmad, ed. *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (London: Ashraf, 1952), vol. I, p. 4.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6.
10. Chagla, *Roses in December*, p. 103.

11. Winston Churchill, February 11, 1935, in the House of Commons. Philips, *Evolution*, p. 318.
12. Saliyd, *Jinnah*, p. 529.
13. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, pp. 12-15.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
15. Waheed Ahmad, ed., *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1977), p. 201.
16. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 258.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 262.
18. Nehru to Subhas Chandra Bose, March 26, 1936, S. Gupta, ed., *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* (New Delhi: Orient Longmans, Ltd., 1973), vol. VII, p. 407.
19. John Clendinning, *The Congress at Bay: a critical bibliography in India, 1936-1947* (London: Collins, 1947), p. 2. The following quote is in italics, p. 25.
20. All India Muslim League Central Board, Policy and Programme, in Ahmad, *Speeches, Writings of the Quaid-e-Azam* (Lahore: Progressive Books, n.d.), p. 66.
21. Hasan, *Collection*, p. 65.
22. M. A. H. Jinnah, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah As I Know Him*, 2d ed., Karachi: Forward Publications Trust, 1990, p. 1.
23. Jinnah to Jinnah, August 9, 1936, L. H. Zaid, ed., *M. A. Jinnah—Imperial Correspondence 1915-1948* (Karachi: Forward Publishing Trust, 1976), p. 70.
24. Saeed, *Quaid-e-Azam*, pp. 80-81.
25. Aziz, *Rahmat Ali*, pp. 22-24.
26. Speech at Aachana, June 1, 1937, *Gopal, Nehru*, vol. VIII, pp. 7-8.
27. Jinnah in Calcutta, January 1937, quoted by S. R. Mehrotra, "The Congress and the Partition of India," in *Partition*, ed. Philips and Wainwright, p. 194.
28. Gopal, *Nehru*, vol. VIII, p. 119.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
31. *Dus, India*, pp. 181-82.
32. Nehru, March 23, 1937, quoted by Z. H. Zaid, "Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-47," in *Partition*, ed. Philips and Wainwright, p. 256.
33. Dwarka Das, *India's Fight*, p. 367.
34. *Dus, India*, p. 182.
35. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore: Pakistan Longmans, 1961), p. 161.
36. Dwarka Das, *India's Fight*, pp. 368-67. The following quote is in italics.
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38. Interview with Mr. Jinnah in his London home, summer of 1978.
39. Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, "Quaid-e-Azam in Kashmir," *Papers* [IV, 1], vol. I, p. 84.
40. Ahmad, *Gleanings*, p. 11.
41. Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway*, p. 170.
42. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, pp. 265-73.

CHAPTER 12: TOWARD A LIAISON (1938-1949)

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66. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 105.
67. John Morley, *On Compromise* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1921), p. 56.
68. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 110.
69. Ibid., pp. 110-11.
70. December 8, 1939, CWMG [III, 15], vol. LXXI, p. 16.
71. Nehru to Jinnah, December 9, 1939, Pirzada, *Quaid-e-Azam*, p. 271.
72. Bombay Standard, December 9, 1939, quoted by M. A. B. Ispahani, "Non-Muslim Reaction" in *Reminiscences of The Day of Deliverance* (Islamabad: National Commission for Birth Centenary Celebrations of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 1976), p. 13.
73. Ispahani to Jinnah, December 12, 1939, *Zaidi Correspondence*, pp. 132-33.
74. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 112. The next six quotes are all from ibid., pp. 113-17.
75. Gandhi to Nehru, December 28, 1939, CWMG [III, 15], vol. LXXI, p. 65.
76. Moore, *Churchill*, p. 9. The following quote is from ibid., p. 13.
77. *Claude L. Latham*, p. 146.
78. January 10, 1940, append. II, CWMG [III, 15], vol. LXXI, pp. 433-35.
79. "Constitutional Matters of India," in Gopal, *Nehru*, vol. I, pp. 128-9.
80. Jinnah, "My Brother"
81. Glendevon, *Lithgow*, p. 194.
82. M. M. Shafi, "The Historic League Session," in Ahmad, *Quaid-e-Azam*, pp. 124-25.
83. Ibid., p. 125.
84. Ibid., p. 126.
85. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 128.
86. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 327.
87. Ibid., pp. 327-30.
88. Ibid., pp. 332-33.
89. Ibid., p. 337.
90. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, pp. 335-37. All of the following quotes at the end of this chapter are from ibid., pp. 337-39.

CHAPTER 13: LAHORE TO DELHI (1940-1942)

1. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 340.
2. Ibid., p. 341.
3. Glendevon, *Lithgow*, p. 167.
4. April 10, 1940, CWMG [III, 15], vol. LXXI, pp. 38-39.
5. Parthasarathy, *The Hindu*, p. 543.
6. Nehru to Krishna Menon, April 12, 1940, Gopal, *Nehru*, vol. XI, p. 19.
7. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 38.
8. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 182.
9. Lithgow to Jinnah, April 19, 1940, Pirzada, *Quaid-e-Azam*, p. 201.
10. Parthasarathy, *The Hindu*, p. 534.
11. May 26, 1940, CWMG [III, 15], vol. LXXI, pp. 41-42.
12. Pirzada, *Quaid-e-Azam*, p. 202.
13. Ibid., p. 203.
14. Jinnah to Liaquat Ali Khan, July 1, 1940, ibid., p. 204. The following quote is from ibid., p. 207-8.
15. July 2, 1940, CWMG [III, 15], vol. LXXI, pp. 229-31.
16. Tej Bahadur Sapru et al., *Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee* (Bombay: Padmar Publications, 1945), September 2, 1940, p. 47.
17. Glendevon, *Lithgow*, p. 184. The following quotes are from ibid.
18. October 24, 1941, Gopal, *Nehru*, vol. XI, p. 193n3.
19. Kanji Dwarkadas, *Ten Years to Freedom* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1965), p. 55.
20. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 234.
21. Ibid., p. 265.
22. Shah Nawaz Khan, "What is Pakistan?" National Archives of Pakistan, 1949, pp. 18ff.
23. Jinnah, "My Brother"
24. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 359.
25. Ibid., pp. 360-61.
26. Ibid., pp. 368-70.
27. Ibid., p. 371.
28. Jinnah, "My Brother"
29. Letters to Jinnah, Jan. 20, 1941, Pirzada, *Quaid-e-Azam*, pp. 215-16.
30. September 5, 1941, *Lithgow*, *Correspondence*, append. III, pp. 650-51.
31. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 341.
32. November 13, 1941, Glendevon, *Lithgow*, p. 210.
33. December 2, 1941, ibid., p. 212.
34. December 28, 1941, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 348.
35. Liaquat Ali Jinnah, December 3, 1941, *Lithgow*, *Correspondence*, p. 220.
36. December 20, 1941, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 354.
37. Liaquat Ali Jinnah, January 13, 1942, *Lithgow*, *Correspondence*, p. 220.
38. *India Wins Freedom*, 1942 - London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970, vol. I, pp. 25-26.
39. January 21, 1942, ibid., p. 48.
40. January 24, 1942, ibid., p. 75.
41. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 368.
42. February 15, 1942, ibid., pp. 370-71.
43. February 21, 1942, *Maniagh, Transfer of Power*, vol. I, p. 218.
44. Note by Major General Lockhart, India Office, January 25, 1942, ibid., pp. 218-30.
45. Ibid., p. 240.
46. Quoted by "Former Naval Person" (Churchill) to Roosevelt, March 4, 1942, ibid., p. 310.
47. March 10, 1942, ibid., p. 365.
48. Ibid., pp. 406-7.
49. March 23, 1942, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 400. The following quotes are from ibid., pp. 411-2.
50. Ibid., pp. 412-2.
51. March 25, 1942, *Maniagh, Transfer of Power*, vol. I, p. 479.
52. Ibid., pp. 480-81.
53. Ibid., p. 484.
54. March 27, 1942, ibid., p. 500.
55. Ibid., p. 530.
56. A. D. E. Owen's statement, quoted in Moore, *Churchill*, p. 82.
57. "And the end of the fight is a tombstone white, with the bones of the dead deceased, And the equipage wear. A fool lies here who tried to live in the East." Rudyard Kipling

- 57 March 19, 1942. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. I, p. 445.
 58 Begun to Luthgow April 2, 1942, *ibid.* p. 619.
 59 April 4-6, 1942. Firzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, pp. 383-84.
 60 April 9, 1942. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. I, p. 704.
 61 April 1, 1942, *ibid.* pp. 779-80.
 62 April 13, 1942. Ali, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, pp. 4, 15-19.
 63 April 13, 1942. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. I, p. 743.
 64 Roosevelt to Luthgow for Churchill April 12, 1942, Moore, *Churchill*, p. 130.
 65 April 11, 1942. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. I, pp. 748-50.

CHAPTER 14: DAWN IN DELHI (1942-1943)

- 1 April 11, 1942. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. I, pp. 787-88.
 2 Clancy to Luthgow, April 14, 1942, *ibid.*, pp. 772-73.
 3 April 16, 1942, *ibid.* pp. 788-90.
 4 *Ibid.* p. 818.
 5 *Ibid.* p. 842.
 6 April 24, 1942. CWMG (II, 15), vol. LXXVI, pp. 63-65.
 7 Luthgow to Amery April 24, 1942.
 8 *Ibid.* p. 87.
 9 June 1, 1942, *ibid.* p. 23.
 10 Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, pp. 422-24.
 11 Ali, *In a Congress Committee*, August 1942, CWMG (III, 15), vol. LXXVII, pp. 377-81.
 12 *Ibid.*
 13 Clancy to Luthgow July 17, 1942. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. II, p. 404.
 14 August 8, 1942. CWMG (II, 15), vol. LXXVI, p. 382.
 15 *Ibid.* 1942. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, pp. 132-33.
 16 August 8, 1942. CWMG (III, 15), vol. LXXVI, pp. 79-82.
 17 *Ibid.* p. 403.
 18 Firzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, pp. 395-98.
 19 Luthgow to Amery August 12, 1942. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. II, p. 668.
 20 *Ibid.* p. 708.
 21 Luthgow to Amery August 15, 1942, *ibid.* pp. 708-9.
 22 August 17, 1942, *ibid.* pp. 740-41.
 23 Asrar to Luthgow August 17, 1942, *ibid.* p. 749.
 24 August 24, 1942, *ibid.* pp. 810-11.
 25 Halifax to Eden, August 26, 1942, *ibid.* p. 830.
 26 Luthgow to Churchill August 27, 1942, *ibid.* pp. 853-54.
 27 September 1, 1942, *ibid.* p. 877.
 28 *Ibid.* pp. 874-75.
 29 September 5, 1942, *ibid.* p. 908.
 30 September 13, 1942. Ali, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, pp. 449ff.
 31 Halifax to Eden, September 16, 1942. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. II, p. 970.
 32 Churchill to Amery, September 16, 1942. Ali, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, pp. 450-51.
 33 Churchill to Luthgow, September 16, 1942, *ibid.* p. 451.
 34 Ali, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, pp. 450-51.
 35 November 9, 1942. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 494.

- 36 November 13, 1942. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. III, p. 243.
 37 Luthgow to Amery November 16, 1942, *ibid.* p. 266.
 38 Annex to No. 187. Report by a Reliable Informant, *ibid.* pp. 288-70.
 39 Amery to Luthgow November 17, 1942, *ibid.* pp. 278-79.
 40 Isphahani to Jinnah, December 17 and 28, 1942. Zaidi, *Correspondence*, I, 233-34.
 41 Gandhi to Luthgow, January 19, 1943. CWMG (III, 15), vol. LXXVII, pp. 55-58.
 42 Luthgow to Amery, February 2, 1943. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. II, p. 570.
 43 Amery to Luthgow, February 8, 1943, *ibid.* p. 617.
 44 *Ibid.* pp. 631-32.
 45 Gandhi to Sir Richard Tottenham, February 8, 1943, CWMG (III, 15), vol. LXXVII, p. 61.
 46 Luthgow to Amery, February 15, 1943, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. II, pp. 667-68.
 47 February 16, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 670.
 48 *Times of India*, February 16, 1943, *ibid.*
 49 Luthgow to Amery, February 17, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 683.
 50 February 18, 1943, *ibid.*, pp. 684-85.
 51 CWMG (III, 15), vol. LXXVII, p. 69n1.
 52 Churchill to Luthgow, February 25, 1943. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. II, p. 730.
 53 Luthgow to Luthgow, March 4, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 760.
 54 Haq to Jinnah, February 5, 1943. Pirzada, *Quaid-e-Azam*, pp. 79-80.
 55 Jinnah to Haq, February 10, 1943, *ibid.* p. 81.
 56 Isphahani's note of their telephone conversation, March 17, 1943. Zaidi, *Correspondence*, p. 328.
 57 Isphahani to Jinnah, March 26, 1943, *ibid.* p. 334.
 58 *Ibid.*
 59 Firzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 399.
 60 *Ibid.* p. 407.
 61 *Ibid.* p. 420.
 62 "Strictly Secret Note" on the proceedings at Delhi, April 24-6, 1943. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. III, pp. 918-20.
 63 *Ibid.* p. 922.
 64 Firzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 422.

CHAPTER 15: KARACHI AND BOMBAY REVISITED 1943-1944

- Gandhi to Jinnah, May 4, 1943. CWMG (III, 15), vol. LXXVII, p. 75.
 1 Luthgow to Amery, May 8, 1943. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. III, p. 95.
 2 Amery to Luthgow, May 9, 1943, *ibid.* p. 955.
 3 Amery to Luthgow, May 19, 1943, *ibid.* p. 996.
 4 Amery to Luthgow, May 24, 1943, *ibid.* p. 1004.
 5 Amery to Luthgow, May 29, 1943, *ibid.* pp. 1025-28.
 6 Luthgow to Amery, June 6, 1943, *ibid.* p. 1045.
 7 June 10, 1943, *ibid.* p. 1053.
 8 Luthgow's marginal note in *ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 36.
 9 Ali, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, *The Viceroy's Journal* (Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1943), p. 1.
 10 *Ibid.*, p. 1.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
 13. July 3 1943. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. I, p. 587. The following quote is from *ibid.*, p. 568.
 14. *Ibid.* pp. 570-71.
 15. Herbert to Luthitigow July 5, 1943. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. IV pp. 44-45.
 16. A. A. Prerthoy *Hinnah Faces An Anasim* (Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1943), mal. transl., pt. pp. 60-61.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
 18. J. Sub to Asghar, August 3, 1943. Zaidi, *Correspondence*, p. 385.
 19. J. Sub to Asghar, August 3, 1943. Zaidi, *Correspondence*, p. 385.
 20. September 5, 1943. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. IV, p. 204. The following quote is from *ibid.*, p. 206.
 21. G. W. to Luthitigow, September 16, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 260.
 22. Asghar to J. Sub, September 8, 1943. Zaidi, *Correspondence*, pp. 373-4.
 23. October 3, 1943. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches* vol. II, p. 3.
 24. November 5, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 4.
 25. November 8, 1943, *ibid.*, pp. 6-10.
 26. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, p. 461.
 27. *Ibid.* pp. 450-51.
 28. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 31. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 37. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 38. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 39. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 40. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 41. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 42. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 43. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 44. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 45. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 46. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 47. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 48. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 49. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 50. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 51. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 52. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 53. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 54. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 55. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 56. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 57. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 58. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 59. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 60. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 61. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 62. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 63. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 64. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 65. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 66. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 67. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 68. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 69. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 70. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 71. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 72. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 73. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 74. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 75. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 76. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 77. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 78. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 79. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 80. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 81. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 82. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 83. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 84. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 85. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 86. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 87. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 88. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 89. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 90. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 91. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 92. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 93. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 94. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 95. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 96. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 97. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 98. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 99. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
 100. *Ibid.*, p. 466.

58. *Ibid.* pp. 101-3.
 59. September 22, 1944 CWMG [III 15], vol. LXXXV II, p. 122.
 60. "The M. L. and He. T. Nations," *Aziz, Bahman Ali*, vol. I, pp. 149-60.
 61. *Janab to Gandhi*, September 23, 1944, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 194.
 62. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
 63. *Janab to Gandhi*, September 25, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 198-201.
 64. *ibid.*, pp. 204-5.
 65. September 25, 1944 CWMG [I 15], vol. LXXXV II, pp. 130-31.
 66. *Janab to Gandhi*, September 26, 1944, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 207.
 67. September 26, 1944 CWMG [III 15], vol. LXXXV II, pp. 131-32.
 68. Wavell to Amery, September 27, 1944, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. V, p. 47.
 69. September 27, 1944 CWMG [III 15], vol. LXXXV II, p. 131.
 70. September 28, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 136-37.
 71. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
 72. September 29, 1944, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. V, pp. 56-57.

CHAPTER 16: SMIA, 1944-1945

1. Wavell to Amery, October 3, 1944, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. V, p. 75.
 2. *Ibid.*
 3. Amery to Wavell, October 10, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 96.
 4. Wavell to Amery, November 29, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 252.
 5. December 6, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 279-80.
 6. Casey to Wavell, December 17, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 308.
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 309. The following quote is from *ibid.*
 8. Wavell to Casey, January 1, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 345.
 9. December 27, 1944, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 345.
 10. January 1, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 347.
 11. January 14, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 350.
 12. Wavell, *ibid.*, p. 353.
 13. *Janab to J. K. Qasim*, March 25, 1945, *Hanan Collection*, vol. III, p. P.
 14. Wavell to Amery, January 14, 1945, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. V, p. 100.
 15. Enclosure no. 202, January 27, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 408, and pp. 411-12.
 16. January 19, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 423.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 473.
 18. V. P. Menon's report of dinner with Desai and Jenkins, January 27, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 476.
 19. Casey to Wavell, March 1, 1945, *ibid.*, pp. 637-42.
 20. Wavell to Amery, March 20, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 712.
 21. *Janab to T. A. S.*, December 18, 1944, *Hanan Collection*, vol. I, NWFP.
 22. March 23, 1945, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 361.
 23. *Ibid.*, pp. 360-62.
 24. March 25, 1945, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. V, p. 733.
 25. March 26, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 735.
 26. *Ibid.*, pp. 739-40.
 27. May 11, 1945, Wavell, *ibid.*, p. 829.
 28. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. V, p. 1078.
 29. June 4, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 1102.

30. Wavell to Amery June 15, 1945. *ibid.*, pp. 1126-27
 31. Joe 16, 1945. Moon, Wavell, p. 142
 32. June 24, 1945. *ibid.*, pp. 144-45
 33. *ibid.*, p. 146. The following quote is from *ibid.* pp. 146-47
 34. Wavell to Amery June 25, 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI pp. 1135-36. The following quotes are from *ibid.* pp. 1156-57
 35. July 9, 1945. Moon, Wavell, pp. 152-53
 36. Wavell to Jinnah July 9, 1945. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, pp. 502. The following quote is from *ibid.* p. 503.
 37. *ibid.* p. 503.
 38. Amery to Wavell July 10, 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI p. 1224
 39. July 11, 1945, Moon, Wavell, p. 154
 40. *ibid.*
 41. July 14, 1945. *ibid.* p. 155
 42. Wavell to Amery, July 15, 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI p. 1262
 43. July 12, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 1237. The following quote is from *ibid.*
 44. August 6, 1945, Moon, Wavell, p. 181

CHAPTER 17 Q. UETTA AND PESHAWAR (1945-1946)

1. August 1, 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI, p. 6.
 2. August 2, 1945. *ibid.*, pp. 22-23. The following quote is from *ibid.*
 3. August 6, 1945. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 387. The following quote is from *ibid.*
 4. *ibid.* pp. 390-91
 5. Pethick Lawrence to Wavell August 11, 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI p. 37. The following quote is from *ibid.* p. 68.
 6. Wavell to Pethick Lawrence August 12, 1945. *ibid.* p. 50.
 7. Clarity to Wavell August 6, 1945. *ibid.* pp. 1-2
 8. Wavell to Pethick Lawrence August 21, 1945. *ibid.* p. 113. The following quote is from *ibid.*
 9. Cabinet minutes, August 29, 1945. *ibid.* pp. 174-75
 10. August 31, 1945, Moon, Wavell, p. 168.
 11. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 411
 12. Wavell to Pethick Lawrence, October 16, 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VI p. 348
 13. October 27, 1945. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches* vol. II pp. 423-24
 14. November 1, 1945. *ibid.* pp. 428-29
 15. Pethick Lawrence to Wavell, November 8, 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI p. 463
 16. Cabinet minutes, November 9, 1945. *ibid.* p. 501
 17. Wavell to Pethick Lawrence, November 23, 1945. *ibid.* p. 524
 18. November 24, 1945. *ibid.* pp. 531-34
 19. "Secret" intelligence Bureau enclosure, November 20, 1945. *ibid.* p. 534
 20. November 24, 1945. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 438-39
 21. *ibid.*, pp. 440-43
 22. Carry to Wavell, December 2, 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI, p. 589.
 23. December 3, 1945. *ibid.* pp. 590-91
 24. December speech to Punjab MLCs. Sumit, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches* vol. II p. 461.

25. December 21, 1945. *ibid.* p. 584
 26. Pethick Lawrence to Jinnah, December 21, 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VI, pp. 672-73.
 27. February 2, 1946. Moon, Wavell, p. 211
 28. January 24, 1946. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VI p. 948
 29. *ibid.* pp. 948-50
 30. January 13, 1946. *ibid.* pp. 951-55
 31. Wavell to Pethick Lawrence, February 13, 1946. *ibid.*, pp. 967-68.
 32. February 18, 1946. *ibid.* p. 1006
 33. February 22, 1946. *ibid.*, p. 1048.
 34. March 23, 1946. *ibid.*, vol. VII, p. 1.
 35. Note by Wyatt, March 28, 1946. *ibid.*, pp. 22-24
 36. Note by Cripps, March 1946. *ibid.* pp. 50-60
 37. April 3, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 236
 38. Secretary's report of Gandhi interview, April 3, 1946. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VII, p. 1-18
 39. April 4, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 237
 40. April 4, 1946. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, pp. 119-21. Following quote is from *ibid.*
 41. Secretary's note by Duckworth, April 4, 1946. *ibid.*, p. 138
 42. Secretary's note by Cripps. *ibid.* p. 176
 43. *ibid.* p. 179
 44. *ibid.* p. 184
 45. July 1, 1946. Moon, Wavell, p. 246
 46. April 16, 1946. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, pp. 283-84. Following quotes are from *ibid.*

CHAPTER 18 SIMLA REVISITED 946

1. April 9, 1946. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. I, pp. 522-23.
 2. *ibid.* p. 523
 3. *ibid.* pp. 514-15
 4. *ibid.* pp. 516-20
 5. *ibid.* pp. 523-24
 6. Record of meeting, April 25, 1946. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 1
 7. April 25, 1946. Moon, Wavell, p. 252
 8. April 26, 1946. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VII p. 342
 9. April 26, 1946. *ibid.* p. 343
 10. May 1, 1946. *ibid.* p. 355. Following quote is from *ibid.* p. 258.
 11. May 6, 1946. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VII p. 437
 12. May 6, 1946. *ibid.* p. 438
 13. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VII p. 440.
 14. May 6, 1946. Moon, Wavell, p. 260
 15. *ibid.*
 16. May 1945. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VII, p. 452.
 17. May 7, 1945, Moon, Wavell, p. 261.
 18. May 1946. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power* vol. VII pp. 462-63.
 19. *ibid.* p. 463
 20. *ibid.* p. 464
 21. February 1, 1946. Moon, Wavell, p. 240
 22. May 1, 1946. Moon, Wavell, p. 240

33. Nehru to Jinnah, May 10, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 502.
34. May 11, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 507.
35. May 13, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 267. Following quote is from *ibid.* p. 268.
36. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 591.
37. *Harijan*, May 17, 1946, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 615.
38. Record of meeting, May 18, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 616.
39. Note by George Abell, May 18, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 619.
40. Record of meeting, May 19, 1946, 11:00 A.M., *ibid.*, p. 623.
41. May 19, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 273.
42. May 19, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 622.
43. Moon, Wavell, p. 273.
44. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 634.
45. Gandhi to Pethick-Lawrence, May 20, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 636-37.
46. *ibid.*, p. 638.
47. May 20, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 644.
48. *ibid.*, p. 635.
49. Record of meeting, May 24, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 673-78.
50. Note by Wyatt, May 25, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 684.
51. *ibid.*, pp. 685-86.
52. *ibid.*, pp. 686-87 (Italics in original).
53. May 26, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 705-6.
54. June 3, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 285-86.
55. Note by Intelligence Bureau, June 5, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, pp. 619-20.
56. June 6, 1946, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 402-4.
57. *ibid.*, p. 406.
58. June 8, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 286.
59. June 7, 1946, *ibid.*
60. Wavell's Note of interview with Jinnah, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 639.
61. June 11, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 290.
62. Record of meeting, June 11, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 693a2.
63. June 12, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 290.
64. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, pp. 666-67; see heading and *has* note, p. 867.
65. *ibid.*, p. 867.
66. *ibid.*, p. 868. This was clearly Jinnah's position from the start and Wavell's account of it is jumbled and inaccurate, where he first notes (June 11, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 290) that "Cripps has spent several hours with Jinnah last night and said that he had agreed to this." (By "this" was meant a meeting with Nehru.) The viceroy later wrote in his journal (Moon, Wavell, p. 292): "At 3:40 P.M., when I was due to see Nehru and Jinnah at 4 P.M., Cripps came in and told me that Jinnah would not come; he had written a letter earlier in the day that he did not feel he could meet Nehru, unless the parity basis was conceded. With so much changing every hour those days, Wavell obviously found it impossible to keep clear in his mind the exact sequence of events, even with daily notes.
67. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 806.
68. *ibid.*, p. 887.
69. *ibid.*

70. June 13, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 292.
71. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 910.
72. Moon, Wavell, p. 314.
73. June 14, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, pp. 931-33.
74. Moon, Wavell, p. 324.
75. *ibid.*, p. 326.
76. Record of meeting, June 21, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VII, p. 906. Following quotes are from *ibid.*, pp. 996-97.
77. June 23, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 1012-13. Following quote is *ibid.*, p. 1014.
78. *ibid.*, p. 1017. Following quotes are *ibid.*, pp. 1017-18.
79. *ibid.*, p. 1037.
80. Note by viceroy, June 25, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 1039.
81. *ibid.*, pp. 1044-47.
82. June 25, 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 366.

CHAPTER 19: BOMBAY TO LONDON (1946)

1. July 23, 1946, Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 407.
2. *ibid.*, pp. 408-11.
3. Pirzada, *Foundations*, vol. II, pp. 548-49.
4. *ibid.*, pp. 548-49. Following quotes are from *ibid.*
5. *ibid.*, p. 551. Following quotes are *ibid.*, pp. 551-52.
6. *ibid.*, pp. 557-58.
7. *ibid.*, p. 560.
8. Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 162.
9. Minute by Scott, August 1, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 174.
10. Wavell's minute, *ibid.*, p. 175.
11. *ibid.*, p. 188.
12. Nehru to Jinnah, August 13, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 339.
13. Jinnah to Nehru, *ibid.*
14. August 18, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 348.
15. Burrows to Wavell, August 16, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 339.
16. Francis Toker, *While Memory Serves* (London: Cusell, 1950), p. 158.
17. *ibid.*, append. V, pp. 597-98.
18. *ibid.*, pp. 160-61.
19. *ibid.*, append. V, pp. 599-600.
20. *ibid.*, pp. 601-3.
21. Margaret Bourke-White, *Halfway To Freedom* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949), p. 23.
22. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, August 21, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 274.
23. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 433.
24. August 24, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 307.
25. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, p. 444.
26. August 25, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 322.
27. *ibid.*, p. 323.
28. *ibid.*, p. 332. The following quote is *ibid.*, p. 334.
29. August 29, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 344.
30. Ahmad, *Recent Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 443-25.
31. A. P. Le Mesurier's report, September 2, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, p. 385.

32. Nehru's broadcast, September 7, 1946, in Dorothy Norman, ed., *Nehru: The First Sixty Years* (London: The Bodley Head, 1965), vol. II, pp. 248-51.
33. September 8, 1946, Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, vol. VIII, pp. 455-59.
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4. Jenkins to Pethick-Lawrence, January 28, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 537.
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17. *ibid.*, p. 832.
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27. Baldev Singh to Wavell, March 11, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 914-16.
28. Cabinet meeting, March 13, 1947, 5:15 P.M., *ibid.*, p. 940.

29. Krishna Menon to Mountbatten, March 13, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 948-49.
30. Jenkins to Abell, March 17, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 962.
31. *ibid.*, pp. 967-69.
32. Attlee to Mountbatten, March 18, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 972-74.
33. Minutes of meeting, March 22, 1947, 10:30 p.m., *ibid.*, pp. 1011-12.
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61. Mountbatten to Ismay, May 10, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 776.
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13. *ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
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